... prospects of developing Arctic hydrocarbon resources and the Northern Sea Route became the top priority, while in the mid-2010s, those issues were partially eclipsed by Moscow’s new confrontation with Washington and a sharp decline in relations with its NATO allies.
China is thousands of miles away from the Arctic, so its interests in the region differ widely from those of Russia. They primarily stem from China’s position as one of the two leading global powers of the twenty-first century, and, on a more formal ...
... Karabakh settlement, but will still be locked in a bitter confrontation over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Iran and Turkey will play their own parts without joining either the Russian or the Western sides, although Ankara will formally remain a NATO member. China will step up its economic presence, although, in the near future, the Caucasus will not become Beijing’s political priority comparable to Central Asia.
...
sceptical
to that advice. Ceteris paribus, the difference of expenditures could have been mitigated by a joint position of NATO states on other more pressing issues; however, it seems that internal discontent over U.S. position is on its rise.
If one ... ... United States is very inconsistent in its policies towards North Korea, the Middle East (predominantly Syria, Turkey and Iran), China, Venezuela, and Ukraine. And this inconsistency doesn’t seem to be a part of a grand strategy defined within the laws ...
... social values.
The fundamental error of Russian foreign policy since the mid-1990s has been the fixation on the problem of NATO expansion.
The basis of this cooperation was the European idea of bringing Russia into ever-closer alignment with European ... ... economic might and international ambitions are growing rapidly, is falling further and further behind the level of interaction with China. In combination with the significant weakening of relations with the EU, this creates a threat to Russia’s geopolitical ...
... treated as such. And it has been since the days of the Cold War. As proof of this, we can point to the nature of joint exercises and exchanges of military delegations; intelligence cooperation; military-technical policies; and Sweden’s participation in NATO missions abroad.
Russia and China already have a document in place that, in extremely vague terms, describes possible military cooperation in the event of a threat to the security of one of the parties.
We are talking about the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation ...
... the effect that the Ukrainian and Syrian crises would produce a negative effect on other regions, including the Arctic, where various powers would step up their struggle for control over natural resources, and that the military confrontation between NATO and Russia would expand, did not come true either. The forecasts of China’s expansion in the Arctic under the slogan of developing the “Polar Silk Road” initiative, part of the larger “One Belt One Road,” also came to naught. Beijing was quite constructive and demonstrated in every possible way its respect for ...
... and no rise of right-wing populism. That world order had no transatlantic fault or split, no comparable economic dominance by China, no return to international protectionism, and no Arab Spring with its tragic consequences.
Bref
, that European order ... ... to wit, that for a quarter-century Russia has not been able to insert itself adequately into the European (EU) and Atlantic (NATO) structures as a full participant or equal partner. One can debate who bears responsibility for this failure, but the fact ...
... two countries’ current and, more importantly, potential losses from America’s protectionist stance far exceed the losses of all the other US trading partners combined. In addition, Washington has a serious political axe to grind with Germany and China. Berlin is being chided for its “insufficient contribution” to the NATO budget and its unswerving commitment to the Nord Stream II gas pipeline, whereas Beijing is suspected of “hegemonic aspirations” in the Asia-Pacific and of its attempted “expansion” into the Indian Ocean.
If talking common sense, Chancellor ...
... legitimate and most effective military-political alliance of the 21st century. He also called on the NATO countries to increase their defense spending to 5 percent of their respective GNPs and to reintroduce a universal draft in its member-states.
Russia and China refused to recognize NATO’s legitimacy as a peacekeeping organization, and even less so to take part in operations under its leadership. By September 15, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping established a bilateral military-political alliance....
... race? Should the INF treaty and other treaties be updated or expanded to include other states, such as the European states and China?
Washington is also in the process of modernizing its tactical nuclear weapons systems, such as the B-61-12, in part by ... ... weapons altogether, would it be possible to engage in deeper reductions and international inspections?
What if there was a mutual NATO-Russia agreement of "no first use" of nuclear weaponry or other forms of weapons of mass destruction? Could this ...
