Nuclear Germany is Moscow’s Red Line

An Interview with RIAC President Dmitriy Trenin, conducted for Limes Magazine (№6, 2026) on “Do We Want Total War?”.

An Interview with RIAC President Dmitriy Trenin, conducted for Limes Magazine (№6, 2026) on “Do We Want Total War?”.

Dmitriy Trenin:
The Wars of Our Time

NATO wanted America in, Russia out, and Germany down. Today, it seems the exact opposite: America out, Russia in, and Germany up.

The United States is certainly not out, and doesn’t intend to be. America’s ties with Europe are extensive and strong. Europe’s virtually all-round dependence on the U.S. is real, and enduring, the current developments notwithstanding. As for Russia, it is in Europe geographically, but the “Europe” of the EU has built a “Russia Wall” on its eastern border. Moscow’s earnest attempt at the start of the century to integrate into a “Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok” (© Putin, 2010) has failed because the west Europeans considered Russia too big and too independent-minded. What they really wanted was a Russia as a resource following the West’s lead. Thus, no deal.

Today, Russia sees Europe as a de facto enemy. Ukraine is viewed as an instrument of Europe whose one purpose is to weaken Russia as much as possible. Kiev’s fight is presented to the European publics as “defense of Europe” from “Russian imperialism”, but Russia, in a major turn from the past, seeks no role in west-central Europe. It has formally described itself as a “civilization state”—apart from “Europe”. This closes the books on the Russians’ 300-years-plus yearning to be accepted as “Europeans”. Finally, Russia has “pivoted” to itself.

Russia has no designs on the EU countries, including the Baltic States, Poland or Finland. It has no need, no desire—and, frankly, no resources–to dominate them. Yet, Europeans’ salami tactics in the Ukraine war are testing the limits of Moscow’s patience by enabling Kiev to undertake ever more daring actions against Russia, using long-range drones. The Europeans are playing the Russian roulette that can well lead to a direct NATO-Russia clash.

Regarding Germany, I believe that that country is definitely up, more active politically and increasingly bold militarily, though it has encountered economic problems that some people call de-industrialization. Well, Berlin believes militarization might help there. My impression is that eight decades after the defeat of Nazi Germany the German elites are ready to finally shed their country’s post-WWII pacifist image and come back in a more familiar garb. Russia is not alone in paying attention.

What do you think of Germany's first postwar military doctrine, entitled "Responsibility for Europe," which considers Russia the primary threat and aims to become the leading conventional power in Europe by 2039?

I expect Germany to bid for regaining the leading role in Europe. Germany is the EU’s biggest nation, its economic powerhouse and the leading banker. Now the Germans aspire also to build the biggest army in the EU. Psychologically—though few Germans would probably admit this in public—they are looking for a chance to revenge themselves upon Russia after Hitler’s crushing defeat of 1945. Germany’s changing role in the EU due to Berlin’s clear military ambitions disguised as “responsibility”. This may raise concerns among some European partners, particularly the French and the Poles. Of course they don’t see this as a threat for now—and the Poles may be even relieved that their big neighbor is beginning to flex its military muscles again, but we’ll see how it goes—particularly if the Americans distance themselves still further from Europe’s defenses.

In Germany, there is open discussion about acquiring the atomic bomb. How would you react?

For Russia, the red line in the German militarization drive is a prospect of Germany acquiring nuclear weapons. Moscow would not permit that. Right now, this prospect seems distant, and the United States would probably act diplomatically before Russia acts militarily. One way or another, that threat has to be nipped in the bud.

In Germany, the neo-nationalist and pro-Russian AfD party could soon enter government. Are you in dialogue with them?

AfD is a nationalist party all right, but I would not call it pro-Russian just because it comes out in favor of renewing energy imports from Russia. AfD is only acting in Germany’s self-interest. The party is essentially pro-NATO and pro-U.S. Unlike Germany’s mainstream parties AfD figures don’t pretend to “isolate” Russia.

Dmitriy Trenin:
The Dangerous Logic of NATO 3.0

Germany and Russia have privileged relations until 2022, not just gas. What happened?

This was not just a “privileged relationship”. It was a rare—I would even say, unique —case of historical reconciliation between two nations, given the 27 million lives lost by the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. In 1989, Moscow “turned the key” on Germany’s reunification, hoping for a new era of relations between the two countries. Paris and London, by contrast, were much less enthusiastic about it then. Within Russia, Germany in the 1990s and early 2000s was widely considered their country’s best friend in Europe. The Russo-German rapprochement was remaking Europe toward a geo-economic space stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. France was also actively involved in the process. This clearly unnerved the Americans and the Brits. The Russo-German-French opposition to the U.S.-UK invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the turning point. The change of leadership teams in Berlin and Paris followed, and their policies toward Russia hardened. Russia was no longer treated as a subject to cooperate with, but as an object of European policies. The Ukraine crisis that began in 2014 was very much the result of Germany’s drive to include Ukraine into Berlin’s economic and political orbit. Since that time, the German-French duo has been increasingly hostile toward Russia. Moscow’s hopes that the vast economic links built over decades would prevent a catastrophic worsening of relations were built on sand. Today, the German leadership and German elites are widely viewed in Russia as political descendants of Hitler, while Russian hopes for a partnership with Germany (and the EU+UK more broadly) are called naivete.

What does the victory in the Great Patriotic War mean to you today?

The victory of 1945 is viewed as confirmation of Russia’s role in the world. Attempts to devalue that victory, by contrast, are seen as a way to diminish Russia, and reverse the result of WWII. Russia’s most bitter enemies now are the political and, in many ways, ideological descendants of Hitler and his ilk: Ukrainian nationalists, Baltic collaborationists, and Finnish allies of Hitler who alongside the Wehrmacht kept Leningrad under siege and built concentration camps for Soviet citizens.

The war in Ukraine is lasting longer than the Great Patriotic War. Why do you still call it a Special Military Operation?

I would say that the war in Ukraine is in its fifth year precisely because we not only call it an SMO, but also prosecute it according to that description. There is no martial law. The bulk of the country is at peace, with only a relatively small portion involved in the fighting, defense production, and other war-related activities. There was only limited mobilization in the first year; the Russian fighting army is an all-volunteer force; conscripts are not sent to the battle. Yet, today Russia is fighting not so much Ukraine as the countries of the West which supply Kiev with weapons, ammunition, and intelligence, keep Ukraine afloat financially and sanction Russia heavily. Europe in particular has again become Russia’s principal enemy, for the first time since 1945. The war continues, its outcome is of existential importance for Russia, and the description of the nation’s war effort may change—if the circumstances demand it.

Europeans no longer trust the Americans, and vice versa. NATO seems sterilized. Have you won?

It is too early to declare victory. Europeans and Americans jointly arm Ukraine and guide Ukrainian weapons to their Russian targets. NATO as an institution has expanded its membership and infrastructure. Even the Polish-Ukrainian dispute over Kiev’s celebration of the Ukrainian nationalists responsible for the massacre of some 100,000 Polish civilians in Volyhnia is muted, so as not to harm the joint fight against Russia. We will only “win” when we can secure our western flank facing the Europe of NATO and the EU. Right now, we are still very far from it.

Ivan Timofeev:
Security in Europe: A Problem Without Solution

Would it have been better for you to have the Europeans under American control or the current chaos?

The Kremlin was ready to use Trump’s Anchorage points as a basis for a peace settlement. The Europeans have torpedoed it, as they managed to derail the 2022 Istanbul agreement between Russia and Ukraine. The Trump administration lacks the will to impose itself, largely because the bulk of the U.S. political class (including some senior figures in the Administration) are of one mind with the Europeans when it comes to Russia. It looks that Europe is attempting to solve its “Russia Question” by inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, leading to the country’s loss of status, sovereignty and territorial integrity. We need to treat that threat seriously.

What is Russia's strategic goal regarding Europe?

In principle, Russia wants security and economic cooperation. However, one has to be realistic. For the foreseeable future—the next 5–15 years—I expect Europe to be generally very hostile toward Russia. The level of hostility will differ from country to country, but Germany, France and Britain will likely be led by rabidly Russophobic elites. Even next year’s elections in France or the removal of Friedrich Merz as chancellor of Germany will not immediately improve the situation. I also expect EU/NATO-allied Ukraine to be a perennial security threat to Russia and a major obstacle to any improvement of relations with Europe.

The Americans' geopolitical nightmare is a Germany — Russia — China axis. Is it possible?

Anything is possible, depending on the time-frame. However, I am skeptical of Germany’s chances to escape from America’s tight embrace. You have said “Germany”. This raises the question of the future of the European Union. I do not think that the EU in the medium term will evolve into an independent power center in the polycentric world. Nor do I think that the EU will disintegrate, like the Soviet Union. Indeed, I expect the EU to become more integrated than now, but still fall short of a “United States of Europe”. As I said at the beginning, the bonds linking Europe to America are exceptionally strong. It is the U.S., after all, not the EU, who initiated the current distancing between the Atlantic’s unequal partners.

Originally published in the Limes.