Moldova: a chance to end the political deadlock
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Since the 2019 political crisis, the parliament and the political situation in Moldova has been at a standstill. The country is stuck in an endless tug of war game between the East and West with the populace equally divided between the pull of Russia and the European Union. Along with this deep-rooted political division which causes road blocks for political advancement, the current situation in Moldova leaves much to be desired. Moldova is facing the worst population decline in Europe with its population having shrunk by a third since 1989, with 20 per cent of 20–25-year-olds having left the country in the last five years (Judah, 2020). This has ultimately led to a shortage in the labour market and an ageing population, which relies on remittances from abroad. With estimates suggesting that the country’s GDP will shrink by 4.5% this year due to the fallout of COVID-19, the future of the country looks fairly bleak. Parliamentary elections due to take place in June could finally bring an end to the years of decline and democratic backtracking.
Source: moldovanews.md
Decade of Decline
Over the last decade, Moldova has been characterised by corruption, a lack of freedom of expression and state capture by powerful oligarchs who have influence in all echelons of the political structure. This oligarchical system has not been dismantled, but rather handed down. After the defeat of the Democratic Party (PDM) and its leader Vladimir Plahotniuc, famous for his participation in the “theft of the century”, where he and other oligarchs managed to launder $1 billion out of the country, depleting it of an estimated 20% of its GDP, the government has taken little action to stop the embedded corruption with the current cabinet under the Party of Socialists of The Republic of Moldova (PSRM), more interested in maintaining their majority in parliament than implementing the much-needed reforms. A notable example can be seen in the 2017 changes to election laws when the parliament introduced a mixed system that maintained proportional representation for half the seats in parliament and a winner-takes-all system for the other half, which goes against European protocols and demands which were set in the Association Agreement with the European Union (Nicu, 2020). For the last four years, former President Igor Dodon had also been degrading relations with the EU, with his party seeking closer ties with Russia than with Europe. This, despite the fact that the EU and Moldova have signed a DCFTA and an Association Agreement and that the EU makes up the lion’s share of FDI and monetary assistance to Moldova. Furthermore, the vote of no-confidence in the pro-EU Sandu cabinet which was in office for merely 5 months in 2019 was also negatively perceived around Europe, especially as the Prime Minister who followed her, Ion Chicu, was a minister in the Filip cabinet under the PDM and a very close ally of Igor Dodon.
State capture is a term that is often used to describe the political and economic landscape in Moldova, and although the situation may have improved slightly since Plahotnuic, who wielded significant influence over the courts, judges and anti-corruption agencies, the institutions that were captured during the rule of the PDM are still corrupt (Nicu 2020), while the unofficial coalition between the PDM and the PSRM makes sure that these captured institutions play to the tune of Dodon, who has been involved in a plethora of corruption scandals that could be punished if the judiciary was independent. According to Transparency International, corruption is endemic in all three organs of government, and on average, 42% of households in society have had to pay a bribe in order to access a basic service. In terms of media freedom, the current situation also leaves much to be admired. Since 2013, the country has dropped from 55th to 91st place in the World Press Freedom Index, and a recent report from The Association of Independent Press showed that intimidation towards journalists and media outlets by politicians and civil servants has intensified. However, media freedom has always been a matter of concern in the country with many outlets being owned or having strong affiliations to main political players. Under the PDM from 2016-2019, Plahotnuic owned four out of the five national TV stations, and Dodon himself was found to have affiliations with three stations.
This political instability and promotion of party politics, which merely has only the interest of the ruling class in mind, has had dire consequences for the reform agenda in Moldova. The independence of the judiciary is a case in point. Although there was a significant desire to alter the system under the Sandu cabinet in 2019, that spark has slowly withered away under the Chicu cabinet. The country has consistently been ranked as the worst country in Europe for judicial independence and in 2018 it was ranked 132nd out of 140 countries in the Global Competitiveness Report. The Venice Commission stated that the rulings of the Constitutional Court which led to the political crisis in 2019 when the PDM refused to step down from power, were “politically biased and groundless” (European Commission, 2020). The appointment of Alexandr Stoianoglo to the post of Prosecutor General in 2019 also raised many eyebrows within the EU, with calls saying that the vote for the position was rigged (Olteanu, 2021). While he has been in this post, one could say that the country has shown signs of democratic backtracking with next to zero progress in the reform program. It was he who declared the 2014 bank scandal case closed and refused to open investigations against 13 judges who were involved in the scandal. In addition, he has released from prison one of the main authors of the scheme who was sentenced to 18 years in prison for his involvement (Olteanu, 2021; Morari, 2021). Five judges who were also suspended for their involvement were reinstated in October 2020 by the Superior Council of Magistracy, an institution often described as weak and captured.
A new chance
It is in the face of this decade of decline that the snap election is of such vital importance to Moldova. As the country is a parliamentary democracy, the real power lies not in the President, but in the parliament, with the constitution giving the President very limited powers. Thus, President Sandu is at the mercy of the parliament to pass reforms. A parliament which was elected in 2019 and has a majority of PDSM and PDM MP’s. However, in a country as politically divided as Moldova, for whom the public will vote is never certain. In a recent questionnaire conducted by the International Republican Institute, both the PDSM and the Pro-EU ACUM bloc received an equal share of the vote. Recent research does point to the fact that more people have a positive image of the EU and that it is the most trusted institution in the country, and, although this percentage has been increasing, this does not necessarily mean that the overall population believes in Moldova’s Western turn. A striking difference is noted when the population is split between mother tongue. Whereas nearly 70% of Romanian speakers are openly pro-EU, 70% of native Russian speakers are either neutral or have a negative view of the EU.
The election of Sandu to the presidency with a noticeable majority for Moldovan politics can be interpreted as a turning point in the country’s political orientation, but it is no guarantee of success. It has already been noted that the old order will die hard, as the current cabinet is doing everything it can in order to cling onto power and stall the parliamentary elections, with the most recent development in this fiasco being the PDSM-controlled cabinet voting to dismiss and replace the head of the Constitutional Court due to their ruling that the snap elections, which threaten the PDSM majority, will take place. Although this was in vain as the Constitutional Court ruled that this action and others undertaken by the cabinet were unconstitutional, it may be a warning sign of things to come.
Moldova seems to be moving in the right direction and an end to the political instability which has grounded the country for so long is in sight, but it remains to be seen whether the citizens of Moldova will make use of this opportunity or whether the oligarchical political structure will be simply handed down once more.
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