The Unsettled Maghreb

Political developments in the Maghreb continue to be defined by a combination of historical contradictions and contemporary challenges. The competition between Algeria and Morocco, the Western Sahara issue, persistent instability in Libya, and the repercussions of crises in the Middle East remain important elements of the regional agenda.

What processes have shaped the modern political configuration of the Maghreb? How significant is the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco? How do the Libyan crisis and events in the Middle East affect the policies of North African states? Vladimir Orlov, Professor at Department of History of the Middle East Countries, Institute of Asian and African Studies, Lomonosov Moscow State University, answered these and other questions in an interview with the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). The interview was conducted by Ivan Bocharov, RIAC Program Manager.

Political developments in the Maghreb continue to be defined by a combination of historical contradictions and contemporary challenges. The competition between Algeria and Morocco, the Western Sahara issue, persistent instability in Libya, and the repercussions of crises in the Middle East remain important elements of the regional agenda.

What processes have shaped the modern political configuration of the Maghreb? How significant is the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco? How do the Libyan crisis and events in the Middle East affect the policies of North African states? Vladimir Orlov, Professor at Department of History of the Middle East Countries, Institute of Asian and African Studies, Lomonosov Moscow State University, answered these and other questions in an interview with the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). The interview was conducted by Ivan Bocharov, RIAC Program Manager.

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– Vladimir Viktorovich, what factors, in your opinion, determine the political processes in the Maghreb today?

– Several factors can be highlighted here. First and foremost is the colonial legacy, which united the Maghreb countries, territories, and cultural areas into a large and quite heterogeneous imperial system. On the other hand, the processes of struggle for independence and subsequent self-development, which led to a high degree of competition among the development models of the region’s states, have played a significant role.

Further worth highlighting is the long-standing rivalry between Algeria and Morocco as the two leaders of the Maghreb, who are quite close in terms of their capabilities. If their potentials differed significantly, a mono-regional order would likely have formed, and there would be far fewer issues.

Morocco, of course, is inferior to Algeria in terms of natural resources, but it has good relations with Western countries and a number of other advantages. In fact, it has established control over Western Sahara, which is also highly significant.

The historical prerequisites for Maghreb unity also refer to the region’s geography: it is bounded to the north by the Mediterranean Sea, to the west by the Atlantic Ocean, and to the east by Egypt and the Nile Valley. To the south lies the Sahel, which today is increasingly becoming a sort of extension of the Maghreb space.

– Can the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco be considered as the main structuring factor of Maghreb politics?

– This is a very significant rivalry because it is comprehensive. On the one hand, it has a political dimension. The most obvious example is the long-term support by Algerian intelligence agencies, government, and army of Western Saharan political figures, irregulars, and independence supporters. This is important because Western Sahara provides access to the Atlantic, which would be an extremely valuable circumstance for Algeria. On the other hand, this issue also has a cultural dimension.

One may recall this episode: before the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, the Algerian sports authority ordered training shirts for its team featuring a pattern of the El Mechouar Palace, located in Tlemcen in western Algeria. This city has a controversial historical legacy: in different periods, it was ruled by both Algerian and Moroccan leaders. This provoked such a massive campaign of criticism on social media in Morocco that, although the Algerian national team did not qualify for the World Cup, the pattern itself effectively ended up being boycotted. This shows just how sensitive this issue remains.

For Morocco, the confrontation with Algeria also holds political-symbolic significance. A telling tragic episode occurred in 1994, when European tourists were shot dead at the “Atlas-Asni” hotel in Marrakech. The Moroccan authorities, without even completing the investigation, suggested a possible Algerian connection. Similar accusations on other matters have also been made by the Algerian side.

The rivalry between Algeria and Morocco also extends to countries south of the Sahara. Two different models clash here. Algeria largely relies on states that support Western Sahara’s right to self-determination, whereas Morocco seeks to strengthen its influence through education, economic cooperation, and humanitarian projects. The concept of Algerian-Moroccan confrontation remains relevant and is fueled by both historical and contemporary political, diplomatic, and military factors.

– How has the role of the Western Sahara issue in regional politics changed over the past two decades?

– Approaches have changed over different periods. In the 2000s, when the current King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, had just come to power (he assumed office in 1999, like Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika), the Moroccan leadership believed that Western Sahara was incapable of functioning as a fully independent state. It was assumed that, in the absence of Moroccan control over the territory, it would be under the Algerian area of influence.

In 2007, Morocco proposed broad autonomy for Western Sahara. Under Mohammed VI, the country has generally undergone extensive decentralization. Historically, the kingdom has always been distinguished by pronounced regional diversity: Fez, Marrakech, Meknes, and Rabat played special roles. Following the constitutional reforms prompted by the Arab Spring events, the regions gained significant powers and budget autonomy. Western Sahara was effectively offered to become one such region.

For part of the local Sahrawi population, the aspiration for a separate national identity and statehood in the form of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic persists. However, Morocco combined strict administrative control with large-scale socio-economic integration of the territory. Significant resources were directed to the region, infrastructure was built, and incentives for relocation and employment were created.

A serious turning point was the official recognition by the United States of Western Sahara as part of Morocco. For Algeria, this was a serious political blow, as for many years, Algerian diplomacy had proceeded from the assumption that Western countries would not take such a step. This decision was largely viewed as part of a broader deal related to the normalization of relations between Morocco and Israel. The logic of the Donald Trump administration was largely transactional, and this issue was embedded precisely into such a system of political concessions.

Today, the Western Sahara issue has somewhat lost its former acuteness. It could certainly become a source of tension again, but at the moment it is difficult to see forces that would be interested in deliberately escalating the situation. It can be said that at this stage, Morocco has achieved significant success in defending its position, and Algeria has not yet shown a readiness to actively challenge this outcome.

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– To what extent do Algeria-Morocco relations today depend on their interaction with external partners?

– In 2021, diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco were severed once again, far from the first time. Simultaneously, the sides conducted unfriendly military-political actions, including exercises in border areas.

The external factor influences the regional order in the Maghreb in a more indirect way. In recent years, both under President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and under Abdelmadjid Tebboune, Algeria has formed complicated relations with France, the European Union, and the U.S. Morocco, on the contrary, thanks to a steady “pro-American pivot,” remains one of the key U.S. allies in the region and is among their major beyond NATO partners.

For instance, a center for emergency landing of spacecraft and aircraft operated for a long time at the Ben Guerir air base. Morocco also receives modern Western weapons on favorable terms.

In the modern regional order, a split is intensifying, somewhat reminiscent of the situation in the 16th–19th centuries, when Morocco remained separate from the Ottoman Empire, whereas Algeria was a border Ottoman province with a pronounced military organization. Today, the external factor operates similarly: Morocco is increasingly focusing on cooperation with the West and developing partnerships with Israel, including within the framework of the Abraham Accords.

Algeria, on the contrary, consistently supports the two-state solution to the Palestinian issue and takes a firm pro-Palestinian stance. Israel previously had observer status in the African Union, but Algeria and South Africa actively opposed this participation, and eventually its status was revised. Particularly after the events in Gaza in 2023, the differences between Algeria and Morocco on this issue have intensified.

Regarding Russia, Algeria remains one of the largest buyers of Russian weapons and an important partner for Russia in Africa. The Algerian authorities have traditionally acted as intermediaries for Russian interests in the region, but at the same time are wary of the independence of Russian policy in the Sahel, preferring that Moscow take into account their own vision of the region. Russia maintains constructive relations with Morocco, based on a long history of cooperation and having no explicit ideological coloration.

The historical difference between Algeria and Morocco is largely tied to their different colonial experiences. Algeria experienced a large-scale war of independence against France (1954–1962), accompanied by significant human losses and deep societal trauma. The French leadership of that period, including Charles de Gaulle, viewed Algeria as an integral part of France.

Morocco, in contrast, was a protectorate and retained more flexible institutional continuity. The French resident Louis-Hubert Lyautey, architect of the protectorate system, built relations with the Moroccan Sultan in the form of a political balance, rather than direct colonial integration.

These differences largely determined the subsequent political culture: Algeria as a revolutionary-type state, Morocco as a more evolutionarily successive political entity. Hence the different nature of foreign policy models: in the case of Algeria, more ideologized; in the case of Morocco, more pragmatic.

– How does the Palestinian issue affect the foreign policy of Algeria and Morocco?

– This issue is significantly more complex than it might seem. Algeria experienced the afflictive consequences of the civil war in the 1990s. It was not equivalent to the War of Independence (1954–1962), but a conflict with massive human losses and deep societal division. Part of the population supported the Islamists, while the other part opposed radical Islamization.

At the same time, the Algerian leadership during the presidency of Abdelmadjid Bouteflika’s consistently pursued a policy of national reconciliation, trying to separate radical groups from moderate ones. Algerian Islamist movements, including the “Movement of Society for Peace,” are close in some characteristics to the “Muslim Brotherhood,” but do not have such a radical agenda.

Moroccan policy regarding Islamism is largely more institutionally stable. The King, as a descendant of the Prophet, holds a special religious position, which reduces the potential for radical Islamist movements in the country. In mass perception, the idea of an “Islamic state” is often associated with the monarchy and the existing order, which limits the attractiveness of extremist projects.

Regarding the Palestinian issue, positions also differ. In Algeria, part of the political forces and public groups traditionally support the Palestinian movement, including Hamas, but it is generally not about direct military support. This is largely due to the state’s consistent pro-Palestinian line.

In Morocco, both Palestinian and Moroccan Jews are seen as part of a single historical community. The mass emigration of Moroccan Jews to Israel occurred gradually and was not completely disruptive. Many of them retained an identity connected to Morocco.

At the same time, for the Moroccan leadership, Israel has become an important technological and political partner. Algeria, especially in the military environment, maintains a much tougher stance, and recognizing Israel as a strategic partner is perceived as extremely difficult.

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– How are various Palestinian political movements, including Fatah and Hamas, perceived in Algeria?

– Until 2006, Fatah maintained its status as the main representative of the Palestinian people, despite the existence of competing movements, including Hamas, as well as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

In 2006, Hamas won the elections in the Gaza Strip, which was a turning point in intra-Palestinian politics. It is important to note that the formal proclamation of Palestinian statehood occurred back in 1988 at the session of the Palestinian National Council in Algeria, which gives Algeria symbolic significance in the Palestinian issue.

The question of Palestinian statehood remains a key element of the Middle East agenda. For Israel, especially in the logic of the governments of Benjamin Netanyahu, the creation of a full-fledged Palestinian state is perceived as a strategic threat. This shapes the policy of territorial control and military operations, including previous conflicts such as the 1982 Lebanon War.

Recent events in the Gaza Strip have become a serious challenge for Morocco’s foreign policy, as they raised the question of balance between normalizing relations with Israel and the public perception of these processes in the Arab world.

– How has cooperation between Morocco and Israel evolved since the normalization of relations?

– Morocco and Israel share multi-layered ties—economic, political, and technological. As early as 1978, secret negotiations took place in Morocco, which were part of the background of the Camp David Accords: the meeting between Moshe Dayan and Hassan Touhami was held at the residence of King Hassan II.

Today, cooperation includes the defense sector, as well as drone technology, and civilian areas. Work with diasporas plays a significant role: Morocco has a specialized state structure responsible for communication with Moroccans abroad, including Israel.

– How have the consequences of the Libyan crisis changed the balance of power and the system of regional ties in the Maghreb?

– The Libyan crisis largely destroyed the previous, rather conditional and unstable configurations of alliances in the Maghreb. Historically, Libya’s alliances in the region were situational in nature. Muammar Gaddafi pursued an extremely inconsistent foreign policy and periodically entered into unexpected alliances.

For example, between 1984 and 1986, Libya and Morocco pursued the establishment of the so-called Arab–African Union. This combination of a monarchy and a revolutionary regime looked paradoxical but was driven by pragmatic interests: Libya sought to acquire labor, while Morocco sought access to oil resources. Algeria, possessing hydrocarbon resources, could not become such a partner due to political contradictions.

In a broader context, Libya more often formed situational alliances with Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania, even discussing the creation of a Maghreb union without Morocco and Western Sahara. However, the Arab Maghreb Union, which formally still exists, has effectively lost its political significance.

The collapse of the Jamahiriya led to the decay of the relative balance and predictability of the regional system. Libya as a single state effectively ceased to function as before: the differences between the west and east of the country have deep historical roots.

The west and east of Libya traditionally developed along different trajectories. The east, Cyrenaica, is associated with the Senussi religious movement, which possessed its own politico-military structure. Tripoli, in contrast, was historically an Ottoman administrative center and later a zone of modernization.

The southern part of the country, Fezzan, represents a separate historical-geographical node, linked to trans-Saharan trade and modern smuggling routes. This is a space with a strong tribal structure and autonomous logic of behavior.

The Tuareg issue remains an additional factor of instability, extending far beyond Libya and affecting the Sahel. Muammar Gaddafi’s policy of integrating Tuaregs into state structures had the reverse effect in the long term: after the regime’s collapse, a significant portion of weapons ended up in their hands.

Thus, the Libyan crisis has intensified the fragmentation of the region and increased the situational nature of all foreign policy alliances in the Maghreb.

– What role does Tunisia play in the regional politics of the Maghreb?

– Tunisia has traversed a complex trajectory from democratic transition during the Arab Spring to a more rigid centralized model of governance. At the same time, its foreign policy role remains largely limited by the country’s objective size and level of economic development.

Historically, Tunisia has taken a pronounced pro-Palestinian position. After the events of 1982, when Palestinian structures left Lebanon, a significant part of their leadership moved precisely to Tunisia. The country has often served as a political “reserve center” of the Arab world.

For instance, after Egypt’s expulsion from the League of Arab States (LAS), it was Tunisia that temporarily assumed some of the organization’s institutional functions, and Tunisian diplomat Chedli Klibi became the secretary general of the LAS.

At the same time, domestic limitations—its small market, limited industrial base and dependence on tourism—constrain the country’s foreign policy ambitions.

Within Tunisia, a structural contradiction persists between coastal regions and interior territories. This difference largely determines the country’s political dynamics and resembles the broader development model of the Maghreb countries, where the coast has historically played a leading role.

In relations with Algeria, Tunisia occupies a special position: it is perceived as a junior partner, which does not always suit the Tunisian political elite. Libya, at different periods, attempted to increase its influence on Tunisia, but the country’s internal political structures, starting from the eras of Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, sought to maintain relative autonomy in their foreign policy course.

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– What trends will determine the development of the Maghreb in the coming years?

– In the broadest sense, the Maghreb’s regional configuration appears likely to continue evolving toward a renewed version of the historical models of interaction that prevailed between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, while manifesting themselves in an entirely new context and form. In this context, it cannot be ruled out that the Algerian-Moroccan border may once again become a front of confrontation.

Morocco will likely integrate more confidently into the political and economic space of Europe and the U.S., while maintaining close cooperation with Israel. Algeria and Tunisia appear more complex and subtle cases in this regard.

Tunisia, having undergone a transition to a more authoritarian model of governance, has noticeably changed its political trajectory compared to the Arab Spring period. The eastern part of the Maghreb as a whole may demonstrate a greater orientation towards the Middle Eastern space.

Morocco, at the same time, remains a country with a pronounced Arab-Berber identity and an independent foreign policy line. The foundation of Morocco’s approach lies in the primacy of national interests, coupled with a willingness to pursue flexible diplomacy and pragmatic engagement with various centers of power, including the West and Israel, while preserving key political sensitivities and “red lines” within the Arab context.

Algeria, on the contrary, maintains an orientation towards a more traditional Arab agenda, including support for the Palestinian issue and a critical stance towards Israel. These differences are persistent and are unlikely to be radically revised in the near future.

– How closely interconnected are the domestic and foreign policies of the Maghreb states?

– The connection between domestic and foreign policy is complex and non-linear. In all countries of the region, there is a significant portion of the population with diverse ideological and religious views, including Islamically oriented groups, and state policy must take this factor into account.

Morocco has long actively supported Palestinian issues, including through the institutional mechanisms of Islamic cooperation. At the same time, the Moroccan leadership has sought to view the Middle East conflict in a more pragmatic light, avoiding rigid ideologization.

Algeria, in turn, has traditionally taken a consistent pro-Palestinian stance, which complicates its perception as a neutral mediator but simultaneously strengthens its internal political legitimacy.

The events of the Arab Spring had a limited impact on Algeria and Morocco. In Algeria, this is largely explained by the traumatic experience of the civil war in the 1990s; in Morocco, by the monarchy’s ability to quite effectively control political liberalization and protest moods.

Regarding changes in Algeria’s political course after 2019, they were often interpreted as a distant effect of the Arab Spring. However, a more accurate explanation is that the deterioration of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s health after his 2013 stroke led to the gradual concentration of power within a narrow circle.

– How have the events in the Gaza Strip after October 2023 affected the foreign policy positions of the Maghreb states?

– One of the key consequences of the post-2023 events has been a noticeable deterioration in Israel’s international image in the Arab world, and the Maghreb is no exception. The scale and nature of the military actions in the Gaza Strip proved extremely sensitive to public opinion in the region.

This development has accelerated the trend toward the diversification of foreign policy ties among Arab countries, including a partial retreat from deep cooperation with Israel in several sectors. At the same time, the nature and intensity of the responses among the Maghreb states have differed.

Morocco, thanks to its more flexible institutional system and the specifics of the monarchical model of power, retains the ability to maneuver between different foreign policy partners. In Algeria, where military structures and the generational shift of the political elite play a significant role, such flexibility is limited.

In the broader regional context, instability in the security system of the Middle East and North Africa is intensifying. Competition and fragmentation are increasing, including tensions in relations between the Gulf states.

For external actors, including Russia, this entails greater complexity in regional politics and the need to account for what may be described as “defective partnership,” whereby the strengthening of relations with one regional partner can inevitably complicate relations with another.

Overall, since 2023, there has been an erosion of the relatively stable configuration that emerged after the COVID-19 pandemic and a transition to a more conflictual and fragmented system of regional relations, where historical contradictions are once again gaining heightened significance.

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