Misperception and Reality

Who are the real "Realists?" International Relations Realists or Cold Warriors?

November 13, 2015
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“Leslie Gelb speaks for much of the US foreign policy establishment, writes Walter Laquer, “when he says that ... ‘It is totally unrealistic . . . to think that the West can gain desired Russian restraint and cooperation without dealing with Moscow as a great power that possesses real and legitimate interests, especially in its border areas’.”
 
In contrast to Gelb, Cold Warrior Laquer contends that: "[t]he problem with this 'realist' analysis is that it is filled with wishful thinking and contradictions that ignore reality."  This sounds strange to me,  a "realist." Usually, what Laquer says about realist analysis is precisely what realists say about anti-realists.  Realism, by definition, strives to be realistic.  So, the key question is: Can Laquer seriously argue that he is more realistic than Gelb?  Isn't it rather the failed Russia policies of people who think like Laquer that are "filled with wishful thinking and contradictions that ignore reality."?   
 
Laquer's flimsy argument boils down to something like this:  Realists like Gelb are wrong because (1) Russia is ruled by one man, Putin; (2) Siloviki like Patrushev are implacably anti-Western and their influence on Putin has been increasing. (3) Therefore, conciliatory policy towards Russia is "filled with wishful thinking and contradictions that ignore reality." He cites one 19th-century theologian and philosopher, Vladimir Solovyov, to bolster his view of what Russians are like.  
 
But Russia not a one-man show, and there are many Russian scholars with views on Russians that are very different from Solovyov's. Russia has a strong, many would say authoritarian, leader who listens to many different people.  He listens to many who are not his friends, including many who disagree with him. He is an unusually good listener.  Putin tried hard, roughly between 2000 and 2011, to forge an alliance with the West;  He strove for an alliance in which Russia would be on an equal footing with the US or, as Trenin puts it, "at least a member of the Western Politburo."  Putin prefered a friendly relationship with the West but, if not friendly, at least business-like and based on common interests.  
 
This policy line failed utterly and, as a result, Putin shifted to a more confrontational stance towards the West.  He is now convinced that Russia needs to be strong in order to realize its vital interests.  He therefore now leans more towards siloviki (hardline) advisors like Patrushev.  But Patrushev is just a Russian John McCain. Patrushev's implacable anti-Western thinking, like McCain's anti-Russian thinking, will not change. But Patrushev's influence will most likely decline if US-Russia relations improve.  The more the US acts as Russia's enemy, the more the influence of the Patrushevs in Russia's decisionmaking elite will increase. If instead the US crafts policy that takes Russia's vital interests into account, the influence of such hardliners will decline.  
 
Is this argument of mine "wishful thinking and contradictions that ignore reality."?  As I see it, the sooner the community of US Russia specialists in government and academia rids itself of Cold War thinking like Laquer's, the sooner our country will be able to develop sensible and effective Russia policies.
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