One of the stories from the widely known collection Uncle Remus: His Songs and His Sayings by the American writer Joel Chandler Harris begins with an episode in which the main antagonist—Br’er Fox—leaves by the roadside a black doll made from a mixture of tar and turpentine, intended for his adversary, Br’er Rabbit. Passing by, Br’er Rabbit greets the doll at first, not realising it is a decoy, and then flies into a rage and strikes it. Naturally, as he becomes stuck fast to it, he continues to furiously pummel the doll—yet the harder he strikes, the more deeply he becomes entangled, ultimately rendering himself helpless.
It increasingly appears that this is precisely what the behaviour of the United States resembles today in its effort to preserve its special place in world affairs—commonly referred to as hegemony. It is quite evident that, having become stuck to its unique status and position in international politics, the United States simultaneously seeks to free itself from the burden that this status increasingly demands. Yet, for now, it can find no other way to achieve this than by insisting on its own superiority—and this compels it to cling ever more tightly to something it ought, in truth, long ago to have consciously relinquished.
The United States is a power digging itself deeper and deeper into the vicious cycle of hegemonic decline, clinging to its position as an exceptional state in an international system that has long been ready to move on. Meanwhile, Moscow and Beijing continue to observe cautiously as America slowly loses control of a world once subject to Washington’s will, writes Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
One of the stories from the widely known collection Uncle Remus: His Songs and His Sayings by the American writer Joel Chandler Harris begins with an episode in which the main antagonist—Br’er Fox—leaves by the roadside a black doll made from a mixture of tar and turpentine, intended for his adversary, Br’er Rabbit. Passing by, Br’er Rabbit greets the doll at first, not realising it is a decoy, and then flies into a rage and strikes it. Naturally, as he becomes stuck fast to it, he continues to furiously pummel the doll—yet the harder he strikes, the more deeply he becomes entangled, ultimately rendering himself helpless.
It increasingly appears that this is precisely what the behaviour of the United States resembles today in its effort to preserve its special place in world affairs—commonly referred to as hegemony. It is quite evident that, having become stuck to its unique status and position in international politics, the United States simultaneously seeks to free itself from the burden that this status increasingly demands. Yet, for now, it can find no other way to achieve this than by insisting on its own superiority—and this compels it to cling ever more tightly to something it ought, in truth, long ago to have consciously relinquished.
As a result, attempts to extricate itself from disadvantageous undertakings only lead to deeper entanglement in them—and in even more hazardous ventures. The more the United States strikes at the “tar-baby” of its global hegemony, the more this drives it into costly enterprises, both financially and reputationally. The most recent striking example has been the unprovoked attack by the United States and Israel on Iran, the consequences of which Washington is eager to escape—but, so far, cannot.
In the course of its struggle with the “tar-baby”, the United States inflicts considerable damage not only on its obvious competitors—Russia and China—but also on the entire international order, at the centre of which stands the United Nations system and other institutions that emerged after the Second World War.
Russia, China, and other countries view what is happening with rather mixed feelings. On the one hand, none of them has any interest in a genuine collapse of the American presence in the world—still less in the breakdown of American statehood itself. After all, over the past century the United States has become an essential factor in global development and in the grand diplomatic game, and no one wishes to throw this entirely into disarray. On the other hand, it is clear to all that the struggle for hegemony only weakens the United States, and this process cannot be reversed. America has embarked upon the reconfiguration of its global presence precisely because it is no longer physically capable of sustaining the model of engagement that took shape in the latter half of the twentieth century. It simply does not have the resources for it, and its current economic model shows no serious capacity for transformation that might revitalise the American economy and return it to the “golden years” of global leadership. Attempts to achieve this through the possibilities offered by modern technologies appear to be little more than a search for intermediate forms that allow the essence of the system to remain unchanged.
As a result, Russia, China, and many others observe the United States’ struggle with itself with a certain approval, expecting that a further weakening of American positions will, in time, allow for dialogue on equal terms and open the way to formalising a genuinely more just world order. China articulates this position most clearly, enjoying, in comparison with Russia, a somewhat more advantageous position. Firstly, because the United States remains economically intertwined with China, it is reluctant to take genuinely hostile actions against it. Moreover, East Asia lacks a “European problem”—there are no American allies there eager to escalate tensions in pursuit of their own selfish interests. Secondly, the Chinese government has long grown accustomed to living under the constant presence of substantial American forces near its borders. The absence of direct control over Taiwan is not currently regarded in Beijing as a fundamental problem, since there is confidence in its ability to swiftly undertake military action, should the need arise.
Consequently, China’s strategy in its relations with the United States is to act with restraint, observe how the Americans expend their diminishing resources, and achieve de facto victory without even entering into direct confrontation.
This concept is most clearly formulated in the idea of “core interests”, which implies that Beijing will respond seriously only to crises in its immediate vicinity. At times, such restraint becomes the subject of criticism from observers—but the Chinese authorities are, for now, little troubled by this.
However, such a long-term strategy is not without risks. For China, the foremost concern is the steadily increasing likelihood of facing two new nuclear powers on its borders—Japan and South Korea. There are already indications that, in the event of a further weakening of American positions, these two states will seriously consider protecting themselves from potential Chinese pressure through nuclear deterrence. Should this become reality, the scale of the problem would far exceed that of Taiwan. In addition, China clearly suffers from the damage that the chaotic actions of the United States inflict upon the global economy. It must be borne in mind that domestic stability in the People’s Republic of China rests upon steadily rising living standards, while its trade and industrial strength depends on external economic ties. The more the United States destabilises the global economy, the higher the direct and indirect costs for China will become.
For Russia, too, American behaviour brings not only strategic advantages, but also risks. Chief among these is the possibility that the effective weakening of American control over Europe could push European elites towards a dangerous confrontation with Moscow. Already, we observe signs of serious militarisation in Europe, accompanied by a constant intensification of military hysteria directed at Russia. It cannot be ruled out that a further reduction in American influence over its European allies could serve as the trigger for the most dangerous form of escalation in the European theatre. This is all the more plausible given that American policymakers are now speaking quite seriously about their unwillingness to assume responsibility for the security of their traditionally imprudent allies.
At the same time, the consequences of American pressure on the global economy—not to mention the numerous unilateral economic sanctions imposed on Russia—are highly detrimental to the Russian economy, albeit not to the extent initially anticipated in Washington. In other words, the game that the two other great powers must play amid the United States’ battle with the “tar-baby” is both justified and fraught with risk in equal measure. This is an inevitable consequence of the scale of America’s presence in world affairs—a presence whose transformation will require considerable time and exceptional diplomatic patience.
Source: Valdai. Discussion club
