The foreign policy rhetoric of the US and South Korea presidents (2017–2024)

Authors: 

Vera Lutsenko, Master’s degree student, Basic Department of Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, HSE University

Klim Fot, Master’s degree student, Basic Department of Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, HSE University

Source: Reuters

In the context of growing geopolitical turbulence between 2017 and 2024, presidential rhetoric has played an increasingly important role in shaping the foreign policies of democratic states. During this period, both the United States and South Korea experienced leadership transitions that had a direct impact not only on their diplomatic agendas but also on the style, tone, and substance of their foreign policy communications. The period encompasses the presidency of Donald J. Trump (2017–2021) and Joseph R. Biden (2021–2025) in the United States, and Moon Jae-in (2017–2022) and Yoon Suk-yeol (2022–2025) in South Korea—each of whom represented different ideological, strategic, and communicative paradigms.
Leaders use discourse to legitimize policies, construct national identity, and persuade both domestic and international audiences. In the Korean Peninsula and broader Indo-Pacific region, where power rivalries and security dilemmas are increasingly intense, understanding the rhetoric of key factors such as the United States and South Korea provides insights into the dynamics of alliance management, deterrence, and regional stability.
It is extremely interesting to compare the foreign policy rhetoric of U.S. and South Korean presidents from 2017 to 2024 as well as to examine how their rhetorical strategies reflect shifts in international relations and national priorities. That is why the focus will be on employing discourse analysis as the main methodology, paying attention on public speeches, official statements, press conferences, and summit declarations.
The study of foreign policy rhetoric requires an interdisciplinary approach that combines elements of international relations theory, political psychology, and discourse analysis. The theoretical foundation includes also both classical concepts of rationality and modern constructivist and behavioral approaches.
From the perspective of bounded rationality, decision-making in international politics does not always follow a logic of utility maximization. As Herbert A. Simon^[1] argued, political actors often operate under conditions of incomplete information and cognitive limitations. This is particularly relevant in contexts of high uncertainty, which frequently characterize foreign policy environments.
In the field of political psychology, threat perception plays a crucial role in shaping the rhetoric of national leaders. According to Janice G. Stein, the interpretation of other states' behavior is shaped not only by rational analysis but also by cognitive and emotional mechanisms^[2]. This is directly applicable to the discourses of leaders like Donald Trump or Yoon Suk-yeol regarding North Korea and China.
The realist school of international relations, as interpreted by Stephen M. Walt^[3], also remains significant: the rhetoric of leaders often reflects a balance between "hawks," "doves," and pragmatic positions in a world where security and power are central variables. Constructivist approaches, especially the work of Alexander Wendt, have emphasized that the structure of international politics is shaped not only by material factors but also by ideational ones, including identity discourses and interactive narratives^[4]. This provides a valuable lens for examining how presidential rhetoric contributes to shaping the strategic environment.
Regarding rhetoric-focused empirical studies, recent years have seen a growing interest in analyzing the rhetorical strategies of U.S. and South Korean leaders. Scholars such as Inderjeet Parmar^[5] and Mary E. Stuckey^[6] have examined how the foreign policy discourse of American presidents reflects ideological transformations. In the South Korean context, particular attention has been paid to the shift from a strategy of "strategic ambiguity" under Moon Jae-in to one of "strategic clarity" under Yoon Suk-yeol^[7][8].
Despite a growing body of scholarship on presidential rhetoric, there remains a notable lack of comparative studies specifically examining the foreign policy discourse of U.S. and South Korean leaders. In addition, the relationship between presidential rhetoric and the responses of international partners or adversaries is often underexplored, limiting our understanding of rhetorical impact on foreign policy dynamics. Furthermore, there is insufficient attention to the discursive dimension of foreign policy, particularly during the crucial period of 2022–2024, marked by intensified geopolitical tensions and leadership transitions in both countries. Thus, while existing literature provides a robust theoretical and empirical basis for analyzing rhetorical strategies, comparative analysis of the foreign policy rhetoric of U.S. and South Korean presidents during the 2017–2024 period remains limited. This study aims to fill this gap.

United States
President Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric was marked by nationalism and unilateralism. His “America First” slogan became a symbol of a transactional, interest-based diplomacy that rejected many traditional alliances and multilateral institutions^[9]. His stance on North Korea, dominated by the rhetoric of “maximum pressure”^[10], portrayed the U.S. as a coercive actor seeking denuclearization through sanctions and threat of force^[11]. Trump also personalized diplomacy, embracing summit-based, leader-centric engagement — notably with Kim Jong-un — while oscillating between hostile and conciliatory language^[12].
Biden’s foreign policy rhetoric represents a return to liberal internationalism, centering on democratic values, alliance cohesion, and rule-based order. His speeches emphasized restoring trust in the U.S. as a global leader and reaffirming commitment to alliances, especially with South Korea^[13]. A key rhetorical shift was the identification of China as a systemic challenge and a renewed focus on value-based coalitions, illustrated by initiatives such as the Summit for Democracy^[14].

South Korea

President Moon’s discourse was deeply rooted in the language of peace and engagement. He emphasized South Korea’s role as a mediator in inter-Korean affairs, often pursuing a dialogue-based approach in contrast to the U.S.'s coercive strategies^[15]. His government advocated for economic cooperation, humanitarian exchanges, and step-by-step trust building with the North^[16]. President Yoon reversed Moon’s approach, employing a firm and realist rhetoric centered on deterrence and alliance with the U.S. and Japan. He introduced the concept of South Korea as a Global Pivotal State^[17], framing its foreign policy as proactive, globally responsible, and rooted in shared democratic values^[18]. Yoon’s discourse marked a shift toward “value diplomacy”, stressing ideological alignment with liberal democracies and criticizing North Korea’s provocations^[19].

Thus, the comparison of presidential rhetoric in the U.S. and South Korea between 2017 and 2024 reveals several significant shifts in foreign policy orientation and discursive strategy. First, the contrast between Trump and Biden reflects a deeper pide between realist-unilateralist and constructivist-liberal paradigms. While Trump framed international politics in terms of competition, strength, and deal-making, Biden emphasized norms, cooperation, and collective identity. Similarly, Moon’s discourse echoed elements of constructivism and pacifism, focusing on identity and reconciliation, whereas Yoon’s rhetoric embraced a realist logic of deterrence and strategic alignment. Second, the rhetoric of both American and South Korean leaders indicates a shift in regional priorities. While North Korea remained a central theme, the increasing focus on China as a systemic rival — especially under Biden and Yoon — marks a reconfiguration of strategic discourse, from peninsula-specific concerns to broader geopolitical rivalries. Third, the domestic political context played a key role in shaping external rhetoric. Trump's rhetoric mirrored his populist, anti-establishment agenda, while Biden’s narrative resonated with liberal democratic restoration. In South Korea, Moon’s rhetorical emphasis on peace reflected a progressive political agenda, while Yoon’s discourse aligned with conservative calls for stronger national defense and global status. Finally, rhetoric has proven to be not merely reflective but constitutive of foreign policy. Presidential language helps frame alliances, set priorities, and signal intentions to both domestic and international audiences. The evolving discursive patterns within the U.S.–South Korea alliance highlight how words shape the perception and functioning of bilateral relations.
This comparative analysis of presidential foreign policy rhetoric in the U.S. and South Korea reveals significant stylistic and conceptual differences, reflecting broader ideological, strategic, and political shifts. Theoretically, the study supports the idea that rhetoric structures foreign policy behavior, reinforcing or transforming existing frameworks of international engagement. In practice, understanding rhetorical dynamics is essential for analyzing how foreign leaders perceive, react to, and anticipate each other’s moves in a complex international environment. Thus, presidential rhetoric not only communicates policy but helps shape the strategic landscape itself — influencing alliances, deterrence strategies, and the broader narratives through which international relations unfold.

Rhetoric/Discourse/Framework table for every president in the specified timeframe

Compiled by the authors using open-source materials

^[1] Simon, Herbert A. 1955. “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69 (1): 99–118. Reprinted in Simon, Models of Man (1957): 241–260.

^[2] Stein, Janice Gross. 2013. “Threat Perception in International Relations.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

^[3] Walt, Stephen M. 2010. “Hawks, Doves, and Realists.” Foreign Policy, July 28. https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/07/28/hawks-doves-and-realists/.

^[4] Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

^[5] Parmar, Inderjeet. 2020. “Racial Liberal Internationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 33(3): 403–421.

^[6] Stuckey, Mary E. 2018. Political Rhetoric and Presidential Discourse: The Instrumental President. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

^[7] Kim, Jiyoon. 2022. “From Strategic Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity: South Korea’s Diplomatic Shift under Yoon.” East Asia Forum, August 12.

^[8] Lee, Seungjoo. 2021. “The Moon Administration’s Foreign Policy: Achievements and Limitations.” Korean Journal of International Studies 19(2): 145–160.

^[9] The Inaugural Address. (2025, January 20). The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/remarks/2025/01/the-inaugural-address/

^[10] Haas, B. (2017, November 8). Trump warns North Korea’s Kim Jong-un: ‘Don’t try us’. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/08/trump-direct-message-to-kim-jong-un-dont-try-us-north-korea-south-assembly

^[11] Walt, S. M. (2010). Hawks, doves and realists. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/07/28/hawks-doves-and-realists/

^[12] Simon, H. A. Op.cit. P, 99-118.

^[13] Biden, J. R. (2021). Remarks by President Biden on America’s place in the world. U.S. Department of State.

^[14] U.S. Department of State. (2023). Summit for Democracy. https://www.state.gov/summit-for-democracy

^[15] Presidential Speeches: Korea.net : The official website of the Republic of Korea. (n.d.). Retrieved 19 April 2025, from https://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Presidential-Speeches/view?articleId=209056&categoryId=111&language=A020101&pageIndex=10

^[16] In pictures: The historic Korean summit. (n.d.). Retrieved 19 April 2025, from https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2018/04/world/korea-summit-cnnphotos/

^[17] Suk-yeol, Y. (2022, February 8). South Korea Needs to Step Up. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-korea/south-korea-needs-step-yoon-suk-yeol

^[18] Yoon, S. Y. (2022). Address to the National Assembly. Office of the President, Republic of Korea

^[19] Camp David Principles: A New Compass for Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperation. (n.d.). The Government of Japan - JapanGov -. Retrieved 19 April 2025, from https://www.japan.go.jp/kizuna/2023/10/camp_david_principles.html