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On April 15, 2024, the international multimedia press center of the Rossiya Segodnya media group hosted a roundtable discussion on Serbia’s current foreign policy challenges in view of its relations with Eastern partners, including Moscow and Beijing, and those from the West — Brussels and Washington.

The experts addressed some hot button topics for the Serbian government such as the upcoming vote in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the membership of the self-proclaimed republic of Kosovo in the Council of Europe, efforts made by some countries to have the 1995 events in Srebrenica recognized as genocide in the UN and mounting pressure on Belgrade from the West, among other matters.

On April 15, 2024, the international multimedia press center of the Rossiya Segodnya media group hosted a roundtable discussion on Serbia’s current foreign policy challenges in view of its relations with Eastern partners, including Moscow and Beijing, and those from the West — Brussels and Washington.

The experts addressed some hot button topics for the Serbian government such as the upcoming vote in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the membership of the self-proclaimed republic of Kosovo in the Council of Europe, efforts made by some countries to have the 1995 events in Srebrenica recognized as genocide in the UN and mounting pressure on Belgrade from the West, among other matters.

Speakers:

  • Ekaterina Entina, Director of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at HSE University and Head of the Department of Black and Mediterranean Sea Region Studies of the RAS Institute of Europe;

  • Polina Sokolova, Research Fellow at the Section for Regional Issues and Conflicts at IMEMO RAS

  • Yakov Smirnov, Research Fellow at the Department of Modern History of Central and Southeast Europe of the RAS Institute of Slavic Studies

Abstracts

Ekaterina Entina

  • The appointment of the new government in Serbia is not expected to bring any surprises. It is likely to be formed as in previous years, with both pro-Russian and pro-Western politicians.

  • France does not seek to curb the sway of the U.S. in the Balkans or in Europe but aims to increase its own influence. Paris needs to make up for the loss of face it suffered from Russia in the Middle East and in Africa.

  • The prospect of Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe is pretty much a done deal for several reasons. First, the 2013 Brussels Agreement between Belgrade and Pristina prevents the former from obstructing Kosovo’s accession to regional organizations. Second, this commitment is reiterated in the French-German normalization plan of March 2023. From the perspective of the West, which has leverage over Belgrade, Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe is legitimate under these agreements.

  • A potential UN resolution on Srebrenica and genocide is a matter of crucial foreign policy interest for Belgrade. Serbia is cooperating with all countries to prevent the adoption of this resolution even if it means trading off Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe.

  • Serbia associates integration with the EU not only with accessing a more advanced social and economic environment or attracting more investment into the national economy, but also with the erosion of national identity, a sensitive topic for Serbian society.

  • The new Serbian government is supposed to be formed in May 2024 as required by law. The opposition is campaigning against the rerun of Belgrade’s municipal election on June 2 and pushes to delay the vote until the fall, so Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic should form a cabinet and demonstrate stability as well as foreign policy achievements. The election in the capital is important as a gauge of public opinion to country-wide policies.

Polina Sokolova

  • France has always been actively engaged in the Balkans. President Emmanuel Macron attempted to assert himself as a broker in the Kosovo issue. Military cooperation between Serbia and France has recently received a boost, and Paris is also a longtime partner of Belgrade in economy and social projects. Russia is vying with France in nuclear energy and seeks to maintain a foothold in Serbia.

  • Serbia’s partnership with Western countries in not something new. Still, it is important to understand that Belgrade seeks to keep its foreign policy organized around multiple vectors and considers itself a participant in multilateral UN- and EU-led peacekeeping operations, while maintaining relations with Russia, China, the Gulf nations and other Eastern partners.

  • The key dilemmas facing Serbia’s new government is whether to impose sanctions against Russia and the issue of negotiations with Pristina.

  • Russia is critically important for Serbia when it comes to Kosovo since Moscow, together with Beijing, is a chief ally in the UN Security Council. Belgrade is actively trying to influence intra-UN sentiment regarding the 1995 events in Srebrenica.

  • Under UNSC Resolution 1244, Serbia maintains leverage over the Kosovo issue. The second negotiating track involves Brussels-led normalization talks between Belgrade and Pristina that are progressing along the lines of Belgrade signing a binding agreement to recognize the region’s independence. It is a condition for Serbia’s membership in the EU.

  • In the wake of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, Western countries chose to fast-track Kosovo’s nation-building and stepped up efforts to incorporate Serb enclaves into the Pristina-run administration. This is where the nerve of the Kosovo settlement lies.

  • In the existing international landscape, Belgrade initially counted on Kosovo taking shape as a multinational country. However, this outcome is now hardly likely, as Pristina treats Serbs as a minority. Belgrade, for its part, cannot accept a monoethnic Kosovo.

  • The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden is a champion of NATO’s aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the course that led Kosovo to proclaim independence in 2008. Belgrade expects its dialogue with Washington to become more rational and draw on respect and recognition of standing agreements if Donald Trump wins the upcoming presidential election in the U.S.

Yakov Smirnov

  • The recent Paris-hosted meeting between Vucic and Macron is an interesting case of the Serbian president soliciting support and assistance from one of the Western leaders in resisting pressure from Brussels, Berlin and Washington on Kosovo and Srebrenica. Macron is clearly cannot be trusted in this matter, so Vucic is trying to play all his cards and exploit internal divisions in the European camp.

  • At the same time, this move is unlikely to bring Vucic any political dividends, so he will turn to Russia and China and look for support within the European camp.

  • As regards the new government, Milos Vucevic is a compromise candidate for prime minister, who is controlled by Vucic and will suit all key players. Vucic is also likely to appoint Marko Duric as foreign minister to have a “carrot” to dangle in front of the West. His previous posting as ambassador to the U.S. and contacts in Washington could “limit the appetites” of Western governments.

  • Belgrade is almost out of options to have the Kosovo issue resolved in its favor. This may have been possible in the 1990s by partitioning the region. However, the current situation — where ethnic Albanians make up over 96% of Kosovo’s population and Serbian towns and villages are isolated and enclaved — rules out the region’s reintegration into Serbia.

  • The Kosovo issue is not exclusive to Belgrade and Pristina and concerns multiple foreign policy directions of the U.S. and the EU, whose contingents are stationed in the self-proclaimed republic. Kosovo provides a leverage opportunity against Serbia, including on the matter on Russia sanctions. Washington and Brussels are interested in keeping up tensions, as they need to keep Belgrade “on its toes.”

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Poll conducted

  1. In your opinion, what are the US long-term goals for Russia?
    U.S. wants to establish partnership relations with Russia on condition that it meets the U.S. requirements  
     33 (31%)
    U.S. wants to deter Russia’s military and political activity  
     30 (28%)
    U.S. wants to dissolve Russia  
     24 (22%)
    U.S. wants to establish alliance relations with Russia under the US conditions to rival China  
     21 (19%)
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