President Biden’s Syria Policy Should Allow for Cooperation with Russia

Middle East watchers continue to speculate about how President Joe Biden’s Syria policy will evolve as he pursues other policy goals in the region, such as the withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. American analysts are inconsistent in evaluating U.S. strategy, as evident by articles from Andrew J. Tabler and Josh Rogin. Though both authors have slightly different conclusions, it’s clear that labeling Syria as the new North Korea is a last-ditch effort by the West to undermine Assad’s power—at least short of advocating directly for military intervention. The analysis, riddled with an anti-Russia bias, leads to short-sighted recommendations that would only prolong the devastating effects of the civil war.

Analysts emphasize Biden’s failure to identify U.S. strategy in Syria. They concede that despite no formal policy, the administration has taken action. Russia has no interest in Syria becoming a failed state (which the West has let happen in Libya), let alone starving civilians to death. This accusation fails to consider the mechanisms of aid distribution. It’s a propaganda effort aimed at discrediting Russia’s role in Syria. Russia is feeding Syrians, delivering regular shipments of wheat since March 2021 when the resource’s demand became an emergency.

Though the American press pursues a clear agenda against Russia and Assad, President Biden’s ambiguous policy could be advantageous. It allows for flexibility in adapting to a post-conflict Syria and for the possibility of back-channel negotiations with Russia. When Secretary of State Anthony Blinken appoints a representative for Syria, there will be more to discern on the direction Biden’s policy is headed. It is commendable that President Biden and President Putin have already achieved success in humanitarian assistance by compromising in phone talks to approve a UN Security Council extension of cross-border aid—indicating a possibility for continued cooperation.

Middle East watchers continue to speculate about how President Joe Biden’s Syria policy will evolve as he pursues other policy goals in the region, such as the withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. American analysts are inconsistent in evaluating U.S. strategy, as evident by articles from Andrew J. Tabler and Josh Rogin. Though both authors have slightly different conclusions, it’s clear that labeling Syria as the new North Korea is a last-ditch effort by the West to undermine Assad’s power—at least short of advocating directly for military intervention. The analysis, riddled with an anti-Russia bias, leads to short-sighted recommendations that would only prolong the devastating effects of the civil war.

Ruslan Mamedov:
Syria: Rules-Based International Order Creates Humanitarian Rule, Not Law?

Andrew J. Tabler, writing for Foreign Affairs, argues that Syria will demand more attention from the Biden administration. Tabler identifies a few pillars of Biden’s Syria policy: “Washington is committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS by reaffirming the U.S. military presence and reissuing the stabilization aid to northeast Syria that the Trump administration had cut.” In addition, humanitarian aid is a priority. Tabler frames Russia as a spoiler of a UN resolution dealing with humanitarian border crossings. He fails to mention that Russia’s initial concern was based on a belief in scaling down cross-border aid as “the Syrian government regains control of more and more Syrian regions and humanitarian assistance can now be delivered from inside the country in coordination with Damascus, as is envisaged by international humanitarian law.” Alexander Lavrentyev, Russian Presidential Special Envoy for Syria, explained how these border crossings of humanitarian aid become co-opted by militant groups: “Because it is them who receive assistance. Further on, they distribute or even sell it, thus depriving civilians of direct access controlled by international organizations. And there is no such control because international organizations are not present there. Everything is actually left at the mercy of militants and it is inadmissible.” Ultimately, Russia worked on a compromised version of the UN resolution—a historic cooperation between Moscow and Washington.

Tabler’s main critique of Washington’s dealings with Syria is severing the Delta Crescent Energy license. Delta Crescent is a U.S. oil company initially allowed to operate in Syria under the Trump administration. The strategy behind the decision: “[Delta Crescent was] to improve Syrian oil fields and introduce mobile refining capacity into northeast Syria. The idea was to make the fight against ISIS self-sustainable and to keep the SDF from trading crude oil with the Assad regime.” The reversal of this decision, following Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s allegedly sham re-election, will mean that Delta Crescent has to trade with the Assad regime which “undermines the strategy that Washington has pursued since the Obama administration,” according to Tabler.

The end of Delta Crescent’s license has positive impacts for Russian interests. Tabler argues that this has been a significant demand for Russia—it allows an energy company called Gulfsands Petroleum to “make inroads.” Tabler cites a report from MEES that “the primary shareholder is a Russian investor believed to have close ties to the Kremlin.” This has led to speculation “about the existence of a quid pro quo, with Washington ending Delta Crescent’s license in exchange for Moscow’s support for continuing to allow humanitarian aid to cross the border into areas of Syria that the Assad regime does not control.” The White House has denied this claim. Beyond the denial, it’s unlikely a quid pro quo is occurring. Though geoeconomics may be playing a more critical role in the reconstruction era, Russia isn’t likely to take such political risks for a single oil company.

Tabler is correct in assessing that the United States will likely “stop trying to isolate the Assad regime.” Despite the sensational label of Syria as the “North Korea on the Mediterranean,” it has become clear that other states are willing to engage with Syria. Assad is here to stay, at least if he has Russian and Iranian backing. Western countries failed to provide any viable alternative to the regime. With the civil war behind, reconstruction is now a priority, with the UN resolution allowing “for the first time for progress on early recovering projects.” Cyprus and Serbia are taking steps to normalize relations with Syria. Greece has made the decision to send a diplomat to Damascus, emphasizing that “Athens is not accrediting him to the regime of Bashar Assad.” As Chloe Cornish, writing for the Financial Times, explains, “smaller countries want direct channels with Damascus, mostly for pragmatic reasons.”

Though Tabler has a clear angle in advocating that the Biden administration develop a “coherent political strategy” to “limit the malign influence of Iran and Russia,” he does offer a compelling recommendation for how to instrumentalize sanctions. Sanctions should be reduced to relieve the impact they have on Syrian civilians. This could be done by lifting restrictions on international nongovernmental organizations: “This could include licenses for NGOs in regime-controlled areas, as long as the Assad regime and Russia continue to allow for international humanitarian access outside regime-controlled areas. Licenses and waivers that allow for crucial humanitarian work can be renewed; those abused by the regime and its supporters can be eliminated.” There are plenty of avenues for partnership between the U.S. and Russia when it comes to alleviating human suffering in Syria.

Andrey Kortunov, Julien Barnes-Dacey:
First Aid: How Russia and the West Can Help Syrians in Idlib

Other analysts such as Josh Rogin, writing for the Washington Post, emphasize Biden’s failure to identify U.S. strategy in Syria. He concedes that despite no formal policy, the administration has taken action. Still, he repeats the line that “the president himself worked to stop Russia from cutting off the last humanitarian aid route to Idlib, where more than 3 million internally displaced refugees would have otherwise starved to death.” Russia has no interest in Syria becoming a failed state (which the West has let happen in Libya), let alone starving civilians to death. This accusation fails to consider the mechanisms of aid distribution. It’s a propaganda effort aimed at discrediting Russia’s role in Syria. Russia is feeding Syrians, delivering regular shipments of wheat since March 2021 when the resource’s demand became an emergency.

Rogin’s analysis relies on an interview from Raed al-Saleh, chairman of the Syrian Civil Defense or White Helmets—a dubious organization linked to working with terrorist groups and charged with being a regime change group working for Washington. So naturally, Rogin’s main criticism of U.S. policy is that there should be more American presence on the ground. He parrots that Russian and Assad forces have killed 21 children via airstrikes failing to mention American airstrikes earlier this year.

Rogin quotes al-Saleh that if Assad regains control of Idlib, “that will entrench Syria as the North Korea of the Middle East.” A widely misleading claim considering that so-called ‘opposition’ groups such as the terrorist group Jabhat al-Nusra have repeatedly carried out “provocation[s] in Syria with the use of toxic chemical agents against civilians.” Maria Zakharova, Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman, explained how these operations receive participation from the White Helmets and that “responsibility for these provocations, as part of the propaganda campaigns that are whipped up afterwards, is invariably pinned on the Syrian government.”

Though the American press pursues a clear agenda against Russia and Assad, President Biden’s ambiguous policy could be advantageous. It allows for flexibility in adapting to a post-conflict Syria and for the possibility of back-channel negotiations with Russia. When Secretary of State Anthony Blinken appoints a representative for Syria, there will be more to discern on the direction Biden’s policy is headed. It is commendable that President Biden and President Putin have already achieved success in humanitarian assistance by compromising in phone talks to approve a UN Security Council extension of cross-border aid – indicating a possibility for continued cooperation.