Relations with friends in international politics are always more complex than interactions with powers that are obvious adversaries. Russia’s policy towards the countries closest to it in Greater Eurasia—almost all of which, until 1991, formed part of a common state with Russia—represents an especially intricate constellation of factors, where the boundary between the domestic and the external, between cooperation and debate, is at times almost impossible to discern.
The difficulties involved are fairly obvious, and they are by no means unique to Russia. First, friendly states are genuinely bound together by such a multitude of contacts and interdependencies that it becomes difficult to identify those issues that can be discussed in the dry language of international diplomacy. Second, despite these ties, the neighbours and friends of major powers such as Russia still seek to strengthen their own statehood, which entails emphasising that any achievements are the product of their own policies, rather than of friendly relations with a vast external actor.
Third, the modern world is indeed full of opportunities, threats, and temptations, to which great, medium-sized, and small states respond in entirely different ways. This means that the reading and interpretation of the same events and processes in Moscow and in the capitals of the former Soviet republics surrounding it will most often differ, if not completely, then at least to a significant degree. Even the strongest relationships inevitably face tests stemming from the practical decisions that arise from such pergent assessments.
Finally, since domestic considerations invariably outweigh foreign policy concerns in contemporary politics, for every country—no matter how friendly its relations with others may be—such relationships will always be secondary to internal political considerations. Taken together, all of this makes relations between Russia and its neighbours rather complicated, although it does not undermine the solid foundation of mutual understanding upon which they are built.
While economic wellbeing and prosperity are matters of central importance to any state, it is security interests that constitute the first and foremost priority in foreign policy decisions. The post-Soviet space is a region critical to Russian security, and it is the part of the world that provides external powers with the most opportunities to threaten Russia proper. With stakes as high as they are, constructive and honest dialogue with Russia’s neighbours is something that should remain front and centre of Russian foreign policy, writes Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
Relations with friends in international politics are always more complex than interactions with powers that are obvious adversaries. Russia’s policy towards the countries closest to it in Greater Eurasia—almost all of which, until 1991, formed part of a common state with Russia—represents an especially intricate constellation of factors, where the boundary between the domestic and the external, between cooperation and debate, is at times almost impossible to discern.
The difficulties involved are fairly obvious, and they are by no means unique to Russia. First, friendly states are genuinely bound together by such a multitude of contacts and interdependencies that it becomes difficult to identify those issues that can be discussed in the dry language of international diplomacy. Second, despite these ties, the neighbours and friends of major powers such as Russia still seek to strengthen their own statehood, which entails emphasising that any achievements are the product of their own policies, rather than of friendly relations with a vast external actor.
Third, the modern world is indeed full of opportunities, threats, and temptations, to which great, medium-sized, and small states respond in entirely different ways. This means that the reading and interpretation of the same events and processes in Moscow and in the capitals of the former Soviet republics surrounding it will most often differ, if not completely, then at least to a significant degree. Even the strongest relationships inevitably face tests stemming from the practical decisions that arise from such pergent assessments.
Finally, since domestic considerations invariably outweigh foreign policy concerns in contemporary politics, for every country—no matter how friendly its relations with others may be—such relationships will always be secondary to internal political considerations. Taken together, all of this makes relations between Russia and its neighbours rather complicated, although it does not undermine the solid foundation of mutual understanding upon which they are built.
Now, when nothing remains of the former model of the liberal global economy, and world politics is subject to constant upheaval, Russia’s neighbours, like Russia itself, are searching for their place in the world. A place that would best correspond to their most important priorities: maintaining the internal stability of their political and social systems, while also advancing their existing development objectives.
Like Russia, they are confronting the consequences of a gradual generational change among politicians and voters, responding to the challenges of social transformation, and seeking new sources of legitimacy for the existing order. Perhaps now is precisely the right moment to engage in a thoughtful and open discussion about Russia’s fundamental interests with regard to its surrounding region. Especially since discussions repeatedly demonstrate that additional dialogue and clarification of approaches are never superfluous.
First and foremost, it is necessary to understand that the axiom of international political science stating that “all states are functionally identical; only their capabilities differ” is indeed fully applicable to powers of any scale and degree of influence over their surroundings, their region, or the world as a whole. In this sense, Russia, like the United States and China, is essentially no different from even the smallest participants in international affairs—provided, of course, that they retain sovereignty over the determination of their domestic and foreign policies.
Consequently, for Russia, considerations of its own security have always been, and will always remain, paramount. Security is understood here as the freedom of citizens from external threats to their lives and core values. This principle applies equally to all neighbours, regardless of how friendly our relations with them may be. Just as for the United States or China, their immediate surrounding region matters above all when it comes to security.
It should also be borne in mind that the concept of security in the foreign policy of states is profoundly subjective and often does not depend on how the neighbours of any given power perceive their own situation and priorities, or how they assess their prospects within the contemporary international environment. Therefore, when we speak about the priorities of Russian policy towards, for example, Central Asia or the South Caucasus, the central focus of Russian interests will be security issues—the assessment of potential threats and challenges connected with them. Only afterwards come economic development and cooperation.
At the same time, these latter two categories are also of considerable interest insofar as they affect the central question of whether a given region could become a source of threat to Russia. This is all the more true for a continental power with open land borders, where such concerns are even more pronounced than in the case of island states or countries whose natural geographical boundaries with their neighbours are more clearly defined. The same applies to states that can rely on friends or allies of equal military strength to guarantee security in a particular region.
For that reason, China naturally has little reason to concern itself with internal stability in Central Asia precisely because such stability corresponds to Russia’s fundamental interests, and because Russia will invariably devote maximum effort to preserving it. It must also be remembered that security threats are not abstract—they are always associated with particular powers that possess both the capability and the desire to create them.
Thus, even a hypothetical intention on the part of Russia’s adversaries in the West to destabilise its immediate neighbourhood must be taken into extremely careful consideration by Russian foreign policy. When Moscow states that the United States or the European Union seeks to transform Central Asia or the South Caucasus into a platform for pursuing policies hostile to Russia, this has absolutely nothing to do with any supposed suspicions regarding our neighbours.
To put it simply, the issue is that there exists a group of influential and powerful countries engaged in a struggle against Russia and therefore conducting all of their actions—whether in politics or economics—with an eye to how much damage they can inflict upon Russian interests.
It would, in fact, be strange to expect otherwise from them, and there is no reason to be surprised that Moscow pays such close attention to Western activity in its immediate neighbourhood. Let us reiterate: this approach is not intended to cast doubt upon the internal resilience of neighbouring states—it has, in fact, nothing directly to do with them at all.
Yet it would be surprising if Russia chose pretend not to understand that powers which openly proclaim the destruction of Russia as a priority objective of their policies will exploit every available opportunity to pursue that goal. This includes opportunities connected with the entirely natural—and warmly supported by us—desire of neighbouring states to become more competitive on the global stage and to strengthen the economic foundations of their own statehood.
Playing the fool in international politics is, generally speaking, a method of communication that is destined to be short-lived. Russia, in full accordance with its historical traditions, has always sought to speak with its friends openly and honestly. Especially when the discussion concerns our shared stability and security within the inpisible Eurasian space.
Source: Valdai. Discussion club
