Russia and Turkey: Partners, Rivals, or Neighbors by Necessity?

In the interview with the Italian magazine LIMES, RIAC President Dmitriy Trenin unpacks the multifaceted relationship between Moscow and Ankara—from economic partnership and Turkey's refusal to join anti-Russian sanctions to competition in post-Soviet Central Asia and disagreements over Libya and Syria. He examines Turkey's place in Russian Eurasian projects, the future of the Black Sea balance after the conflict in Ukraine, and touches on Russia's Middle East policy—including ties with Israel and the prospect of a Turkish-Israeli conflict. D. Trenin concludes that for Moscow, Turkey is both a “friendly state” and a complex, independent actor with whom dialogue and rivalry are inevitable.

In the interview with the Italian magazine LIMES, RIAC President Dmitriy Trenin unpacks the multifaceted relationship between Moscow and Ankara—from economic partnership and Turkey's refusal to join anti-Russian sanctions to competition in post-Soviet Central Asia and disagreements over Libya and Syria. He examines Turkey's place in Russian Eurasian projects, the future of the Black Sea balance after the conflict in Ukraine, and touches on Russia's Middle East policy—including ties with Israel and the prospect of a Turkish-Israeli conflict. D. Trenin concludes that for Moscow, Turkey is both a “friendly state” and a complex, independent actor with whom dialogue and rivalry are inevitable.

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What is Turkey for Moscow: friend or rival?

Turkey for Russia is, above all, a neighbor with a 500+ years-long history of bilateral relations. Turkey is an important and ambitious regional power. It is also one of Russia’s leading economic partners. Of corse, Turkey is a NATO member with the biggest military force in the alliance after the United States. Yet, Turkey is the only NATO country that has refused to join the sanctions regime against Russia. Thus, it is formally designated by Russia a friendly state, unlike all members of the European Union.

This does not mean that Moscow and Ankara see eye-to-eye on many important issues, including the crises over Ukraine or in Libya. However, Russians and Turks engage in a dialogue where they disagree or compete, seeking better understaning of each other’s positions, and aiming at establishing some common ground.

You've said that the Russian Federation's ignorance and lack of understanding of its neighbors can create problems. And that you consider Turkey one of its closest neighbors. What do you know about Turkey and its strategic ambitions? And what don't you know yet?

When I used that phrase in one of my interviews, I actually meant some of the new states that were formed on the territories of former Soviet republics. There, we need to do some homework. Turkey, by contrast, is a “(well-)known known”, to use Don Rumsfeld’s famous expression. In Russia, Turkey studies have a long tradition. Men as different as the late Vladimir Zhirinovsky and President Putin’s current spokesman Dmitri Peskov, were trained as Turkey experts. I have deep respect for their colleagues who do work on Turkey. I think they know all that is important to know about Turkey’s strategic ambitions. And of course President Putin himself has established a particularly close working relationship with Turkey’s President R.T. Erdogan. Last but not least, every year Turkey is visited by millions of Russian tourists and holidaymakers.

Turkey is very committed to consolidating the "Turkic world" in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, and beyond. What posture has Moscow chosen to avoid losing influence to Ankara?

The Azeris and four out of five nations in Central Asia are Turkic-speaking. No wonder Ankara has been capitalizing on those linguistic and cultural links. This is as natural as Russia advancing its interests in the Russian/Slavic world. Of course this means competition in soft power. However, the Russian civilization state – as we now call it - is a veritable “civilization of (many) civilizations”. European racists of the past used to say, “scratch a Russian, and you will discover a Tatar”. Indeed, the ethnic backbone of the Russian state has been a close union of Slavic and Turkic peoples. The historic original homeland of all Turks lies in the Altai Mountains, in southern Siberia.

That said, Moscow watches closely Ankara’s efforts to bring the various Turkic nations under the umbrella of a Turkey-led organization, but it doesn’t particularly fret over it. All Turkic-majority states of the former Soviet Union pursue multi-vector foreign policies. Turkey is but one vector. Russia no longer takes the former Soviet republics for granted, and it is learning to compete with other powers to protect and promote its legitimate interests there.

With the possible normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia, could Ankara jeopardize Russia's presence in the South Caucasus?

If you talk about Russia’s military presence, it is a matter for Moscow and Yerevan. Russia has not opposed Turkish-Armenian normalization. Armenia’s current leadership has been openly distancing the country from Russia, hoping one day to accede to the European Union. This, however, is a very long shot indeed. More likely, Armenia will find itself dependent on Turkey. It’s their business.

In my judgment, Armenia today benefits from the Russia connection (mostly, but not only economic) immensely more than Russia benefits from having a military base in Gyumri. Actually, Turkey’s own military presence in the South Caucasus was most evident in Azerbaijan. Baku, however, does not enjoy playing a little brother to Ankara. The geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus is very complex, but the countries in the region are not to be viewed as mere puppets of the great powers.

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Do you consider Turkey to be Nato's longa manus, and therefore a threat to Russia, or a free geopolitical entity with which to seek balance and cooperation?

I take Turkey’s NATO membership for all it’s worth, but I also note Ankara’s de facto special status in the alliance, especially under President Erdogan’s leadership. He has managed to win Washington’s acquiescence for Turkey’s pursuit of its regional interests – and its relations with Russia, which I have already mentioned. To the extent Turkey is acting on its own, Russia treats it as a free agent – and is ready to engage with it on the basis of a balance of interests. Syria in 2015-2025 is a case in point. As things stand now, it is other NATO countries, not Turkey, that are seen in Moscow as a clear and present danger.

Do you consider Ankara a necessary part of the Russian Federation's Eurasian projects? If so, which ones?

Russia’s continent-wide projects, such as the Greater Eurasian Partnership,

or its idea of an architecture for Eurasian security, are open to all countries in Eurasia – of course including Turkey. Ankara is certainly welcome to join, but this doesn’t mean that these projects can only work if Turkey joins. GEP and a Eurasian Security compact would clearly benefit from Turkish participation, but it is Ankara that will decide what attitude to take. No one expects, of course, expects Turkey to accede to the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Union, or the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Yet, there are other projects where Moscow is an active, even a leading force: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. These should be open to Turkey if it decides to join.

Russia, Turkey, and the Black Sea: what are the prospects once the war in Ukraine is over?

The question is what is meant here by “the war being over”. To put this difeferntly: does one mean the end of hostilitiers without a settlement or a genuine peace accord. If the former, I think that the region will remain highly unstable, replete with incidents, and tending to a resumption of war. If the latter, then I believe that Russia and Turkey will need to play a stabilizing role – not co-dominating the Black Sea, but making sure that it is not used for provocations that would upset the Ukraine peace accord.

Do Turkish strategies compromise Russian interests in the Mediterranean?

Russian and Turkish interests in the region are different on a number of issues. They may conflict in a few cases. Given mutual goodwill and a shared understanding of the importance of keeping the relationship stable, however, there can be reasonable understandings that prevent a Russo-Turkish collision, and even allow for cooperation. Moscow and Ankara, after all, managed to do this in Syria.

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Can Russian and Turkish interests coexist in Syria and Libya?

Russian interest in Syria, to put it bluntly, is to keep the air base at Hmeimin and the naval facility at Tartus, which are way stations for the Russian security presonnel and goods en route to Africa. Moscow and Damascus are still in talks about the status of their lease granted by the previous Syrian government. Russia has greatly reduced its security role in Syria proper. With Iran virtually out of the picture, Turkey is the principal foreign influencer in Syria. As for Libya, it may be more difficult. A lot will depend on Ankara’s attitute toward Western efforts to drive the Russians out of the country.

What do you think of the current relationship between Moscow and Jerusalem?

Israel, like Turkey, is designated by Russia a friendly state. The relationship is complex. Moscow has condemned the recent U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran as an aggression; Tel Aviv is unhappy, to say the least, with close relations between Moscow and Tehran. Yet, both Russia and Israel have managed to avoid an unnecessary break and keep the relationship on a working level. Israel, like Turkey, has refused to join the anti-Russian snactions regime. President Putin maintains regular contacts with Prime Minister Netanyahu. So, the relationship is as good as it gets, under the circumstances.

How important is the massive presence of Israeli citizens of Russian origin in relations with Israel?

It is an important factor in economic relations, cultural ties and people-to-people contacts. Politically, it is far less significant. Many of the Russian emigres to Israel, particularly those who came there after 2022, are opposed to Moscow’s current policies. Much more important is the generally positive attitude of President Putin toward Jewish people and the State of Israel. This has not changed since his first arrival in the Kremlin over a quarter of a century ago. The Israeli leadership’s attitude toward Russia, however, is more ambiguous.

What do you think of Israel's choice for permanent war, and what are the implications for Russia?

I understand the motives behind this, but I think Israel’s goal of permanent security is unattainable by force. I also believe the two wars against Iran, which Israel fought aloingside the United States, have provided ample proof that permanent security assured by the force of arms is a chimera. I will desist from attempting to provide unwarranted advice to the Israeli people – they will need to sort all this out themselves. As for implications for Russia, Israel’s threat of a new war against Iran logically pushes Tehran to get closer to Moscow and Beijing.

Which side will Russia be on if Turkey and Israel come to conflict?

Moscow will naturally be acting in Russia’s interests, of course. Both Turkey and Israel are Russia’s nominal friends. Which means that Moscow will not take sides and will be calling for peace and offering its good offices – alongside Washington, I trust.

First published in LIMES.