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Alexander Pivovarenko

Ph.D. in History, Senior Research Associate, RAS Institute of Slavonic Studies

After almost three years, Bosnia and Herzegovina has finally published its census results. The reason for the delay was not that the organizers lacked computational capabilities, but rather because the figures, which were supposed to demonstrate the changes that had taken place in the republic since 1992, are of great political significance.

 

The census was conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina between October 1 and October 15, 2013. Even before it began, there had been some debate concerning the methodology of the survey: civil-minded parties (essentially a number of Muslim parties) pushed for the removal of questions on ethnicity, native language and religious persuasion, which would set the course for the creation of a consolidated nation. Proponents of ethnic identities – Serbs, Croats and some other Muslims – insisted on retaining the dividing lines. The decision to exclude self-designation for small identities (for instance, Herzegovinians) was questionable, as it contradicts the European principle of multiculturalism. Essentially, self-determination was limited to three names: Croats, Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Serbs.

 

 

Photo: REUTERS/Dado Ruvic

 

Other disagreements arose when the preliminary results of the census were announced in November 2013. According to those results, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 3,791,000 people. However, the results drew criticism due to the practice of double surveying, or counting members of the diaspora who had long since left the country, which led to the population being artificially inflated by 196,000 people. Bosnian Serbs did not accept these figures, since they saw them as an attempt by Sarajevo to increase the number of Bosniaks in the Republika Srpska and artificially inflate their number in Bosnia and Herzegovina to over 50 per cent.

 

The final results were made public on June 30, 2016 (see Tables 1 and 2). The overall population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 3,531,000, of which 1,769,000 (or 50.11 per cent) are Bosniaks, 1,086,000 are Serbs (30.78 per cent), and 544,000 are Croats (15.43 per cent). What conclusions can be drawn from this data?

 

Table 1. 2013 Census Results and Population Ratio by Entities and districts.
 
Table 2. Population Ratio by Ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (line 1), the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2), the Republika Srpska and the Brčko District (4).
 
 
  1. 1. The total population of the country decreased by 833,000 compared to 1991. This is due to the demographic disaster of the 1992–1995 civil war, when about 100,00 people were killed and 2.2 million people left the country (700,000 people went to Western Europe). [1].The economic emigration of the 2000s should also be kept in mind, yet its significance is hard to pinpoint against the background of the massive military losses. In any case, these figures demonstrate the disaster the region faced: the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina today is at the level of the 1960s.

  2. Significant change of ethnic ratios. The proportion of Orthodox Serbs dropped a further 0.62 per cent, or 283,000 people, compared to 1991. The proportion of Croats also dropped significantly (by 1.87 per cent, or 211,000 people). These dynamics look even more impressive within the long-term chronology (see Table 3). The proportion of Bosniaks increased by over 6 per cent, yet decreased in absolute numbers (by 136,000 people). Still, Bosnian Muslims succeeded in carrying out their political task and bringing their proportion to over 50 per cent.

  3. Although the census had one more political goal, namely, to demonstrate that the Republika Srpska is a state born out of ethnic purging and genocide (genocidna tvorevina in Serbocroation), [2], the results rather prove the opposite. According to the census, 13.99 per cent of Muslims live in the Republika Srpska, many of them returned after the war. Conversely, only 2.55 per cent of Serbs live in the other political entity (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). It essentially legitimized the ethnic purges against the Serbs that took place in the post-Dayton period.

  4. Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a state of its title nation and ethnic minorities, rather than a republic of three equal peoples, as it had been before. It gives Sarajevo grounds to demand administrative reform or the unitarization of Bosnia. There is an incongruity between the population percentage in the Republika Srpska (34.7 per cent) and its territorial percentage (49 per cent). Therefore, either the autonomy could find itself under attack under the pretext of protecting its non-Serbian population, or a part of its territory could be transferred over to the Federation according to the principle of “proportionality.” For instance, it could happen in the south-east, towards the Serbian Sanjak.

  5. Practical considerations will push Serbs and Croats who have not lost hope that they will gain their own autonomy. However, this cooperation is hindered by current contradictions and their desire to use each other: thus, it is advantageous for Croats to have their radical demands delivered through the mouth of Milorad Dodik, who will take the brunt of the flak.

  6. The theory of the nation dying out may be linked to socioeconomic slogans aimed at mobilizing the discontent of the people with the current elites. It is particularly relevant for the Republika Srpska, where dissenting moods are on the rise. The positions of Sarajevo’s leaders and of the Croats look somewhat more stable due to external support.

  7. The leadership of the Republika Srpska has already declared that it does not accept the census results. This means that, come July, the situation might be fraught with a new political crisis.

 

In conclusion, it should be noted that the international protectorate over Bosnia and Herzegovina is no longer effective in achieving inter-ethnic and political reconciliation and economic progress. Yet it definitely resulted in the ethnic picture swinging towards homogeneity, which could lead to the destruction of the region’s fragile stability.

 
Year
Orthodox
Muslims
Catholics
Other
Total
1879
496,761
(42.8%)
448,613
(38.7%)
209,391
(18%)
3,675
(0.3%)
1,158,440
1921
829,612
(43.9%)
588,247
(31.1%)
443,914
(23.5%)
28,156
(1.5%)
1,889,929
1953
1,002,737
(35.2%)
917,720
(32.2%)
601,489
(21.1%)
25,844
(11.5%)
2,847,790
 
Year
Serbs
Muslims
Croats
Yugoslavians
Other
Total
1948
1,136,116
(44.3%)
788,403
(30.7%)
614,123
(24.0%)
 
26,635
(1.0%)
2,565,277
1953
1,261,405
(44.3%)
891,798
(31.3%)
654,227
(23.0%)
 
40,029
(1.4%)
2,847,790
1961
1,406,057
(42.9%)
842,248
(25.7%)
771,665
(21.7%)
275,883
(8.4%)
42,095
(1.3%)
3,277,948
1971
1,393,148
(37.2%)
1,482,430
(39.6%)
772,491
(20.6%)
43,796
(1.2%)
54,246
(1.4%)
3,746,111
1981
1,320,644
(32.0%)
1,629,924
(39.5%)
758,136
(18.4%)
326,280
(7.9%)
89,024
(2.2%)
4,124,008
1991
1,369,258
(31.4%)
1,905,829
(43.7%)
755,895
(17.3%)
239,845
(5.5%)
93,747
(2.1%)
4,364,574
Table 3. Population Change Dynamics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1879–1991

 

1 Martynova M.Yu. The Balkan Crisis: Peoples and Politics [in Russian]. Moscow, 1998, p. 239, p. 255.

2 This opinion is widespread not only among Bosnian Muslims. It has been put forward by some Serbian politicians as well, including the leader of the Sanjak Muslims Muamer Zukorlić (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U9xCw0E7lcw, in BCS) and the liberal Čedomir Jovanović (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2-754hzfCJc, in BCS).

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