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Pavel K. Baev

Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

Henrik Larsen

PhD, Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich

Russia has recently unveiled its draft security treaty proposals addressed to NATO and the United States. With these proposals leaving plenty of room for comment and discussion, RIAC has reached out to experts from our partner organizations in a bid to share their perspective on the drafts, exploring the possibility of a compromise between NATO and Russia.

Below you can find the comments presented by some of the experts. If you would like to add your ideas to the broader picture, be sure to send your comments and/or analyses to editorial@russiancouncil.ru.

Russia has recently unveiled its draft security treaty proposals addressed to NATO and the United States. With these proposals leaving plenty of room for comment and discussion, RIAC has reached out to experts from our partner organizations in a bid to share their perspective on the drafts, exploring the possibility of a compromise between NATO and Russia.

Below you can find the comments presented by some of the experts. If you would like to add your ideas to the broader picture, be sure to send your comments and/or analyses to editorial@russiancouncil.ru.

Pavel K. Baev, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

The substance of proposals published by Russian Foreign Ministry is interesting not because most of demands are clearly and deliberately unacceptable, but because it is delivered in such unusual way - by virtual publication.

The rush in soliciting a negative response can only be explained by a “strong move” of some sort that is already prepared and needs to be delivered in a matter of a few weeks.

An invasion into Ukraine can hardly constitute such move—too crude and too predictable; something surprising in the cards, and of an entirely unexpected character.

One option is a withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, particularly since it is not ratified by the USA (and neither by China).

Another is even simpler: movement of non-strategic nuclear warheads to storages in Kaliningrad and Crimea.

Will be extremely glad to be wrong.

Henrik Larsen, PhD, Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich

Western diplomacy may perhaps see reason in negotiating Russia’s specific demands about NATO. It seems a better option than, as proposed by other pundits, to pressure Kiev to implement the Minsk Agreement, which risks giving Russia a de facto veto also over Ukraine’s economic and political affiliation with the EU. In no circumstance could the Western countries agree to conceding Ukraine to a Russian sphere of influence, nor to a ‘closed door’ policy. The only compromise that perhaps could be negotiated—prompted by U.S. leadership—is language signaling what is already the reality: that NATO has the intention neither to enlarge, nor to station military infrastructure in Ukraine in the current security environment, provided that Russia in exchange commits to not using military force against Ukraine and to solve the conflict in the Donbass. Negotiations should be treated strictly as a question of military neutrality and probably without concessions on NATO’s continued advising, training, and funding of Ukraine’s armed forces.

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