Discrediting the U.S. Alliance System as the Key Preliminary Outcome of the Middle East War

Many refer to the conflict involving the United States and Israel against Iran as a “Persian Gulf” War, sometimes even as the “Third Gulf War.” Such a characterization, however, is valid only when viewed from a U.S. perspective.

From the perspective of Moscow, and of Tehran and Tel Aviv as well, the conflict is something much larger. The war has spread far beyond the two shores of the Gulf, encompassing a broad swath of the Middle East, from Israel and Lebanon to Iraq and Yemen, and from Gaza to Jordan. Israel openly states that it is fighting on seven fronts, while Iran coordinates its actions with other regional members of the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” At stake in this armed confrontation is the future regional order in the Middle East. For that reason, it is more accurate to describe the conflict as a Middle Eastern war.

It is still too early to draw definitive conclusions about the outcome of the Middle Eastern war. The conflict could reignite, and stability is unlikely to return to the region anytime soon. Nevertheless, the failure of the United States and Israel to reshape the entire Middle East under a Washington–Tel Aviv security order is already evident. This is a highly significant outcome: Iran succeeded in stopping the United States and Israel.

The military crisis in the Middle East exposed what may be considered the Achilles’ heel of America’s global strategic position: its unwillingness to make sacrifices and suffer losses for the sake of its allies. In peacetime, this vulnerability was not readily apparent; in the context of wars—whether direct or indirect—the truth has come to light. As a result, the alliance system that has underpinned Washington’s global predominance since the Cold War has been called into question and has shown visible signs of strain.

There can be little doubt that the vulnerability now exposed in one of the fundamental pillars of America’s international position will have far-reaching implications for the construction of a future world order. Those engaged in shaping that new order should not merely take this reality into account—they should seek to make use of it.

Many refer to the conflict involving the United States and Israel against Iran as a “Persian Gulf” War, sometimes even as the “Third Gulf War.” Such a characterization, however, is valid only when viewed from a U.S. perspective.

Indeed, the first Gulf War took place in 1991, when the United States and its allies defeated Iraq and liberated Kuwait. The second—lasting just twelve days—occurred a year ago, when Washington sought to bring Israel’s war against Iran to a decisive end through a campaign of airstrikes. The attempt fell short. The current conflict is therefore the third of its kind—but only from an American perspective.

From the perspective of Moscow, and of Tehran and Tel Aviv as well, the conflict is something much larger. The war has spread far beyond the two shores of the Gulf, encompassing a broad swath of the Middle East, from Israel and Lebanon to Iraq and Yemen, and from Gaza to Jordan. Israel openly states that it is fighting on seven fronts, while Iran coordinates its actions with other regional members of the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” At stake in this armed confrontation is the future regional order in the Middle East. For that reason, it is more accurate to describe the conflict as a Middle Eastern war.

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Moreover, from Moscow’s perspective—and, objectively, from Beijing’s as well—the Middle Eastern war appears to be part of a broader struggle over the future world order: a functional equivalent of a world war. It may well be the first such confrontation of the twenty-first century. Unlike the last century, when Europe stood at the center of global rivalry, the focal point today is the Eurasian landmass as a whole. The conflict has already engulfed Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and the prospect of its expansion into East Asia is becoming increasingly plausible.

These are three closely interconnected and mutually dependent theaters of confrontation. The world’s three largest military powers—the United States, Russia, and China—are involved in each of them, either directly or indirectly. At their core, all three conflicts revolve around the same issue: the determination of the United States and its allies to preserve, even in a reduced form, their global predominance and to suppress (or at least contain) the rise of other major independent powers. This struggle is likely to continue for decades to come. Any assessment of the trajectory and prospects of global development through the middle of the twenty-first century should begin from this premise.

It is still too early to draw definitive conclusions about the outcome of the Middle Eastern war. The conflict could reignite, and stability is unlikely to return to the region anytime soon. Nevertheless, the failure of the United States and Israel to reshape the entire Middle East under a Washington–Tel Aviv security order is already evident. This is a highly significant outcome: Iran succeeded in stopping the United States and Israel.

Yet an even more significant conclusion emerges from the conflict. The military crisis in the Middle East exposed what may be considered the Achilles’ heel of America’s global strategic position: its unwillingness to make sacrifices and suffer losses for the sake of its allies. In peacetime, this vulnerability was not readily apparent; in the context of wars—whether direct or indirect—the truth has come to light. As a result, the alliance system that has underpinned Washington’s global predominance since the Cold War has been called into question and has shown visible signs of strain.

This is not merely a “regional phenomenon” confined to the Middle East—including not only the Arab states of the Persian Gulf but, crucially, Israel as well. Similar patterns have already become evident in relation to NATO Europe, and they may well emerge among America’s Asian allies, from Taiwan and the Philippines to Japan and South Korea.

This is not simply another “Trump zigzag” or a deviation that will be corrected after the 2028 presidential election. The gradual unraveling of what was long portrayed as a blood-sealed, almost sacred compact between the United States and its many allies has been long underway for years. The war in the Middle East merely opened the eyes of those who preferred to believe the ritual assurances. There can be little doubt that the vulnerability now exposed in one of the fundamental pillars of America’s international position will have far-reaching implications for the construction of a future world order. Those engaged in shaping that new order should not merely take this reality into account—they should seek to make use of it.