... OSCE was the first truly pan-European organisation – a factor which has lent it a unique form of legitimacy.
Secondly, I clearly recall that in the early 1990s, Russia (and as the Soviet Union in late 1980s) was pushing very hard to transform the OSCE into the central organising body of the new European architecture. The West entertained the prospect of a greater role for the OSCE for some time, but in the end resolved not to give the body even more importance. There were concerns among Europeans that the OSCE might start competing with NATO to be the main security provider ...
... support. Moscow, on the other hand, is fixated on the elites it can control – and is therefore bound to resist the change. Furthermore, it would interpret any difficulties with the societies as subversion originating in Europe. That way, even if the West did concede Russia a sphere of influence, it would never reap the desired benefits in terms of stability – but it would have lost the OSCE-based principles of the European order.
Finally, the third option – a combination of firmness and an appealing project - runs the risk of being misunderstood by Russia in the same way the reset was misunderstood. The EU-EEU cooperation especially has its natural limits ...
