RIAC and RUSLAT Convene Roundtable "Triangle of Russia, Brazil and China in Latin America. Cooperation or competition?"

March 30, 2026

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Topic: International security, Russia's Foreign Policy, Global governance

Region: Latin America-Caribbean

Type: News

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On March 26, 2026, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), in partnership with the Russia–Latin America Observatory (RUSLAT) at the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas), held a roundtable titled "Triangle of Russia, Brazil and China in Latin America. Cooperation or competition?"

Welcoming remarks were delivered by Alexandra Terzi, Program Coordinator, RIAC, and Daniela Vieira Secches, Coordinator, Co-Founder, Russia-Latin America Observatory (RUSLAT); Professor, Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas).

Presentations were given by Li Yonghui, Senior Research Fellow, Director, Department of Multilateral and Regional Cooperation at the Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS); Javier Vadell, Professor, Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas); Viktor Kheifets, Editor-in-Chief, Latin America Journal; Professor, St. Petersburg State University; Chief Researcher, Institute of Latin American Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; Zhou Zhiwei, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Latin American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS); Daniela Vieira Secches, Coordinator, Co-Founder, Russia-Latin America Observatory (Ruslat); Professor, Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas); and Ana Lívia Araújo Esteves, Lecturer, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, HSE University. The session was moderated by Alexandra Terzi, RIAC Program Coordinator.

During the event, experts explored the compatibility of Russian, Chinese, and Brazilian interests in Latin America, the impact of global crises and the policies of the Trump administration, the potential areas and mechanisms for trilateral cooperation, the prospects for institutionalizing the "triangle," and the role of BRICS in this context.

Key Takeaways

Alexandra Terzi

Global trends are bringing the potential for Russia–China–Brazil cooperation in Latin America into sharper focus. The war in the Middle East is deepening the energy crisis for many countries and contributing to the fragmentation of the global economy. The Trump administration continues to exert political pressure on Western Hemisphere nations, aiming primarily to counter Chinese influence and, in some cases, Russian influence as well. The situation surrounding the Brazilian port of Santos is a telling example. Added to this are the circumstances in Venezuela and the deepening crisis in Cuba.
Significant changes are underway within the region itself: the recent wave of right-wing parties coming to power raises questions about how these shifts will affect their foreign policy approaches. Brazil faces a tense electoral campaign this fall. In this context, trilateral cooperation could offer pathways to mitigate the impact of these turbulent developments.

Li Yonghui

Latin America is growing in importance as a major resource supplier and as part of the expanding Global South, particularly amid growing uncertainty in U.S. foreign policy. There are both convergences and divergences between Chinese and Russian interests in the region. While both countries share the goal of promoting a multipolar world, they rely on fundamentally different tools: China focuses on trade and infrastructure, while Russia emphasizes defense and energy projects. This configuration gives rise to both functional complementarity and partial competition.
China's approach in Latin America is primarily development-oriented and market-driven, focusing on securing resources and food supplies, expanding markets, fostering cooperation on production capacity, broadening global sales channels, and strengthening its discursive influence. At the same time, Beijing maintains a relatively restrained security presence in the region.
For China, Latin America is critically important for imports of energy, minerals, and agricultural products—including soybeans, meat, copper, and lithium—which support China's food security and industrial upgrading. The region also offers new markets for Chinese electric vehicles, infrastructure projects, telecommunications equipment, and other high-tech goods. Furthermore, China's cooperation with Latin American countries is aimed at securing political support and cultivating an image as a responsible partner.
Russia, by contrast, orients its presence in Latin America primarily around political and security issues, viewing the region as an opportunity to strengthen its foothold in terms of traditionally strong U.S. influence. Moscow engages in military-technical cooperation with regional countries and participates in information projects. On the economic front, Russia pursues projects in oil, gas, nuclear energy, and mining, while also providing significant support to a few key partners.
The first major challenge to cooperation stems from differing risk perceptions regarding U.S. reactions. Russian-American relations are going through a difficult period, making Moscow less sensitive to additional sanctions or political costs, whereas Beijing seeks to maintain balanced ties with Washington and exercises greater caution in Latin America.
The second challenge is commercial: companies from the two countries sometimes compete directly for contracts in arms, nuclear energy, or mining, which can undermine their bargaining power and weaken the perception of their coordination.
The third challenge comes from Latin American states themselves, which pursue multi-alignment strategies. Many governments seek to maximize flexibility by striking economic deals with China, receiving certain forms of support from Russia, while simultaneously maintaining ties with the U.S. and Europe. This limits the scope for a unified China-Russia regional strategy.
Tensions could be reduced and the effectiveness of Russian-Chinese engagement in the region improved through more active information sharing on sensitive projects, coordination in less sensitive areas, and the implementation of small-scale joint initiatives in fields such as health, education, and disaster relief. This would help build trust and foster a more positive image in the region.

Javier Vadell

The systemic chaos resulting from the breakdown of the old-world order is characterized by multifaceted confrontation initiated by Washington. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. intends to advance on all fronts with the aggressiveness characteristic of an imperial power, exhibiting a paradox: acknowledging multipolarity while acting in ways typical of a unipolar approach.
A key area of pressure has been BRICS, with Brazil as a specific target. After the last BRICS summit in Brasília, the Trump administration opposed the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, lent support to former president Jair Bolsonaro (who is on trial for attempting a coup d'état), and also criticized Brazil's Supreme Court. At the same time, Brazil was hit by a new wave of unilateral U.S. tariffs, raising average tariff levels to their highest since the post-war period. This signals the dismantling of the multilateral economic order.
Amid this systemic chaos, the Western Hemisphere is viewed by the Trump administration as a space for recolonization. Any cooperation with China, Russia, or other BRICS members is likely to be perceived as a threat to U.S. interests. Brazil emerges as the largest target in Latin America, being the region's only full BRICS member and its largest economy.
Contradictions are evident in the positions of some BRICS members, notably the UAE and India. The UAE, functioning as a hub of neoliberal globalization, also plays a significant role in the Sudanese conflict while hosting U.S. military bases on its territory, creating a complex dynamic. An even more delicate situation involves India, which maintains historic partnership ties with Russia, yet the Modi government has strong ties with Israel and the United States.
Amid these contradictions and multifaceted confrontation, the Russia-China partnership takes on special significance. Their cooperation is crucial for consolidating an alternative model of international relations, not only in the Eurasian geopolitical complex but also globally. Iran plays a key role for both Russia and China in strengthening Eurasia's geopolitical future.
The exhausted model of neoliberal globalization must be overcome, not through unilateral imperial policies, but through the formation of a new order based on sovereignty, inclusiveness, and genuine multilateral cooperation among civilizations. The way forward lies in a new model of sovereign and inclusive globalization guided by humanism, cosmopolitanism, and authentic multilateral coexistence.

Viktor Kheifets

The arrest of Nicolás Maduro in Caracas raises questions about how a new Monroe Doctrine might shape the engagement of other countries primarily China and Russia in this contested region. Although both China and Russia took strong stands in the UN Security Council, refusing to support anti-Venezuelan sanctions, China's position was noticeably softer. Existing strategies are likely to lose much of their effectiveness.
Over the years, Russia has shifted its approach to Latin America, moving from ideologically driven engagement to developing ties through diplomatic, strategic, and economic instruments. Today, Russia maintains economic cooperation with Brazil, Mexico, and Ecuador, and to a lesser extent with Argentina, while its military and geopolitical ties have traditionally been stronger with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Bilateral trade volume has reached $16–18 billion, exceeding Soviet-era figures, though Latin America accounts for no more than 2% of Russia's total foreign trade, and Russia accounts for less than 1% of Latin America's foreign trade.
Russia's economic activity includes Rosneft deals with Argentina and Brazil, Rostec deliveries of aircraft, helicopters, and air defense systems, as well as civilian nuclear cooperation with Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador. The bulk of Russian cooperation with South American countries is concentrated in the primary sector.
Venezuela was long Russia's largest arms market after India, but this market has effectively disappeared amid the country's severe economic crisis. Russia was also a major partner in Venezuela's oil industry, including alliances between national companies and Rosneft, but this cooperation too appears to be a thing of the past. Similar uncertainty surrounds Cuba.
Russian and Chinese strategic interests in the region are not fundamentally at odds, though competition exists on specific projects. Over the past decade, traditional Russian exports to Latin America, including agricultural machinery and fertilizers, have faced stiff competition from China's lower prices. In Argentina, Rosatom competed with Chinese and U.S. firms in a tender for nuclear plant construction, losing to the China National Nuclear Corporation for the Atucha III project, which was backed by long-term Chinese financing.
The approaches of China and Russia share certain common features, such as deepening economic and strategic engagement. Differences lie in the level of involvement: China's engagement is primarily economic in nature, whereas Russia brings a more strategic and geopolitical dimension to its relations with Latin America. Russia is currently seeking to diversify its exports and imports, paying increased attention to the region.
Over time, China's presence has acquired strategic dimensions, serving to some extent as a counterbalance to the U.S. China actively invests in infrastructure and logistics: over $1.5 billion has been invested in the construction of Chancay Port in Peru, the largest port in the region and China's first logistics hub in South America. Chinese investment in Brazil's mining sector particularly in iron ore, copper, nickel, and other minerals critical to industry and the energy transition holds strategic importance. Of particular note are investments in rare earth elements in Brazil, an area of explosive growth and high geopolitical priority, given that Brazil possesses the world's second-largest rare earth reserves.
Unlike Moscow, Beijing does not seek to expand political ties and adheres to the principle of avoiding provocation toward the U.S., which underpins its quiet economic expansion. Russia, by contrast, often prioritizes geopolitics, sidelining or weakening economic instruments. With few exceptions (oil and gas fields in Venezuela, bauxite mining in Guyana, nuclear projects in Bolivia and Argentina), Moscow does not make major investments in infrastructure projects in the region.
The prospect of confrontation between China and Russia in Latin America seems unlikely, as confrontation presupposes parties with comparable potential, whereas China's economic presence in the region is on an entirely different scale. As long as the economy does not become a priority in Russia's Latin America strategy, talk of confrontation is moot. The Russian leadership faces the difficult task of competing economically for contracts in nuclear power plant construction, railways, subways, satellite launches, and other projects.
The prospects for trilateral cooperation between Russia, China, and Brazil remain limited. Potential exists in the nuclear sector, but here China and Russia are competitors. Another possible area is offshore oil development in Brazil, where China could provide capital in exchange for a share of production and Russia could contribute technology and qualified personnel.
U.S. pressure is unlikely to constrain trilateral cooperation in the region, for the simple reason that such cooperation does not yet exist, nor are there clearly articulated plans to develop it. Russia, Brazil, and China have established bilateral relationships and see no need to change this format. The largest economic player China will not take decisive steps unless it perceives a direct threat to its economic interests and presence in Latin America.
BRICS, at least in its Latin American dimension, does not yet serve as a platform for such trilateral cooperation and adds little to existing capabilities. Should the group succeed in creating additional mechanisms for transactions in national currencies, as well as interbank and investment cooperation, the potential for this format of cooperation could be discussed.

Zhou Zhiwei

Brazil, China, and Russia have three potential areas for economic cooperation. The first is the agricultural sector. China and Brazil are priority partners in agricultural products: China is the largest market for Brazil's agribusiness, while Brazil is China's leading trading partner in this sector. Russia and Brazil also maintain close agricultural cooperation, particularly in Brazilian fertilizer supplies, and bilateral trade in this area has grown quite dynamically in recent years.
The second area is energy. Brazil and Russia are important energy partners for China, with Brazil possessing significant potential in renewable energy. Amid growing global geopolitical risks, the three countries can deepen their engagement in the energy sector.
The third area is finance. As BRICS members, Brazil, China, and Russia can strengthen cooperation on transactions in national currencies, especially given U.S. abuses of financial sanctions. In recent years, initiatives such as a common BRICS currency and a BRICS payment system have been actively discussed.
There are certain complementarities between China and Russia in several areas. Both countries support Latin American states in defending national sovereignty, advancing regional integration, and enhancing their role in international multilateral mechanisms. They also demonstrate effective coordination on multilateral platforms, particularly within the UN.
Today, the U.S. perceives Chinese and Russian economic cooperation in Latin America as a security threat. In the short term, engagement between China and Russia in the region will face growing difficulties. However, as a regional power, Brazil remains firmly committed to safeguarding its national autonomy, and U.S. hegemonic policies only reinforce Brazil's determination to diversify its international partners by expanding cooperation with extra-regional actors, including China and Russia. The Lula administration has shown sustained interest in Asia: the Brazilian president has visited more Asian countries than any of his predecessors. In the long term, strengthening ties with China, Russia, and other emerging powers will become an important way for Brazil to counter U.S. hegemony in the region.
U.S. pressure remains significant, and Brazil must exercise caution to avoid potential political interference and economic sanctions. The U.S. now views the Western Hemisphere as its geopolitical sphere of influence and seeks to control all processes in the region while excluding extra-regional actors. Unlike the situation 20 years ago, when the U.S. was relatively open to China's presence in Latin America and even saw China as a positive factor for the region's development, the conditions today have changed dramatically.
BRICS is a priority mechanism for all three countries: an important platform for deepening economic and trade cooperation, as well as for coordinating diplomatic positions on international issues. However, establishing a trilateral dialogue mechanism on Latin America, while an interesting idea, is unlikely in the short term. Such an initiative would carry strong political connotations, which does not align with Brazil's preference for diplomatic neutrality.

Daniela Vieira Secches

Latin American foreign policies in the new millennium are shaped by several key factors. U.S. influence remains inescapable, creating challenges for building engagement with other powers such as Russia and China. The region is highly diverse, encompassing different domestic political scenarios, economic conditions, sharp ideological shifts in recent periods, and reliance on commodity exports. Furthermore, the fragmentation of regional integration processes pushes countries toward bilateral arrangements, limiting opportunities for a unified regional policy.
Latin America finds itself between the "bear and the dragon," but a clash of interests between China and Russia in the region appears unlikely. Bilateral ties between the two powers have strengthened significantly, and this partnership has a positive impact on the continent, where both are expanding their presence through investment, trade agreements, and military cooperation.
A key point of convergence is the Latin American call for global governance reform, which aligns with Russia's position. Within the UN, a combination of non-alignment, legalism, and pragmatic balancing can be observed, reflecting the region's tradition especially that of Brazil.
Latin American countries approach relations with Russia through a lens of pragmatism and diversification, seeking to expand their autonomy beyond traditional partners such as the U.S. and Europe. Exceptions are Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, where deeper political ties and security cooperation have developed as a counterbalance to U.S. influence. However, the situation in Venezuela is changing, which is already affecting its relations with Russia.
In Brazil, there is cross-party consensus on the rhetoric of multipolarity, which is important for Russia. Left-leaning governments frame multipolarity in terms of benign multipolarity, while right-leaning governments approach it through a civilizational lens. Regardless of the outcome of the upcoming elections, this point will remain a rhetorical point of convergence.
In defense and international security, cooperation is selective and based on strategic asymmetry, with Russia acting as a supplier of equipment and know-how. Challenges include U.S. external pressure, technological sensitivity in technology transfer, and differing security priorities between Brazil and Russia. Nonetheless, opportunities exist for sectoral cooperation and engagement within BRICS.
Opportunities for deepening cooperation exist in energy and natural resources, infrastructure and logistics projects (where China could promote projects that also benefit Russia), as well as in multilateral and diplomatic coordination, as both regional countries and the two powers share similar rhetoric regarding the desired international order.
Challenges persist, including asymmetries and divergent economic roles, geopolitical pressure and external constraints (particularly from the U.S. with its new security doctrine, as well as the current situation in Iran), along with regional fragmentation and domestic instability in Latin America, including ideological shifts. Under these conditions, the prospects for trilateral cooperation remain limited, while deepening bilateral ties with individual states in the region appears more realistic.

Ana Lívia Araújo Esteves

The discussion on Chinese and Russian strategies in Latin America should challenge the notion that Russia is guided solely by geopolitical or political interests. Geopolitical interests exist for all actors, and a distinction can be made between Russia's relations with Cuba and Nicaragua on the one hand, and with major players such as Brazil on the other. In Brazil's case, convergence is driven primarily by shared views on the international order and the desire to reform the multilateral system.
Russia has numerous interests in Brazil and Latin America that are unrelated to great power rivalries or the U.S. position. While Brazil-Russia trade is concentrated in a limited number of products, these are strategic for both sides: Brazilian soybeans support Russia's high level of pork and beef production, while Russian fertilizers are critical to Brazil's agribusiness and its trade balance. Brazil is the world's largest fertilizer buyer and Russia's main client in this sector. This is an example of strategic trade in which both sides act as equal partners.
Another example is Russian nuclear cooperation with Bolivia, often interpreted as a purely political gesture. However, the research reactors Rosatom is building in Bolivia also provide Russia with access to Bolivia's lithium sector. This demonstrates that the relationship is built on a combination of economic and political interests.
Thanks to this pragmatic dimension of Russian-Latin American relations, ideological shifts in the region no longer decisively shape Russia's position. As the cases of Bolivia and Brazil during the Bolsonaro administration show, Russia—like China—has learned to engage with right-wing governments in the region. If relations continue to develop along pragmatic lines, ideological shifts will likely lose some of their significance in the near future.
Trilateral cooperation is a concept familiar to Brazil from the Lula administration's early mandates (e.g., the IBSA format with India, Brazil, and South Africa). The idea is that one party provides financing, another provides technology, and the third generates demand, with roles shifting depending on the agenda. Full-fledged cooperation of this kind between China, Russia, and Latin America has not yet materialized, but this could change if U.S. pressure on China in the region intensifies.
Already, coordination on the use of the yuan can be observed in fertilizer trade between Brazil, China, and Russia. This is perhaps the only current example of trilateral engagement, but it appears quite promising.

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