Escalation Trap

In Lebanon, the interests of Iran and Israel intersect, affecting the security of the entire region. The Jewish state perceives the threat emanating from Hezbollah as an existential security threat. This issue became particularly acute after the events of October 7, 2023, when Hamas attacked Israel. Hezbollah has traditionally been regarded as a more powerful force than Hamas, which heightened perceptions of the threat originating from the north. Strategically, Israel would like to eliminate Hezbollah, but its elimination is practically impossible due to its deep integration into the socio‑political structure of Lebanon.

At the same time, the Lebanese factor remains critically important for Iran. Hezbollah is one of the few allies of the Islamic Republic capable of conducting military operations against its key ideological adversary. Moreover, Hezbollah is not just an ally for Iran. The organization has symbolic, ideological, and political significance for Tehran, primarily in the context of the anti‑Israeli agenda. In addition, it was created with the active participation of the Islamic Republic, which gives these relations an additional dimension. That is why Iran seeks to include Lebanon and the issue of Hezbollah in the broader context of possible agreements with the United States.

However, this is where one of the key knots of contradiction lies. Israel insists on preserving its freedom of action against Hezbollah and is not prepared to relinquish the option of conducting strikes against its facilities. From its point of view, this is a direct threat located near the state's borders, and therefore Lebanon is perceived as one of the priorities for ensuring security.

At the beginning of June, reports emerged that Israel and Lebanon, with the assistance of the United States, had agreed to a ceasefire arrangement. At the same time, the provisions of the agreement were largely aimed at limiting Hezbollah’s influence. In fact, the document contained provisions on expanding the role of the Lebanese army in the south of the country. However, the problem is that Hezbollah did not participate in the drafting or signing of the agreement and does not consider itself bound by its terms. As a result, the fragility of the arrangement was noticeable from the very beginning.

Simultaneously, broader mechanisms for the gradual transfer of control to the Lebanese army were also discussed, including the creation of pilot security zones. However, in practice, it does not have sufficient resources to reliably prevent Hezbollah's activities in these territories.

Despite numerous statements of interest in peace and stabilization, there is no reason to believe that durable agreements can be reached in the near future. Moreover, even if such agreements are reached, the risk of their breakdown at any stage remains significant. Both Hezbollah's actions and Israel's decisions can jeopardize both the negotiation process itself and the implementation of already achieved agreements. For this reason, the current situation should be regarded as highly fragile and characterized by high potential for escalation.

In Lebanon, the interests of Iran and Israel intersect, affecting the security of the entire region. The Jewish state perceives the threat emanating from Hezbollah as an existential security threat. This issue became particularly acute after the events of October 7, 2023, when Hamas attacked Israel. Hezbollah has traditionally been regarded as a more powerful force than Hamas, which heightened perceptions of the threat originating from the north. Strategically, Israel would like to eliminate Hezbollah, but its elimination is practically impossible due to its deep integration into the socio‑political structure of Lebanon.

At the operational level, the primary challenge for Israel is the shelling of its northern regions, which has led to population evacuations and sustained a state of constant tension. The Jewish state seeks to reduce Hezbollah’s activity in the border areas of southern Lebanon south of the Litani River, while also increasing the distance from potential shelling positions to allow more time for air defense systems to respond and for civilians to take shelter.

After a ceasefire regime was reached between Israel and Hezbollah in November 2024, the parties engaged in clashes, but large‑scale fighting was generally avoided. This year, against the backdrop of escalation around Iran, Hezbollah supported Tehran and entered the war. The Israeli leadership had not previously viewed Hezbollah as an actor capable of adhering to long-term agreements, and the subsequent escalation has likely only reinforced this perception, further strengthening the emphasis on resolving issues through the use of force.

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At the same time, the Lebanese factor remains critically important for Iran. Hezbollah is one of the few allies of the Islamic Republic capable of conducting military operations against its key ideological adversary. Moreover, Hezbollah is not just an ally for Iran. The organization has symbolic, ideological, and political significance for Tehran, primarily in the context of the anti‑Israeli agenda. In addition, it was created with the active participation of the Islamic Republic, which gives these relations an additional dimension. That is why Iran seeks to include Lebanon and the issue of Hezbollah in the broader context of possible agreements with the United States.

However, this is where one of the key knots of contradiction lies. Israel insists on preserving its freedom of action against Hezbollah and is not prepared to relinquish the option of conducting strikes against its facilities. From its point of view, this is a direct threat located near the state's borders, and therefore Lebanon is perceived as one of the priorities for ensuring security.

An examination of the situation in Lebanon would be incomplete without considering another factor—the agency of Hezbollah and the degree of its autonomy in decision‑making. To consider it merely an instrument of Iranian policy, devoid of its own will, would be an oversimplification. Despite its close ties with Tehran, Hezbollah retains significant autonomy.

At the same time, in recent years the organization has become more decentralized. Indirect signs indicate the growing independence of individual commanders and units, who may act in conditions of limited communication with the central leadership. The higher the level of autonomy on the ground, the more likely that individual actions will be taken without direct authorization from the central command, which increases the risk of escalation.

Over the past several weeks, Hezbollah has repeatedly launched drones and missiles both at northern areas of Israel and at Israeli forces located in southern Lebanon. After one such attack, the IDF struck Hezbollah’s positions in Dahieh—the southern suburb of Beirut—after which Iran struck Israel, and then Israel struck Iran. This clearly demonstrates how local incidents around Lebanon can trigger a chain escalation that reaches the regional level. Potentially, such incidents can provoke exchanges of strikes between Israel and Iran, with the possible involvement of the United States and again Iranian strikes against the Gulf monarchies.

This also creates problems for the negotiations between Washington and Tehran. Iran is unable to give guarantees that Hezbollah will not shell Israel. The United States, in turn, cannot guarantee that Israel will refrain from strikes on Lebanese territory and on facilities linked to Hezbollah.

At the beginning of June, reports emerged that Israel and Lebanon, with the assistance of the United States, had agreed to a ceasefire arrangement. At the same time, the provisions of the agreement were largely aimed at limiting Hezbollah’s influence. In fact, the document contained provisions on expanding the role of the Lebanese army in the south of the country. However, the problem is that Hezbollah did not participate in the drafting or signing of the agreement and does not consider itself bound by its terms. As a result, the fragility of the arrangement was noticeable from the very beginning.

Simultaneously, broader mechanisms for the gradual transfer of control to the Lebanese army were also discussed, including the creation of pilot security zones. However, in practice, it does not have sufficient resources to reliably prevent Hezbollah's activities in these territories.

Despite numerous statements of interest in peace and stabilization, there is no reason to believe that durable agreements can be reached in the near future. Moreover, even if such agreements are reached, the risk of their breakdown at any stage remains significant. Both Hezbollah's actions and Israel's decisions can jeopardize both the negotiation process itself and the implementation of already achieved agreements. For this reason, the current situation should be regarded as highly fragile and characterized by high potential for escalation.