Salvaging what can be saved! – or: From the “Common European Home” to the “Europe of Cooperation”?

According to some leading Russian publicists, Gorbachev’s idea of a “Common European Home” for official Russian policy is gone for good – possibly for a large part of Russia’s population as well. The former Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov reiterated this reality recently, when he stated: “There will definitely be no return to the autumn of 2013. We are drifting apart – not for years, but for decades to come!”

For those seeking a sustainable de-escalation in the new East-West conflict, this statement can be seen as the current worst-case scenario. Those that envisioned a solution in the “Common European Home” must now wonder what alternatives are possible. Before considering the development of completely new concepts, it might be helpful to return once more to the idea of the “Common European Home.” There may be momentums from this concept that could be maintained both in the present time and the near future, even within a changed geopolitical framework. The relevant political players in the West (USA/EU) and in Russia must simply be firmly determined to do so. Tellingly, Ivanov himself recently provided some constructive hints in this direction:

“For too long, we have been trying to build this house from the roof down, rather than from the foundation – with political declarations, rather than concrete actions. [...] Therefore, the most practical and efficient thing right now would be to build cooperation around concrete issues where our interests are objectively the same.”

A closer examination will show that most of the ‘essentials’ could be implemented as individual projects, even outside of the “Common European Home” concept. An essential prerequisite for this, however, would be to say goodbye to the debate on value-related issues, which is invariably a voluntaristic construction and a political instrument! What would be desirable instead is a simultaneous, gradual defusing of the mutual zero-sum game policy between the West and Russia.

Essentially, four levels of action may be identified: the military-political level, the level of politics in a narrow sense, the economic level, and the level of civil society. At every level, there are realistic short-term and long-term objectives to be developed for a policy of de-escalation.

The Military-Political Level

• The ultimate goal has been and will be the prevention of a ‘hot war’ between Russia and the West.

• If this goal is taken seriously, then any steps bending towards a (new or old) cold war must be nipped in the bud. This would specifically include the following:

o Strict adherence to all treaties on disarmament and arms control;

o De-escalation of rhetoric;

o Reviving a continuous dialogue between NATO and Russia within the framework of old or to-be-developed multilateral formats;

o Stopping combat operations in Ukraine and freezing the Ukraine conflict on the basis of the Minsk II Agreement;

o Immediately stopping any and all unilateral activities for building a missile shield;

o Immediately stopping any ‘modernization’ and/or new deployment of nuclear weapons on European territory between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains; this includes the deployment of medium and short-range nuclear weapon delivery systems as well;

o Resuming negotiations between NATO and Russia for the gradual reduction of strategic nuclear weapon systems, as well as the control and limitation of conventional weapon systems;

o Setting up a demilitarized corridor between the eastward-expanded NATO and Russia;

o Revaluating the OSCE; starting a new ‘Helsinki Process’ to create a new policy of détente and a renewed ‘Paris Charter’;

o Stopping any further territorial NATO expansion; opening negotiations between NATO and Russia to build a new transatlantic security architecture with Russia as an equal partner.

The Level of Politics in the Narrow Sense

• On this level, the primary short-term objective could be in Igor Ivanov’s own words: “Our common goal is to move past this dangerous period with as little collateral damage as possible.”

• All players would be called upon to break the spiral of escalation through some material and symbolic moves (such as visa-free travel).

• Post-Soviet countries must be relieved from the binary choice between either Russia or the West at political, military and economic levels.

• After freezing the Ukraine conflict, a solution for the Crimea providing a rule for its subsequent legal affiliation to one state or another should be found.

• Any sanctions imposed in the wake of the Ukraine conflict should be abandoned by all sides.

• A constructive and ‘project-related’ cooperation on an equal footing between the West and Russia should be sought in all areas of common interest. Such areas include fighting Islamist terrorism, the proliferation of fissile materials, and climate change. Some promising approaches towards such ‘project-related’ cooperation have been the negotiation of the Minsk Agreement and the Iran Nuclear Deal.

• As confrontation would be contrasted with successful cooperation in certain fields over time, the general pattern of escalation gradually would erode.

The Economic Level

• After all sides lift their imposed sanctions, halted collaborations should be resumed and further developed as soon as possible.

• Mutual economic interdependencies (e.g. in the energy sector) should be specifically sought, promoted and consolidated.

• A common economic area ranging from Lisbon to as far as Vladivostok should be envisaged and implemented step by step.

The Level of Civil Society

• The primary objective within civil society would be to stop the growing alienation between the people in Russia and in the West by implementing a new “culture of listening and direct dialogue”.

• In this process, the first priority would be the reconstruction of trust on all levels.

• Trust can neither be ordered nor be restored by decree. Even with absolute determination, the reconstruction of trust would need some conducive basic conditions that inspire all sides to cooperate in joint projects. Trust will grow through successful cooperation over time. In this field, official policy – provided it is based on goodwill – would have a number of options to support civil society initiatives by advancing suitable basic conditions.

• The reconstruction of trust should be understood as being a ‘cross-sectional task.’ It should be specifically addressed within the framework of all existing bilateral and multilateral contacts (including economic contacts, town twinning agreements, youth exchange, inter-denominational dialogues and sports).

Preliminary Conclusion

The “Common European Home” may be an untenable vision in today’s geopolitical framework. However, the loss of this whole vision may not be a disaster, provided all sides would be willing to ‘bake smaller rolls’ instead. This would relieve the pressure of an increasingly difficult vision and endless value-related disputes. A pragmatic and project-related course of action could end escalation and begin the reconstruction of trust. A more peaceful coexistence in Europe could be possible. In other words: The proponents of a policy of de-escalation should focus on a somewhat less ambitious, more down-to-earth project and build a “Europe of Cooperation” “around concrete issues”.

Within such a pragmatic starting position, the essential momentums of the original “Common European Home” could still be realized – perhaps even more easily!