U.S. Questions Russian Intentions

Stephen Kotkin, professor of Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs at Princeton comments on the current state of Russia-U.S. relations, the roots of tensions, and reasons of misunderstanding.

Stephen Kotkin, professor of Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs at Princeton comments on the current state of Russia-U.S. relations, the roots of tensions, and reasons of misunderstanding.

Could you please give an assessment to current condition of Russian-American relations and comment of the roots of it? Would you agree that the current state of the Russia-U.S. relations is the most alarming ever?

I don’t think either side expected the situation that we have now. I don’t think they expected relations to deteriorate so much to the condition that we have now. It is unexpected, unplanned. The question is how did it happen like this and what could be done to get out of the situation from both sides’ point of view? Obama administration had idea to improve relations with Russia. It didn’t know how exactly but it certainly was intending to improve relations. There were good intentions. On the Russian side, I’m not sure what the intentions were at the beginning of the Obama administration. That would be more for your experts here to discuss. But, of course, now we have worse relations than before Obama came to power. Something went wrong. And what went wrong is difficult to explain in one sentence but a number of factors came into play, largely having to do with the reduction of the place of Russia in American foreign policy in general. Russia does not occupy the same place that the Soviet Union occupied before. When things happen in Russia, the response on the American side is not to prioritize the relation with Russia. On the Russian side, they don’t feel that there’s been a reduction in the importance in Russia’s place in the world or in the relationship with America, since the United States is the most powerful global power. So, on the Russian side no reduction in importance, on the American side significant reduction in importance. So that’s one piece of the puzzle of why things went wrong.

On the Russian side no reduction in importance, on the American side significant reduction in importance.

Stephen Kotkin

Now we’re in the situation where it’s not clear the limits, it’s not clear how to manage the relationship, the different state interests, the different views on world affairs, the different views on Russia’s role in the world.

Second piece is that their interests diverge; state interests diverge meaning that the perception of each side of what it wants in global affairs doesn’t overlap very much, doesn’t coincide. And so this difference in relations has led to different behavior and it’s led to the tensions. So, on the one hand, reduction of the importance, on one side but not on the other, and then differences in state interests.

And then the third point, I would say, is the developments inside the Russian regime, internal domestic developments in Russia which are hard for the United States’ government to understand and which seem to have an effect on Russian foreign policy. There are multiple other factors, of course, but those are the three main ones that I see in deterioration of relations.

Is it a new Cold War?

It’s not possible to call this a new Cold War from the American side because, as I said, there’s been a reduction in the place of Russia in American foreign policy. This is not the Soviet Union, this is not a global competition; this is not a competition of two different systems which appeal to third world or different parts of the world. It is not on the scale of the new Cold War. However, in many ways it’s worse because in the Cold War there was a sense of limits. They had developed over time. It had taken many different avenues and international forums and agreements that were signed and decades of leaning by both sides to understand the limits of the relationship during the Cold War, given that each side had the capability to destroy the Earth many times over, and that tensions could lead to unexpected developments potentially. There was a way in which the Cold War reached a point of mutual understanding, if not mutual acceptance, and that Cold War sense of limits and sense of mutual limitations, or acceptance, it was lost because one side appeared to be unable to continue the Cold War or unwilling to continue the Cold War and effectively capitulate it. And the other side, of course, declared victory. So, now we’re in the situation where it’s not clear the limits, it’s not clear how to manage the relationship, the different state interests, the different views on world affairs, the different views on Russia’s role in the world. It’s not clear to me how you manage these big differences given that it’s not as important as the Cold War to the American side but also that there’s a lack of learning and understanding developed through decades of dealing with the new Russia and with agreements and forums and various different ways that the relationship can be managed. So, in many ways the relationship is very troubling but in other ways it’s not on the scale of the Cold War.

Do you see any ways to restore the mutual trust?

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In Washington, on the one hand, people are calling for stronger measures in the relationship with Russia, and on the other hand, people don’t want to have to confront the situation because of, as I said, the reduction, the perceived reduction in importance in the relationship with Russia.

Well, it depends on what Russian intentions are. Americans have difficult time understanding Russian intentions right now. What is it that the Russian regime is pursuing? What are the goals of Russian foreign policy? This applies to many questions. Obviously, it applies to the situation in Ukraine. Maybe the Russian government feels that it has articulated its goals very clearly and it’s the Americans’ fault for not understanding. I’m not sure what the Russian government thinks about that question but from the American point of view there seems to be a lack of clarity on Russia’s intentions, Russia’s goals.

We see the Germans attempting to intercede and to play an important role. German-Russian relationship is extremely important. In many ways it’s the most important relationship that Russia has in the world. So, it’s not just relations with the United States that are damaged; relations with Germany, as you know, are also damaged. And in some ways the United States relied on the Germans to try to clarify Russian intentions but this has not worked so far. The Germans have been unable to clarify the intentions of the current Russian government, and so therefore Americans feel that if the Germans can’t do it, who really can clarify? And so, like I said, maybe from the Russian point of view they feel that they have clarified their intentions, but from the other side’s point of view the feeling is a lack of clarity. Until there is some clarity on Russian intentions, it’s very hard to see how the situation could improve. In Washington, on the one hand, people are calling for stronger measures in the relationship with Russia, and on the other hand, people don’t want to have to confront the situation because of, as I said, the reduction, the perceived reduction in importance in the relationship with Russia. So, you have a kind of paradox. On the one hand, many people want to go much harder, on the other hand, many people want to do nothing at all and ignore the situation. And so this lack of clarity of the intentions on the Russian side and this difference in opinion on the American side of how to approach the Russian question has made for a prolonged stalemate now.

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Being outside the international system means that the incentives for Russian behavior to integrate with other institutions, to pursue policies that are on lines of compromise, the incentives are diminished for Russia to behave that way.

So, I don’t think it’s in anybody’s interests and it’s advantage to know one for Russia to be outside the international system the way it’s perceived today. It’s not in Russian state interests, it’s not in the interests of Europe; it’s not in the interests of the United States. I don’t fear any trouble. I don’t fear rapprochement, deep accommodation between Russia and China the way many people say that this is where the world is going, and we have to be careful Russia and China are getting close to each other. Russia and China are sovereign powers, and if they want to have strong bilateral relations that’s their own business. I don’t think anybody has anything to fear from that. So, that’s not the issue for me, but being outside the international system means that the incentives for Russian behavior to integrate with other institutions, to pursue policies that are on lines of compromise, the incentives are diminished for Russia to behave that way. Moreover, the incentives for the other powers that are inside the international system to deal with Russia are also diminished when Russia’s outside the international system. Now, there are many complicated reasons why Russia is somewhat isolated in the current moment, not all reasons on the Russian side, as we were discussing but I don’t think it’s to anybody’s advantage. So, it’s, I think, in everyone’s interests that Russia is more integrated into the current international situation. I don’t mean only the United Nations, ‘cause, of course, Russia has a prominent role in the United Nations and is a permanent member of the Security Council. And this is very important to Russia, and we all understand that Russia has earned that place through history and through the size of the country and many other reasons. I’m talking about other forums besides the United Nations where Russia is no longer seen as a partner or as a co-member of international organization. This is very troubling. And so we need some type of a process to reintegrate Russia back, and that process is going to involve compromise on all sides, and it’s going to involve some sort of path of negotiations going forward.

To my mind, it’s also not in Russia’s interests to be outside of the club. One of the challenges that face the world now is ISIL. Would you see any possible ways of cooperation between Russia and the United States against ISIL and the threat of terrorism and Islamism?

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We’re not suggesting that Russia is the only one responsible but to us nonetheless it looks like there’s a situation of stalemate and potential stagnation in the Russian domestic scene.

There are very difficult problems, of course, and these are problems that were caused not by Russia. These were issues that arose in large part because of American policy in the world. And so, American policy in the world has not been very effective in the Middle East region. America has achieved the opposite of its intentions in many places in the Middle East. And so, America also needs coalition of partners to help it out of the situation that it itself created. So, I agree with you that there’s the basis for potential cooperation there. But it’s not clear what the proper policy is going forward. We all understand what the trouble is but we don’t all understand what the solution is.

But let me say that those of us who are well-disposed towards Russia, those of us who have been coming here for many years, those of us who have long-standing interests in Russia and in Russian affairs and are well-disposed towards the country, we’re a little bit concerned about the domestic situation here in Russia. We feel that if there were changes in the Russian domestic situation, that it would help internationally Russia’s positioning, including its relationship with the United States and especially with Germany. You see, everybody here in Russia knows that the country needs to regain the path of economic modernization. We all understand this. The President says it here; the Prime Minister says it; all the members of the government say it. The establishment is well aware of the issues. There are many different plans. We’ve read all the plans. Everybody knows it must be done but it’s not being done. And this is quite puzzling to us. Here is the country that made tremendous strides between 1991 and 2008. Before the financial crisis caused by, largely by American banking system Russia has made tremendous strides in economic modernization, not everything that was hoped for but certainly impressive gains. In part this was a hydrocarbon economy but not only.

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There were other reasons, including first-stage liberalizing economic reforms that happened during the first term of President Putin. We feel that this was in Russia’s interests, and we feel that a second stage of such economic modernization domestically would also be in Russia’s interests. We feel that it would be beneficial to Russia domestically, and we feel that it would be enhance Russia’s international position. And so, when the statements are made by President Putin or Prime Minister Medvedev or other members of the Russian ruling establishment about the need for economic modernization, the desire for economic modernization here in Russia, we welcome these statements but we’d like to see some of the programs get implemented. I think if that happened it would be potentially an important breakthrough in Russia’s international relations. When no changes happen domestically in the economy, when there are announcements that it should be done and then nothing happens, this reminds people a little bit of Brezhnev era and 1979 and Kosygin reforms which were announced but never implemented. At the same time as Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms in China, Kosygin reforms here were announced. Then nothing happened, even though whole Soviet elite knew that they were necessary.

I don’t want to say that the current situation here in Russia is like the Brezhnev era. That would be a superficial comparison. Russia today has a predominantly market economy. It has a big thriving private sector. State sector is also big but private sector now exists which didn’t exist before. There are many positive things that Russia has achieved. At the same time, I think that the lack of dynamism in the economy and the lack of implementation of second-stage pro-market reforms is one of the stumbling blocks; not the only stumbling block but one of the stumbling blocks in improving Russia’s standing in the world, both from its own point of view and from the point of view of its potential partners. It won’t solve all the issues but it would be a good step.

What is your vision as an expert on Russian history the second step of modernization is not going? What is the core problem?

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In many ways, it’s because of the success of the first stage. First-stage economic reforms produce winners, and the winners become interest groups. They become powerful interest groups in the system that you have here. And those interest groups are not interested in second-stage economic reforms. They prefer the status quo because they are winners from the first stage. They are the beneficiaries of the first stage. Just as the first stage was necessary to overcome many interest groups, to overcome opposition, so the second stage is necessary to overcome.

It’s very difficult to do second-stage pro-market liberalizing reforms. It’s much easier to announce them than it is to implement them because of the obstacles created by the success of the first-stage economic reforms. In the social science this is called partial reform equilibrium. Partial reform equilibrium means that you went part of the way towards modernization but you created equilibrium out of the interest groups from this first stage. So that’s one way.

The other explanation for why, potentially why we have not seen a second-stage economic liberalization is because those very interest groups that were the winners and enjoy the status quo, they are the major building blocks of President Putin’s coalition regime at the top. They are the current elites who are in power here. And so, for them to embark on second-stage economic reform would be an acknowledgement that they themselves might have too much power. We rarely see this in any government, not just the Russian government where the people who hold the most power are willing to sacrifice some of their power potentially in the political system on behalf of modernizing the country economically. Instead, sometimes you see what’s called the path of least resistance. This is where they try to enhance their power through means of appeal to nationalism rather than difficult decisions involved, in carving their own power by engaging in second-stage economic reforms. So, to many people, I don’t know what it looks like here in Russia but to many people on the outside Russia looks like it’s stalemated. It looks like it’s stuck in the current situation.

Once again, not only because of Russia’s actions; many of these actions involve United States, Europe and other powers in the world, right? So, we’re not suggesting that Russia is the only one responsible but to us nonetheless it looks like there’s a situation of stalemate and potential stagnation in the Russian domestic scene. And for those of us who care about Russia, this is troubling.

Interviewed by Natalia Evtikhevich, RIAC program manager