This is how the Russian historian and diplomat Alexander Hilferding, who had served as a consul in Bosnia and Macedonia, posed the problem of studying the countries and peoples of the Balkan Peninsula 150 years ago. Being a proponent of the Slavophile branch of Russian public thought, he was, nonetheless, far removed from idealistic and metaphysical constructions, preferring instead to assess the situation in the region from specific and pragmatic positions. Today, Hilferding's musings and assessments would be of much use to the new generation of diplomats and experts interested in Southeast Europe.

In 2016, the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation was announced. The absence of such concepts as "the Balkans," "Serbia" and "Southeast Europe" in the text of the Concept clearly reflects Russia's influence and opinions on the subject. The Concept only mentions "Europe" and the "Euro-Atlantic region." Calling the Balkans a part of the Euro-Atlantic region is not entirely correct, since over recent years, the economic, political and ideological influence of other important actors in the region, including new ones, has grown significantly. These actors are primarily China, but also Turkey and several Middle Eastern states.

The presence of many actors with diverging interests in the fragmented post-conflict Balkan space demonstrates that the situation in the region would be more properly assessed not as part of the "Russia–West" or "Russia–West–China" paradigm, but within the paradigm of multilateral competition that, under certain circumstances, might devolve into the "natural condition of mankind" as described by Thomas Hobbes.

These circumstances prompt a detailed consideration of the actors present in this complicated region and their interests. Such an analysis is needed from both the theoretical and practical standpoints, as it will allow us to outline the entire range of contradictions in the region, determine the points where interests coincide and diverge for expert dialogue, and reduce the likelihood of conflicts recurring in the region. From the point of view of Russia's interests, this analysis will help assess Russia's stance in Southeast Europe with greater precision and help develop a strategy for interacting with the countries of the region.

The Balkans are also important for Russia–Europe, Russia–EU and Russia–NATO relations. In the future, this region may hold a significant place in the emerging architecture of relations with two of Russia's neighbours: China and Turkey. The people in this region are culturally close and politically sympathetic to Russia, and are not concentrated in Serbia alone, but in other countries as well [2]. Consequently, this is where Russia's stance can find the greatest understanding and support.

However, Russia does not have as much influence in the Balkans as the Western media would traditionally have us believe pushing its "Russian threat" narrative. Montenegro's accession to NATO in 2017 and the expansion of the Alliance's military infrastructure and logistics into Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina reflect the problems and drawbacks in Russia's foreign policy. If in the 2000s, Russia's task was to "stop NATO's expansion," then the country risks failing in this task now. The inclusion of Serbia – Russia's strategic partner– in these processes additionally complicates the picture and makes Russia an "obstacle" from the point of view of Euro-Atlantic integration. Equally, the increasing presence of Turkey, several Arab countries and China blurs the "historical" presence in the region, making it less significant and more of a "cultural and folkloric" phenomenon, although here too Moscow's influence is not entirely clear [3].

Today, the Russian strategy, which is based on a reactive approach and the singling out of exclusive partners, can only provide limited response to these challenges. This requires an inclusive approach that would be based on a broad vision of regional development and the dynamics of the changes taking place. This paper is dedicated to developing such an approach.

#5aThat was the situation in Southeast Europe in 1860 as seen from imperial St. Petersburg. Centuries pass, empires pass into oblivion… How should we assess the situation in the Balkans today?

In the regional dimension, the key issues are the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the problem of centralization and the problem of Republika Srpska) and Macedonia (the problem of changing its name and the problem of its relations with its neighbours). Changes in those republics, as in the situation with bringing Montenegro into NATO in 2015–2017, are implemented under the slogan of combatting the "subversive Russian influence." The Kosovo situation is a special problem, as is that of the Serbian minority in the north of the region, which acquired a new dimension after the Brussels Agreement was signed on April 19, 2013. [5]

In macro-regional terms, the situation in Southeast Europe is defined by a combination of the region's growing transit significance and its peripheral socioeconomic standing.

Today, nine actors have detectable influence in the region, each differing in their significance, capabilities and goals. For the sake of clarity, let us call them "play makers" (those who set the tone), "flanking players" (those who exercise significant, yet non-systemic influence) and "role players" (whose role and tasks are either situational or poorly predictable). Such division appears provisional, but it largely reflects the real balance of powers.

It is clear that the United States, the European Union and China have the greatest capabilities for influencing the situation in Southeast Europe, and it would be proper to call them "leading actors" or "play makers."

Traditionally, the United Kingdom, Turkey and Russia have major influence in the region. Due to their geographical location, as well as their political and economic influence, they would be properly classified as "second-order actors" or "flanking players."

Simultaneously, one can discern the influence of the Visegrád Group with the participation of Austria, as well as the Arab oil countries, which in the future may claim the role of "second-order actors," but today, they are rather "role players."

The so-called "non-state actors" (Islamists, refugees, organized crime groups, semi-systemic and non-systemic political forces) form a separate category. Without having full-fledged agency, they are, nonetheless, an integral part of the region. For that reason, they can be called "wild cards." Due to their specifics, "wild cards" can act both in conjunction with each other and interact with actors of a higher order. The presence of "wild cards" increases the level of unpredictability in the region.

Thus, the region has three groups of actors ("leading" actors, "second-order actors," "entrants" and "wild cards"). The presence of a certain "hierarchical" element entails actors of different levels interacting in order to advance their interests.

Although this configuration has structural elements (the expansion of the European Union and NATO), one cannot fail to notice that the interests of leading actors (primarily of the United States and the European Union) are not fully identical. Thus, the interests of the United States are more pragmatic and selfish and they affect the military and political sphere, while the European Union is forced to deal with issues of economic development and political settlement. In economics and energy, the United States is more of a "spoiler" in relation to the European Union, while Russia and Turkey could claim the role of a "constructive partner." These circumstances untie China's hands, which is left to implement its own action plan in the region.

Since Russia is a second-order actor in the emerging structure of interactions, its most apparent role is that of a partner of one of the "higher" actors (the United States, China and the European Union). Still, hypothetically, alternative configurations are also possible.