Transition from Hierarchical to Flat Leadership in Iran

In what can be regarded as a period of turmoil within the Iranian regime, the intentional removal of the Iranian leadership by Israel and the United States has had a significant impact on the nature of leadership within the political and military establishments, as well as the nature and coherence of the decision-making process.

With the transformation of Iran's decision-making apparatus into a flat, rhizome-based organization due to the absence of the Supreme Leader and the top-tier leadership of the deep state, the fragmentation of the once cohesive, unified institution into several parallel entities has led to inconsistent and sometimes contradictory decisions. This has also made it impossible to reach a unified and final decision and to identify the entity that actually holds the reins of power in order to reach an agreement with it. However, this absence, on the other hand, has entrenched the power of the Revolutionary Guard, transforming it into the dominant institution in decision-making by virtue of its armed presence and widespread deployment. No decision can be made except through it or with its approval.

While the wave of assassinations has weakened the Revolutionary Guard's leadership structure, there are still generals and commanders within the Guard who can be considered influential in the current decision-making process. These include the Revolutionary Guard's top commanders: Mohsen Rezaei, Yahya Safavi, and Mohammad Ali Jafari (both two-star generals), along with Hossein Taeb, the former head of the Revolutionary Guard's intelligence organization. Ultimately, Iran appears to be facing a difficult transitional period that could be prolonged or shortened depending on regional and international developments, but it is unlikely to be short. This means that the ongoing negotiations with Iran are taking place amidst political and institutional fragmentation, making it difficult to reach a final decision and complicating smooth communication with influential figures within the Iranian political landscape.

In what can be regarded as a period of turmoil within the Iranian regime, the intentional removal of the Iranian leadership by Israel and the United States has had a significant impact on the nature of leadership within the political and military establishments, as well as the nature and coherence of the decision-making process.

I. While Iran's sovereign decision-making apparatus was characterized for decades by a hierarchical structure governing its decision-making mechanisms, this hierarchical leadership system, which had long managed political and military policies, transformed into a flattened command system after the recent 40-day war. This transformation was not limited to the political system, which became headless in the absence of the Supreme Leader—who had been like an orchestra conductor managing independent mechanisms—but extended to the military establishment, considered a pillar of the deep state. The absence of top-tier leaders and the rise of dozens of mid-level commanders led to the collapse of the hierarchical system and the emergence of a broad network of leaders with similar status and influence.

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II. This was further supported by another equally significant change brought about by the leader's absence and the breakdown of the traditional leadership institution. The absence of this root resulted in the emergence of a non-centralized style of leadership known as rhizometic leadership, which is characterized by a lack of organic connection to a single root and a great deal of independence for each part of the decision-making process. In contrast, the supreme leader institution's dominance over decision-making led to the consecration of the tree type of leadership, where sub-institutions derive their legitimacy and effectiveness from a single root.

The absence of the supreme leader resulted in the disappearance of institutions that relied on his administrative legitimacy, while the transition from hierarchical to flat leadership, as well as from tree-like to rhizome-like leadership, produced several significant outcomes that influenced political decision-making in Iran, the most important of which are as follows:

I. The rise of numerous parallel institutions, relatively equal in power and influence, in place of a single political institution, is a significant development. While the Iranian political establishment, under the previous Supreme Leader, was a unified and highly cohesive entity, it transformed after his death into a collection of parallel institutions with limited interconnectedness. This transformation was not limited to the political establishment; it was also reflected in the military, which, once characterized by cohesive leadership, fragmented into sectors with a high degree of autonomy and a decline in cohesion after the removal of its top tier of commanders. This shift was evident in developments on the ground and statements by Iranian officials. For example, in the early days of the war, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi indicated that local commanders within the Revolutionary Guard had gained greater decision-making autonomy and were operating under a principle of open fire based on pre-established instructions.

II. The rise of fragmented decision-making processes and the emergence of decisions characterized by inconsistency and contradiction are evident. This phenomenon was manifested in the lack of harmony between the Iranian Foreign Minister's position and that of the Revolutionary Guard regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, the political establishment formed a negotiating team comprising dozens of individuals, each representing one of the various institutions within the regime. Parliament Speaker and head of the negotiating delegation, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, alluded to this when he emphasized that the large size of the delegation was intended to encompass the diverse viewpoints within the Iranian political landscape and to "conduct the necessary consultations." While this has complicated communication with the Iranian side, particularly given the absence of the Supreme Leader and the complexities hindering rapid contact, and prompted President Trump to assert that he doesn't know who is leading Iran "or with whom we are dealing," it has simultaneously prevented, thus far, reaching a "final decision" on any issue.

III. The militarization of Iranian decision-making and the growing power of the military, as the institution that bears arms and enjoys the widest presence within Iran, are significant. This does not refer to the Iranian army, which US officials have confirmed is exempt from strikes and assassinations, yet it remains largely absent from the decision-making process. Rather, it concerns the Revolutionary Guard and its affiliated military institutions. While the Revolutionary Guard's influence on the political scene was previously restrained by the figure of the Supreme Leader, who, by constitution and historical precedent, is placed above the institution, his absence signifies the removal of this constraint and the elimination of the limitations that prevented the Revolutionary Guard's dominance over the political landscape. In its quest to consolidate its hegemony, the military establishment has sought to impose a state of emergency to prevent the convening of institutions that could define its powers and intervene in the decision-making process, including the parliament, the Expediency Discernment Council, and the Supreme National Security Council. The Revolutionary Guard's dominance over decision-making has repeatedly thwarted efforts to reach a final agreement, and diplomatic channels have failed to find solutions with the U.S. The obstacles faced by the Speaker of Parliament, despite his affiliation with the Revolutionary Guard, in formulating a solution due to the Guard's rejection, are noteworthy. Similarly, the Revolutionary Guard rejected Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi's statement, made in a tweet on the X platform, that the Strait of Hormuz was open to navigation; however, the Guard's leaders insisted that the strait would remain closed, effectively imposing their will.

Thus, with the transformation of Iran's decision-making apparatus into a flat, rhizome-based organization due to the absence of the Supreme Leader and the top-tier leadership of the deep state, the fragmentation of the once cohesive, unified institution into several parallel entities has led to inconsistent and sometimes contradictory decisions. This has also made it impossible to reach a unified and final decision and to identify the entity that actually holds the reins of power in order to reach an agreement with it. However, this absence, on the other hand, has entrenched the power of the Revolutionary Guard, transforming it into the dominant institution in decision-making by virtue of its armed presence and widespread deployment. No decision can be made except through it or with its approval.

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Currently, the military wing likely dominates the decision-making process in the following area:

I. The government's role is primarily limited to managing internal affairs, particularly in logistical and economic matters, while its involvement in sovereign decision-making is restricted to procedural tasks carried out mainly by the minister of foreign affairs and, to a lesser extent, by the president of the Republic.

II. The Iranian parliament, whose role is limited to Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (who leads the negotiating team, but whose powers are restricted) and a small group of his deputies, has little influence. Parliamentary blocs, including hardline ones, remain largely ineffective due to the suspension of parliamentary sessions during wartime.

III. The headquarters of Khatam al-Anbiya, which is dominated by the Revolutionary Guard and led by General Abdollahi (a two-star general, the highest military rank available in the Iranian military establishment), includes influential figures such as General Mostafa Izadi (a two-star general) and General Mohammad Jafar Asadi (commander of Iranian forces in Syria before the overthrow of the Assad regime).

IV. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is the dominant military institution both domestically and in the conflict with the United States and Israel. It is currently led by General Ahmad Vahidi (a two-star general), with General Hojjatollah Qureshi as his deputy. General Ali Ozmaei (a one-star general) commands its naval forces, while General Majid Mousavi oversees its air and missile forces.

While the wave of assassinations has weakened the Revolutionary Guard's leadership structure, there are still generals and commanders within the Guard who can be considered influential in the current decision-making process. These include the Revolutionary Guard's top commanders: Mohsen Rezaei, Yahya Safavi, and Mohammad Ali Jafari (both two-star generals), along with Hossein Taeb, the former head of the Revolutionary Guard's intelligence organization. Ultimately, Iran appears to be facing a difficult transitional period that could be prolonged or shortened depending on regional and international developments, but it is unlikely to be short. This means that the ongoing negotiations with Iran are taking place amidst political and institutional fragmentation, making it difficult to reach a final decision and complicating smooth communication with influential figures within the Iranian political landscape.