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Topic: Energy
Region: Europe
Type: Columns - European Policy
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Dimitris Symeonidis

Energy policy and geopolitical risk analyst based in The Hague

Historically, Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic have both developed a pro-nuclear strategy and the government arguing in favour of such an energy strategy. However, we live currently in a world which comprises of two main characteristics. First, most countries, in particular in the European Union (e.g. Germany since 2011), are turning their back on nuclear power plants. Secondly, the thorium and molten salt reactors revolution threatens to make the conventional uranium technology irrelevant. Hence, several questions arise: What are the actual reasons that lead Czechia to such a pro-nuclear policy? What will the geopolitical implications for Prague be? What will the thorium revolution mean for a traditional nuclear power such as Czech Republic?

The Czech energy policy makers are facing a challenge of many faces. On the one hand, nuclear debate has resulted in a geopolitical game, both on the EU and globally, and it is now leading to Prague choosing a less popular “path” to decarbonisation, which, if not “walked” properly, can lead to isolation. On the other hand, this debate is closely connected with the scientific debate, over which safety is the most important issue. The reason for this is that, if Czechia, or any other EU member state, chooses a nuclear technology of questionable quality and safety, it might be possible that it breaks the already very sensitive balance in the nuclear debate against nuclear power plants. Prague should, primarily, find partnerships in the EU, preferably in the region of Central or Eastern Europe, to promote its pro-nuclear strategy. More specifically, the V4 can move forward with further integrating their nuclear power systems and trying to form partnerships from there on.

The debate, however, is also domestic. During parliamentary votes and tenders the pro-Russian and anti-Russian lobbies become evident and this reflects on the ambivalence of most laws and strategies in Prague related to nuclear.

The external strategy is suggested to embrace the thorium revolution. The fact that it is not applicable to the self-sufficiency narrative of Czechia does not mean that it should be disregarded, as potential resolution of safety concerns (if they are acknowledged at an EU level) because of thorium reactors might change the public view and the political landscape.

In February 2021, the Czech parliament postponed voting on a nuclear tender which, if successful, would result in a Russian bid to build a 160 billion Koruna (6,25 billion euros) power plant. The tender does not come as a surprise, as the State Energy Policy Update (SEPU) model as well as the National Action Plan (NAP) on nuclear energy have portrayed the significance of nuclear energy for the transition on the Czech Republic by contrast to other options available at the moment. However, the postponement raises several questions. Several months later, on September 16, the Czech parliament approved a law for the transition to low-emission energy that excluded countries such as Russia and China from being able to bid for the construction of a new nuclear power plant. Both decisions are characterized by a lack of decisiveness and by ambivalence.

Historically, Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic have both developed a pro-nuclear strategy and the government arguing in favour of such an energy strategy. However, we live currently in a world which comprises of two main characteristics. First, most countries, in particular in the European Union (e.g. Germany since 2011), are turning their back on nuclear power plants. Secondly, the thorium and molten salt reactors revolution threatens to make the conventional uranium technology irrelevant. Hence, several questions arise: What are the actual reasons that lead Czechia to such a pro-nuclear policy? What will the geopolitical implications for Prague be? What will the thorium revolution mean for a traditional nuclear power such as Czech Republic?

Historical Background

In the former Czechoslovakia, energy policy gained significance in the wake of World War II, where it became evident that coal alone could not support the booming Czech industry, which involved several energy intensive sectors such as the steel industry.

Being a country with a tradition on uranium mining, Czechoslovakia quickly turned to the solution of nuclear industry. Considering that the Soviet Union had a need for uranium imports to develop its own nuclear sector, this presented a great opportunity for the usage of these vast deposits of uranium. On one hand, Soviet atomic experts assisted with their technical expertise, but also with materials to build the power plants. On the other hand, the demand for Czechoslovak uranium increased, giving a boost to the industry.

Ever since the seizure of power by Communist Party Leader Klement Gottwald, several nuclear agreements with Moscow were made, even leading to the repurposing of a Skoda factory in Plzen for the construction of nuclear power reactors, showing firm alignment with the Soviet Union. By 1972, the first nuclear reactor was built. The A-1, the first example of a KS-150 reactor (gas cooled using heavy water), was constructed in Jaslovske Bohunice. Despite the fact that 24 units were planned, only 8 of them were finalised by the time the Soviet Union collapsed. Four were located in Jaslovske Bohunice and four were in Dukovany. Out of the ones under construction, only the power plants in Temelin went through.

Contemporary history of the Czech Republic has showed efforts to decouple its nuclear strategy from Moscow, both in terms of fuel and in terms of reactor technology. In 1996, CEZ issued a tender for maintenance works in the VVER-1000 reactor in Temelin, which was won by the American Westinghouse company. The project had to face major backlash and after 5 years of delays and constant increase of projected costs, it was not finished. Second attempt took place in 2009, where Westinghouse participated in a tender over the expansion of Temelin but these plans were cancelled in 2014. The third attempt from the American company was a success in 2021, when a nine-year agreement on maintenance works on the Dukovany power plant was signed with Westinghouse.

All in all, one main trend in the Czech nuclear trajectory can be observed, which is a pro-nuclear strategy and a chiefly pro-Russian nuclear technologies approach, both of which are characterized by hesitance. There is great interest in investigating the reasons for this hesitance. Analyzing the flaws of SEPU might facilitate better understanding this hesitance.

Understanding the Czech nuclear rationale

In order to better understand the clear pro-nuclear bias of Prague, it is important to take into consideration several points that were omitted from the Czech energy policy that is expressed through SEPU. Primarily, construction of nuclear power plants is significantly expensive and, according to several projections, there is very low possibility of these costs ever being reduced. Maintenance is relatively inexpensive; however, it is insignificant when considering the capital expenditure needed. Still, solar and wind technologies have been getting cheaper over the past decade and are considered to become even more affordable. Moreover, reliability is a very important issue, in which nuclear technology certainly wins the battle at the moment. Nevertheless, the potential of energy storage as well as transferring through hydrogen is not given the right attention. In addition, the potential for other renewables, currently marked as low, has not been examined thoroughly, as more technologies, other than solar and wind, are emerging. Finally, as mentioned, the Bohemian Massif is home to 32 ore deposits. However, since 1993, 30 of those have either been mined out or closed. Out of the two remaining, the Straz and Rozna mines, only the latter has been recently active, which is considered a vein-deposit (containing a large amount of uranium). However, it is unknown to which extent this mine, along with the others that contain uranium, can fuel the soon-to-be-built nuclear power plants.

Reflecting on research on public and political opinion during the issuing of the Temelin 2009 expansion tender, the main theme is energy security and self-sufficiency. Even in an era of interconnectivity in energy and electricity, the notions of self-sustaining exists. In addition, there is little faith in the future participation of renewables as base load units, as even Czech Prime Minister Peter Necas in 2009 admitted that he considers nuclear energy a reliable source of energy unlike renewables.

Nonetheless, there is a deceleration power to the Czech nuclear driving force of self-sufficiency and that is the political decision-making arena in Brussels.

The European Union Nuclear Debate

One of the major energy challenges that the European Union currently faces is the potential inclusion of nuclear and gas power in the EU green deal, to be able to combat climate change. There have been numerous debates and disputes over the subject on the European Commission, with the latest news talking about 80 lawmakers calling the EU executive branch to include nuclear energy into the energy sources eligible to support the energy transition. Thinking on that, there should be a focus on specific member states’ stance to be able to analyse and anticipate the geopolitical implications of a pro-nuclear strategy.

Germany is deemed to be the most important state actor in the EU in that aspect. The German and Czech energy systems are strongly connected and thus the Czech energy system’s wholesale price, price volatility and the future of the market design depend largely on the German energy policy. Following a completely different path creates uncertainty in those sectors, which might potentially lead to friction among the two member states. For Germany, it will be crucial to monitor the aftermath of the elections in terms of nuclear policy-making.

The strongest opposition is projected to be given from the Austrian side. The Austrian government has already portrayed being against the construction and operation of the Russian VVER nuclear reactors in Czechia, since its politicians have made the connection with the RMBK reactors, which have also been constructed in Russia and were used in the Chernobyl power reactor, where the explosion and the unprecedented catastrophe took place. Austria at the time had threatened of even trying to impede Czechia from entering the EU, which makes the Rosatom bid to build the nuclear power plant a very dangerous geopolitical card. Together with other member states, such as Denmark, Italy, Greece, Estonia and Luxembourg, there is a strong anti-nuclear block in Brussels that Czechia has to work through.

However, the future is not solely dark about nuclear energy in the EU. France is the largest state actor in the EU that is pro-nuclear and would serve as a good ally, but it is not the most strategic one. In Poland, the Polish Energy Policy (PEP)was designed to gradually phase out electricity production from coal and build as much as six coal reactors, starting from 2026. In Slovakia, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (UJD) issued a permit to commission the Mochovce-3 (471MW) nuclear power plant, despite initially delaying that decision due to complaints from Austria. The Central European country has also made claims about expanding its nuclear power plants. Over the past decade, Hungary has made agreements to build up on its own nuclear power plants, like the Russia-Hungary deal on the Paks II nuclear power plant. At the same time, its ministers, as well as former prime minister Janos Ader have highlighted their wish to increase their nuclear capacity. Reflecting on the aforementioned strategies, the future of nuclear might be uncertain at a EU level, but the V4 member states have a great opportunity to further integrate their energy systems at a nuclear level, which certainly constitutes a good geopolitical opportunity.

The advocates of nuclear energy in the EU do not seem to be the majority at the moment, but Prague can play a major role in forming coalitions that will support nuclear energy in Brussels.

The Choice of Ally

The Russian Federation

As mentioned, the Czech parliament dodged a vote for a 160bln Koruna offer by Rosatom to build a nuclear power plant. This was followed by the vote on the Czech nuclear law on September 2021 that basically excluded states that have not signed the WTO Procurement Agreement from bidding on its nuclear tenders, among which Russia and China. Nonetheless, Czechia has not been following a clear strategy with regards to neither Kremlin nor Brussels.

Signs of that are Andrej Babis’ quote that “Czechia is not a colony of Brussels” but also the pro-Kremlin views of former presidents Zeman and Klaus. With regards to nuclear energy, the Czech power plants both in Dukovany and in Temelin operate through VVER reactors, which are of Russian technology. The technology familiarity, together with the traditional support and participation of Czech enterprises in Russian bids builds a strong case in favor of Moscow. This is expected to create another set of debates about nuclear in Brussels but it will not formulate a spike of discussions over a possible ‘nuclear strategy’ of Moscow.

There is, nevertheless, an opposition within the Czech parliament. President Zeman himself, a pro-Russian politician under most circumstances, signed the new nuclear law that is not favorable to Moscow. In addition, during 2009, politicians like Vaclav Bartuska raised the issue of energy overdependence in Russia and the need for diversification.

The United States of America

What might likely create a large discussion over safety concerns Washington. The U.S., through its Westinghouse Company, has been promoting the construction of the AP1000 reactors, which promise to reduce cost in nuclear energy, one of the major disadvantages of nuclear power plants. Biden has pushed for a $2 trillion climate plan that includes nuclear power, especially in small modular reactors, and Czechia poses as a great example of a ‘buyer’, since the government already supports construction of new nuclear power plants. Nonetheless, these reactors have faced major backlash, as, according to nuclear scientists and engineers, there is a possibility of rust in the containment structure line steeler and there is no backup container for that. These disputes have made the safety of these reactors highly doubtful, which is a reason for severe concerns that would pose as obstacles for Prague to accept an American bid. This means that a possible acceptance of an American bid in the tender would score high on the dispute probability matrix, both in terms of geopolitics, but also on the discussion over nuclear energy. In such a case, there is a probability that even the pro-nuclear states, such as Hungary or Poland would not back such a decision.

India and China and the nuclear energy revolution

Ivan Timofeev, Sabine Fischer:
EU-Russia in 2030: Alternatives Scenarios

India has been promoting its advanced heavy water reactors (AHWR) through cooperation with nations such as Australia and Argentina and has inked civil nuclear agreements with other countries, but also agreed on cooperating on a nuclear level. One of these is the Czech Republic. On September 7, 2018, the two sides agreed to formulate a cooperation between the Global Centre for Energy Nuclear Partnership, Jhajjar, Haryana and a relevant Czech institution. India has been trying to promote its own Thorium-based technology, with the objective of controlling the fuel and exporting some of their 963.000 tonnes of thorium. However, the fact that even thorium reactors require uranium in the initial phase had made this a less preferable solution for the time being.

The revolution might have been finalized in Beijing. China is considered a state that constantly invents new ways to pursue its diplomacy. One of these ways is considered to be ‘nuclear diplomacy’. While most of its nuclear efforts, including the construction of French technology-based CPR-1000, had foreign expertise as foundation, the recent Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) revolution can convert Beijing into a nuclear pioneer. Molten sand reactors do not require the use of water to cool down, are much cheaper and also might probably lead to the independence of uranium in nuclear energy. Nonetheless, when it comes to energy self-sufficiency, both countries are of the least of direct interest for Prague, as Czechia does not possess significant thorium reserves. It might become a topic of indirect interest, as the additional safety of MSR might lead to a shift in views within Brussels, which have formulated very strict safety standards for the nuclear power plant sector.

In a nutshell

The Czech energy policy makers are facing a challenge of many faces. On the one hand, nuclear debate has resulted in a geopolitical game, both on the EU and globally, and it is now leading to Prague choosing a less popular “path” to decarbonisation, which, if not “walked” properly, can lead to isolation. On the other hand, this debate is closely connected with the scientific debate, over which safety is the most important issue. The reason for this is that, if Czechia, or any other EU member state, chooses a nuclear technology of questionable quality and safety, it might be possible that it breaks the already very sensitive balance in the nuclear debate against nuclear power plants. Prague should, primarily, find partnerships in the EU, preferably in the region of Central or Eastern Europe, to promote its pro-nuclear strategy. More specifically, the V4 can move forward with further integrating their nuclear power systems and trying to form partnerships from there on.

The debate, however, is also domestic. During parliamentary votes and tenders the pro-Russian and anti-Russian lobbies become evident and this reflects on the ambivalence of most laws and strategies in Prague related to nuclear.

The external strategy is suggested to embrace the thorium revolution. The fact that it is not applicable to the self-sufficiency narrative of Czechia does not mean that it should be disregarded, as potential resolution of safety concerns (if they are acknowledged at an EU level) because of thorium reactors might change the public view and the political landscape.

As far as the internal planning is concerned, the Babis minority government would be wise to revise SEPU and the National Action Plan on nuclear energy. While nuclear energy is deemed to significantly reduce CO2 emissions, it is not the sole way and there has not been thorough research on the rest of the renewable energy sources and Czechia’s potential. Such research would benefit Prague in understanding the actual energy needs for a safe energy transition, in accordance with its geopolitical allies.

This presents itself as one of the many struggles that exist in Brussel, in the constant effort to achieve clean, secure and conflict-free energy across Europe.

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