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Subject: Victory Day
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Viktor Katona

RIAC Expert

If more far-reaching and serious political events did not occur in the world, considerably more attention would be devoted in Russian scientific circles and media to the attitude of Central-Eastern European countries to the Red Army’s victory in the Second World War. After all, in all the countries liberated by the Red Army in 1944–1945 a particular microcosm of emotions has now arisen that is pitiless towards oppressors and full of sympathy for the peoples that suffered.

If more far-reaching and serious political events did not occur in the world, considerably more attention would be devoted in Russian scientific circles and media to the attitude of Central-Eastern European countries to the Red Army’s victory in the Second World War. After all, in all the countries liberated by the Red Army in 1944–1945 a particular microcosm of emotions has now arisen that is pitiless towards oppressors and full of sympathy for the peoples that suffered.

On 4 April 2015, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Bratislava to take part in the official 70th anniversary celebrations of the liberation of the capital of Slovakia. Despite the significance of the event, the President of Slovakia did not participate in the wreath-laying ceremony with the Russian Foreign Minister and preferred to pay tribute to the fallen Soviet soldiers on his own. This was a deliberate step on his part. In the same spirit, during a subsequent meeting with Lavrov, President Kiska spoke about 1968 and the events in Ukraine.

In the Russian media, the countries of Central-Eastern Europe are not particularly popular and they are mentioned only when high-level officials make a state visit or one of these countries supports Moscow’s political lines. Yet Andrej Kiska is a worthy politician. Born in a family of teachers, the future president applied to join the Communist Party, but was rejected. After the collapse of the socialist regime in Czechoslovakia, he emigrated to the USA and worked there at a petrol-filling station, as a cleaner, builder and lathe operator. He returned to Slovakia with, in his own words, a tremendous desire to engage in business. He founded a company selling goods on credit and other financial organizations of a non-banking nature (for many, high interest loans ended lamentably) and suddenly became rich. Subsequently, he engaged in charitable work and, with an improved reputation, began making his way in politics. This simple example shows the difference between a “new politician” in Central Europe who has grown up and formed his character in the age of capitalism, with a dubious 1990s background and sympathizing with the countries of Western Europe and the USA, on the one hand, and an “old career politician”, on the other. Skovakia’s current Prime Minister Robert Fico, who takes a more circumspect position in relation to Russia, belongs to the second category: also born into an ordinary family, he rose up the career ladder in the SDL party, the successor to the Communist party of Czechoslovakia and moving away from Communism towards social democracy ideas.

The liberal-minded public of Slovakia has perceived the Ukrainian crisis as an opportunity to let loose their long-standing but not openly expressed feelings and grudges.

For Russia, the problem is that the cast of “old” politicians are much less able in using the media to promote their image. It should not be forgotten that virtually all countries of Central-Eastern Europe experienced the consequences of the political purging following the departure of the Communist parties from the foreground of national politics and any connection with Communism negatively impacts on the local public perception of a politician. That is why the “new” politicians ultimately prove more successful and this has a definite influence on the relations between Central-Eastern Europe and Russia.

AFP

For over a year, the liberal-minded public of Slovakia has perceived the Ukrainian crisis as an opportunity to let loose their long-standing but not openly expressed feelings and grudges. July 2014 proved to be the most fruitful in this respect: a whole series of stories emerged extolling the resistance by Czechoslovakia to the Russian “occupiers”. For example, the newspaper Sme published an article to the effect that, in 1969, Czheckoslovak hockey players refused to shake hands with the Soviet team after they won a match (2:0). Nothing is said about the fact that the Soviet team eventually won the World Championship. After all, the main thing is heroism and heroes cannot lose. Ideas are also thrown around that appear to have nothing at all to do with politics; in particular, special attention is focused on the fact that Slovakians avoid Russian tourists when on holiday, since “a large proportion of them drink and do not conduct themselves like other European tourists, which does not comply with their perceptions”. A clear distinction is simply drawn (sometimes claimed to be a civilizational one) between inhabitants of Central-Eastern European countries and Soviet-Russian authorities.

The logic here is quite clear: it comes down to denying any guilt with respect to one’s own history. This, being quite characteristic of the peoples of Central Europe, prompts the idea that the Soviet authorities were to blame for the vast majority of Central-Eastern Europe’s current difficulties. Civil activists speak about almost 60 years of being “excluded” from the life of Europe, of destroyed hopes and lives, but a more subtle argument consists in comparing economic indicators, without taking into consideration the socio-political specifics of the socialist system. The following data are often brought up: in the 1960s, the per capita GDP in Czechoslovakia amounted to 60–65% of the Austrian, whereas in 1991, after the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops, it fell to virtually 16%. This fact is quite obvious: Czechoslovakia and Hungary and Poland developed more slowly than Austria. At the same time, the state of affairs with respect to the development of the countries of Central-Eastern Europe before and after the socialist period deserves separate attention.

Table 1. per capita GDP (Austria = 100%)

Year Austria Czechoslovakia (up to 1918 as part of Austria-Hungary; since 2000 the CZE/SVK separately) Hungary (up to 1918 as part of Austria-Hungary)
1900 2882 ~60 ~58
1910 3290 ~60 ~60
1920 2412 ~80 ~70
1930 3586 ~81 ~67
1937 3156 ~91 ~80
1950 3706 ~94 ~94
1960 6519 ~78 ~56
1970 9747 ~66 ~51
1980 13759 ~58 ~45
1990 16895 ~50 ~38
2000 26600 ~ 24/15 ~18
2010 35200 ~ 42/35 ~27
2014 38540 ~ 38/36 ~27

Source: Maddison A. Historical Statistics for the World Economy: 1-2003 AD. OECD, 2003.; Eurostat.

So it turns out that the Soviet authorities cannot be blamed for “all the mortal sins”, since the fall in the standard of living in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe is still continuing, even 25 years after the Velvet Revolution and other national power changes. Moreover, its fall in the most capital period has been most impressive. Even so, it is totally inappropriate to accuse those who promoted the regime change of bad faith at the given stage. Unfortunately, the data on the falling standard of living of the population of Central-Eastern Europe do not figure in the political discourses among the elites of these countries. It is all the more dangerous to express the opinion that to build a new Austria, Austrians must live in the country.

A clear distinction is simply drawn between inhabitants of Central-Eastern European countries and Soviet-Russian authorities.

The problem of Central European Communism comes down to the fact that there were not enough Communists in these countries, and those who truly believed in this utopian idea were not able to stand up against the “old-new” intelligentsia, well integrated into Europe’s upper echelons. In essence, the leading role in overturning the socialist regime was played by the intelligentsia of Central-Eastern Europe. The successors of the intellectual elite of the former era and the activities of 1968 have come back to the social fore, whereas the popular intellectuals who rose from the ranks of ordinary workers and became leading cultural and political figures in Czechoslovakia were ousted from their top positions. Similar processes also occurred in Hungary: the new elite was made up of successors of previous noble dynasties and dissidents who took part in the events of 1956 or expressed their dislike of the regime in some other way.

Considering the world view of the new elite, assessments of the past are inevitably based to a certain extent on economic indicators, though, in fact, the emotional element plays an even greater role here. “Occupation” as a concept is beneficial to those who were removed from power and subsequently returned, since it gives an excuse to stress the “inferiority” of the socialist regime. It was in the atmosphere of resistance to what happened “before the return” that the current resistance to celebrating Victory Day was born.

“Occupation” as a concept is beneficial to those who were removed from power and subsequently returned, since it gives an excuse to stress the “inferiority” of the socialist regime.

On 9 May 2015, out of all the leaders of the countries of Central-Eastern Europe, only President of the Czech Republic Milos Zeman and Prime Minister of Slovakia Robert Fico will be in Moscow. They will not attend the military parade, preferring to hold talks with each other in the Russian capital. The President of the Czech Republic, who has always held a pro-Russian position, had to act in a greatly restricted room for manoeuvre after US Ambassador to the Czech Republic Andrew Schapiro stated that it would not be desirable for Zeman to visit Moscow. Representative of the Czech parliament also used their leverage and stated that the President would have to pay for his own costs associated with the visit. Ultimately, a variant was developed that would not annoy Brussels excessively but would allow tribute to be paid to the soldiers who fell liberating these countries.

Something similar happened with Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic, who was advised by former Foreign Minister of Slovakia, current European Parliament Deputy Eduard Kukan, not to go to Moscow for 9 May 2015 and, like other leaders of western countries, “to visit the memorial to the soldiers who fell in the Second World War in their own country”. Even though Serbia is not a member of the European Union.

Hungarian President Janos Ader, whose visit was agreed back in February when Vladimir |Putin visited Budapest, on 27 April 2015 published the following announcement on his official website: “In accordance with the recommendations of the European Commission, Hungary will be represented at the 9 May 2015 celebrations by the country’s Ambassador accredited in Moscow”.

The same argument was put forward in all cases: to visit Moscow under the current conditions would mean to justify Russia’s actions in Ukraine, split the ranks of the European states and undermine the unified Brussels foreign policy. “Respect for the soldiers”, according to Slovakian President Andrej Kiska, “should be expressed on the territory of the countries where they fell”. Consequently, there is absolutely no need for heads of state to visit Moscow for the Victory Parade. Nevertheless, all countries of Europe, apart from Lithuania, will be represented at the 9 May Victory Parade.

Over the 25 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a number of topics are no longer taboo. Even so, a multitude of sensitive issues for Europe remain “official secrets”: Babi Yar, the Moscow talks of 1939, collaboration by residents with Nazi troops, and so on. The collapse of the Soviet system thus provided an opportunity to discuss the bloody consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, though it has not become a mass trend to ask questions about the late opening of the second front.

For a long time, public opinion in Hungary held that the Hungarian army that fought on the Don treated the civilian population of the occupied territories well. To the amazement of journalists and historians, the population that lives in today’s Ukraine felt the complete opposite towards them, describing in detail the atrocities committed by the army called on to help the Wehrmacht in 1942. The leading Hungarian historian Krisztian Ungvary asserts that, after power transferred to the Communists, the Hungarian leadership knew about the army’s barbarity but preferred not to make this public, being concerned that such a scandal might prompt even greater animosity towards the socialist regime. Today, there is no political will to return to this issue.

The collapse of the Soviet system thus provided an opportunity to discuss the bloody consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, though it has not become a mass trend to ask questions about the late opening of the second front.

The history of virtually all the countries of Central-Eastern Europe conceals a number of issues that it would not be desirable to discuss under current conditions. For instance, collaboration with the Nazis was not confined to just a few hundred people and in the Czech Republic no large-scale resistance was seen until the last month of the war – and then only in the hope that the American forces then in Pilsen would liberate Prague. Even the entry of Nazi troops into Prague went off without incident and, moreover, there were minor anti-Semitic skirmishes. The best known event of the Czech “resistance” was the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, planned and organized from London and not by the Prague underground. Slovakia (1939–1945) and, to a lesser degree, Hungary (1944–1945) were fascist states, though there was no complete purge after the war and only leading Nazi figures were executed.

Poland differs from the Czech Republic, Austria and Hungary in that it really suffered from the actions of the Soviet Union: the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the subsequent division of Poland, like mass events such as the Katyn massacre, will always be used as counterarguments to celebrating Victory Day. Despite the local acts of collaboration with the Nazi regime that occurred everywhere, the Polish state did not dishonor itself with complicity with fascism. This in no way justifies the statements by Foreign Minister Grzegorz Schetyna to the effect that Auschwitz was not liberated by the Red Army but by Ukrainians and that “it is not logical to celebrate the end of the war where it started”. One might counter that unprofessional statements by foreign ministers are not indicative of the moral state of the nation (the former head of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry is now Ukrainian Ambassador to Poland), but the attitude to Victory Day on the part of Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski is completely incomprehensible (“Victory Day is a demonstration of power threatening the whole world”, since his own father fought side by side with Soviet soldiers in the 4th Polish Infantry Division organized by the Soviet military authorities.

In fact, the opinion of most of the population differs from that expressed by the leading politicians of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, does not change much over time, is strictly orientated on events within the country and does not tend towards foreign policy. For instance, the phrase “I fear German might less than German inaction” (Radoslaw Sikorski) will never be heard from an ordinary Polish citizen. Yet Central Europe politics rarely do without weaving and maneuvering. Five years ago, during the celebrations of the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory, it was again Komorowski who told Russian President Medvedev that “any citizen of Russia should take pride in the victory in 1945”, just as he was proud of his father who, “hand in hand with Soviet soldiers”, went as far as Dresden. In 2015, Komorowski says that “9 May is not a celebration for Poland”, and the celebration of the Great Victory is transferred to 8 May. In the European Union, no-one will take much notice of such steps, thought the initial thrust came down specifically to demonstration (suppressed by the socialist regime) of “Europeanness”, of belonging to a common family. In Russia, such actions cannot but arouse puzzlement, yet one has to get used to the idea that 9 May is no longer celebrated further west than Kaliningrad.

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