RIAC and CEBRI Held a Roundtable "Russia — Brazil: (In)complete Cooperation?"

On July 29, 2026, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) co-hosted a roundtable on "Russia – Brazil: (In)complete Cooperation?" The event marked the release of their joint Working Paper"Russia–Brazil Relations: Political Rapprochement and Economic Development."

Opening remarks were delivered by Dmitry Kiku, Deputy Director General of RIAC, and Feliciano de Sá Guimarães, Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of São Paulo, and Editor-in-Chief of CEBRI-Journal. The findings of the study were presented by Feliciano de Sá Guimarães and Ludmila Simonova, Head of the Center for Economic Research at the Institute of Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences.

The discussion featured contributions from Fabiano Mielniczuk, Professor at the Department of Political Science, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, and member of the NEBRICS research group; Olivier Bertrand, Professor of Strategy at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV/EBAPE); Daniela Vieira Secches, Coordinator and Co-Founder of RUSLAT, Professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais; and Vladimir Goliney, Senior Research Fellow and Chairman of the Council of Young Scientists and Specialists at the Institute of Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences. The session was moderated by Alexandra Terzi, Program Coordinator at RIAC. The roundtable was concluded by Ivan Timofeev, Director General of RIAC.

The discussion focused on the structural constraints and growth points in Russia–Brazil relations, the persistence of the gap between political rapprochement and tangible economic outcomes, the impact of external pressures on the bilateral agenda, prospects for trade diversification and investment cooperation, the potential for technological collaboration in nuclear energy, space, and information technology, as well as the role of institutional mechanisms and the possible implications of Brazil's 2026 presidential elections for the future of relations with Russia.

On July 29, 2026, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) co-hosted a roundtable on "Russia – Brazil: (In)complete Cooperation?" The event marked the release of their joint Working Paper"Russia–Brazil Relations: Political Rapprochement and Economic Development."

Opening remarks were delivered by Dmitry Kiku, Deputy Director General of RIAC, and Feliciano de Sá Guimarães, Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of São Paulo, and Editor-in-Chief of CEBRI-Journal. The findings of the study were presented by Feliciano de Sá Guimarães and Ludmila Simonova, Head of the Center for Economic Research at the Institute of Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences.

The discussion featured contributions from Fabiano Mielniczuk, Professor at the Department of Political Science, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, and member of the NEBRICS research group; Olivier Bertrand, Professor of Strategy at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV/EBAPE); Daniela Vieira Secches, Coordinator and Co-Founder of RUSLAT, Professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais; and Vladimir Goliney, Senior Research Fellow and Chairman of the Council of Young Scientists and Specialists at the Institute of Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences. The session was moderated by Alexandra Terzi, Program Coordinator at RIAC. The roundtable was concluded by Ivan Timofeev, Director General of RIAC.

The discussion focused on the structural constraints and growth points in Russia–Brazil relations, the persistence of the gap between political rapprochement and tangible economic outcomes, the impact of external pressures on the bilateral agenda, prospects for trade diversification and investment cooperation, the potential for technological collaboration in nuclear energy, space, and information technology, as well as the role of institutional mechanisms and the possible implications of Brazil's 2026 presidential elections for the future of relations with Russia.

Key Points Raised During the Roundtable

Feliciano de Sá Guimarães

• Russia–Brazil relations should be examined through the lens of incomplete cooperation, whereby interaction exists but remains selective and uneven. The central question is why political convergence—underpinned by shared views on multipolarity, multilateralism, sovereignty, and global governance reform—has not translated into a consolidated strategic partnership.

• The history of bilateral relations contains three critical junctures that could have altered their trajectory but were not fully seized: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the creation of BRICS, and the onset of the conflict in Ukraine. The post-Soviet period raised high expectations but yielded few concrete results. BRICS generated significant hopes for a strategic partnership, yet these have not materialized in the bilateral dimension. The Ukraine conflict, contrary to initial expectations, has not led to a substantial deepening of ties.

• The picture across eight measured parameters is uneven. Multilateral alignment is strong on broad agendas but weakens when Russia's core strategic interests are directly engaged. GLONASS cooperation stands as a successful example: Brazil hosts the largest GLONASS ground infrastructure outside Russia. Educational cooperation is growing, including through the Brazil–Russia–Belarus University League. However, foreign direct investment remains minimal—Russia's stock of FDI in Brazil stands at 0.0044%. Defense cooperation remains limited, with Brazil purchasing virtually no Russian weaponry. Institutional mechanisms exist but operate irregularly.

• The fertilizer trade paradox deserves particular attention. Brazil, one of the world's leading agricultural exporters, imports 95% of its fertilizer needs, creating a significant strategic vulnerability. In 2026, China overtook Russia as Brazil's largest fertilizer supplier due to logistical difficulties faced by Moscow. The National Fertilizer Plan 2050 aims to reduce dependence, but its targets appear unlikely to be met. The structural nature of fertilizer dependence is set to persist in the foreseeable future.

• A change of government in Brazil is unlikely to fundamentally alter the trajectory of bilateral relations—under Bolsonaro and Lula, they remained broadly comparable. Brazil and Russia are more aligned in their visions of world order than in their capacity to deepen their own bilateral engagement.

Ludmila Simonova

• The Brazilian colleagues' conclusion regarding a structural imbalance between political ambitions and material outcomes is debatable. Despite Western sanctions, logistical and financial challenges, bilateral cooperation has demonstrated positive momentum: growth in mutual trade, Russian investment, and the development of scientific and technical cooperation. Expanding trade with Brasília has helped Moscow mitigate the effects of sanctions, reorient export flows, and compensate for declining supplies to unfriendly countries.

• At the same time, structural constraints persist. Mutual trade is characterized by weak diversification and dependence on a limited range of commodities, making it vulnerable to market fluctuations. Technological and production constraints remain, particularly reliance on critical components and technologies in non-commodity segments. Regulatory barriers persist: direct bans on exports of certain goods, tariff quotas, sanitary and technical restrictions in Brazil, and anti-dumping measures. Sanctions have caused serious supply disruptions, longer delivery times, higher tariffs, and refusals of cargo insurance. Adaptation required expanding the Russian fleet, organizing container lines, and attracting Turkish and Chinese shipping companies. Restrictions on access to the international financial system and payment difficulties have posed serious challenges, but alternative mechanisms have been developed: transactions via third countries, settlements in national currencies and yuan, direct correspondent banking relationships bypassing SWIFT, and netting arrangements.

• These measures contributed to high growth rates in bilateral trade in 2022–2024, reaching a historic peak of $12.4 billion in 2024. On the export side, growth was recorded in fertilizers, inorganic chemicals, aluminum, machinery and equipment, and organic chemicals. On the import side, pharmaceuticals and organic chemicals grew, while soybean supplies declined due to increased domestic production in Russia.

• Among promising areas, the transition from fertilizer supplies to establishing production in Brazil with Russian participation across the full cycle stands out. An example is EuroChem's facility in Serra do Salitre, with a capacity of 1 million tons of phosphate fertilizers per year and investments of $1 billion. Other avenues include increasing Russian gas supplies, nuclear fuel for NPPs, materials for nuclear medicine, construction of small modular floating nuclear power plants, railway equipment supplies and participation in railway infrastructure development, and expanded procurement of Brazilian pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and agricultural machinery. Joint projects in artificial intelligence, robotics, cybersecurity, smart cities, the green economy, and space are promising, alongside the establishment of direct container lines and regional logistics hubs. Russian IT companies—Kaspersky Lab, PIX Robotics, SearchInform, ITGLOBAL.COM, and SolidSoft—specializing in cybersecurity and business process automation, are already entering the Brazilian market.

Fabiano Mielniczuk

• The study does not account for two significant factors. First, U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere and Washington's efforts to constrain Brazil–Russia cooperation cannot be overlooked. This factor has structural significance, evident both in official documents—such as the U.S. National Security Strategy, which explicitly identifies Russia and China as competitors—and in informal diplomatic engagements, where U.S. officials signal their opposition to non-Western investment in Brazil. This largely explains the persistently low levels of foreign direct investment from Russia (and, to a lesser extent, China) in Brazil.

• Second, Russia's economic model has undergone transformation since the onset of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, reducing its dependence on imports of goods previously supplied by Brazil (beef, pork, chicken). Until 2014, Brazil maintained a positive trade balance with Russia, but as Russia expanded domestic production, the trade structure shifted dramatically—Brazil now imports diesel fuel and fertilizers from Russia, creating a significant imbalance. This calls into question the feasibility of trade diversification in the future, as Russia's strategy of autonomous development aims to reduce dependence on external supplies of sensitive goods.

• In the defense sector, prospects appear limited due to the situation in Venezuela. Russia supplied arms and oil technologies to Caracas, but it is currently unclear who controls these assets and how they might be used. This creates a high degree of uncertainty, making military-technical cooperation with Brazil unlikely, particularly given the structural U.S. presence in the region.

Olivier Bertrand

• Russia–Brazil relations cannot be examined in isolation from China, the United States, and the European Union—the choices made by both countries depend on their relationships with these three centers of power. The working paper could have more systematically analyzed how this broader context shapes the options available for bilateral cooperation.

• Comparative benchmarks are needed: the concept of incomplete cooperation is useful, but without comparison to other bilateral relationships, it is difficult to assess whether Russia–Brazil cooperation deviates from the norm or, conversely, fits it given distance and other constraints. The assumption that more comprehensive cooperation is always preferable is not self-evident. The answer depends on objectives: food and energy security require fertilizers and fuel, innovation requires investment and technology transfer, and expanding humanitarian and business ties requires education and business networks. Even cooperation limited in scope but substantive in content can be highly valuable. Given resource constraints, pursuing all goals simultaneously is unrealistic.

• The asymmetry in the relationship is more complex than the study suggests. Historically, contacts have been very limited, investment negligible in both directions, and tourism and migration links virtually absent. For Brazilian companies, Russia is a challenging market (payment problems, transport, insurance, sanctions, and reputational risks) with many alternatives available. For Russian companies, the situation is different: sanctions have narrowed the pool of accessible markets, making Brazil more significant for Russia than the reverse, yet the Brazilian market remains difficult—distant, Portuguese-speaking, with complex rules and institutions (124th in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business ranking).

• The working paper is largely state-centric. While the second chapter provides examples of companies, these are not systematized around questions of business strategy—why one firm enters the market while another does not, why some expand while others exit, and what competencies are necessary for success. Ultimately, firms determine whether an opportunity is commercially viable; the state's role is to support internationalization by reducing costs, uncertainty, and risks. Given the additional costs of operating in a foreign market, a firm must possess a genuine competitive advantage. International experience in both countries is concentrated in a small number of large corporations; many small and medium-sized enterprises lack such experience. Russian companies operating in Brazil have encountered difficulties due to insufficient understanding of the local market and have made operational and strategic errors.

• The study identifies practical barriers that can be grouped by type: information gaps (lack of knowledge about local demand, regulation, culture), network gaps (absence of reliable local partners, distributors, banks), and competence gaps (access to finance, insurance, managers with international experience). Each type of barrier requires specific support from state structures.

Daniela Vieira Secches

• Incomplete cooperation is not a negative assessment but a descriptive category that captures a real pattern and opens a research agenda. This characterization does not imply failure or fragility. Cooperation does not cover all possible areas but has a functional core —fertilizers and energy—that provides relative stability. This is structural complementarity in two key sectors that are productive necessities rather than luxuries.

• The asymmetry in the relationship is structural rather than temporary, shaped by three factors: geographical distance and the commodity profile of trade, dominated by low-value-added goods; the negligible presence of Russian multinational corporations in Latin America; and the sanctions architecture, which effectively closes the Russian economy, deterring even willing Brazilian partners. Without a deliberate project of productive integration—joint ventures, co-development, technological cooperation—the gap between political rapprochement and economic outcomes will persist.

• The problem with institutional mechanisms is not the number of committees but the absence of a legal infrastructure: there are no agreements on investment promotion and protection, nor on avoidance of double taxation. This constrains long-term private investment. Flexibility should not substitute for institution-building. External pressure has a paradoxical effect: sanctions constrain (the SWIFT disconnection and the threat of secondary sanctions create a chilling effect) but also open opportunities (diversification of Russian exports, as in the case of diesel). Brazil and Russia, for different reasons, share an interest in building parallel architectures—payment systems, technology standards, multilateral forums. This is not an ideological but a pragmatic convergence, resulting from both countries' experience of pressure through economic interdependence. Whether these measures, born of external pressure, can evolve into a positive agenda or remain reactive remains an open question.

• In the area of trade diversification, three levels can be distinguished. The first includes sectors with already established demand: the Brazilian market needs these goods and services, but state support is not yet fully forthcoming (IT, cybersecurity, fintech). The second includes sectors where the initiative comes from the state: supply is state-driven, but business remains hesitant (nuclear energy and space). The third involves a long-term horizon: geotechnologies and biotechnologies, joint research and development.

• Among the obstacles to investment are institutional (absence of agreements), logistical (no direct high-frequency maritime routes — goods transit through third countries, adding time, risk, and cost), and financial (SWIFT disconnection). Alternative payment mechanisms are necessary but not sufficient: they solve the payment problem but not the investment or logistics problems, requiring a comprehensive approach.

• Russia–Brazil relations have differentiated sensitivity to political cycles. The structural core (fertilizers and energy) is largely insulated from political change. The political-diplomatic dimension is moderately sensitive: the degree of alignment in multilateral forums shifts with administrations, but nearly every Brazilian president since 1988 has visited Russia, indicating diplomatic pragmatism. The human and social dimension is the most vulnerable, as it is the thinnest; without dense people-to-people ties, this aspect can quickly atrophy with a change of government. The material foundation of relations (fertilizers and energy) is likely to remain stable, the diplomatic line will adjust to political conditions, and the humanitarian and social dimension—where the impact of political change may be swiftest and most severe—will prove the most vulnerable.

Vladimir Goliney

• The influence of the United States on Russia–Brazil relations should not be overstated—Brazil and Russia determine the parameters of their cooperation themselves, as evidenced by nearly two centuries of relations that have evolved independently of Washington's position. Moreover, U.S. pressure on the two countries is multidirectional. Sanctions against Russia constrain economic activity but simultaneously stimulate import substitution and reindustrialization. Tariff restrictions against Brazil constitute pressure on domestic politics—in particular, support for Bolsonaro—rather than an attempt to isolate Brazil from world trade; tariffs signal the possibility of their removal with a change of government. The current situation opens opportunities for strengthening cooperation precisely because U.S. pressure is not yielding the results Washington expects.

• Russia and Brazil are major players in the oil and gas market. Rising energy prices open opportunities for both countries to modernize their economies, not merely for one-off revenue increases. In the 2020s, the structure of bilateral trade has shifted: Russia has expanded soybean production, reducing mutual trade in this commodity, while Russian petroleum products, particularly diesel fuel, have gained a prominent place in bilateral trade. The development of Brazilian offshore oil production could reduce the significance of this commodity in bilateral trade over time, but opens opportunities for technological cooperation in the oil and gas sector.

• Russia's cooperation with Latin American countries, including Brazil, lies primarily in the foreign policy rather than the economic domain. Overcoming this limitation is possible only with political will on both sides. Promising niches resilient to political change and U.S. pressure include cooperation in Antarctica and the South Atlantic (Russia, as the discoverer of Antarctica, possesses extensive polar research expertise, while Brazil seeks to explore the continent), and energy and peaceful nuclear technology (Brazil is developing data center and additive manufacturing industries requiring substantial increases in electricity generation; Rosatom is developing not only traditional NPPs but also renewable energy and new products, including energy storage devices successfully tested in Antarctica without diesel generators). Brazil, with its focus on environmental sustainability and supplying clean energy to remote areas of the Amazon, could benefit from this experience, enabling a shift from commodity trade to higher-value-added products.

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