The Iranian Conflict: Energy Dominance and Trump's Strategic Doctrine

The length and inconsistency of the military operation against Iran, the Strait of Hormuz blockade, and the subsequent negotiation process are often attributed to U.S. missteps, such as Washington's lack of a global strategy. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of military action, the blockade, and the negotiations are meaningful not so much in themselves than in how well they align with the ultimate goal and contribute to achieving it. While many criticize the U.S. administration for its lack of a global strategy, they often overlook the fact that the foundation of President Trump's second-term geopolitical agenda is the 2025 Energy Dominance Financing Program (EDF). Essentially a strategic doctrine, the EDF set up and outlines a strategic innovation designed to enable U.S. companies to increase shale oil exports, all while neutralizing the resistance previously exerted by OPEC countries.

The United States has become the world's largest oil producer, with production exceeding 13 million barrels a day in recent years. This dramatic growth has reduced U.S. dependence on imported oil and positioned the United States as a potential major exporter, directly competing with OPEC members in global markets. In response to the development of shale oil production technologies in the United States, OPEC+ was forced to maintain global oil prices at levels to prevent significant volumes of U.S. oil, particularly shale oil, from entering global markets. Once the Strait of Hormuz blockade was launched, supply volumes from the Middle East declined and oil prices rose, so much so that OPEC's ability to maintain pricing power and market share became hardly possible. The erosion of OPEC's market power and its seizure by the United States paved the way for the proactive expansion of the U.S. oil industry as part of the country’s strategy of global energy dominance.

Most major exporters in the region, all OPEC members, rely on the Strait of Hormuz for their exports. As a result, Washington has acquired the ability to influence the volumes and availability of energy resources to importers on global markets. This influence is to be expressed not in the form of agreed-upon production quotas, but in the security and access to maritime transportation channels, as well as insurance costs. Through these mechanisms, the United States intends to set the framework under which energy resources move across global markets and determine their prices.

From the perspective of the EDF, the goal of the regional conflict was not to inflict a military defeat on Iran, but rather to develop the economic and financial component of a global strategy to contain China, the main geopolitical competitor of the United States, and the ultimate consumer of Iranian exports. The counter-blockade, specifically targeting maritime shipping entering and exiting Iranian ports, was used as a tool against Iran with the operational goal of reducing its oil revenues, over 80% of which were destined for China. The double blockade has also triggered a process of regional economic competition, halting energy supply routes for OPEC competitors while simultaneously breaking down their price barriers to increasing U.S. exports.

Thus, the U.S. is using the Strait of Hormuz blockade as a tool not only to develop its own oil and gas industry but also to enhance the competitiveness of the national economy in the face of confrontation with China. In this regard, it would be highly useful to examine the impact of the updated “Trump Doctrine” on the transformation of its competitiveness model. Structuring the processes observed in this context would provide a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between their manifestations in the economic and foreign policy dimensions.

The length and inconsistency of the military operation against Iran, the Strait of Hormuz blockade, and the subsequent negotiation process are often attributed to U.S. missteps, such as Washington's lack of a global strategy. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of military operations, the blockade, and even the negotiations matter less in themselves than in how well they align with the ultimate objective and contribute to achieving it. In the absence of a rational understanding of the broader picture, and when the goals are neither singular nor entirely obvious, it is worth attempting to identify them by examining the current situation in a wider context, taking into account the updated Trump Doctrine, in addition to the economic interests of the U.S. and its oil and gas sector.

Currently, insufficient attention has been paid to the nature of competition in the global oil market, the expansion of U.S. oil exporters, and the provisions of Energy Dominance Financing Program. There have been virtually no attempts to develop a coherent analytical framework that integrates the military, foreign policy, and economic dimensions, within which these events can be interpreted rationally rather than through subjective accusations of imperfect U.S. execution.

In an attempt to identify elements of a rational approach and find an objective explanation for the essence of what is happening, it seems appropriate to first identify its possible economic logic, considering the above-mentioned factors. This paper examines the applicability of strategic entrepreneurship approaches to structuring the observed processes. Could neutralizing OPEC's power in the global market represent an integral part of a broader strategy to shift the U.S. oil and gas sector from maintaining stable competitiveness toward proactive expansion in the global energy market?

Conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa: Current State and Possible Dynamics. RIAC Report

The OPEC and Saudi Arabia Factor

Application of Michael Porter's five forces model [1] to the global oil market shows that, at the beginning of the Iranian conflict, the industry was characterized primarily by intense global competition between two major groups of exporters. The first group consisted of oil companies from OPEC member states, while the second comprised U.S. shale oil exporters. The rivalry between the two manifested into a struggle for dominance. Since the shale revolution enabled the expansion of U.S. energy production and the development of the industry's export potential, the U.S. has been in direct structural competition with OPEC countries for global market share. The United States, as the world's largest oil producer, has often been one of the primary targets of OPEC's restrictive power. OPEC has repeatedly demonstrated its geopolitical superiority by effectively curbing U.S. companies' attempts to increase shale oil exports. The history of competition between OPEC member countries and the U.S. demonstrates a conflict of interest and the latter's objective interest in neutralizing OPEC's market power.

The United States has become the world's largest oil producer, with production in recent years exceeding 13 million barrels per day. This sharp rise reduced U.S. dependence on imported oil, positioning it as a potentially major exporter, hence directly competing with OPEC members in global markets. In response to the development of shale oil production technologies in the U.S., OPEC+ was forced to maintain global oil prices at a level to prevent significant volumes of U.S. oil, particularly shale oil, from entering global markets. Since the cost of shale oil production is several times higher than that of conventional oil production in OPEC countries, it appeared less attractive to importers in an environment where competitiveness was determined solely by its price.

In late 2014, instead of cutting production to support prices, OPEC—led by Saudi Arabia—decided to maintain high production levels even as prices fell. The goal was to force prices down so low that high-cost shale oil production would become unprofitable for U.S. producers, leading to their bankruptcy or the closure of fields. When U.S. shale oil production reached record levels in 2024–2025, OPEC+ resumed this policy, advancing a strategy of increasing production to regain market share and pushing prices below $60 per barrel. This strategic competition reflected the shifting balance of power in global energy markets, but the U.S. now had significant economic and military tools to counter OPEC's influence. In recent years, Trump's energy policies have predetermined the use of these tools to reshape the market itself. According to strategic entrepreneurship theory [2], if current competitive conditions do not provide a market opportunity related to expanding one's share of a given resource's exports, it is recommended to consider the option of changing the competitive landscape in one's favor. When identifying such an opportunity, one must determine what process could reshape the market and whether one possesses the levers that could initiate this process [3]. Once the desired process has been identified and the levers, in the form of the most powerful military and financial resources, are available, they can be used to transition to a proactive competition model. This involves strategic innovation capable of reshaping the market to force its participants to play by the new rules of the game, altered in one's favor.

Here, one must have some process at one's disposal, possibly in the form of a multi-step strategy, which, when launched, can somehow reduce the market share and influence of existing exporters, such as Saudi Arabia. Once the Strait of Hormuz blockade was launched, Middle East supply volumes declined and oil prices rose to such an extent that OPEC's ability to maintain pricing power and market share became virtually impossible. The erosion of OPEC's market power and its seizure by the United States paved the way for the proactive expansion of the U.S. oil industry as part of its strategy of global energy dominance.

Energy Dominance Program: A Former Risk as a Current Opportunity

While criticizing the U.S. administration for its lack of a global strategy, many ignore the fact that the 2025 EDF, essentially a doctrinal document, forms a cornerstone of the new geopolitics under President Trump's second term. The EDF envisions the implementation of a strategic innovation that will allow U.S. companies to increase the volume of shale oil exports they produce while neutralizing the influence previously exerted by OPEC countries. Export development is based on exploiting new market opportunities created by the development of shale oil and gas production technology. With 310 billion barrels (including Alaska and offshore) of technically recoverable oil and nearly 3,000 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, the United States has the resources to both meet domestic demand and develop exports to support allies abroad.

The EDF’s stated goals extend beyond achieving domestic energy independence to providing a reliable supply of affordable energy to U.S. allies and influencing global energy prices. These goals reflect an extremely ambitious approach to energy policy, justifying the use of any resources and methods to seize market power globally in the interests of the United States. Reliability of affordable energy supplies is guaranteed not to all importers, but only to a limited segment of consumers exclusively represented by U.S. allies. Thus, the obvious conclusion is that the EDF serves as a government-level framework for transforming the U.S. oil and gas sector model from maintaining neutral competitiveness to proactive expansion in the global energy market.

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To what extent did the United States have advance knowledge of how events would unfold, prepare for a bottleneck scenario in the Strait of Hormuz, and anticipate the causal chain of events and the actions of the parties that would trigger the three-step plan to shut down energy supplies through the Strait? Claims that the Trump administration failed to consider the possibility of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz appear dubious, given that this scenario had been discussed regularly at multiple levels. Fatih Birol, Executive Director of the International Energy Agency (IEA), reported that in IEA interviews, after asking about the reasons for applying for the job, the second question was, "What would you do if the Strait of Hormuz were closed?" Former EU negotiator for the 2015 agreement, Federica Mogherini, commented on the existence of forecasts of the consequences of the expected conflict as follows: "Analysts predicted that a war with Iran would strengthen the most conservative hardliners in the country, spread the conflict throughout the region, and raise global energy prices to prohibitive levels." However, the fact that the analysts' predictions came true rather means that their conclusions were heard and accounted for during the planning stage of the operation, albeit within a fundamentally altered context: as an opportunity, not a threat.

In the 2025 White Paper "Strategic Implications for US LNG Exports," the realized scenario of a supply disruption in the Strait of Hormuz was examined in detail as a potential risk of a trilateral armed conflict [4]. The document noted: " Approximately 24% of global LNG supply is produced in the Middle East, with 20% coming from Qatar and passing through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman. Amid increasing tensions between Iran and Israel, Arab states and their LNG production rely on the United States for security commitments to stabilize the region. The U.S. is worried that if Israel attacks Iranian energy infrastructure, Iran will retaliate against Gulf energy installations, which would, in turn, necessitate a U.S. military response against Iran. Such a conflict would disrupt the supply of LNG from this region and create supply shocks in global energy markets. While Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates can divert some of their oil and gas to avoid shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain currently cannot. If Qatar and neighboring countries cannot meet supply commitments, it would be disastrous for Asian markets, which receive more than 70% of Qatar’s LNG shipments. Obstructed supply from Qatar would drive up demand for alternate suppliers of LNG, including the United States, and make spot LNG prohibitively expensive for emerging countries." This fragment of self-fulfilling prophecy suggests that the U.S. was fully aware of the underlying factors and the causal relationships between the parties and their actions in the event of a blockade. For decades, U.S. importers viewed the Strait of Hormuz primarily as a threat to the security of maritime supplies. However, if the United States currently positions itself as an exporter rather than importer, a blockade of the strait could no longer be a risk. Instead, it could be an opportunity to create the necessary tool in the U.S. strategy to undermine OPEC's control over the global oil market. With a detailed understanding of the conflict's development mechanism, why not now view this process from another angle and use it to reconfigure the market by disrupting historically established supply channels, creating a shortage of oil and LNG, and neutralizing OPEC's market power?

The Blockade as a Process in a Business Model

A key factor in understanding the nature of the military conflict is the objective interest of both direct participants in partially weakening OPEC by imposing a blockade on the Strait of Hormuz. As Konstantin Simonov, Director General of the National Energy Security Fund, noted in his book "Global Energy War," control over shipping lanes, refining capacity, or critical resources can be converted into a strategic advantage [5]. Most major exporters in the region, OPEC states, depend on the Strait of Hormuz for their exports. Since the security of passage through this strait was determined by the continuation of the Iranian conflict and the use of the blockade as a tool for achieving its strategic interests, Washington acquired the ability to influence the volumes and availability of energy resources to importers on global markets. This influence will be exercised not through agreed production quotas, but through control over the security of and access to maritime transportation routes, as well as the cost of maritime insurance. Through these mechanisms, the United States intends to set the conditions under which energy resources move through global markets and determine their prices.

The effectiveness of a strategic innovation can be assessed according to two key criteria: its physical outcomes and its monetary profitability. The economic consequences of a full-scale war with Iran, given its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, proved to be diametrically opposed: catastrophic for OPEC members and oil-importing countries on the one hand, and yet extremely positive for the United States on the other. It was hardly a fluke that the United States became the main beneficiary of this war. By the end of March 2026, U.S. companies were exporting significantly more oil and other fuels than pre-conflict levels. U.S. crude oil exports reached a historic high, exceeding 10 million barrels per day. As of mid-May 2026, additional crude oil export revenues were estimated at approximately $45 billion. These numbers were likely the result of replacement supplies amid the slow and inconsistent conduct and suspension of armed conflict. "The longer the strait remains closed, the more those who benefit will benefit," said Jim Burkhard, head of global oil research at S&P Global Energy.

"Energy can be a tool of foreign policy, but it can also be an end," says Dr. O'Sullivan, a professor at Harvard Kennedy School. "Energy weapons have not disappeared, but a number of global factors—as well as individual decisions by the Trump administration and others—have brought them back to the forefront." Such individual decisions, the significance of which O'Sullivan notes, are reflected in the Trump Doctrine through the updated National Security Strategy and EDF.

U.S. presidential doctrines are defined as unilateral statements of strategic and/or defensive objectives that codify the country’s grand strategy in a given historical period. It alerts both allies and adversaries to U.S. intentions, specifying the conditions for the use of force, strategically important geographic regions, reasons for their importance, and the values and priorities that shape its diplomacy. With the finalization of the Trump Doctrine for his second term [6], interstate competition between the United States and China emerged as its central message. Since any conflicts will be considered and resolved within this context for the remainder of Trump's presidency, the objectives of U.S. engagement in this case are not limited to the geographic boundaries of the region or military-political confrontation with Iran.

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The Trump Doctrine is an integrated framework in which foreign policy goals are achieved primarily through aggressive economic warfare. It cannot be divided into "foreign policy" and "economic policy”; it is a unified strategy in which economic influence serves as the primary weapon of foreign policy. Rather than treating diplomacy, military action, and trade as distinct spheres, the Trump Doctrine explicitly uses individual elements of U.S. economic dominance—such as tariffs, financial sanctions, and supply chain blockades—as tools for maintaining its global hegemony and achieving updated national security goals.

From the perspective of the EDF, the goal of the regional conflict was more likely to be the development of economic and financial components of a global strategy to contain America’s main geopolitical rival—China. The measured pace of the conflict suggests that the goal was not to swiftly defeat Iran militarily and establish long-term U.S. control over the Strait of Hormuz; instead, it seeks to block supplies to Middle Eastern exporters for a sufficiently long period of time. The blockade served as a tool for simultaneously expanding U.S. economic influence in two interrelated areas within the framework of the Trump Doctrine.

In the first, oil was used as a means of exerting pressure on China—the U.S’ main geopolitical rival and end consumer of Iranian exports. At the level of the regional armed conflict, the counter-blockade, specifically targeting maritime shipping entering and exiting Iranian ports, was used as a tool against Iran with the operational goal of reducing revenues from its oil export, over 80% of which was destined for China. The inability to secure U.S. oil supplies for other countries, as declared in the EDF, poses a risk to energy security for those countries, such as China, that are heavily dependent on oil and gas imports from the Middle East. In the second area, oil can be viewed as the target: at the level of regional economic competition, the dual blockade disrupted the energy supply routes of OPEC competitors while simultaneously dismantling the price barriers that constrained the expansion of U.S. exports. Improving the competitiveness of the American oil and gas industry significantly contributes to the overall competitiveness of the national economy.

The United States also needed market control to acquire a new and effective lever—in addition to its existing military, trade, and financial ones—to increase its pressure in the trade and economic standoff with China. If, according to Fudan University Professor and China Forum expert Zhao Minghao, the blockade of Iranian oil supplies to China is not a distant crisis for Beijing, but a direct attack on its vital interests, then, in the words of Director General of the National Energy Security Fund Konstantin Simonov, it is a "transit noose for the dragon." [5] Considering that China receives approximately half of its oil from the Persian Gulf, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has created an existential threat to the country's energy security and economy. In this regard, it is worth emphasizing the relevance of the statement made by Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu at a meeting of high-ranking BRICS representatives responsible for security issues, regarding the fact that "the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has jeopardized global food and energy security: energy resources and mineral fertilizers, which are significant for many countries, are exported through it."

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The duration and inconsistency of the armed conflict, the Strait of Hormuz blockade, and the negotiation process, accompanied by outward manifestations of pseudo-irrationality on the part of the most active political figure in this conflict, should not pose an insurmountable obstacle to discovering its entirely rational justifications and driving forces. An analysis of the nature of competition in the global oil market and the expansion of U.S. oil exporters has revealed the latter's objective interest in transforming their strategic energy model from maintaining neutral competitiveness to proactive expansion, which is consistent with the directives of the U.S. Energy Dominance Program, adopted in 2025. The relevance of the proposed model is confirmed by financial results, namely, the significant growth of U.S. oil and gas exports in the face of OPEC's diminishing market power and the undermined logistical supply chains of Middle Eastern competitors.

The Strait of Hormuz blockade is being used not only as a tool for developing the U.S. oil and gas industry but also to enhance the competitiveness of the its national economy in the face of confrontation with China. In this regard, it would be highly useful to examine the impact of the updated Trump Doctrine on the transformation of its competitiveness model. Structuring the processes observed in this context would allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the connection between their manifestations in the economic and foreign policy dimensions.

1. Michael Porter, a professor at Harvard Business School, was the first to systematically approach multi-factor models of economic competitiveness. In particular, he used the concept of a pure strategy of competition based on the lowest possible cost level. This strategy was used by OPEC members from the Arabian Peninsula to create barriers to entry for U.S. exporters into global markets. For more details, see: Porter, ME, 1980. Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. New York: Free Press.

2. Strategic entrepreneurship involves behavior that combines the search for opportunities with the search for an advantage, leading to improved firm performance. For more information, see: Ireland, R.D., Hitt, M.A., Sirmon, D.G. A Model of Strategic Entrepreneurship: The Construct and its Dimensions // Journal of Management, 2003, 29(6). Pp. 963-989.

3. M. Kozlov, Heterogeneous Analyzer Typology Organization: The Role of Strategic Entrepreneurship. Chapter 1 in The Power of Entrepreneurship, ed. Daan Dirksen, Nova Science Publishers, NY, 2019, pp. 1-43.

4. White Paper — Strategic Implications of U.S. LNG Exports. Posted by American Security Project on January 17, 2025.

5. K. Simonov. Global Energy War. 2007, Moscow: Algorithm, 270 p. (in Russian)

6. The "Trump Doctrine" refers to a summary of relevant documents and statements, in particular the updated U.S. National Security Strategy and the 2025 Energy Dominance Financing Program (EDF).