... is no time and no political will around to put together a regional collective security system, one should at least think about a regional crisis management mechanism involving Iran and key neighboring Arab starts. Concerned overseas powers – like Russia, China, India, and EU – could assist in building this mechanism working with their respective regional partners. We should regard the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani as a wakeup call, not as a trumpet of the approaching Armageddon.
First published ...
... better position to advance its interests in its extended neighbourhood which, as an observer, it was unable to do so.
Today, India is also in a unique position to leverage the contradictions in great power rivalry. It is the only country within the Russia-India-China triangle which has a fairly positive relationship with the U.S. While this could be a challenge for New Delhi in SCO, particularly if the organisation morphs into an anti-U.S. grouping, yet the opportunity could be to leverage better ties with each ...
... sanctioned objects in the mirror are closer than they appear.” In other words, China may also be a subject to sanctions at one point partially or fully.
Tristan Kenderdine:
US–Iran Conflict Would Strengthen China’s Position in the Middle East
China, Russia, India, Brazil, and South Africa are the founding members of the
New Development Bank
. NDB’s 2017–2021 general strategy clearly highlights the bank’s commitment and intention to be new in three areas: 1) new relationships; 2) new projects and instruments; ...
The Indian authorities striving to reduce the country’s dependence on tools developed ... ... obvious reasons, was not conducive to strengthening cyber protection. Since Pakistan and China were traditionally considered to be India’s principal adversaries on the cyber... ... secret services continue to conduct cyber ops that threaten India’s national security.
Russia is one of the few great powers that has interests in the region and does not...
... Russia–India–China actions would give an impetus to reviving the RIC trilateral format.
Clearly, details of the patrolling operation need to be discussed and coordinated with coastal states. It is necessary at all costs to avoid giving the impression that the India–China–Russia initiative is aimed against any party in the confrontation in the strait (be it the Arab Gulf monarchies or the Islamic Republic of Iran). Particular sensitivity and attention to detail will be required in consultations with Tehran: Iran is particularly ...
... India’s role in regional and global affairs, which is the object of the country’s progressively growing desire. These developments also open new opportunities for broad cooperation within BRICS and the consultative mechanism of three SCO members — Russia, India, and China (known as RIC). The next RIC meeting is scheduled to take place alongside the upcoming BRICS summit in Osaka in late June 2019, which will be held concurrently with the next G20 summit.
Another important positive factor in the further improvement ...
... S-400 missile defense system, weathering repeated US prodding, nudges, and implicit threats of collaterally damaging implications.
Similarly, New Delhi’s recent reconsideration of long-held reticence at upgrading the level of the mundanely operating Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral dialogue from Foreign Ministers forum to Summit status, and the actual convening of the RIC. The Modi regime desires to follow the vision enunciated and delineated in the Shangri-la address of the Prime Minister, of an Indo-Pacific ...
... hegemony. Still, Russia remains a very important strategic player. In fact, Russia has become a swing player. Essentially Russian goals determine the balance of powers, placing Russia in a very privileged position vis-à-vis BRICS. Also the fact that India, China and Russia now have reactivated the trilateral dialog called RIC, which happened in Buenos Aires, is also going to give further strength to BRICS. Because now they can actually use their trilateral cooperation as the building block within BRICS to strengthen ...
... that have the greatest significance for Russia, the key talks for understanding the development of Russia’s foreign policy are the now traditional sessions held with BRICS countries. In addition, a meeting was also held between the heads of state of Russia, India and China (in the RIC format). Objectively, this format could be the most efficient, since interaction between Eurasia’s three largest states is of principal significance for both regional and global security. The dialogue on security issues and collaboration ...
... the topic of Asian multilateral institutions less interesting for observers and relegates it to the bottom of the list of the priority areas of Russian policy in Asia. When Russian official speak of the country’s Asia policy, they usually start with Russia’s bilateral relations with regional leaders – China, Japan, South Korea and India – before turning to the Korean nuclear problem. Only then do they list the various multilateral diplomacy institutions around the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): the ASEAN–Russia Dialogue Partnership; the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ ...
