What the Second Chechen War tells us about Russia’s ‘War on Terror’ today

In the wake of the recent terrorist attacks claimed by IS in Beirut and Paris, Russia reiterated the counter-terrorist rhetoric it has been using to justify its intervention in Syria. That rhetoric echoes claims Russia made during the Second Chechen War, when it conflated Chechen fighters with international Islamist terrorists. At the time, Russia hoped its ‘war on terror’ would eventually yield strategic gains in the Russian-US relationship – to no avail. Its current counterterrorist claims on Syria are, again, unlikely to produce such gains in the long-term.

In the wake of the recent terrorist attacks claimed by IS in Beirut and Paris, Russia reiterated the counter-terrorist rhetoric it has been using to justify its intervention in Syria. That rhetoric echoes claims Russia made during the Second Chechen War, when it conflated Chechen fighters with international Islamist terrorists. At the time, Russia hoped its ‘war on terror’ would eventually yield strategic gains in the Russian-US relationship – to no avail. Its current counterterrorist claims on Syria are, again, unlikely to produce such gains in the long-term.

IS, according to Moscow, poses a threat not just to the Middle East, but the entire civilized world. By bombing IS positions in Syria, the argument goes, Russia is fighting a ‘systemic threat’ on behalf of the international community. To add further credence to Russia’s ambitious rhetoric, the state media and Russian officials (including President Putin himself) have compared IS and Nazism. Moreover, Moscow has conflated different Syrian opposition groups with extremist Islamist militias. In past weeks, Russia has stated frequently that there are no 'moderate' rebels in Syria to support and that members of the Free Syrian Army are ‘hard to find’ (though Russia recently appears to have entered into a dialogue with representatives of the latter).

The current rhetoric is aimed at justifying support for the Assad regime. Despite being labeled ‘anti-terrorist’, Russian airstrikes have been mainly in support of the Syrian armed forces. Moscow rejects calls for Assad’s ouster on principle: It accuses the West of trying to enforce another Iraq-type regime change on a sovereign state. Certainly, the Kremlin also wants to weaken IS, given long-standing fears about radical Islamism inside Russia. Around 2700 Russian citizens are estimated to have joined IS so far. In order to prevent any extremists from returning home, Russia needs to “fight them there”. Yet, as after 9/11, Russia likely pursues broader strategic goals today which are easy to lose sight of, given the current dramatic events surrounding IS terrorism. At a minimum, some experts say, Moscow believes significant advances against IS would induce the West to gradually remove sanctions and make concessions in any settlement over the Ukraine crisis. Others argue the Kremlin wants no less than a ‘grand bargain’: Carrying the torch in the fight against IS, Russia expects a leading role in talks on a new international security architecture that would give it a more prominent place.

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To those remembering Chechnya, Russia’s current rhetoric must sound familiar. When the George W. Bush administration launched a ‘Global War on Terror’ following 9/11, Russia seized the opportunity to change international perceptions of its war in Chechnya. Officials rushed to argue that Chechnya and Afghanistan were “branches of the same tree” and pointed to links between Chechens and Osama bin Laden. In its own fight against international terrorism in Chechnya, so the argument, there could be no distinction between what were allegedly ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘real’ extremists, between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ terrorists.

Such rhetoric was aimed at justifying the brutal war in Chechnya, especially considering previous international criticism. Russia also expected increased US willingness for intelligence sharing with Moscow. Yet importantly, the Kremlin additionally hoped its counterterrorism partnership would induce the US to finally treat Russia like a ‘great power’. In return for Russia fighting international terrorism, so the thinking, the US would respect Russian influence over its ‘near-abroad’ and no longer criticize its domestic human rights record. Moreover, whatever changes NATO was to go through, the Kremlin would have a say and become further integrated in the alliance’s political structures.

Whereas the US government had often criticised the Chechen war, it indeed changed its rhetoric after 9/11, admitting that “Russia is fighting terrorists in Chechnya”. It designated some Chechen groups as terrorist organizations. Yet, officials also repeatedly stated that a political process was needed to end the conflict and that “not every Chechen is a terrorist”. In Russia, such talk was received as evidence of Western hypocrisy in the ‘war on terror’. Moscow’s hopes for improved counterterrorism cooperation with the US also proved exaggerated. Given residual Cold War mistrust, Russian officials actually expected little from working with the Americans: “They pretend that they are really sharing information with us, and we pretend that we’re acting on the basis of that information”.

But most importantly, Moscow was unable to rewrite the rules of the Russian-US relationship via its ‘war on terror’ partnership. Early on, the US’ missile defense plans and abrogation of the ABM Treaty angered Putin, but the Kremlin yielded to Bush's initiative. When the Baltic states were invited to join NATO, however, anger was brewing in the Kremlin. Russia felt it was not treated like an equal partner at all. Then, a firm belief that the West had staged the “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine dealt the ultimate blow to the ‘war on terror’ partnership. As it turned out, Russian expectations that weaving its own counterterrorist agenda into the ‘Global War on Terror’ story could bring rewards in areas as strategically important as NATO expansion simply seemed far-fetched.

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Just as Russia’s past attempts to describe its Chechnya campaign as a fight in defense of the civilized world never really jived with a US audience, Russia’s IS-Nazism analogy is unlikely to make the desired impact today. Putin was much criticised for invoking the analogy at the UN General Assembly in September, prompting Russia’s Foreign Ministry to clarify the differences between the two evils. Also, if the US refused to tarnish all Chechens with a terrorist brush, it equally does not buy into Russia’s conflation of moderate with extremist Syrian opposition forces today. Instead, it has reiterated its commitment to support what it considers “moderate” rebels, most recently in its decision to send Special Operation Forces to train and advise some of them. And while Russia and the US have expressed readiness for consultations to finally agree on one list of ‘terrorists’ in Syria, mistrust between them might well undermine such efforts, which would have to entail some amount of intelligence sharing.

Given the limited appeal of its current counterterrorist rhetoric on Syria, the Kremlin should be cautious to expect strategic gains vis-a-vis the US, including a “deal” over Ukraine or sanctions. That being said, Russia may well achieve its more modest goals, especially ensuring the medium-term survival of the Assad regime. Russian success here does not just depend on whether the West subscribes to its simplistic counterterrorist claims. Russia can change “facts on the ground” in Syria, even if Washington is at odds with how Moscow portrays the conflict. At the end of the day, its military actions will be consequential in their own right. Drawing on lessons from Chechnya, however, suggests that Russian rhetoric by itself certainly won’t generate the bigger strategic gains that Moscow is seeking.