Russian diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – stationed both at the central office and at foreign diplomatic missions, embassies and consulates – were among the first to mount a political challenge against the Bolsheviks after they had seized power in Petrograd. Unlike their Petrograd-based colleagues, who went on strike alongside other ministerial officials and thus brought the work of the entire government to a screeching halt, Russian diplomats abroad remained at their posts. While they refused to follow the foreign policy of the Bolsheviks, they stood up to protect the national interests of Russia and those of their fellow countrymen abroad. They condemned the separate peace concluded with Germany as a betrayal of the interests of the great nation of Russia, undermining its international status. Russian diplomats relieved thereafter of their duties by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Leon Trotsky thus found themselves in emigration. During the Civil War, they collaborated actively with the governments of Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel, rendering them any required diplomatic assistance, and after the end of the Civil War, following the first de facto and subsequently de jure recognition of the Soviet Union by most foreign countries, continued to work under the direction of the Council of Ambassadors in the framework of special organizations representing the interests of Russian emigrants.

At the time of the October Revolution of 1917, Russia, which was engaged at the time in the bloody war with Germany and bound by the military and political Entente Cordiale agreements with the United Kingdom and France, had six embassies (in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, the United States and Japan), 19 missions (to the Holy See, Portugal, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Argentina, Abyssinia, Persia, Siam, Mexico and one to Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile); three diplomatic agencies (in Egypt, Morocco and Mongolia) and a vast network of consulates. The mission in Montenegro continued to work after its evacuation to the safety of the French city of Bordeaux, while the mission in the Serbian King operated from its temporary accommodations on the Greek island of Corfu.

Up until mid-November 1917 (Julian calendar), it seemed as though People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Leon Trotsky was completely unaware of the existence of Russian diplomatic representatives abroad: for a long time, he spent most of his time at Smolny without paying a single visit to his People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Trotsky was reminded of the diplomats by French newspapers, which reported on Maklakov's participation in the Inter-Allied Conference. This spurred Trotsky into action.

On November 17 (30), the Pravda newspaper published Trotsky's ministerial decree (apparently, the Narkomindel abbreviation that stood for the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was still new to him), which said that "Mr Maklakov, who was appointed to a diplomatic post in Paris under the previous government, is stripped of any and all powers. His participation in the Allied Conference reported by official French newspapers would, therefore, be a blatant state crime and entail heavy punishment" [22]. On the same day, Trotsky circulated a telegram among all Russian diplomatic representatives that was drawn up, as the diplomatic rules of the time required, in French. The telegram said that "the Council of People's Commissars suggests that all staff members of the embassy respond immediately as for whether or not they are prepared to pursue a foreign policy as determined by the Congress of Soviets." All those diplomatic representatives in disagreement with the Soviet foreign policies were forced to step down effective immediately, transferring their work to their subordinates, regardless of their prior posts, if they were ready to submit to the new authorities. Any attempts by diplomatic officials to pursue former policies would be regarded as the gravest state crime [23].

However, Maklakov did not receive Trotsky's telegram until November 22 (December 5). The next day, he telegraphed his colleagues that he had left the telegram unanswered. French Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephen Pichon "quite agreed" with Maklakov's decision; he informed Maklakov of this in advance so as not to, in his words, tie up the hands of the French government with his decisions. Pichon decided against going public with Trotsky's telegram. Further, Maklakov drew the attention of Pichon, as well as that of Colonel House, to the fact that "it was inadvisable for neutral countries to express their stance on the recognition of Lenin's government before other countries" [24].

Many Russian diplomatic representatives followed Maklakov's lead and left Trotsky's telegram unanswered, with the exception of Solovyov in Madrid and Ungern-Sternberg in Portugal. They were both boycotted by their colleagues and diplomats of the allied countries.

On November 26 (December 9), a new decree by Trotsky was issued saying that "in view of the lack of response to the telegrams and radiotelegrams to ambassadors, envoys, embassy employees, etc., of the Russian Republic suggesting that they immediately reply whether or not they agreed to work under the authority of the Soviet regime based on the platform of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, they are hereby relieved of their duties without the right to a pension or be appointed to any public posts." They were equally stripped of the right to make any kind of withdrawal from public funds [25]. The order listed the names of only 28 Russian diplomats – ambassadors, envoys, charges d'affaires, counsellors, general consuls, one first secretary and one consul.

To ensure complete unanimity among diplomats on the matter of coordinating their activities and to reinforce Maklakov's position, a new collegial body was formed in Paris in late November 1917 called the Council of Ambassadors. It included Ambassador to Italy Giers, Charge d'Affaires to Great Britain Nabokov, envoy to Spain Stakhovich and envoy to Switzerland Efremov. The Council of Ambassadors met regularly to discuss day-to-day policies and issues pertaining to Russia and a general stance, with all decisions being necessarily unanimous. In addition to Maklakov, Giers also commanded the respect of its members. The other diplomats considered him to be the Senior Ambassador and his opinion carried considerable weight.

On December 10 (23), Maklakov sent a telegram to Bakhmetev and copied it to his colleagues in London, Rome and Tokyo outlining a plan for the Allies with regard to Russia. According to him, the events in Russia were doubly dangerous for the allies: one the one hand, they immediately benefited the Germans the moment Russia abandoned the war, while on the other hand, they created exclusively favourable conditions for the entire country to fall under the influence of the Germans. Maklakov believed that, even as the war continued, the Germans would try to further weaken the effects of the blockade by extracting Russia's remaining raw materials. And in the future, Germany reckoned that it would improve its own economic and political positions at Russia's expense and "maybe even, should it fall into Germany's hands, make use of the considerable economic interests of the allies associated with Russia as a negotiation tool to demand further benefits" [26]. Maklakov warned the allies against the enormous strengthening of Germany by subduing Russia for years to come.

Maklakov also feared that "the cultured and propertied class, whose very existence was being threatened by the anarchy," may have itself turned to Germany, seeing no other option. Maklakov saw a lot of signs that this was precisely the essence of Germany's plan for Russia. He was positive that the interests of the Allied Nations in this regard were completely in line with Russia's vital interests "as a cultural and national whole," and the allied countries would be guaranteed the "grateful cooperation of the best Russian forces" in this fight. In his opinion, the Allied Nations had, first and foremost, to do everything in their power to support the forces opposing the Bolsheviks and provide resources to help these forces organize and prepare themselves. Moreover, "these forces could not be expected to continue the war, but only counter the authority of the Bolsheviks and the Germans that keep them company from spreading further."

Meanwhile, Maklakov believed that, in order to preserve the influence of the Allied Nations on events in Russia, it was extremely important to keep the Siberian Railway out of the hands of the Bolsheviks. "It is safe to assume that the U.S. troops, without resorting to open occupation, could achieve serious success here. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Germans have enough products to tempt Russian peasants to sell whatever raw materials they still possess. In this respect, the Americans could compete quite favourably with the Germans," Maklakov reflected [27]. Finally, the Allied Nations could make good use of the ideological factor "in the very hotbeds of Bolshevism." To solve these tasks, it was necessary to obtain complete information about what was going on in Russia as soon as possible, specifically, in certain parts of it, as well as to work out a concerted approach to the events in Russia and agree on joint measures and steps.

In his telegram, Maklakov pointed out not just the lack of "united action among the allied countries regarding Russian matters," but also the lack of planning and resoluteness in the actions of some of the allied governments. He stressed the need to align the efforts of the allied powers "in the sphere of Russian matters." In his opinion, the need for more unity of action was "apparently, more evident" to President Wilson. "Meanwhile, the Allied Nations now pay particular attention to America's opinion. Therefore, if the U.S. government supported the idea of setting up an allied council on Russian affairs along the lines of other allied bodies, the proposal could very well be successful," Maklakov noted. He emphatically asked Bakhmetev to advise him of his thoughts regarding Maklakov's arguments, and in the event of his agreement, expressed hope that Bakhmetev would not refuse "to assist in bringing them to fruition by relaying them" to the Washington government [28].

As they feared that Russia would fall entirely into the hands of Germany, Russian diplomatic representatives came to the conclusion that an allied intervention was indispensable. In February 1918, envoy to Siam Iosif Loris-Melikov asserted the need for U.S. troops to intervene in Russia in order to liberate the country from the German oppression and "domestic slavery" in his letter to Bakhmetev. Loris-Melikov even appealed personally to the U.S. government for help, acting through the U.S. envoy to Siam. He was seriously concerned that Japan might enter the scene as Russia's "saviour," but for entirely different reasons and with entirely different consequences. By the spring of 1918, the idea of an intervention took centre stage in the correspondence between Maklakov and Bakhmetev. Since both the United States and the European Allies had adopted a position of non-involvement in Russia's internal affairs, Japan nevertheless became the main actor in the intervention.

Fearing a rise in pro-German sentiment in Russia, and hoping to revitalize the national movement, Russian diplomats were actively urging the Allied Nations to intervene and effectively sanctioned it. On May 10, 1918, in a telegram to Maklakov, Bakhmetev announced that it would be advisable for them to abandon general discussions and pose the matter of intervention to their allies, and to the United States more specifically. To coordinate the activities of the U.S. and French Embassies, Bakhmetev sent Secretary of the Embassy Ivan Sukin to Paris. These diplomatic efforts resulted in France proposing at the allied conference in Versailles held in late May – early June to actively seek the approval of the United States for an intervention. "In our efforts, we proceeded from the assumption that, as it went deeper into Russia, the allied initiative would breathe new life into the Russian national movement. It was the correct tactic at the time, particularly in Siberia, where the Russian movement was building up around the actions of Czechoslovakian forces," Bakhmetev noted later [referring to a move made by Czechoslovakian troops against the Bolsheviks in May 1918]. However, the diplomats solicited the support of political groups in Russia well in advance, as well as warning the Allied Nations that Russia's territorial rights could not be violated.

Almost from the very moment that armed White groups began to appear, Russian diplomats closely followed their activities wherever possible. "All of us, who without any doubt predicted the fall of Bolshevism as an unsustainable system, were always liable to pre-empt the natural course of life, hoping for a surgical intervention from some kind of a surgeon; we saw this surgeon successively in Kaledin, Alekseyev, Kolchak, Denikin, etc.," Maklakov said in one of his letters. In March 1918, the Beijing mission led by Prince Nikolai Kudashev started to support Ataman Grigory Semyonov in Transbaikal, who took charge of an armed anti-Bolshevik group and keep Maklakov and Bakhmetev updated on his movements.

Simultaneously, Kudashev spearheaded the creation of the army of Admiral Alexander Kolchak, who was recalled halfway to the Mesopotamian Front. Back then, Kudashev told Kolchak: "Armed forces are gathering in the south of Russia, where volunteer armies led by General Alexeyev and General Kornilov are operating [the news of his death had not reached Kudashev yet], against the anarchy that has been taking hold of Russia. It is essential that we start preparing the Far East to be able to build an armed force there, as well to defend order and peace in the Far East."

By October 1917, colonies of various sizes of Russian citizens taken unawares by the onset of the First World War while travelling abroad and now unable to return home had been established in a number of European countries, including Switzerland, Italy, France and the United Kingdom. There were also others sent on missions by various institutions to cooperate with the Allied Nations. Russian colonies were adversely disposed to the Bolshevik coup and were effectively cut off entirely from their home country.

After the Revolution, both pension and private money transfers from Russia ceased, and even well-to-do Russians fell into serious financial troubles. Furthermore, a great number of Russian civilian and military prisoners of war, including those who had escaped captivity, were also stuck abroad in need of help. Russian embassies and missions authorized by the previous government to issue allowances and loans to Russian citizens in need were the only place they could seek help and sustenance. However, cut off themselves from the centralized financing, diplomatic missions had to find new ways to help their stricken compatriots abroad.

The Russian Embassy in France launched the Russian Aid Society, a charity presided over by the ambassador's sister, Maria Maklakova, intended to provide financial assistance and help find employment [32]. The Embassy in Rome opened a Committee on Aiding Russians in Italy [33]. The Netherlands mission transferred 1.5 million guilders received from the Central Prisoners of War Committee to Turkey and Bulgaria to help Russian prisoners of war. Furthermore, the mission continued to give out pensions to Russians residing in the Netherlands using the charity funds at its disposal.

The Organizational Structure of the Russian Overseas Representation Immediately Before Abolition

As of May 1921, the overall structure of the non-Bolshevik overseas representation included the Central Diplomatic Office in Paris headed by the chief of the Russian diplomatic legation Mikhail Giers (with B. E. Nolde as Counsellor), six embassies (Paris, London, Rome, Madrid, Tokyo and Washington), nine of the former 19 "old" missions (Brussels, the Holy See, Christiania, Copenhagen, Stockholm, the Hague, Tehran, Bucharest and Athens) and six "new" missions established during the Civil War, three of which were permanent (Belgrade, Prague and Berlin, where the mission was officially known as the Russian Delegation for the Affairs of Military Personnel and Prisoners of War), with the other three having temporary status (Sofia, Warsaw and Constantinople) [37]. It should be noted that the list does not include the envoy in Argentina, who maintained his status but had no contact with the Conference of Ambassadors. In addition to the embassies and missions, there were diplomatic agencies operating in Cairo and Morocco, a temporary diplomatic representative in Helsinki, 11 general consulates, around 20 consulates, a consular unit in Constantinople, Consuls C. P. Christi in Christiania and F. V. Ptashnik in Buenos Aires, and two Vice-Consuls. The total number of officials posted overseas exceeded 135.