... of its foreign policy, proving that Iran can even negotiate the nuclear deal with the “Great Satan”. The failure of the JCPOA framework should be attributed to the inconsistency of the United States rather than to the stance professed by Iran. Besides, anti-Americanism no longer seems to be an issue today. The relations between Moscow and Washington have progressively been degrading all this time, while China has turned from a stable partner of the U.S. into the main threat to it as a leading world power. In other words, Iranian ...
... the Iranian economy. It is likely that Biden will attempt to return America to the JCPOA. This will not be easy. The big question is: what will happen to Trump’s sanctions... ... become such a condition? In any case, a certain window of opportunity is opening up for Iran.
In the coming months, Washington will be calibrating key foreign policy goals... ... arena. The rivals themselves are also unlikely to let the grass grow under their feet. China, Russia and other nations will take into account the “bends” of the American...
... supply, sale or transfer of conventional weapons and their components to Tehran. The document allows the United States to impose sanctions on any state involved in the arms trade with Iran. The US approach is not shared by other participants in the JCPOA, in particular, Russia and China, which regard the Iranian arms market as rather promising.
Dmitriy Kiku, Ivan Timofeev:
US Left Isolated, Iran Nuclear Deal Under Threat: What Will Crisis Over Iran in UN Security Council Lead to?
The expiration of a five-year embargo on the supply of conventional arms ...
... of balance and deterrence, and that the US' view of Iranophobia is a lie. Iran is, at the same time, aware that radical behavior can put the international community against it.
Iran is also aware that Trump's main goal is to force it to withdraw from JCPOA (in reaction to a possible extension of arms embargo), in order to put various powers, like Russia and China, on its side, against Iran. With this in mind, Iran is unlikely to engage in radical behavior, even if the embargo is extended.
While financing new arms purchases in the face of declining oil revenues due to sanctions and the global coronavirus clampdown seems difficult, Iran's ...
... Arabia to Israel – urging the White House to take more steps to stop the growing Iranian presence in the Middle East? Was it a flood of advice from self-proclaimed experts... ... Iranian pride and the US arrogance makes a highly explosive cocktail.
Pyotr Kortunov:
JCPOA: Forward Into the Past
Unfortunately, all prospects for bilateral negotiations... ... involving Iran and key neighboring Arab starts. Concerned overseas powers – like Russia, China, India, and EU – could assist in building this mechanism working with their...
... unilateral in recent years.
Washington will find it more difficult to persuade its allies and partners to help it to contain China
One of the most glaring examples is Washington’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and its efforts to make the international business community abide by US sanctions. This policy tends to cause dissatisfaction ... ... affected the interests of such countries as Japan, India, and South Korea, which have recently been stripped of exemptions to buy Iranian oil. We can hardly expect a system-wide, consolidated, and effective protest against US sanctions in the foreseeable future....
Any US action in Iran would profoundly benefit China’s interests in Iran and strengthen its position across the region
China’s rise in the Middle East is not simply a case of debt-trap diplomacy or expanding Chinese influence, it requires an ideological shift to accommodate a new regional player ...
Russia can do quite a lot at the political level, but it cannot replace Europe as a potential driver of Iran’s economic and social development
On May 8, 2019, Iran sent a message to Germany, Britain, China and Russia that it was suspending the fulfilment of certain obligations under the “Iranian nuclear deal” – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. In particular, Tehran refuses to comply with restrictions that were placed on the production of uranium and heavy water reserves. In addition, if Iran’s partners fail to fulfil their obligations “in the banking and oil fields sectors” within ...
... accumulated potential of Iran’s telecom companies in communications control.
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Despite the critical situation surrounding the JCPOA, which further deepens Iran’s domestic political crisis, Tehran is still determined to consolidate its positions in Syria in the long term and, should ... ... Lebanese scenario. Insufficient resources make the task far more difficult, and Tehran is forced to act with regard to Russia and China’s support, given the unwillingness of European investors to invest in post-war rebuilding of Syria. Iran also reaffirms ...
... for another 5 years or take other steps. What line of behavior D. Trump chooses towards the PRC is also not completely clear. China, obviously, is not the main goal of the U.S. in the negotiations on strategic arms reduction, since the U.S. and the PRC ... ... trilateral cooperation can take place, for example, on North Korea issue. Also, the parties may cooperate on a nuclear deal with Iran - the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) expires in a few years, so they will have to decide on further actions. The most effective is the cooperation of the three ...
