The SCO, BRICS and India's Strategic Autonomy

India’s Eurasian diplomacy was on full display recently, as New Delhi participated in the 26th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek and hosted the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi. Both forums bring India into close multilateral engagement with Russia and China, even as New Delhi continues to deepen its ties with Western powers through similar mechanisms like Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, G7 Outreach, India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, and the I2U2 (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States). Given the ongoing alignment between Russia and China, due to their strategic competition with the West, India’s multilateral strategy could appear somewhat contradictory. However, this signifies the overall multi-alignment doctrine of India’s foreign policy, where New Delhi engages all major centers of power to increase its space to maneuver the great power competition and safeguard its strategic autonomy.

SCO and BRICS become spaces for diplomacy to engage with China. If India boycotts these forums, it cedes important diplomatic space to China in Eurasia and the Global South. This will impact India’s strategic autonomy in a negative way. Afterall, since India’s independence, its policy towards multilateralism has aimed to ensure its strategic autonomy. During the Cold War, India emphasized centrality of the United Nations in global affairs which was an attempt to stay away from the military alliances and the great power competition between the U.S. and the then Soviet Union. India also played an important role in establishment of multilateral platforms other than the UN, like the Non-Alignment Movement and the G-77 Group. These initiatives carried a collective identity of the “Third World” and gave voice to its member states on issues like decolonization, sovereignty, universal disarmament and a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

India uses multilateralism to engage with competing power centers without having an alliance with them. Different multilateral institutions serve different aspects of strategic autonomy for India. SCO helps India’s institutional engagement with Central Asia, however, some complications or disagreement over terrorism and connectivity with China and Pakistan show some of the limits of India’s multi-alignment strategy. On the other hand, BRICS has a bigger vision and space for India to practice its strategic autonomy. Through initiatives like the NDB, local currency trade and alternative payment mechanisms, BRICS strengthens India’s economic autonomy in times of great power competition. In both the organizations, Russia is the bridge for India’s Eurasian and global ambitions. In other words, institutional diversification helps India to expand its strategic choices and hence, both SCO and BRICS will continue to play a role in shaping India’s strategic autonomy.

India’s Eurasian diplomacy was on full display recently, as New Delhi participated in the 26^th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek and hosted the 18^th BRICS summit in New Delhi. Both forums bring India into close multilateral engagement with Russia and China, even as New Delhi continues to deepen its ties with Western powers through similar mechanisms like Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, G7 Outreach, India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, and the I2U2 (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States). Given the ongoing alignment between Russia and China, due to their strategic competition with the West, India’s multilateral strategy could appear somewhat contradictory. However, this signifies the overall multi-alignment doctrine of India’s foreign policy, where New Delhi engages all major centers of power to increase its space to maneuver the great power competition and safeguard its strategic autonomy.

India’s former foreign secretary, Shyam Saran has defined strategic autonomy in the following way: “It is best understood as the capacity of a state to take relatively autonomous decisions on matters of vital interest to the state. The element of relativity is important. Not all interests are of a vital nature, and in a multi-state landscape, one cannot ascribe absolute value to every interest. If one did so, there would be no space for diplomacy. On different issues, in different time periods and situations, the calculus will differ.”

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In the context of Saran’s definition, India’s vital interests in Eurasia (connectivity, counter-terrorism, regional stability and monitoring China-Pakistan ties) make SCO membership important for New Delhi. On the other hand, BRICS serves India’s global and economic interests like reform of global governance institutions, local currency trade, developing alternatives to Western financial institutions and being a prominent voice of the Global South. For this reason, India’s presence in forums where China and Russia are present does not work against its ties with the West, as relativity is important in such a context. India will cooperate with China and Russia but at the same time, New Delhi will also find ways to balance China through initiatives like Quad, largely due to lack of strategic trust between the two Asian powers. Indian experts have termed it as “evasive balancing,” which is a combination of balancing and reassurance towards China.

SCO and BRICS, hence, become spaces for diplomacy to engage with China. If India boycotts these forums, it cedes important diplomatic space to China in Eurasia and the Global South. This will impact India’s strategic autonomy in a negative way. Afterall, since India’s independence, its policy towards multilateralism has aimed to ensure its strategic autonomy. During the Cold War, India emphasized centrality of the United Nations in global affairs which was an attempt to stay away from the military alliances and the great power competition between the U.S. and the then Soviet Union. India also played an important role in establishment of multilateral platforms other than the UN, like the Non-Alignment Movement and the G-77 Group. These initiatives carried a collective identity of the “Third World” and gave voice to its member states on issues like decolonization, sovereignty, universal disarmament and a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

In the 1990s, with the end of the bipolar era, India diversified its multilateral policy by joining newly formed other institutions. It became a founding member of World Trade Organization (WTO) and G20, joined ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and played an important role in establishing regional forums like Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). These mechanisms strengthened India’s strategic autonomy in different ways. The WTO allowed India to engage with the emerging global economic order, the G20 gave New Delhi a voice in global financial governance while ARF, BIMSTEC and IORA strengthened India’s regional and diplomatic network in South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.

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Rise of BRICS and the SCO in India’s Foreign Policy

BRICS was an outcome of the RIC (Russia, India, China) process that started at the level of foreign ministers in September 2002. India had already signed a nuclear deal with the U.S. before the first 2009 BRIC summit took place in Russia. In India’s domestic politics, there were concerns expressed by opposition parties that India would lose its strategic autonomy after signing the nuclear deal with the U.S. However, the Indian government had to clarify that India would continue to uphold its strategic autonomy. This is further bolstered by the fact that India become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2017.

Interestingly, in the same year, India was part of the leaders meeting of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) which aimed to revive this mechanism for maritime security. In some ways, it was an attempt by India to engage simultaneously with the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific initiatives while keeping its own interests at the center. The seemingly simultaneous rise of BRICS, SCO and Quad in India’s foreign policy are indicative of its multi-alignment strategy, in which New Delhi engages the great powers, carefully navigates their complex relationships to strengthen its strategic autonomy.

With this, the SCO remains one of the main regional organizations in Eurasia which becomes important for India, as its physical access to the region remains constrained by geography, particularly due to absence of direct overland connectivity. Afterall, the SCO has become a mechanism through which there are regular political interactions between India and Central Asian countries. India has bilateral channels of regular interactions with Russia and SCO further adds to that momentum, as both Russia and the Central Asian countries supported India’s SCO membership. Additionally, the SCO also facilitates India-China engagement, although their overall relationship remains devoid of any strategic trust. For this reason, India maintains a constant contact with the Eurasian region through the SCO, in its efforts to shape a multipolar Eurasia; one which is not dominated by a single power. SCO membership also prevents India’s diplomatic isolation in a region where its geographical connectivity is limited. However, the presence of both China and Pakistan in the SCO may complicate some of India’s interests, particularly in areas like anti-terrorism.

On the other hand, BRICS provides a bigger platform for India's engagement with the world. BRICS supports India’s long-standing demand to reform the global governance institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Funds and the UN Security Council. If India becomes a permanent UNSC member, that will enhance India’s capability to protect its strategic autonomy. In addition, the New Development Bank (NDB) widens India’s choice to seek developmental assistance beyond Western institutions. The NDB has approved approximately USD 10 billion for 28 major infrastructure projects in India, including metro projects and the Delhi–Ghaziabad–Meerut Regional Rapid Transit System.

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Furthermore, BRICS also allows India to keep the Global South agenda at the center of the global development debate. Trade in local currencies and interlinking their existing national payment systems helps BRICS countries to develop options beyond Western payment mechanisms. This will help India to deal with external geopolitical pressure, sanctions and tariffs, strengthening its economic autonomy.

The 2026 BRICS New Delhi Declaration notably highlighted the technology dimension to strategic autonomy. Cooperation among BRICS countries over artificial intelligence (AI) governance and emerging technologies gives India alternative platforms in shaping technology norms instead of depending on such frameworks developed by any one country. The BRICS Leaders’ Statement on the Global Governance of AI, issued in 2025 at Rio de Janerio, says that AI “must operate under national regulatory frameworks and the UN Charter, respect sovereignty as well as be representative, development-oriented, accessible, inclusive, dynamic, responsive, grounded in personal data protection, the rights and interests of humanity, safety, transparency, sustainability, and conducive to overcoming the growing digital and data divides, within and between countries.” Compared to the SCO, India is better placed in BRICS to safeguard its strategic autonomy as power is more diffused within the BRICS unlike the SCO where China’s influence is more pronounced due to lack of substantial members to balance Beijing. Hence, BRICS facilitates better flexibility and strategic autonomy for India.

Conclusion

India uses multilateralism to engage with competing power centers without having an alliance with them. Different multilateral institutions serve different aspects of strategic autonomy for India. SCO helps India’s institutional engagement with Central Asia, however, some complications or disagreement over terrorism and connectivity with China and Pakistan show some of the limits of India’s multi-alignment strategy. On the other hand, BRICS has a bigger vision and space for India to practice its strategic autonomy. Through initiatives like the NDB, local currency trade and alternative payment mechanisms, BRICS strengthens India’s economic autonomy in times of great power competition. In both the organizations, Russia is the bridge for India’s Eurasian and global ambitions. In other words, institutional diversification helps India to expand its strategic choices and hence, both SCO and BRICS will continue to play a role in shaping India’s strategic autonomy.