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Timofey Bordachev

Doctor of Science, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic supervisor of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE University, RIAC Member

There is a reason to believe that the best way to avoid viewing the historical process from the perspective of our unfulfilled expectations is to strive for a relatively objective assessment of the ideas which serve as their underpinning. Currently, Russia’s foreign policy, especially at the global level, rightly assumes that history is on our side, and that Russia’s aspirations do not contradict the strategic intentions of the majority of the world community. The correctness of this view is confirmed by the events accompanying the fierce military-political confrontation between Russia and the West, in the context of which our opponents do not hide the fact that the ideal outcome would be the cessation, in one form or another, of Russian statehood. These intentions, however, not only encounter confident resistance from Russia itself, but also conflict with the interests and strategic aspirations of many countries throughout the world, which the Russian expert community has come to define as the World Majority. It was their representatives who made up the majority of foreign participants at the most recent annual conference of the Valdai Club, which took place in early November this year.

From a strategic point of view, the main advantage of the discussions that took place there was that we gained a better understanding of what unites and divides Russia and the countries close to it. Of course, we cannot think that Russia’s success in its confrontation with the West can fundamentally depend on the development of partnerships with third powers, no matter how large or significant they are. However, we must take into account the emergence of an international order, where the likelihood of a repetition of the current events in Europe will be much less dependent on how the countries of the World Majority act. This means that their probable actions can be taken into account when determining the volume of resources Russia will have to allocate in the future to ensure its basic foreign policy interests. The fact that in some nuances the approaches of the Russian expert community and their colleagues from the countries of the World Majority are not identical is not a problem, but an opportunity to improve mutual understanding and refine national strategies. First of all, because our long-term interests are the same – a more just and unified international order in which there will be no room for the dominance of a narrow group of powers.

The countries of the World Majority look at Russia as a country that can show more restraint, even if it sacrifices its interests for the sake of the rest of humanity. A broader understanding in the countries of the World Majority that this is impossible is an important task of our joint work in various expert platforms, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev.

There is a reason to believe that the best way to avoid viewing the historical process from the perspective of our unfulfilled expectations is to strive for a relatively objective assessment of the ideas which serve as their underpinning. Currently, Russia’s foreign policy, especially at the global level, rightly assumes that history is on our side, and that Russia’s aspirations do not contradict the strategic intentions of the majority of the world community. The correctness of this view is confirmed by the events accompanying the fierce military-political confrontation between Russia and the West, in the context of which our opponents do not hide the fact that the ideal outcome would be the cessation, in one form or another, of Russian statehood. These intentions, however, not only encounter confident resistance from Russia itself, but also conflict with the interests and strategic aspirations of many countries throughout the world, which the Russian expert community has come to define as the World Majority. It was their representatives who made up the majority of foreign participants at the most recent annual conference of the Valdai Club, which took place in early November this year.

From a strategic point of view, the main advantage of the discussions that took place there was that we gained a better understanding of what unites and divides Russia and the countries close to it. Of course, we cannot think that Russia’s success in its confrontation with the West can fundamentally depend on the development of partnerships with third powers, no matter how large or significant they are. However, we must take into account the emergence of an international order, where the likelihood of a repetition of the current events in Europe will be much less dependent on how the countries of the World Majority act. This means that their probable actions can be taken into account when determining the volume of resources Russia will have to allocate in the future to ensure its basic foreign policy interests. The fact that in some nuances the approaches of the Russian expert community and their colleagues from the countries of the World Majority are not identical is not a problem, but an opportunity to improve mutual understanding and refine national strategies. First of all, because our long-term interests are the same – a more just and unified international order in which there will be no room for the dominance of a narrow group of powers.

Russia and the countries of the World Majority, at the level of expert discussion, look differently at the probable scale of future changes. This is primarily explained by the differences in the categories that we use. The Russian expert community has in the past typically followed in step with traditional European reasoning with regards to international politics: with its characteristic categorical judgments, the search for conflict as the most important driver of change in the world economy and politics. This approach is natural for us, but the countries of the World Majority try not to follow it. First, because it represents the Western way of thinking, evoking associations with the difficult colonial period of their development. With very few exceptions, the countries of the World Majority in the very recent historical past were colonies or dependent territories of European empires, and their increasing emancipation requires the development of an independent view of the world based on national traditions, so as to provide a frame of reference for the occurring processes and phenomena.

Second, all countries of the World Majority are truly independent and geographically localised civilizations – Arab, Indian, Asian and African. They all have a rich history of their own relations between social organisms called states. This history has never been understood in the conceptual framework of European statecraft: competition, tough struggle and anarchy, the counterbalance of which can only be the predominance of individual states or unions. A way of thinking about international relations which differs from the European one offers much more flexibility, it reflects the geographical environment, where there can be no permanent allied relations and no conflicts of high ideological charge.

However, there are also differences of a more essential nature. It is necessary to take into account that the absolute majority of countries that are now friendly to Russia are medium-sized states that do not have the resources for independent survival. Moreover, many of them are militarily, politically or economically dependent on the West. They seek to destroy it, but won’t to risk introducing existential threats to their own statehood. Over the past 30 years, the US and the EU have proven several times that a direct conflict with them, if you are not Russia, can have very dramatic consequences, even if we take into account the fact that the West’s capabilities and its ability to unilaterally invade and destroy sovereign states have now diminished. The lessons taught during the period of complete dominance of the US and Europe remain in the memory of the countries of the world.

Whether we like it or not, the scale of participation of most countries in the present system of trade and economic relations and the institutions that ensure these relations is so great that the potential “exit price” may be too high for their developing economies and public systems vulnerable to information influence. It is an axiom of the science of world politics that the inclusion of a state in international institutions brings benefits, but limits freedom of action. However, it is also self-evident that the powers that create and control institutions receive most of the benefits. They can use their unique position to put pressure on their partners by raising the price of potential independence for them. Even Russia remains limited in its actions due to its participation in the UN and some economic agencies of globalisation. Not to mention countries for which this has long been the main way to achieve national development goals. The destruction of such institutions, even in order to achieve the noble purpose of pursuing a fairer international order, can cause damage comparable to the most serious “sanctions tsunami.”

Therefore, the countries of the World Majority react very cautiously to what they perceive as calls for a radical revision of the entire world order. It is no coincidence that in his speech to the participants of the Valdai Club meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasised the absence of any revolutionary intentions in our country. The only problem is that the US and Europe themselves, in striving to protect their positions, are now acting as destroyers of globalisation.

It is also important to see the nuances of expert assessments in Russia, China and the countries of the World Majority in terms of current conflicts and the prospects for their resolution. For most countries which remain friendly to Russia, it is obvious that the military-political confrontation in Europe is the result of Western policy. To the same extent, it is obvious to them that substantively, this is a European conflict related to the security of a certain region. In any event, in the event of the escalation of the conflict by the West, it can cause particularly tragic consequences for the entire world. The countries of the World Majority also understand that it is the US and Europe that are ready to unleash even more conflicts. However, given the difference in power potential, the world would like to settle the ongoing confrontations and prevent the emergence of new ones to the best of its ability.

In this sense, they look at Russia as a country that can show more restraint, even if it sacrifices its interests for the sake of the rest of humanity. A broader understanding in the countries of the World Majority that this is impossible is an important task of our joint work in various expert platforms. Moreover, in strategic terms, the interests of Russia and countries which are friendly to it are completely identical – the methods for achieving them and, especially, the rhetoric accompanying diplomatic and military efforts may differ.



Source: Valdai. Discussion club

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