The Rightward Shift in the European Union and the Transformation of Its Economic and Political Space

The rise of right-wing political forces has become one of the most prominent trends in the development of the European Union. It is reflected not only in rising electoral support for these parties, but also in their increasing participation in national governments, their emergence as leading opposition forces, and gradual adoption by traditional parties of certain elements of their agenda.

The rightward shift has become one of the most prominent political trends in the contemporary European Union. However, the analysis shows that its causes extend well beyond electoral dynamics, the migration crisis, or the growing popularity of individual political parties. The strengthening of right-wing forces reflects deeper changes in the mechanisms through which the European Union operates, associated with the transformation of its economic and political space under the impact of current internal and external challenges.

In recent years, European integration has entered a new stage of development. While its economic foundations were previously shaped primarily by the deepening of the internal market, liberalization, and regulatory harmonization, today competitiveness, economic security, technological sovereignty, and strategic resilience are becoming increasingly important. This objectively strengthens the role of the state in the economy, alters the balance of powers between the national and supranational levels of governance, and heightens public sensitivity to the distribution of the resulting costs.

Under these conditions, the rightward shift is both a consequence of the structural changes underway and a factor shaping their further development. As right-wing parties gain influence over the political agenda, they contribute to adjustments in certain areas of EU policy, particularly migration, industrial development, energy, and domestic security. This does not amount to a rejection of integration as such. Rather it reflects a search for a new model of how it should function—one in which supranational coordination is more closely combined with the protection of national interests and the preservation of public legitimacy for the decisions being made.

For external actors engaging with the European Union, including Russia, this means that the EU’s further evolution will be determined primarily by the internal transformation of its economic and political space rather than solely by changes in the balance among political parties. Even if right-wing forces continue to gain strength, there is little reason to expect a fundamental revision of the EU’s common policy toward Russia in the short term. At the same time, the gradual strengthening of the national dimension of European policymaking may create conditions for a more pragmatic approach to certain aspects of economic interaction, provided that broader changes in the international environment are conducive to such a shift.

Thus, the rightward shift should be viewed not as a sign of an inevitable crisis or the collapse of the European Union, but as a political manifestation of its transition toward a new development model. The transformation of the EU’s economic and political space is the process shaping the nature of current changes in European integration and will likely continue to define its trajectory in the years ahead.

The rise of right-wing political forces has become one of the most prominent trends in the development of the European Union. It is reflected not only in rising electoral support for these parties, but also in their increasing participation in national governments, their emergence as leading opposition forces, and gradual adoption by traditional parties of certain elements of their agenda. Following the 2024 elections and the formation of the new European Parliament, the three political groups positioned to the right of the European People’s Party (EPP)—Patriots for Europe, the European Conservatives and Reformists, and Europe of Sovereign Nations—together held 187 of the 720 seats. At the same time, the center-right EPP, with 188 seats, retained its position as the largest parliamentary group. Thus, the political center of European integration has not disappeared, but the overall balance has shifted noticeably to the right. [1]

At the national level, this trend takes various forms. In Italy, right-wing forces shape government policy. In France, the National Rally received around one-third of the vote in the European Parliament elections, more than twice the share won by the presidential camp’s list. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany has established itself as one of the country’s leading nationwide political forces. In Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, Hungary, and a number of Central and Eastern European countries, right-wing and national-conservative parties also exert a direct or indirect influence on government policy. [2] However, their ideological stances and attitudes toward European integration, transatlantic relations, Russia, and economic policy differ significantly. It would therefore be premature to speak of the emergence of a unified “right-wing international” within the EU.

The rightward shift is most often attributed to the migration crisis, declining trust in political elites, inflation, the rising cost of living, and public reaction to the liberal values agenda. While these factors remain significant, they do not fully explain the systemic nature of the developments underway. Similar political processes are unfolding in countries with different party systems, economic models, and historical traditions. This points to the existence of a common environment shaping these developments.

This environment is the European Union’s economic and political space. It should be understood not as a simple aggregate of national economies and political systems, but as a multilevel system of interaction among EU institutions, member states, regions, businesses, and society. Within this framework, the functioning of the internal market is ensured, divergent interests are coordinated, and mechanisms are developed to enable the Union to adapt to internal and external challenges.

In recent years, this space has been undergoing a profound transformation. The market-based and regulatory logic that long shaped the development of European integration is increasingly being complemented by geoeconomic priorities: competitiveness, supply chain resilience, technological sovereignty, economic security, and defense readiness. The Competitiveness Compass, the Clean Industrial Deal, and the Readiness 2030 initiative adopted by EU institutions demonstrate that security, industrial production, and the reduction of strategic dependencies are becoming part of an integrated economic and political agenda. [3]

The central hypothesis in this article is that the rightward shift is simultaneously a consequence of this transformation, a form of social and political response to it, and a factor shaping its further development. Right-wing parties channel discontent over the unevenly distributed costs of the energy transition, migration policy, expanding regulation, and geoeconomic confrontation. At the same time, as their influence grows, they prompt EU and national institutions to adjust the Union’s development priorities. The future of the EU will therefore depend not only on the electoral success of right-wing parties, but also on the ability of the European integration model to establish a new balance among supranational coordination, national interests, and public legitimacy.

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The Rightward Shift as a Europe-Wide Trend

The growing influence of right-wing parties can no longer be viewed simply as a series of separate national political developments. In recent years, it has become a sustained pan-European trend, manifesting itself in various forms depending on the characteristics of the party systems, economic structures, and public sentiment in the member states.

In some countries, right-wing forces have become the core of governing coalitions, as in Italy. In others, they have established themselves as the largest or among the largest opposition forces, exerting increasing pressure on mainstream parties. Finally, even where right-wing parties do not gain direct access to power, they are having an increasingly visible impact on the political agenda, prompting centrist parties to adopt tougher positions on migration, security, industrial policy, agriculture, and energy.

At the same time, it would be methodologically incorrect to speak of a unified European right-wing movement. National-conservative, right-wing populist, and radical-right parties differ substantially in their platforms, their attitudes toward European integration, economic policy, the role of the state, and relations with the U.S., China, and Russia. They are united not by a single ideology, but by a similar response to shifts in public sentiment and the growing demand to protect national interests, improve the efficiency of public administration, and revise certain policies of the European Union.

Another common feature is the changing behavior of traditional centrist parties. Seeking to preserve electoral support, many of them are increasingly incorporating into their own platforms certain demands previously associated primarily with right-wing forces. This is most evident in migration policy, tighter control over the EU’s external borders, the revision of certain elements of climate policy, support for national industries, and greater attention to domestic security. As a result, the rightward shift is reflected not only in changes to the balance among political parties, but also in the gradual transformation of the European Union’s broader political agenda.

At the same time, this interpretation explains only the political dimension of the processes underway. It identifies the forms in which the rightward shift manifests itself but does not explain why it has acquired a pan-European character. This raises a natural question: why are similar political changes occurring simultaneously in countries that differ substantially in their levels of economic development, social structures, historical experience, and national political traditions? The answer, it seems, should be sought not so much in the specific characteristics of individual states as in the changing conditions under which the European Union itself operates.

From Migration to Systemic Transformation

Migration remains the most visible catalyst of the rightward shift. The inability of national and EU institutions to ensure effective control of the Union’s external borders, accelerate asylum procedures, and establish effective mechanisms for the return of persons without the right to remain has reinforced perceptions of a crisis of governance. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, adopted in May 2024, is intended to harmonize the relevant procedures and the distribution of responsibility among member states. However, the fact that it was adopted only after years of disputes underscored the depth of divisions within the Union. The Pact’s provisions became applicable on June 12, 2026, but this does not eliminate the political sensitivity of the issue or the extent to which outcomes depend on national implementation.

Socioeconomic factors are no less significant. The inflationary surge has subsided, but its consequences remain evident in household spending patterns and perceptions of personal well-being. Household electricity prices in 2025 remained noticeably above the pre-crisis levels of the early 2020s, while high energy costs continue to affect industry and the EU’s competitiveness. Inflation, rising prices, and the cost of living remain the foremost public concern. A significant share of citizens continue to hold pessimistic expectations regarding their standard of living. [4]

This is compounded by a crisis of expectations. European integration was long associated with rising prosperity, freedom of movement, and the gradual convergence of development levels. Citizens are now increasingly being asked to accept long-term transformations that entail high immediate costs: energy and digital transitions, increased defense spending, the restructuring of the industrial sector, and the reduction of external dependencies. Their strategic necessity does not guarantee public support, particularly when the costs are distributed unevenly among countries, regions, industries, and social groups.

The rightward shift therefore cannot be explained solely as a protest against migration or liberal values. It reflects a response to the gap between the declared pan-European objectives and the ability of its institutions to provide a convincing explanation of their value, consistency and social justice. Significantly, strong support for EU membership coexists with critical assessments of the state of the European economy. According to Eurobarometer surveys, around three-quarters of citizens believe that their country benefits from EU membership, although approximately half hold a negative view of the state of the European economy.

The rightward shift is therefore not representing a direct rejection of European integration. Rather, it reflects demand for changes in its priorities and governance mechanisms. The roots of this call lie in the transformation of the EU’s economic and political landscape itself.

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Transformation of the EU’s Economic and Political Space

The current stage of the European Union’s development is characterized less by a crisis of integration than by a shift in the logic governing its economic and political space. Whereas in previous decades the main drivers of development were the progressive deepening of the internal market, the liberalization of economic activity, greater competition, and regulatory harmonization, in the first half of the 2020s the focus gradually shifted toward ensuring economic security, strengthening the competitiveness of European industry, and reducing critical external dependencies. [5]

This transformation has been driven by a combination of interrelated factors. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the vulnerability of global value chains. The energy crisis demonstrated the European economy’s dependence on external energy suppliers. Intensifying geopolitical confrontation increased attention to strategic autonomy, infrastructure resilience, and technological development. At the same time, the emergence of a new industrial policy accelerated, with government support, investment coordination, the development of critical technologies, and protection of the internal market playing an increasingly prominent role. [6]

Characteristically, these changes are being implemented not through the abandonment of the existing integration model, but through its adaptation to new conditions. The European Commission is steadily supplementing traditional regulatory instruments with mechanisms to stimulate industrial development, support innovation, and ensure economic security. The strategic documents on competitiveness and clean industry discussed above, the development of defense-industrial cooperation, programs supporting critical technologies, and measures to strengthen the single market reflect a shift toward a more active role for EU institutions in shaping the conditions for economic development. At the same time, the strategic objective is not to replace national economic policies, but to enhance the EU’s resilience amid intensifying geoeconomic competition. [7]

At the same time, the role of the member states is growing. National governments bear primary political responsibility for implementing EU-wide decisions, distributing the associated costs, and maintaining public consensus. As a result, a unique duality is emerging within the EU’s contemporary economic and political space: the expanding coordinating role of supranational institutions is accompanied by a growing determination among member states to protect their own economic interests, industrial bases, and social stability. This is reflected in debates over the permissible scope of state aid, the reform of fiscal rules, the future of climate policy, support for national producers, and the distribution of financial burdens among member states.

Within this new institutional environment, political forces advocating a reassessment of certain areas of European policy are gaining additional momentum. The uneven distribution of the benefits and costs associated with the transformation of the EU’s economic and political space is strengthening public demand for a more pragmatic economic policy, a greater role for the nation-state, and adjustments to integration mechanisms. The rightward shift is becoming one of the political manifestations of this structural transformation, reflecting the desire of part of European society to adapt the integration project to new conditions rather than abandon it.

The Rightward Shift as a Factor in the European Union’s Further Transformation

The growing influence of right-wing political forces is already affecting the development of the European Union, regardless of whether these parties participate in national governments. Even when they remain in opposition, they are reshaping the substance of the EU-wide political debate, compelling mainstream parties and EU institutions to consider issues that only a few years ago remained on the periphery of the integration agenda.

This is most evident in migration policy. In recent years, the European Union has significantly increased its focus on protecting its external borders, accelerating the processing of asylum applications, and expanding cooperation with third countries on readmission and combating irregular migration. Many of these measures were initially perceived primarily as demands advanced by right-wing parties, but have gradually become part of EU-wide policy. Similar developments can be observed in the field of internal security, where greater attention is being paid to combating cross-border crime, protecting critical infrastructure, and countering hybrid threats.

A similar dynamic can be observed in the economic sphere. Intensifying international competition, the need to accelerate industrial modernization, and the need to preserve the competitiveness of European producers are contributing to a more pragmatic approach to climate policy. Without calling into question the long-term goal of achieving climate neutrality, the European Commission and member state governments are increasingly emphasizing the need to take into account the economic consequences of policy decisions, support energy-intensive industries, and reduce the administrative burden on businesses. This is resulting in a more balanced combination of environmental, industrial, and social priorities. [8]

At the same time, the impact of the rightward shift should not be overstated. Despite the significant strengthening of these parties, the Union’s institutional resilience remains high. Key decisions on the internal market, economic governance, the budget, sanctions policy, external trade, and the common foreign policy continue to be made through a complex system of coordination between EU institutions and member states. Therefore, the strengthening of right-wing forces will most likely lead not to a radical overhaul of European integration, but to its gradual political and economic adjustment.

Thus, the current rightward shift should be viewed not as an alternative to the European project, but as one of the mechanisms of its internal adaptation. The growing influence of right-wing parties is contributing to a shift in the political center toward a more pragmatic balance between EU-wide objectives and national interests, the need for economic competitiveness, and public demand for security. As a result, the transformation of the European Union's economic and political space takes on the character of a two-way process: structural changes strengthen the positions of right-wing forces, while the right-wing forces themselves become a factor in the further evolution of the integration model.

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Conclusion

The rightward shift has become one of the most prominent political trends in the contemporary European Union. However, the analysis shows that its causes extend well beyond electoral dynamics, the migration crisis, or the growing popularity of individual political parties. The strengthening of right-wing forces reflects deeper changes in the mechanisms through which the European Union operates, associated with the transformation of its economic and political space under the impact of current internal and external challenges.

In recent years, European integration has entered a new stage of development. While its economic foundations were previously shaped primarily by the deepening of the internal market, liberalization, and regulatory harmonization, today competitiveness, economic security, technological sovereignty, and strategic resilience are becoming increasingly important. This objectively strengthens the role of the state in the economy, alters the balance of powers between the national and supranational levels of governance, and heightens public sensitivity to the distribution of the resulting costs.

Under these conditions, the rightward shift is both a consequence of the structural changes underway and a factor shaping their further development. As right-wing parties gain influence over the political agenda, they contribute to adjustments in certain areas of EU policy, particularly migration, industrial development, energy, and domestic security. This does not amount to a rejection of integration as such. Rather it reflects a search for a new model of how it should function—one in which supranational coordination is more closely combined with the protection of national interests and the preservation of public legitimacy for the decisions being made.

For external actors engaging with the European Union, including Russia, this means that the EU’s further evolution will be determined primarily by the internal transformation of its economic and political space rather than solely by changes in the balance among political parties. Even if right-wing forces continue to gain strength, there is little reason to expect a fundamental revision of the EU’s common policy toward Russia in the short term. At the same time, the gradual strengthening of the national dimension of European policymaking may create conditions for a more pragmatic approach to certain aspects of economic interaction, provided that broader changes in the international environment are conducive to such a shift.

Thus, the rightward shift should be viewed not as a sign of an inevitable crisis or the collapse of the European Union, but as a political manifestation of its transition toward a new development model. The transformation of the EU’s economic and political space is the process shaping the nature of current changes in European integration and will likely continue to define its trajectory in the years ahead.

[1] See: The 2024 European Parliament Elections: A Stage in the Evolution of the Old World’s Party System / Edited by V.Y. Schweitzer. DIU RAS, No. 417, Moscow, 2024. – 144 pp. – DOI: 10.15211/report112024_417

[2] See: Fragmentation of the European Party Landscape / ed. by V.Y. Schweitzer. Moscow: Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2026. – 176 pp. – DOI:10.15211/report32026_428

[3] Kondratyeva, N.B. The Geoeconomic Approach in the Economic Policy of the European Union // Bulletin of International Organizations: Education, Science, New Economy. 2025. Vol. 20, No. 1. – pp. 31–45. – DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2025-01-02

[4] See: Lunkin, R.N. Factors Contributing to the Erosion of the European Union’s Social Model // Modern Europe. 2024. No. 7. pp. 182–195. DOI: 10.31857/s0201708324070155

[5] Butorina O.V. The European Union and large cycles of economic integration // International Trends. 2024. Vol. 22, no. 3-4. ‒ Pp. 6-28. – DOI: 10.46272/IT.2024.22.3-4.78-79.1.

[6] See: The European Union in the Global Economy: The BRICS Factor / ed. By O.V. Butorina. – Moscow: Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2026. – pp. 14–87 – DOI: 10.15211/report52026_430

[7] See: European Strategic Autonomy: Assessments and Challenges / Eds. A.V. Kotov, K.A. Godovanyuk. M.: IE RAS, 2025. – Pp. 13-63. DOI: 10.15211/report32025_420; Mariotti S. "Open Strategic Autonomy" as a Compass of Industrial Policy for EU Competitiveness and Growth: Is It Good, Bad, or Ugly? // International Organisations Research Journal: Education, Science, New Economy. 2025. No. 2. – Pp. 160‒188 – DOI:10.17323/1996-7845-2025-02-09

[8] See: Kaveshnikov N.Yu. The Green Deal as a Trigger for Deepening Integration in the European Union // World Economy and International Relations. 2024. Vol. 68, no. 6. – Pp. 93-107. – DOI: 10.20542/0131-2227-2024-68-6-93-107