Avoiding the Exclusive Integration Trap: Envisioning Russian Foreign Policy in the Asian-Pacific

Author: Kazushige Kobayashi, PhD student in International Relations at the Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Switzerland

 

The single most important lesson world leaders learned from the Ukrainian crisis is that a policy of exclusive cooperation would be neither effective nor sustainable in the long run. In the Western media, a sensational theory is widespread that the Ukrainian crisis emerged from Russian “imperial” ambition to keep Ukraine in its “sphere of influence”. Yet a closer examination of the negotiation process reveals that, in principle, Russia’s position was not that Ukraine should never be integrated into the Western political and economic architecture. From the very beginning, Russia opposed to the Western encirclement of Ukraine, that is, endorsing an EU association to Ukraine as a means of containing or isolating Russia. Indeed, Russian policymakers repeatedly pushed for a tri-party Russia-Ukraine-EU association, which would have minimized the possibility of excluding Russia from the regional integration process. Considering Russia’s grave contribution to European livelihood and economic activities (in terms of reliable and cost-competitive energy), EU’s political motto “We want Ukraine but not Russia” was indeed diplomatically an immature move, with a series of political repercussions for the region and beyond.

       

Unfortunately, the problematic practice of exclusive cooperation is common in international politics. America’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) project, which aims to integrate the Pacific trade arena while excluding China participating in it, is a vivid example. The controversial membership suspension for Russia in the G8 group is another instance, which has drawn stark criticism from one of the senior directors at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations Stewart M. Patrick:

 

But let’s not kid ourselves. The G7 may be useful for coordinating policies among like-minded countries. But the time is long gone when any of the world’s most critical problems could be resolved within a cozy Western boardroom.

 

But one’s failure is always a lesson for somebody else. Then, what can Russia learn from the Western misconduct?

       

Russia’s deepening cooperation with China needs to be an inclusive process embedded in the wider framework of Eurasian regional cooperation. Particularly since the onset of the Ukrainian crisis, Russian-Chinese cooperation has risen to a historic level. Not only have Russia and China signed a mega-energy deal, but bilateral exchanges in political, economic, cultural, educational, and humanitarian domains have also shown a significant increase. While European powers chose to stay in the “cozy Western boardroom”, for the first time Chinese soldiers participated in the grand parade on 9 May, enshrining a new era for Russian-Chinese partnership. However, as the Russian-Chinese partnership accelerates, we cannot exclude a possibility that small and medium countries in the region (mis)perceiving it as a bid for tandem regional domination by Russia and China. The problem here is that, even though Russia has no intention of “dominating” the region, a grand partnership of the two most powerful nations in the Asia-Pacific might stir paranoia among less powerful neighbors. Hence, an upcoming challenge for Russia would be how to present this new partnership as a practice of joint leadership, which contributes not only to regional prosperity but also to world peace.

 

In this context, Russian foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region should be multi-vector. A multi-vector policy entails several key elements, including (1) the diversification of cooperative relations in the region; (2) the maintenance of an inclusive regional dialogue; and (3) the institutionalization of multilateral relations. To begin with, as Russia seeks to deepen its partnership with China, road for bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other regional states (India, South Korea, and ASEAN members, among others) must be kept open. Particularly, Russian-Chinese partnership needs to be advanced in a way that it does not completely disregard the core interest of other key regional players, India and Japan. In addition, the positive development in Russian-Chinese relations needs to be presented as a joint leadership project which does not only advance the interests of Russian and Chinese people but also brings benefits to a wider web of diverse citizens inhabiting in the economically dynamic Eurasian region.

 

Last but not least, the acceleration of Russian-Chinese bilateral relations should be crystallized in a form of regional institutionalization. To date, the Asia-Pacific region has been a least institutionalized region in the world (with the notable exception of the ASEAN structure). This is a reflection of the pertinent lack of regional leadership since the end of the Second World War, where China had been more domestically focused and Japan was entrapped into its imperial trauma. Today, with the rise of China and the re-emergence of Russia as a key global power, we live in a pivotal era with the vacuum of regional leadership being increasingly fulfilled. The recent inception of the Eurasian Economic Union and the headline-making establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are both manifestations of the changing dynamics. With the acceleration of regional institutionalization, Russian-Chinese partnership is expected to function as a central coordination mechanism to ensure inclusiveness, coherence, and integration of the regional institutional architecture. In other words, the Eurasian Economic Union should not be advanced in a way that excludes China, and the Chinese-led Silk Road project should also seek to actively incorporate Russia into its process of realization. Likewise, in a new future, a roadmap should be drafted on how these newly emerging regional institutions can ensure active participation of other states in the region.

 

Paradoxically, the model of exclusive integration is inherently prone to instability and fragmentation, which, in turn, only invites further disintegration in the region. Russia along with China should be cautious not to repeat the same failure and position ourselves in a wider picture. Simply put, a grand blueprint for the Eurasian integration should not be a puzzle that artificially combines Russian Eurasia and Chinese Eurasia, but a singular monolithic vision that foresees a common future of peace and prosperity, marshaled by an inclusive, joint-leadership of Russia and China.