U.S. Soft Power: The End of an Era

In May 2025, U.S. political scientist, scholar, and Harvard University professor Joseph Nye passed away. Nye is best known for coining and introducing the concept of “soft power” into the study of international relations in the early 1990s. Over the following 30 years, the concept gained extraordinary popularity around the world. Nye developed his idea of how to win influence through attraction rather than coercion in a series of monographs in the 2000s, the last of which was published in 2023. In its classic interpretation, “soft power” rests on a country’s culture, political values, and the legitimacy of its foreign policy in the eyes of its allies. Over the past decade, U.S. soft power has begun to falter across all three of these dimensions, gradually reaching its lowest point of influence since the end of the Cold War. In 2026, against the backdrop of Washington’s military campaign against Iran, it became clear that U.S. soft power was in a state of clinical death, outliving its creator, Joseph Nye, by only one year.

The decline of the soft power concept, however, does not automatically imply that the United States is relinquishing its humanitarian dominance in the world. Although the country has, in many respects, lost its ideological and normative leadership in its relations with other states, decline is not the same as displacement. Cultural codes and prevailing normative trends may lose their appeal, yet the world will continue to exist within what has been described as a “globalized world of Western origin.” To uphold the normative foundations underpinning such a world, the U.S. retains a powerful public diplomacy apparatus—one that emerged and operated long before the concept of soft power itself was introduced.

The U.S. public diplomacy system has continued to function for decades, regardless of the political science concepts advanced to explain it or the institutional transformations it has undergone. Washington does not need soft power as a conceptual framework; it need only keep its public diplomacy apparatus in good shape, allowing it to draw on the full range of its humanitarian resources. This is an important point to always bear in mind when assessing the latest trendy concepts in politics and international relations. Such concepts may, for a time, capture the imagination of particular scholarly communities, politicians, or even entire societies, leading them to believe in seemingly magic formulas for promoting a country's national image abroad.

In May 2025, U.S. political scientist, scholar, and Harvard University professor Joseph Nye passed away. Nye is best known for coining and introducing the concept of “soft power” into the study of international relations in the early 1990s. [1] Over the following 30 years, the concept gained extraordinary popularity around the world. Nye developed his idea of how to win influence through attraction rather than coercion in a series of monographs in the 2000s, the last of which was published in 2023. [2] In its classic interpretation, “soft power” rests on a country’s culture, political values, and the legitimacy of its foreign policy in the eyes of its allies. Over the past decade, U.S. soft power has begun to falter across all three of these dimensions, gradually reaching its lowest point of influence since the end of the Cold War. In 2026, against the backdrop of Washington’s military campaign against Iran, it became clear that U.S. soft power was clinically dead, outliving its creator, Joseph Nye, by only one year.

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Soft Power’s Case History

In his writings, Joseph Nye consistently argued that he conceived soft power as a scientific concept. [3] In reality, however, the term lacks a precise definition; moreover, Nye's own formulations of "soft power" throughout his works are often deliberately broad. Yet this concept, which the U.S. political scientist developed literally at his kitchen table, [4] went on to become one of the most popular ideas in the world. Its central premise is straightforward: a country can sometimes achieve its desired objectives without resorting to threats or inducements, relying instead on its own appeal. As Nye himself wrote: "What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies." [5]

During the 2000s, soft power evolved from an academic concept into a wildly popular idea that suddenly captivated governments and political leaders seeking to promote a positive image of their countries on the international stage. The concept quickly spread far beyond the United States. Alongside Europe, China emerged as one of its most active proponents. Even in Russia, soft power became a frequent subject of scholarly and public debate. A substantial body of academic and policy literature, including monographs, articles, and commentaries, was devoted to various aspects of soft power. Many of these works encouraged national governments to follow the U.S. approach to promoting humanitarian influence abroad.

At the same time, Nye’s concept was frequently criticized within both political and expert circles. He was repeatedly forced to defend it against his critics while continuing to refine a theory that never enjoyed universal acceptance among the U.S. political elite, which has traditionally placed greater faith in hard power—in military force, weapons, sanctions, and coercive pressure. In his seminal book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Nye recounts that when then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was asked about soft power, he replied that he did not know what it was. [6]

In the United States, the "golden age" of soft power coincided with the administrations of Bill Clinton (1993–2001) and Barack Obama (2009–2017). These Democratic administrations, which relied on a values-based approach and the global projection of U.S. economic and political leadership, sought instruments that would enable them to shape the behavior of other states by influencing their desires and needs. [7]

In 1999, another prominent U.S. scholar, Samuel Huntington, published an article in Foreign Affairs [8] titled "The Lonely Superpower." The piece became something of a blueprint for the long-term aims of U.S. foreign policy under the globalists and neoliberals who formed the backbone of the Democratic Party. Huntington identified the need to exert pressure on other countries in order to secure acceptance of American values—democracy, human rights, and the free market. In the public sphere in the U.S. and other countries, the idea was promoted that "the American understanding of declared values serves as a global standard that all states are required to observe." [9] The concept of soft power became a convenient tool for U.S. policymakers, as it could be easily adapted to U.S. strategic needs.

Under Bill Clinton, democracy promotion became a central priority of U.S. diplomacy. [10] Under Barack Obama, the appeal of American values was declared a cornerstone of U.S. global leadership. His administration sought new foreign policy approaches for the Middle East and other regions of the world, requiring both a new strategy for America’s international engagement and what it described as “a new vessel for American values.” [11] It was in this context that Washington produced a hybrid of soft and hard power known as “smart power.” Nye was clearly sympathetic to Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, from whom the world first heard the term “smart power,” since the new U.S. foreign policy approach was fundamentally grounded in his own idea of combining soft and hard power. [12] In practice, however, the concept never progressed beyond rhetoric. Smart power failed to attract the same level of support as soft power and never became firmly embedded in U.S. foreign policy.

In January 2017, Barack Obama was succeeded as president by Donald Trump, a staunch opponent of any form of soft power. With his arrival, the “golden age” of soft power entered its decline—not only as a concept, but also as a practical instrument of U.S. foreign policy. The four years of Joseph Biden’s presidency did not reverse this trend. On the contrary, policy and academic circles increasingly embraced a different concept altogether: “sharp power.” Significantly, this concept was also devised by Democratics, many of whom adopted a strongly confrontational stance toward Russia. At its core is the argument that only the United States and its allies hold a monopoly on soft power. Russia, China, and other “unfavorable” countries regarded by Washington’s political establishment as “authoritarian regimes” are, under this logic, denied the right to exercise soft power of their own. Instead, any efforts they undertake to engage foreign societies are characterized as propaganda and a threat to national security. Accordingly, measures to counter this threat should be as robust as possible. It was precisely these considerations which shaped the approach of the Biden administration and its European allies, which, following the start of Russia’s special military operation, moved to systematically dismantle the infrastructure of Russian public diplomacy toward the West.

U.S. scholar Nicholas Cull argues that the decline of soft power was predictable because the concept was “ideal concept” to the post-Cold War world. [13] It emerged at a particular historical moment, under conditions in which U.S. foreign policy required a new conceptual and ideological framework for how the U.S. would govern the world. In Cull's view, the concept also gained traction because it explained why the West had been so successful against the backdrop of the Soviet Union’s failures. [14] It is therefore no coincidence that Joseph Nye consistently emphasized that soft power was, above all, a concept designed for the United States and its foreign policy. It was developed specifically with the United States in mind, and Nye himself admitted that he was somewhat puzzled and surprised by the fact that the concept became even more popular abroad than it did at home. [15]

It would be a mistake, however, to argue that Donald Trump alone set in motion the decline of U.S. soft power, despite the claims of his ideological opponents. Sanctions, as an element of “hard power,” had become a routine feature of U.S. foreign policy toward other states long before Trump's presidency. Russia experienced this approach firsthand under the Democratic administration of Joseph Biden. Trump did, however, take America's coercive economic policy to a new level by launching tariff wars not only against U.S. strategic competitors but also against its NATO allies.

The final collapse of U.S. soft power came during Donald Trump’s second term in office. [16] His administration sent a clear message to the world: only hard power matters—war, political coercion, and sanctions; everything else is of secondary importance. Value-based diplomacy gave way to intimidation, threats, tariffs, and other forms of pressure. The impact of hard power on America’s international image was of little concern to Trump. On the contrary, his approach was premised on the belief that hard power itself constitutes the essence of the U.S. image. Furthermore, serious domestic challenges—including a profound crisis of values that has divided the country into two hostile camps—created the impression that the United States itself no longer has a clear understanding of which values currently underpin American society.

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The Erosion of the Three Pillars of U.S. Soft Power

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has evolved from an ideological leader and normative reference point for much of the world into a country whose international reputation is increasingly associated with threats to national sovereignty and identity. Over the past three decades, the aggressive policies pursued by Western neoliberal elites have fostered a deep-seated reluctance among both the general public and political elites all around the world to unquestionably embrace what has been presented as a “global standard.” An examination of the current state of the three pillars of U.S. soft power suggests that there has been a sobering realization and disillusionment with these proclaimed political standards. Democracy, the free market, and human rights—the traditional mantra of Western politicians—are no longer viewed as a novel or compelling vision, as they were in the 1990s. Instead, they are increasingly perceived as hallmarks of an aggressive U.S. foreign policy toward other states. The notion that there is no alternative to U.S. leadership is no longer merely being questioned; it is now openly challenged by countries such as China, Russia, and Iran. Many other states, though less vocal, are also expressing growing skepticism toward Pax Americana—something they would have been far less willing to do even a decade ago.

Moreover, criticism of “American-style” globalization is no longer confined to countries that oppose the United States (Russia, China, and Iran). It is increasingly voiced within the Western bloc itself. In 2020, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban published an open letter sharply criticizing the activities of famous U.S. billionaire George Soros and organizations associated with him, particularly the Open Society Foundations, [17] accusing them of seeking to “dismantle national structures” under the guise of promoting democracy.

As for the cultural component of soft power, the U.S. mass cultural industry—film, music, and pop culture—remains popular and in demand around the world. [18] At the same time, the past decade has seen major shifts associated with the reawakening of national cultural consciousness in many countries. The Americanization of mass culture has reached its limits. At a certain point, the abandonment of one’s own cultural roots in favor of Western culture came to be seen as a clear threat to civilizational distinctiveness and identity, and consequently to the value sovereignty of states. For this reason, many governments have begun to impose restrictions on the influence of Western, and above all American, culture in their countries—for example, by introducing quotas on products of the Western film industry.

Equally significant have been the changes affecting the second pillar of soft power—the values projected by the West, led by the United States, to the outside world. These values have undergone a substantial transformation, giving rise to phenomena and trends that many traditional societies regard as unacceptable. The promotion of the LGBT movement's agenda, [19] radical approaches to gender issues, and other "new" norms that have gained prominence in Western countries in recent years have proven incompatible with the values of many other societies. As a result, these societies have been unwilling to embrace what they perceive as an aggressive effort to promote such ideas or to view their own cultures through an American lens.

Washington's greatest challenge, however, has concerned the third pillar of soft power—the legitimacy of its foreign policy, over which, in the words of Oman's foreign minister, the United States has "lost control." As Richard Stengel, former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, has argued, America's military campaign against Iran under Trump will drive the country's popularity to plummet to a level unseen this century—and it may never recover, not even to the levels seen during the presidencies of Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan.

Nye’s concept assumes that the legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy, and its unconditional acceptance by other states, is a fundamental prerequisite for the effective exercise of soft power. This was the case in Western Europe after 1945. It was also true in the 1990s, when, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe accepted the undisputed leadership of the United States in constructing a new “world based on [Western] rules” through institutions such as NATO and the European Union.

Under Donald Trump, however, Washington largely ceased to concern itself with whether its policies were regarded as legitimate by its allies, let alone by its rivals. The sharp shift away from promoting the values and rules of the liberal international order toward a U.S. nationalist agenda under the banner of MAGA; [20] the abdomen of a policy of unwavering support for transatlantic unity; the president's skepticism about NATO’s usefulness; efforts to forge special relations with Moscow; and his reluctance to become further entangled in the conflict in Ukraine despite European calls for increased support for Kyiv—all of this generated growing unease within the European Union over the direction of U.S. foreign policy. The slogan "America First" left the United States increasingly isolated. Leadership gave way to what Zbigniew Brzezinski once described as "arrogant dominance" [21]—an approach that alienates allies and erodes America's prestige around the world. Although U.S. European allies have generally avoided expressing their dissatisfaction publicly, often masking their true views of the Trump administration behind diplomatic cordiality, their discontent has manifested itself in their unwillingness to compromise on Ukraine and in their limited practical support for the United States during its confrontation with Iran. This, in turn, has reportedly fueled President Trump's frustration, leading him even to raise the possibility of U.S. withdrawal from NATO.

The attitudes of U.S. rivals and non-aligned states toward the foreign policy of the current administration are even clearer, ranging from outright rejection of what they see as Washington’s heavy-handed approach to increasingly vocal public criticism expressed across the world.

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Ideological Resistance to Soft Power

Another important factor behind the declining appeal of soft power has been the waning interest in the concept among other countries. China, for example—once one of Joseph Nye's greatest “fans”—has largely moved beyond the idea, shifting its attention instead to the concept of "discursive power." Moreover, Chinese scholars have advanced their own framework—­­t­he "decolonization of the mind." The concept was presented in the fall of 2025 in the analytical report Colonization of Consciousness: The Means, Roots, and Global Threats of America's Cognitive Warfare, published by the Xinhua Institute, a think tank affiliated with the Xinhua News Agency. Within this framework, Chinese analysts interpret U.S. foreign policy through the lens of what they describe as U.S. attempts to colonize consciousness—a long-term effort to instill U.S. ideological and value-based narratives in other societies. According to this perspective, such efforts are intended to undermine the civilizational foundations of other countries and establish ideological dominance.

The report expresses deep concern about the erosion of the moral and spiritual foundations of local civilizations through the gradual dismantling of their everyday values. According to its authors, prolonged exposure to U.S. values leads to the loss of national identity and, ultimately, of sovereignty. In this way, they argue, the United States seeks to colonize the consciousness of other peoples. At the same time, Chinese scholars contend that U.S. value hegemony is in decline and call on other countries to resist it by emancipating themselves, breaking the “shackles of the mind.”

Soft power has also come under increasingly sharp criticism in Russia. The concept became widespread during the 2000s, its popularity peaked sometime between 2012 and 2016, when it began to be used actively not only in academic circles but also in political discourse at the highest levels. [22] At the time, however, there was no genuine understanding that the concept symbolized the penetration of U.S. political discourse into the thinking of Russian experts and political scientists. [23] The situation began to change following the start of Russia’s special military operation, which led to an increasingly pronounced distancing from Western theories, concepts, and analytical approaches.

The debate over soft power within the United States has, in many respects, been brought to a close by Nicholas Cull, who has proposed an alternative framework in the form of his own concept of "reputational security." In his view, this concept can serve as a guide for developing a national strategy on issues of a country's international image. [24] The premise is straightforward: a state with a strong positive reputation is better able to withstand crises than one whose reputation is weak or negative. [25] At the same time, a state should pursue a dual strategy in the international arena—strengthening its own reputation while undermining that of its adversaries. [26]

Although the concept of reputational security has yet to attain the level of prominence that soft power once enjoyed, even within the United States, the sustained efforts of the U.S. expert community to break with the intellectual legacy of Professor Joseph Nye should not be underestimated. Increasingly, these efforts are aimed at moving away from the idea of cultivating an attractive image of the United States toward providing an intellectual justification for more aggressive U.S. foreign policy and economic interests, with little regard for values or other considerations now dismissed as “outdated.”

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Public Diplomacy Endures

The decline of the concept of soft power, however, does not automatically imply that the United States is abandoning its humanitarian dominance in world affairs. Although the U.S. has largely lost its value-based and ideological leadership in its relations with other countries, decline is not the same as displacement. Cultural codes and prevailing moral trends may lose their appeal, yet the world will continue to exist within a "Western-based globalized world." [27] To sustain the normative foundations of this order, the U.S. continues to rely on a powerful public diplomacy apparatus that predates the emergence of the concept of soft power itself. [28]

Unlike soft power, the U.S. public diplomacy system is a sprawling network of government and non-governmental institutions engaged in promoting the country's political and ideological leadership around the world and in influencing foreign publics in a wide variety of ways. [29] It represents a symbiotic relationship between the state, business, and private interests in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

The U.S. public diplomacy system has continued to operate for decades, regardless of the political science concepts used to explain it or the structural transformations it has undergone. Even despite Donald Trump's decision to cut funding for USAID, [30] Radio Liberty, [31] the National Endowment for Democracy, [32] and several other institutions, the state system of public diplomacy—whose main operator is the U.S. Department of State—will not disappear. Its existence is predetermined by the very presence of America's global political and economic interests. The system may experience periods of rise and decline, and even atrophy, [33] but it will not be abolished under any circumstances. Washington does not need soft power; it is enough for it to keep its public diplomacy apparatus in working order, allowing it to mobilize the full range of its humanitarian instruments. This is an important point to always bear in mind when assessing the latest trendy concepts in politics and international relations. Such concepts may, for a time, capture the imagination of particular scholarly communities, politicians, or even entire societies, leading them to believe in seemingly magic formulas for promoting a country's national image abroad.

Against this backdrop, Russian public diplomacy, which is facing challenges of its own, should not let its guard down. The process of adapting to new international realities largely took place during 2022–2024; [34] now is the tie to set new goals and objectives. Unfortunately, many of the structural problems that had long characterized Russia’s public diplomacy system—and that experts had been highlighting well before 2022 [35]—have not disappeared. The current situation has only intensified these accumulated challenges. At the same time, it has prompted a reassessment of existing approaches and working models, encouraging the search for new topics and more effective instruments for engaging with foreign audiences in friendly countries.

Beyond the methods and instruments of engagement, however, the conceptual and intellectual foundations of humanitarian policy are an equally essential component of any major power’s international strategy. Continued reliance on Western concepts is no longer viable, and treating soft power as the key to restoring a country’s international image has become counterproductive. The conclusion, therefore, is straightforward: Russia’s socio-political sphere must stop thinking, reasoning, and operating on borrowed, foreign ideas—however familiar they may be. Stepping out of Russia’s comfy domestic bubble and into the harsh reality of international competition is the best way to develop its own foundational framework of values and meaning in humanitarian policy—the very Russian public diplomacy that is so sorely lacking and so eagerly awaited in many regions and countries around the world.

[1] Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York, Basic Books, 1990. 336 p.

[2] Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York, Public Affairs, 2004, 208 p; Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The Future of Power. New York, Public Affairs, 2011. 320 p.; Joseph S. Nye. Soft Power and Great-Power Competition Shifting Sands in the Balance of Power Between the United States and China. Singapore, Springer, 2023. 217 p.

[3] See: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The Future of Power. New York, Public Affairs, 2011, p. 81; Nye, J. Soft power: the origins and political progress of a concept. Palgrave Communication (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/palcomms.2017.8

[4] Joseph Nye repeatedly recounted the story of how the idea of soft power was conceived literally at his kitchen table in interviews and later publications. However, he first mentioned this anecdote in print in a 2017 article. See: Nye, J. “Soft Power: The Origins and Political Progress of a Concept.” Palgrave Communications (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/palcomms.2017.8

[5] Nye J.S., Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York, Public Affairs, 2004, p. 10.

[6] Ibid. p. 9.

[7] Suchkov, M. A. Post-America: How and Why the United States Is Changing. Moscow: AST, 2026, p. 76.

[8] Huntington Samuel P. The Lonely Superpower // Foreign Affairs. March/April. 1999. Vol. 778. No.1.

[9] Voronkov, L. S. Liberal Values in Theory and Practice: On the Problems of Russia's Intellectual Decolonization: A Monograph / L. S. Voronkov; Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Department of Integration Processes. Moscow: MGIMO University, 2024. P. 293.

[10] Ibid. P. 301.

[11] Zhuravleva, V. Yu. "The Concept of 'Smart Power' and Barack Obama's National Development Strategy." Russia and America in the Twenty-First Century. 2011. No. 2. P. 10.

[12] Gaman-Golutvina, O. V. “The ‘City upon a Hill’ in the Face of Major Challenges.” Comparative Politics Russia. 2024. Vol. 15. No. 1. Pp. 4–21.

[13] Nicholas J. Cull. Reputational Security: Refocusing Public Diplomacy for a Dangerous World. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2024. 232 p.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Nye, for example, described the period of his extraordinary popularity in the Chinese media after Chinese leader Hu Jintao referred to soft power in a speech in 2007. Nye, J. Soft power: the origins and political progress of a concept. Palgrave Communication (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/palcomms.2017.8

[16] Donald Trump’s second presidential term began on January 20, 2025.

[17] In 2015, it was included on the Russian Federation’s list of foreign and international organizations designated as undesirable.

[18] Artamonova, U. Z. "Popcorn Diplomacy: The Role of American Blockbusters in Shaping the World Order." Analysis and Forecasting. IMEMO Journal. 2022. No. 3. Pp. 76–90. DOI: 10.20542/afij-2022-3-76-90.

[19] The movement has been designated as extremist and banned in the Russian Federation.

[20] Voitolovskaya, A. R. “Ordinary ‘Trumpism’.” World Economy and International Relations. 2025. Vol. 69. No. 9. Pp. 62–72. DOI: 10.20542/0131-2227-2025-69-9-62-72.

[21] Brzezinski, Z. The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership. Moscow, 2007. P. 268.

[22] Burlinova, N. V. Theory and Practice of Russian Public Diplomacy. Teaching and Methodological Materials No. 10/2024 / N. V. Burlinova; ed. By S. M. Gavrilova, E. A. Solodukhina, et al.; Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). Moscow: RIAC, 2024. Pp. 48–54.

[23] One of the most prominent critics of the use of the term soft power in the Russian context is Yevgeny Primakov, former head of Rossotrudnichestvo, who led the agency from 2020 to 2026. Viewing the term as part of American imperialism, Primakov advocated replacing it with the concept of humanitarian policy.

[24] Cull N.J. From Soft Power to Reputational Security: Rethinking Public Diplomacy and Cultural Diplomacy for a Dangerous Age. McKercher B.J.C., ed. The Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft. New York, Routledge, 2022, pp. 409-419. DOI: 10.4324/9781003016625-41

[25] Nicholas J. Cull. Reputational Security: Refocusing Public Diplomacy for a Dangerous World. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2024.

[26] See, for example: Artamonova, U. Z. “The Concept of ‘Reputational Security’ in U.S. Public Diplomacy after 2022.” Analysis and Forecasting. IMEMO Journal. 2024. No. 4. Pp. 30–42. DOI: 10.20542/afij-2024-4-30-42.

[27] Slezkin, P. "Where Is the West Headed?" Russia in Global Affairs. Vol. 23. No. 6 (136). November–December 2025. P. 46.

[28] The term public diplomacy was introduced into the foreign policy lexicon in the early 1960s by the retired U.S. diplomat Edmund Gullion. He defined public diplomacy as the means by which governments, private groups, and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in ways that shape their foreign policy decisions. Quoted in: Burlinova, N. V. Theory and Practice of Russian Public Diplomacy. Teaching and Methodological Materials No. 10/2024 / N. V. Burlinova; ed. by S. M. Gavrilova, E. A. Solodukhina, et al.; Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). Moscow: RIAC, 2024. P. 11.

[29] Kubyshkin, A. I., and N. A. Tsvetkova. U.S. Public Diplomacy: A University Textbook. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2013.

[30] Included in the Russian Federation's register of foreign and international organizations whose activities have been designated as undesirable.

[31] Included in the Russian Federation's register of foreign and international organizations whose activities have been designated as undesirable. Designated as a foreign agent in the Russian Federation.

[32] Included in the Russian Federation's register of foreign and international organizations whose activities have been designated as undesirable.

[33] Artamonova, U. Z. The Emerald City upon a Hill: U.S. Public Diplomacy. IMEMO. Moscow: Ves Mir Publishers, 2026. Pp. 55–80.

[34] Burlinova, N., and V. Tabak. "The Year of the Great Turn: Public Diplomacy of Russia's Regions after 2022." Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). August 2, 2024. Available at: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/god-velikogo-povorota-publichnaya-diploma....

[35] Expert Review of Russian Public Diplomacy in 2018–2019: Ten Steps toward Effective Russian Public Diplomacy. Report No. 52/2020 / N. Burlinova, P. Vasilenko, V. Ivanchenko, O. Shakirov; executive eds. I. Timofeev and O. Pylova; Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). Moscow: RIAC, 2020. 58 p.