... into account such desires in the very last place. The dramatic fate of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) after the Cold War is a great illustration. The Western countries were immediately able to act within the framework of this ... ... with a consolidated position, which excluded even minor manifestations of justice in relation to the basic interests of others: Russia, Kazakhstan or smaller states outside the European Union and NATO.
The fact that only Russia actively opposed it is connected solely with its own capabilities and ambitions. Small countries ...
... intensified the shelling of the separatists’ positions, which returned fire. Who has been doing what is clearly obvious from the OSCE Monitoring Mission maps (for example, for 17-19 February). What was also very strange that the US and UK called off their ... ... Minsk 2; and the rest – to recognise the two republics immediately.
The recognition of the two republics was seen by many in Russia as the least forceful from the rest of the toolkit to make the US and NATO to be more receptive to Russia's demands. This was the recognition of the fact that Kiev would never implement Minsk 2. Also ...
... legitimate security interests of other States.
Discussing the present situation in Europe, our colleagues from the United States, NATO and the European Union make constant appeals for ‘de-escalation’ and call on Russia to ‘choose a path of diplomacy’. We want to remind: we have been moving along that path for decades. The key milestones,... ... diplomacy. The very fact that the West now tries to revise to its benefit these diplomatic achievements of the leaders of all OSCE countries raises serious concern. The situation demands a frank clarification of positions.
We want to receive a clear answer ...
... member-states.
On September 23, 2021, after a summer break, Russia-NATO International Expert Dialogue resumed its work with a regular online meeting bringing together experts, former diplomats and military, public leaders from Russia, the USA, and European NATO member-states.
The organizers of the dialog on the Russian side included RAS Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies and RAS Institute of Europe. The first meeting focused on the role of the OSCE in the field of arms control and confidence-building measures in Europe. Keynote speech was made by Ambassador Thomas Greminger, former OSCE Secretary General. The discussion was moderated by Sergey Rogov, Academic Director of RAS Institute for the ...
... and somewhat challenging. The country is in the zone of interest of the USA and the Russian Federation, as well as Europe. This makes it a point of contention between powerful... ... international institutions, such as Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), etc. In this article, I aim to look at the global structure and the roots of... ... revolution. Institutionally, this path implies the country’s aspiration to join the EU and NATO. Recent amendments to the Ukrainian constitution legitimize this drive.
The European...
... years (Tashkent has even managed to leave the CSTO on two separate occasions, once in 1999 and again in 2012).
The idea that Russia could block the accession of former Soviet republics to NATO entirely by using the candidate requirements formulated at the 1999 Washington summit has gained widespread popularity in ... ... international disputes, as well as any ethnic, territorial and political conflicts in which they are involved, in accordance with OSCE principles. Stoking the flames of smouldering territorial or other conflicts in neighbouring states could, in theory, block ...
Interview with one of the co-authors of the OSCE Report “Reducing the Risks of Conventional Deterrence in Europe”
On October 24, 2019, the Russian International Affairs Council held a breakfast lecture on the topic “
Arms Control: Will Russia and NATO Reach a Deal?
” timed to the release of the OSCE Report “
Reducing the Risks of Conventional Deterrence in Europe
”. In an interview following his speech, Colonel (GS) Wolfgang Richter, one of the co-authors, discussed the art of conflict de-escalation, the changing nature of arms control and ...
... of the 2016 Steinmeier initiative, are focusing so much on CAC than on the issue itself. And finally, in the framework of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, a group of authors from Germany, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, and the US presented a concrete
proposal
for sub-regional arms control in the Baltic region — “Reducing the Risks of Conventional Deterrence. Arms Control in the NATO-Russia Contact Zones”.
There are many, to some extent, reasonable arguments questioning new efforts for CAC. The Conventional ...
... rearranged to transfer our forces and assets to our borders. The destructive military activity of the alliance is accompanied by a line for scrapping the cornerstone agreements in the field of security - the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty, and the Founding NATO-Russia Act, the START Treaty are destroyed.
The OSCE potential, which we considered as a core role in building a “common European home,” still cannot reach its “design capacity” due to the unhealthy atmosphere established in the Euro-Atlantic region. One of the few remaining confidence-building ...
... is only a bit more than half of what it was before 2014, it is still important, particularly in the energy sector. Security matters will have to take a back seat: Europeans cannot decide alone on the issues that fall within NATO’s competence. The OSCE is essentially irrelevant, and the Russia-NATO communications line is but an add-on to the US-Russian one. Yet, a few EU member states, including France, Germany and Italy, prefer to keep open their channels of political dialogue with Moscow. Despite the likely termination of Russia’s membership ...
