... building nuclear ties with both Moscow and Washington.
Islamabad’s nuclear program is traditionally alleged to be backed by China. Pakistan has been set to overcome New Delhi’s demographic superiority by “eating grass” to create its A-bomb [
iv
... ... mid-level powers in the Asia-Pacific region also show certain behavioral similarities. The emergence of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” with its accompanying ideologemes (such as “rules-based order”) did not coincidentally coincide with a shift ...
... list of the new opportunities that need to be carefully considered.
Geopolitically, Russia tends to associate the notion of “the Indo-Pacific” with U.S. endeavours to preserve its strategic hegemony in the Pacific and Indian oceans in the face of China’s growing power. However, India has a somewhat different perspective on this, believing “the Indo-Pacific” to be an opportunity to expand its political and economic presence east of the Strait of Malacca. As far as this standpoint goes, the central place in the emergent mega-region is assigned to the ASEAN nations rather than the U.S.
Obviously,...
... pandemic), it is more proactive when it comes to investment, trying to ensure that the Indo-Pacific market continues to be highly dependent on U.S. investments (especially in the ASEAN countries, where U.S. foreign direct investment exceeds that of China, Japan and South Korea).
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity is designed to promote and strengthen partnerships within the Quad of the United States, Japan, India and Australia. Industry-specific priorities largely overlap with the
economic agenda of the Quad
, which ...
... developments, China, on its part, has been struggling to balance on a fine line between avoiding accusations of directly
helping
Russia and sticking to its commitment that a strategic partnership presupposes.
On the conceptual level, neither Russia nor China accept the Indo-Pacific framing used by some regional powers (Australia, Japan and India in the first place), as well as European countries and—naturally—the U.S. Same applies to ideologemes such as “rules-based order” or, in particular, “Free and Open ...
... in the regions they have not paid much attention to before. The main purpose of the military, diplomatic, and economic efforts of the Global West is to expand the sphere of influence, preventing their “non-democratic and revisionist” vis-à-vis, China and Russia, from building up their capabilities.
The Indo-Pacific, which provisionally includes all nations in the vast space stretching from the Horn of Africa to Oceania, has seen the fiercest and comprehensive confrontation. So far, the ideologists of the concept have failed to come up with any parameters ...
... partial list of the new opportunities that need to be carefully considered.
In a geopolitical sense, Moscow and New Delhi could lend each other a helping hand: New Delhi could do so in the India–U.S.–Russia triangle to become Moscow’s guide in the Indo-Pacific, while Moscow could do so in the Russia–China–India triangle by advancing the involvement of the other two in multilateral security and development projects in Eurasia. The international system slipping down towards a rigid bipolarity cannot align with the strategic interests of either Moscow ...
... creating a new potential threat for Russia’s Northern Fleet. There is every reason to suppose, however, that their main routes will lie much further south, and will not directly impinge upon Russian interests.
Zhao Huasheng:
Assessing the Trend of the Indo-Pacific Strategy
It is noteworthy that at around the same time as the establishment of AUKUS, China submitted an application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP was actually conceived as part of the strategy for China’s economic containment under former U.S. president Barack Obama,...
... possibility of directional improvement in the near future, which is also an important background for the future of the Indo-Pacific strategy. This situation will stimulate the four countries to get closer, thus naturally contributing to the development of the Indo-Pacific. Among these, the change in China-India relations has a greater impact. The relations between China and the United States, Japan, and Australia have been subject to strategic tensions, so the impact of them as variables is relatively consistent. India has been abiding by its non-aligned ...
... principles-based “global infrastructure development”. Similarly, in September 2019, the European Union and Japan, also non-members of the BRI, announced the “Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure” (
PSCQI
), encompassing the Indo-Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia regions.
Yuan Jiang:
The Thucydides’ Trap: the Avoidable Destiny Between the US and China
Even without mentioning China, it is not difficult to establish that the BDN and PSCQI projects are the Western strategic responses to the BRI in the infrastructure area in Indo-Pacific and beyond, an identical scope that the BRI focuses on. Conspicuously,...
... (ASEAN) and ASEAN-led regional architecture, such as the East Asia Summit. As committed ASEAN dialogue partners, all four Quad countries are strong supporters of ASEAN-centrality.
Chinese is now the second most spoken language in Australia after English
China is strengthening its position in the Indo-Pacific and Oceania. At the same time, Australia has very developed ties with China. What do you think: is China mainly a partner or a competitor to Australia?
China is an important partner for Australia, and one with which we share a wide range ...
