Valery Fedorov: "We Live during a Time of General Distrust"

This Viewpoint column showcases the insights of Valery Fedorov, Director of the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM), who spoke with RIAC Web Portal Editor Maria Smekalova about the credibility of polls, Russia’s enemies and the role of the media and social networks in shaping the views of Russians, as well as the latter’s attitudes towards the authorities and international issues.

This Viewpoint column showcases the insights of Valery Fedorov, Director of the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM), who spoke with RIAC Web Portal Editor Maria Smekalova about the credibility of polls, Russia’s enemies and the role of the media and social networks in shaping the views of Russians, as well as the latter’s attitudes towards the authorities and international issues.

Today Russia is in difficult economic straits. Have polling results revealed any noticeable signs of an impending crisis? Was it possible to predict the crisis by studying public opinion?

We have a number of indicators that capture people's ideas about the future. For example, we have asked: Is now a good time to borrow money or not? Is it a good time to make major purchases or not? In your opinion, are prices rising rapidly, very rapidly, slowly, or are not growing at all? These and other questions help us to understand whether people are noticing economic threats and risks, whether they expect a crisis to occur, or a weakening of the ruble, or economic stagnation, etc.

Up until September 2014, none of these indicators showed negative expectations. On the contrary, all figures were abnormally positive. In fact, the patriotic upsurge which began in March 2014 dispelled the fears of most Russian citizens about the economy. This explains why the sharp devaluation of the ruble and rising prices came as a big surprise for them.

Nevertheless, over the last two months, Russians, by and large, have managed to cope with the situation for two reasons. The first one is the imposition of sanctions by the West, whom we distrust and dislike. The absolute majority of Russians believe that the West is hitting below the belt, while Russia is playing fair. Accordingly, if sanctions are imposed against us, then the West is punishing us for our – right and correct – policy.

The second factor is the oil price. Everyone understands that the dependence of the Russian economy on oil remains very high and falling oil prices reflect adversely on all of us. Under normal circumstances, if the economy declines, blame is largely placing on the government. However, virtually no one in our country accuses either the government or the President. We lay blame on oil prices and the West, while the responsibility for the market’s collapse is often ascribed to the West as well.

What is the role of mass media on shaping public opinion? What are the limits of the influence of mass media and resistance to the latter?

In the mid and late 1990s, when the Internet did not yet exist, the communists won a large number of votes in the presidential and parliamentary elections. They had little if any media access other than the Pravda newspaper and small regional publications. The Communists won the State Duma elections in 1995, and placed second in the 1996 presidential election and the 1999 Duma elections. How did they manage to do this “without TV”?

The point is that people are not zombies who directly receive instructions how to vote via the radio or via the TV. Apart from media, people have their own experiences, their views, their social circles. There is also the grapevine – rumors that perhaps are not to be trusted, but are sure to be listened to. And now there is the Internet – a dump, where everyone can find anything to his or her liking. Today anyone can install satellite TV and watch different channels. So, if the “official” TV channels begin to lie through their teeth, people quickly begin to “filter” television information and prefer other channels.

To summarize, the extraordinary success of Putin's policies in Russia (beginning in May 2014 to the present day, he has enjoyed the support of up to 85 per cent of the population) is due neither to zombieing nor to propaganda. Or, at least, not just to only propaganda. The main reason is that the President is pursuing policies that the vast majority of Russians consider right and decent. Even if they have to pay for these policies out of their own pockets.

In an interview with Vladimir Pozner two years ago, you said that the status of a governmental institution hindered a dialogue with customers and generated some degree of prejudice. Has anything changed in this respect in your opinion?

Over this period, the prestige of almost all sociological centers has somewhat declined. This is relevant not only for VTsIOM, but also for Levada Center and other organizations too. We live during a time of general distrust. According to my colleague Alexander Oslon from FOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center), this growing distrust is largely inspired by the expansion of social networks. It is worth remembering that Russians appear to spend more time on social networks than any other nation. IN addition, our people, as a rule, are registered on more than one social network.

However, the influence of social networks on shaping the views of an individual is quite peculiar. Although there are tens of millions of registered users, each of us tends to communicate with a limited number of people. We choose those whose opinions interest us, and over time gradually and unconsciously (and sometimes quite deliberately) drive ourselves into a kind of “opinion ghetto,” where we communicate either only with like-minded people or with those for whom differences in opinion appear surmountable and acceptable. As a result, the world is split into a large variety of little worlds, each of which is inhabited by small groups of people who do not know what is happening beyond the borders of their little world and perceive any new information from the outside with disbelief (if they notice it at all).

VTsIOM, like the others, was hit by this trend of growing popular distrust of everything. People distrust not just us – they distrust the media (regardless of their political orientation) and the authorities, they do not trust the opposition. Sociologists used to enjoy confidence mainly due to the fact that they were considered scientists. Then, these scientists became businessmen or politicians in the view of the public. And there are reasons for this: for example, rather than turn us into a scientific research institute or academic institution, the state has made us a corporation, i.e. a commercial company. Accordingly, attitudes towards us have changed for the worse – people believe that we are working for money, and not “for the idea.”

Nevertheless, over the last year we, as well as our colleagues, have been facing less criticism than before. This is mainly due to the disappearance for awhile of domestic policy. All Russia’s policy now is foreign. Inside the country, we are all more or less united: we have one leader, and it’s not the struggle of Communists against the United Russia party that makes the headlines, but Russia’s fight against external enemies. Of course, Kasyanov, Shenderovich or Navalny continue to criticize the authorities, but this criticism enjoys little support. Their agenda is outdated, and their range of voice is out of the one that the Russians are currently tuned into. Now our critics have a brief respite, but after a year and a half, there will be elections to the State Duma, and new (or rather old) accusations will be voiced again, namely of falsifying data rather than polling, of collusion with Chairman of the Central Election Commission of Russia Vladimir Churov, etc.

What sources of information do you trust?

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I read Vedomosti, Kommersant, Profil', Vlast, Expert, Gazetu.ru and Facebook. I try to read different authors, even those whose views I do not share at all. For example, Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian activists who talk every day about the “great victory” of their army over the Russian and Donbass troops. As for TV channels, I watch mostly the news on the First and Russia-1 Channels, RBC-TV, News 24, Lifenews and Euronews.

Is the longing for a firm hand a myth or reality? Do the polls testify to it?

First of all, we cannot undo the past. For at least 500 years Russia has been governed by a hard-line centralized authority, which always ruled, built and shaped society at its sole discretion: at best it refrained from repression, at worst – it headhunted. Of course, if people failed to adapt to it, there would have been no one living here long ago. For a long time, Russians have played one and same game with the state. On the one hand, people humbly recognize their wretchedness and misery as well as the need for instruction and guidance. On the other hand, they beg for help and assistance, assuring loyalty and appealing to finer feelings and compassion from the powers that be.

Our prominent sociologist Simon Kordonsky called this phenomenon the “resource state.” It implies that the basic resources and mechanisms for their distribution are in the hands of the state. The easiest, shortest and most effective way to ensure normal life is not to launch one’s own business, but to ask for help from a government institution or to write a letter to the president. Paternalism is a familiar and popular game, but in reality most people rely on just themselves (the authorities also rely on themselves and not on the people).

Here's an example. The president says that it is necessary to attract investment in this country and offers a tax amnesty to encourage the return of money from offshore centers. What does an average businessman do? He immediately transfers the last of his money to offshore accounts. Is it because he does not like Putin? No, in most cases, he respects him, considers him a real man, who speaks common sense and is quite shrewd. However, the businessman is self-oriented and guided only by his own private interests. He fears for his money and calculates the risks. With all this going on, he continues to complain about the poor investment climate and high taxes. It turns out that nobody likes the rules of the game, but continues to play by them. So I would not exaggerate the phenomenon of paternalism. Rather, there is a phenomenon that Yuri Levada, my predecessor in VTsIOM, called doublethink or the duplicity of the Soviet (and now Russian) people.

Whom do Russians consider an enemy of the country? Are these beliefs deep and stable or are they a reaction to the current state of affairs?

Of course, the United States. It was awarded this status in 1999 after its bombing of Yugoslavia. Before that, the US had been seen as a very successful country, the leader of the free world, which we must learn from and which can help us, with which it is necessary to integrate and make friends. Yugoslavia showed that the United States is not the leader of the free world, but a country of liars and hypocrites who say one thing and do quite another, stopping at no crime. It was a bitter disappointment and within several years has led to a complete reorientation of our policy, both internal and external.

Since then, the US has provided evidence of this image every two or three years. Suffice it to recall the invasion of Iraq, the Arab Spring, Libya, and Syria. All the events that take place on the world stage fit perfectly to the embedded public stereotype. The situation in Ukraine is an added testimony to this: the Americans staged Euromaidan, they made Petro Poroshenko bomb Donbass, etc. Therefore, the United States is our main enemy. The number of Russians who think so varies: at times it is 30%, while now it is 90%. This peak of anti-American sentiment was observed before only in 2008.

According to the polls, what do the Russians think of the Ukrainian events?

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The unconstitutional “third round” of the 2004 presidential election won by Viktor Yushchenko dispelled Russians’ hopes of a potential partnership with Ukraine. Most Russians viewed it as a betrayal. The liberal-minded minority, on the contrary, hoped that Ukraine under the new government would show Russia how to develop. However, Yushchenko failed quite quickly; Ukraine went down the drain and could not serve as a model.

The rise of Viktor Yanukovych to power in Kiev infused great hopes into Russians that he would pursue the correct policy. The start was good but did not last long. It turned out that, on the one hand, the anti-Russian leaders Yushchenko and Tymoshenko pursued a policy against our country, while, on the other hand, the pro-Russian Yanukovych played footsie with the West and the United States, paying lip-service to a friendship with us. Putin's proposal at the end of 2013 to give Ukraine $15 billion for its continued love was met by Russian society with hostility, because, as they say, friends are OK when they don’t get in the way. Especially, if such friends can leave you stark naked without a moment’s thought.

By the beginning of the coup and the ensuing civil war, the attitude of Russians towards Ukraine as a state was very negative. This negative perception gained momentum when the Ukrainian President fled, and militants unconstitutionally came to power and began to topple monuments to Lenin and erect monuments to Bandera. Ukraine is now perceived as one of the three or four countries most unfriendly to Russia.

It should be noted that many Russians hold Ukraine in semi-contempt. The fact is that as soon as any country abandons an independent policy and moves under the “umbrella” of the West, its value in the eyes of Russians drops dramatically. Why? Because it becomes a satellite – a country that does not have its own interests, views and position, and dances to the US fiddle, which is considered big “Satan.” This is our attitude, for example, towards Poland. Despite the fact that Poland is a large, well-developed, dynamic country, and the third most populous Slavic state, for Russia it is only one of the satellites, which runs before the hounds trying to be holier than the Pope. What is the Russian attitude towards Poland? It is semi-contempt.

The attitude towards Ukraine now is similar. Ukraine is regarded as a country that is pursuing a pro-American policy, has betrayed the fraternal ties, itself, and its civilizational identity and has become a springboard for anti-Russian activity. However, the Ukrainians as a nation – even after a year of tough confrontation close to a war – are perceived by the Russians as the closest (after Belarusians) people. There is still some hope that they will come to their senses and return to the common house of the East Slavic peoples. Time will tell whether this is wishful thinking or not.

What does Russia's population expect from the authorities in 2015?

First, people look forward to peace in Ukraine, because peace is the main thing. Second, they don’t want the international confrontation to intensify and hope that it will at least stay frozen. Third, people are waiting for economic stabilization. At the same time, we do not want to sacrifice Crimea, to abandon an independent course or to depose Putin.

What would you recommend to read on international and sociological topics?

Recently I reread the article “The Clash of Civilizations?” written by Samuel Huntington in 1993. Now, after more than twenty years, some of his ideas appear to be quite topical, especially concerning Russia, Ukraine and Turkey. He predicted Ukraine’s disintegration, noting that this process will be more painful than that of Czechoslovakia, but less painful than that of Yugoslavia. The point is that Yugoslavia happened to be the intersection of three civilizations, i.e. Eastern Christian, Western Christian and Muslim, while Ukraine is the intersection of two civilizations: Eastern Christian and Western Christian.

What makes Russia different from Ukraine? Huntington wrote that Ukraine is a divided country, while Russia is torn to pieces. Ukraine is clearly divided into two parts, and Russia for at least three past centuries has tried to fit its structure into the Western pattern. However, all such efforts have failed, as the country has not been willing to sacrifice a number of the components of its national identity. But Russia cannot retrace its steps either. It seems to me that these judgments are very relevant today.

As for sociology, I would recommend reading the works of Simon Kordonsky. He developed his own, original theory of the social structure of Russia, which, in my opinion, describes the real processes in our country much better than Western theories.