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Sergey Rogov

Academic Director of the RAS Institute of US and Canada, RAS Full Member

With the disintegration of the USSR, the United States was left without a competing power equal in strength. At the turn of the millennia, U.S. power had peaked, and Washington believed the world was entering a long reign of a “single superpower.” However, under George W. Bush, the United States had overexerted itself in an attempt to consolidate the unipolar system of international relations. Even the globalization process led by Washington had started to stall. Multipolarity prevailed.

Contributors: Dr. S.M. Rogov, Full Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, P.A. Sharikov, Ph.D. S.N. Babich, Ph.D. I.A. Petrova, N.V. Stepanova.

Introduction

With the disintegration of the USSR, the United States was left without a competing power equal in strength. At the turn of the millennia, U.S. power had peaked, and Washington believed the world was entering a long reign of a “single superpower.” However, under George W. Bush, the United States had overexerted itself in an attempt to consolidate the unipolar system of international relations. Even the globalization process led by Washington had started to stall. Multipolarity prevailed.

On February 12, 2013 President Barack Obama presented his state-of-the-union address to Congress, detailing U.S. policy priorities in his second term as President. In international terms, Barack Obama intends to ensure U.S. leadership in two giant economic blocks: Transatlantic and Transpacific [1]. Washington is expected to retain its leadership in the polycentric system of international relations. This was one of the key elements of the “Obama Doctrine.”

Steam Roller

Neither the United States nor the European Union, nor indeed Japan, managed to effect a speedy recovery from the 2008-2009 economic crisis. While the Western world is making no headway, China is rapidly expanding, demonstrating exceptionally high growth rates. As one American observer put it, “‘multipolarization’ has come faster and more forcefully than expected.” [2]

One article entitled “While America Slept” in Foreign Policy magazine includes the following paragraph: “China’s benign rise was a result of American neglect, not a result of any long-term strategy. China acted strategically; America did not. After the 9/11 attacks, for instance, the United States focused on the Middle East instead of the rise of China.” [3] The National Interest Weekly notes: “As the United States devoted more time and resources to the dubious results of Mideast wars, China aimed a shop and smile policy at its Asian neighbors with great success.” [4]

As a result, the “world’s factory” has switched locations from America to East Asia. In the past decade, the United States’ share in global GDP by purchasing-power parity (PPP) dropped from 23 to 18 percent, whereas that of China grew from 10 to 15 percent. Based on the exchange rate, the United States is twice times as big as China (see Table 1). However, China has already overtaken the United States in export trade and car output. China accounts for more than half the world’s gold and currency reserves. True, there is a certain interdependence in economic area between China and the United States. In 2012 U.S.-China trade volumes hit USD 536 bn. (USD 110 bn. U.S. exports and USD 426 bn. imports) [5]. Beijing has become Washington’s key lender: China holds almost 22 percent of the U.S. Treasury’s debt [6].

Apart from being been increasingly active in the Asia Pacific region, China is competing successfully with the United States in Latin America and with the European Union in Africa (see Tables 6 and 7). Lately, they have also set their eyes on the Arctic Sea [7]. By 2020, almost 15 percent of China’s foreign trade will follow the Arctic route.

Photo: RIAC
National Intelligence Council: “China alone will
probably have the largest economy, surpassing
that of the United States a few years before 2030”

According to the National Intelligence Council’s report, released in December 2012: “Asia will have surpassed North America and Europe combined in terms of global power, based upon GDP, population size, military spending, and technological investment. China alone will probably have the largest economy, surpassing that of the United States a few years before 2030.” [8]

Global public attitudes surveys in 2012 showed that only 36 percent of respondents considered the United States the world’s leading economic power (by contrast, there were 45 percent in 2008), while 42 percent believed that China already topped the list (compared to only 22 percent in 2008) [9].

Former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, has stressed that Washington should focus, as a long-term priority, on its relations with China as a potential 21st century superpower [10]. Unless the Chinese economic model leads to a dead-end, China will catch up with the United States on GDP (by PPP) this decade, and by mid-century China’s GDP will be twice that of the United States by exchange rate. Beijing is also expected to catch up and overtake Washington in defense spending. Is there a way to resist the steamroller of the Chinese economy or put it on American rails? “Can a more powerful China be integrated effectively into the existing order, or does China’s ascent mean pressure or demands for relatively radical change?” [11] ask Foreign Policy Research Institute observers.

At one point, Robert B. Zoellick, who served as Deputy Secretary of the U.S. State Department in the George Bush Administration and later became the President of the World Bank Group, urged that China should become “a responsible stakeholder” in the U.S.-centric world [12]. At the beginning, the Obama Administration also hoped to negotiate with China on American terms. A popular idea at the time, put forward by Zbigniew Brzezinski, a political scientist and one of the leading U.S. foreign policy-makers, was to set up a Group of Two, in which China would be a junior partner to the United States [13]. A formal mechanism was set up to pursue an official dialog between the two countries on economic and strategic matters.

However, China refused to accept the American rules of the game, for instance, during negotiations on trade, climate change or intellectual property. With repeated accusations of currency manipulations leveled against China in the United States, given the severe trade imbalance between the two countries [14], Beijing only agreed to minor concessions and refused to devalue the Yuan.

As Robert Zoellick concluded: “China might be emerging as a "reluctant stakeholder.” [15] Beijing has refused to cooperate on Washington’s terms [16], argues prominent U.S. political observer Fareed Zakaria.

Photo: Reuters
At the National People’s Congress, the new
Chinese leader, Xi Jinping declared:
“The Chinese nation is a nation with
unprecedented creative force”

At the National People’s Congress, the new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping declared: “We need to multiply our forces and persistently move forward to be able to advance Chinese socialism and fight for the ‘Chinese Dream’ of the great revival of the Chinese nation.” Chairman Xi mentioned the 170 years that had passed since the first Opium War (1839-1842) and the five millennia of Chinese civilization. “The Chinese nation is a nation with unprecedented creative force” [17] Xi Jinping said. He warned that Chinese armed forces must remain “in full combat readiness to be victorious in any war.” [18]

Some American observers have argued that “Beijing believes that the United States is both the greatest threat to China’s national security and a declining power.” [19] “It is China’s intention to become the greatest power in the world – and to be accepted as China, not as an honorary member of the west,” [20] claims former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.

It should be remembered that the ideological factor plays a particular role in Sino-American relations. In the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, China has emerged as a symbol of a successful alternative socioeconomic model, an authoritarian antithesis to Western liberal democracy. Beijing is suspicious of Washington’s campaign to promote American-style democracy and human rights. Beijing is furious about Washington’s support of Taiwan or separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang, while in the United States, many continue to consider China a “communist power.”

The 2012 Republican Party Platform proclaimed: “The Chinese government has engaged in a number of activities that we condemn: China’s pursuit of advanced military capabilities without any apparent need; the suppression of human rights in Tibet, Xinjiang, and other areas; religious persecution; a barbaric one-child policy involving forced abortion; the erosion of democracy in Hong Kong; and its destabilizing claims in the South China Sea […] China’s failure to enforce international standards for the protection of intellectual property and copyrights, as well as its manipulation of its currency […].”[21]

Remarkably, 66 percent of Americans consider China a foe, and 52 percent believe that a rising China is a threat to the United States [22], while 23 percent of respondents are convinced that China is “the key threat” to America (only 2 percent believe Russia is) [23].

Not surprisingly, during the presidential debates in autumn 2012, Barack Obama described China as an “adversary” of the United States, whereas the Republican nominee, Mitt Romney urged for strong pressure on Beijing, while pronouncing Russia “Our number one geopolitical foe.” [24]

Changing Milestones

Speaking to the Asia Society in New York on March 11, 2013, National Security Advisor to President Obama, Thomas Donilon, said: “After a decade defined by 9/11, two wars, and a financial crisis, President Obama took office determined to restore the foundation of the United States’ global leadership – our economic strength at home.” [25]

Leslie H. Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that the Obama Administration has a clearer sense of the limits on American power than Bush did. According to Gelb, Barack Obama “saw that conventional military superiority cannot pacify countries or resolve civil wars and vast internal conflicts.” [26]

The present White House incumbent seems to realize that he has to break away from the “decade of wars” unleashed by George W. Bush and carry out in-depth domestic reforms to ensure U.S. competitiveness in a multipolar world. On the international stage, President Obama now needs to make an orderly retreat, without panic, retaining American leadership, but at a lesser burden to the United States. He needs to regroup his forces and cut down external commitments that Washington is no longer capable of honoring. In the meantime, he has to revive the American economy’s many mechanisms that are no longer functioning properly. Domestic demand is no longer capable of sustaining growth in the United States, and, accordingly, the Obama Administration is focusing more on economic growth and job creation by boosting exports by U.S. manufacturing industries.

Photo: www.thegatewaypundit.com

All these considerations cannot but reflect on the current U.S. approach to international affairs. Barack Obama’s foreign policy is focused on helping overcome this domestic crisis without overstretching America.

Professor Richard William Smyser of Georgetown University wrote: “Obama and his team believe that the United States needs a new strategic doctrine, corresponding to a changing world, including the completion of a military presence in Iraq and then in Afghanistan. The new doctrine should reflect the slowdown in the U.S. economy, tight restrictions on the resources of the United States, as well as the urgent need to reduce the gap between rich and poor in America.” [27]

Since Harry Truman’s day, each new president proclaims a doctrine reflecting the priorities of the White House incumbent. George W. Bush, too, had a doctrine that sought to advance democracy via armed intervention. The Obama Administration has revisited this stance and has turned its back on the “global war on terror.” Instead, they concentrated on the concept of “smart power,” abandoning the purely military tools (“hard power”) used to protect U.S. interests under the neoconservative government of George W. Bush. Barack Obama advocates greater reliance on non-military tools (“soft power”).

And although neoconservatives maintain that the Obama Doctrine is paving the way for the United States’ “retreat” and even “decline” in the world, as has been mentioned extensively, e.g., by Charles Krauthammer [28], this is merely a reflection of the internal political struggle in the United States.

Judging from what happened in Libya and Syria, President Obama prefers “leading from behind” [29] and is ready to allow U.S. allies to be more prominently involved. The role of special operations is increasingly more important (it was a special operation that killed Al-Qaeda’s leader Osama bin Laden), and unmanned drones are being more extensively used.

A rather ambitious strategy is taking shape, a kind of “Obama Doctrine.” David Sanger, once Chief Washington Correspondent for The New York Times, now at Harvard, and the author of a book on the Obama Administration’s foreign policy [30], draws parallels between the current President’s policy in Libya and Syria with Franklin Roosevelt’s lend-lease [31]. However, we do not think the Obama Doctrine is all about the Middle East: it is global – not local.

According to Thomas Donilon, the new “comprehensive, multidimensional strategy” of the Obama Administration means “an effort that harnesses all elements of U.S. power – military, political, trade and investment, development and our values.” [32] The stress is more on the diplomatic and economic tools to protect U.S. interests worldwide, although Washington is not giving up its right to use military force.

“While China’s rise has brought shifts in its favor in military and economic power, soft power appears to be a persistent and growing source of strength for the United States,” [33] argue observers at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Washington faces a dilemma: to accept compromises relating to China as the “other superpower” or to start containing Beijing.

Prominent U.S. military expert Richard Betts writes: “The most dangerous long-term risk posed by Washington's confusion over deterrence lies in the avoidance of choosing one approach to strategy when it comes to China. Washington needs to determine whether to treat Beijing as a threat to be contained or a power to be accommodated.” [34] Betts argues that in the first scenario the United States would have to “make a clear commitment to contain China, meaning that Washington would block Beijing from expanding its territory through either military action or political coercion. This sounds somewhat precipitate, because China sees containment as an aggressive threat.” In the second scenario, the United States “would recognize that as China becomes a superpower, it will naturally feel entitled to the prerogatives of a superpower – most obviously, disproportionate influence in its home region. And Washington would have to accept that disputes over minor issues will be settled on China's terms rather than on those of its weaker neighbors.” [35]

The Obama Doctrine attempts to combine both approaches.

Pacific: U.S. lake or Chinese Sea?

As Donilon admits, the White House had to conduct a strategic reassessment, and this unveiled an imbalance in the projection and focus of U.S. power: “It was the President’s judgment that we were over-weighted in some areas and regions, including our military actions in the Middle East. At the same time, we were underweighted in other regions, such as the Asia-Pacific.” [36]

Hillary Clinton, as U.S. State Secretary, in a keynote paper declared the advent of America’s Pacific Century. Clinton wrote: “Harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama. Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress.” [37]

But now Tom Donilon has declared: “… the United States’ security and prosperity in the 21st century still depend on the presence and engagement of the United States in Asia. We are a resident Pacific power, resilient and indispensable.” He says: “… in President Obama’s second term, this vital, dynamic region will continue to be a strategic priority.” [38]

This strategy rests on several pillars. One is strengthening alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. The U.S. also intends to deepen “partnerships with emerging powers”: India and Indonesia. A particular emphasis is made on the new “economic architecture” of the Asia Pacific.

Photo: AP / freebeacon.com
National Security Advisor to President Obama,
Tom Donilon, said: “… the United States’
security and prosperity in the 21st century still
depend on the presence and engagement of
the United States in Asia. We are a resident
Pacific power, resilient and indispensable”

“The centerpiece of our economic rebalancing is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), states Tom Donilon. “We always envisioned the TPP as a growing platform for regional economic integration… the TPP is intended to be an open platform for additional countries to join – provided they are willing and able to meet the TPP’s high standards.” [39] The United States intends to use the TPP to advance toward a free trade zone that includes the entire Asia Pacific region. Donilon’s deputy, Michael Froman, insists that the TPP “really embeds us in the fastest-growing region of the world, and gives us a leadership role in shaping the rules of the game for that region.” [40]

This means that the Obama Administration’s strategy is about regional integration under Washington’s aegis. The United States would account for three quarters of the TPP countries’ aggregate GDP, and this will ensure American supremacy in the new economic alliance.

The TPP is undoubtedly an alternative to the approach that Beijing has been pushing for a few years now, involving ASEAN+3, i.e. a regional economic coalition of China, Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN countries, which, after India, Australia and New Zealand join, could expand to ASEAN+6.

Soon after the election, Barack Obama, who had missed the APEC Summit in Vladivostok, attended the ASEAN summit (and related summits) in Phnom Penh. President Putin did not attend. The summit on November 20, 2012 ushered in negotiations to establish a “Comprehensive regional economic partnership.” Significantly, this is not an issue of deep integration, but it is in line with the traditional stance of many Asian countries which are in no hurry to open up their domestic markets.

The dominant role in this economic alliance with a population of 3 billion people and a GDP of USD 17 bn. should belong to China, responsible for half the GDP of the 16-country alliance. India and Japan, which joined the Comprehensive regional economic partnership, can hardly act as a balance to Chinese power. The United States, meanwhile, has been left out of this project.

In fact for Japan, South Korea and ASEAN trade and economic relations with China have become more essential than their trade with the United States. China’s neighbors, according to former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, are trying hard to establish friendly relations with the “Celestial Empire” but are less than eager to be left one-on-one with Beijing. Although they fear China, they are loath to pick a fight: “… they know that there will be consequences if they thwart China when its core interests are at stake. China can impose economic sanctions simply by denying access to its market of 1.3 billion people, whose incomes and purchasing power are increasing [41]. Therefore, Lee Kuan Yew argues, the United States must become a counterweight to China.

This must have been the reason why President Obama pronounced that the TPP was to become one of his administration’s key priorities. Washington cannot afford to see Beijing head any economic alliance in Asia. Two such projects in this huge region will not be able to co-exist.

Having admitted that the Group of Two idea fell through, Zbigniew Brzezinski sadly noted: “I’m sorry that the trans-pacific partnership idea, that we are propagating, doesn’t include China. I think that is a mistake. But I also know there is a Chinese proposal for an Asian cooperative sphere, which does not include us. We are both making mistakes.” [42]

Beijing was very negative about Washington’s plans. The Chinese newspaper People’s Daily wrote: “The U.S. is strengthening its old military alliances, undermining the foundations of peace in East Asia, exacerbating territorial disputes between China and its neighbors, creating a united front against China, forcibly imposing the Trans-Pacific strategic partnerships and disrupting the process of independent regional cooperation and integration.” [43]

We are thus witnessing the emergence of acute geo-economic and geopolitical rivalry in the Asia Pacific between the United States and China, which is spilling over into various other areas and is expected to continue for quite a while, years or even decades. According to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “… the president has sought to shift America’s diplomatic and military attention away from the Middle East toward a rising China.” [44]

However, the Obama Administration denies that its new doctrine is about “China deterrence,” resembling the Cold War’s USSR deterrence. The White House has officially stated that Sino-American relations have “elements of cooperation and competition,” [45] recognizing the growing interdependence of the United States and China.

Regional Directions and Global Scenario

Photo: alex-talaman.livejournal.com

The new U.S. strategy is not limited to the Asia Pacific: it is global. “The TPP is part of a global economic agenda that includes the new agreement we are pursuing with Europe – the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,” notes Tom Donilon. As Professor Ely Ratner believes, “the TPP should stand not just as a model for future trade agreements but more broadly as a model for partial global governance.” [46]

In its second term, the Obama Administration prioritized the creation of the TPP and the Trans-Atlantic Partnership (TAP). Trade between the United States and Europe has reached USD 1 trillion and mutual investment, USD 3.7 trillion [47]. Notably, the EU has already been pursuing a dialogue with East Asia as part the ASEM, and has started negotiating with ASEAN about a free trade zone.

With globalization slowing and developing and emerging countries unable to overcome their disagreements, the Obama Administration is focusing on taking the lead in establishing connected regional economic blocs that would bring together the bulk of developed democracies in North America, Europe and the Asia Pacific. The White House incumbent seems to believe that, with the Doha Round in stalemate, globalization should be advanced through regionalization under the U.S. lead.

Instead of the universal umbrella of the WTO, Washington is promoting a “coalition of the willing” among its partners [48]. President Obama is set on putting the United States at the head of two giant “rings,” two gigantic regional economic coalitions: the TAP and the TPP, which today embrace 20 percent of the world’s population, about 63 percent of global GDP, almost 70 percent of the world’s exports, about 80 percent of capital exports, and virtually 90 percent of the global market capitalization (provided Japan and South Korea join the TPP).

China, by comparison, seems rather modest: 19 percent of the world’s population; 15.8 percent of GDP by PPP; 7.5 percent of capitalization and 10 percent of exports. Even with growth prospects, Beijing will continue to be significantly smaller than the two U.S.-led regional coalitions. This should secure Washington a firm leadership in the polycentric system of international relations.

To achieve its aims, the White House needs Congress to allow it freedom of movement in trade negotiations. Similar authorities helped the executive create NAFTA in the 1990s, despite resistance from protectionists. A non-partisan group of senators recently urged the administration to press on with TPP and TAP negotiations. This seems to suggest that Barack Obama may hope to get bipartisan support for his strategy. Polls suggest that 58 percent of Americans support the TPP idea [49].

The White House hopes to be able to establish the TPP and TAP in a few years’ time, before Barack Obama’s second term in office ends. As the Washington Post writes, “these talks, covering Europe and much of Asia, reflect the global ambitions and include economic sectors of particular importance to the U.S.” [50] It is about the financial sector, services, IT and biotechnologies, which are expected to give a boost to the struggling U.S. economy.

However, lobbyists from various sectors of the U.S. economy may try to overburden the talks’ agenda with excessive demands (protection for agricultural producers; intellectual property, etc.). And the same is true of U.S. partners in Europe and Japan.

As a result, experts from the American Enterprise Institute doubt that the two grandiose projects promoted by the Obama administration can be concluded simultaneously; they mention how Washington has already chalked up integration project failures [51]. One of key challenge, analysts at the Cato Institute argue, is bound to be the unification of economic regulation mechanisms that differ so much in the United States and its partner countries [52].

Military Strategy Dimension

In January 2012, Barack Obama published
a new U.S. military strategy
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities
for 21st Century Defense

“…Our goals are strategic as well as economic. Many have argued that economic strength is the currency of power in the twenty-first century. And across the Atlantic and Pacific, the United States will aim to build a network of economic partnerships as strong as our diplomatic and security alliances – all while strengthening the multilateral trading system. The TPP is also an absolute statement of U.S. strategic commitment to be in the Asia-Pacific for the long haul. And the growth arising from a U.S.-Europe agreement will help underwrite NATO, the most powerful alliance in history,” [53] states Donilon.

In January 2012, Barack Obama published a new U.S. military strategy. The document with its ambitious title, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” [54], effectively moves to abandon the concept of simultaneous warfare in two theaters that the U.S. has had for many years. America has neither the money nor the personnel to support it any longer. The Obama administration withdrew U.S. troops from Iraq and announced plans to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. Washington decided against a large-scale intervention in Libya in 2011, and it is doing the same with regard to Syria.

At the same time, the White House agreed to sequester the government budget and significantly cut back Pentagon expenditure. This heralds cuts in the U.S. army [55].

People in Washington talk openly about making the TAP an “economic NATO,” and refer to the paper published in February early this year by the Atlantic Council [56], headed by Chuck Hagel before his appointment as Defense Secretary. Former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, also actively lobbied this idea of the “economic NATO” [57].

The European Union Institute for Security Studies published a research paper in December 2012 that maintains: “As major centers of global power with a shared stake in an inclusive, rules-based international system, America and Europe have long sought to address the risks and opportunities associated with China’s rise. However, policy coordination between the U.S. and EU is far from satisfactory, in part reflecting their asymmetric roles in Asia and the Pacific. America retains a dominant security position in the region but there is no equivalent involvement by European states. In addition, there is widespread concern in European capitals that American preoccupation with the rise of China and a nascent Sino-American strategic competition have supplanted traditional U.S. policy interests in Europe.” [58]

The TAP was welcomed enthusiastically by President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso and the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and UK Prime Minister David Cameron have supported Barack Obama’s initiative.

Former NATO Secretary General Xavier Solana notes that, by 2030, there will be no European country among the world’s leading economies. He argues that the TAP may be the vital means for Europe to retain its sway in international affairs. However, for that, continues Solana, it needs to complete its own integration [59]. However, Chatham House Director Robin Niblett doubts that the EU could succeed in setting a supranational government in which decision-making will be by majority votes and not by consensus [60].

In one of its reports, the U.S. Atlantic Council proposes to establish a multilateral system of American unions, which would need Europe to be linked to key U.S. partners in the Pacific, thus ensuring the much needed security capabilities in a region where the balance of power is shifting. According to the paper, “A Pacific Peace Partnership would bind NATO to important U.S. allies with shared values and common interests, including Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, and Singapore.” [61] The European Council on Foreign Relations has suggested that, “since the United States announced that they were shifting the focus on the Asia-Pacific region, the Europeans are speculating what are the consequences of this policy for them.” [62] Before she resigned, Hillary Clinton stressed that this shift in the “focus” toward Asia would not mean that the United States was turning away from Europe; rather it meant a joint U.S.-European approach to the Asia Pacific.

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta urged NATO allies in January to lend their support to the refocusing of U.S. priorities in the Asia Pacific region. So far, Europe has failed to show much enthusiasm. The EU is not too keen on getting involved in risky U.S.-led military ventures. The European Council on Foreign Relations thinks that Europe is still undecided about a common policy on the U.S. “focus” on Asia [63].

Importantly, the U.S. Congress has been trying to put pressure on the allies threatening to withdraw U.S. troops from Europe. During the hearings in the House Armed Services Committee on March 20, 2013 its chairman Buck McKeon said: “…Maybe we can pull all those troops home and it would be a big money savings.” According to a recent report by the RAND Corporation, the Pentagon could save up to USD 500 bn over 10 years [64].

According to the European Union Institute for Security Studies, “Japan and South Korea, the main U.S. allies in the area, would also prefer not to have to choose between Washington and Beijing. While their security depends on the U.S., Tokyo’s and Seoul’s socio-economic development increasingly depends on the Chinese market (much like Europe in both regards).” [65]

Some U.S. economists believe that, in the near future, the immediate benefit from the TPP or TAP for the U.S. will not be that high [66].

“Meanwhile, most of the Asian countries benefiting from our security umbrella pursue industry targeting and strategic trade policies that have contributed to the chronic U.S. trade deficit and the off shoring of millions of U.S. jobs even as our Navy dutifully patrols the trade lanes. Geopolitically, the question should not be what we can do for prospering Asian countries made anxious by the growth of China. Rather, it should be what they can do to help relieve us of the economic burden of our continuing military commitment,” [67] says Clyde Prestowitz from the Economic Strategy Institute in a frank statement.

Some U.S. political scientists debate the need to set up a new defense bloc in the Asia Pacific region along similar lines to NATO. Attempts have been made before (SEATO, ANZUS), but with little success. Until now Washington has had to rely on bilateral military links with its key partners in the region, and although SEATO was disbanded, the little-known Collective Security Treaty remains, involving the United States, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. There are, in addition, certain informal commitments that the United States has taken to protect Taiwan.

There is a possibility that, should the TPP project be implemented, the United States will try to set up a multilateral security system in the region, although the prospects for this have so far been rather unlikely. However, it may give a renewed impulse to bilateral military alliances under the TPP umbrella, particularly in light of Beijing’s territorial claims. Nor can one rule out new attempts to create a trilateral defense alliance between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul under the pretext of missile defense against North Korea.

Light Footprints

The new Obama Doctrine contains an explicit reference to the Pentagon’s new priorities: “…as we end today’s wars, we will focus on a broader range of challenges and opportunities, including the security and prosperity of the Asia Pacific… U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia.” That is why the United States intends to “rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region.” The document goes on to note “China’s emergence as a regional power” and “the growth of China’s military power.” [68]

The likelihood of direct confrontation between Washington and Beijing is widely discussed by the U.S. expert community. “History teaches us that rising powers inevitably compete with status quo leading powers, and that this conflict often leads to war,” writes former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. “But getting to 2030 without a major confrontation will be a major achievement. While the U.S. is likely to maintain the upper hand in terms of military power for at least another 15-20 years, asymmetric warfare could undercut America’s advantage should China engage in cyber-attacks on U.S. electronic and satellite systems, along with attacks on infrastructure.” [69]

Presidential National Security Adviser Tom Donilon has voiced his concern about the implications of the Chinese armed forces’ modernization efforts. The United States is particularly worried about Beijing’s expansion in outer space and cyberspace. Donilon demanded that China discontinue its “unprecedented cyberspace attacks.” Jack Lew, a new U.S. Treasury Secretary, announced that this issue “has become a challenge to our economic relations.” [70]

Some observers call the emerging cyberspace developments between the United States and China “a cool war” [71] or even a “Third World War.” [72]

A bill adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives in March 2013 bans the purchase of any information systems produced entirely or partly in China until the FBI has cleared it over the possible threat of cyber-spying or sabotage [73].

The cyber-threat in the United States has been addressed by an “active cyber-defense” concept, “a range of proactive actions that engage the adversary before and during a cyber-incident – also called ‘retaliatory hacking’.” [74]

theaviationist.com
A Chinese DF-21D MaRVed missile that can hit
a U.S. aircraft carrier at 1,500 km costs 1,000
times less than the aircraft carrier

As the American Enterprise Institute believes, “The U.S. government needs to go on the offensive and enact a set of diplomatic, security, and legal measures designed to impose serious costs on China for its flagrant violations of the law and to deter a conflict in the cyber-sphere.” To make this deterrence real, it was proposed to set up a cyber-defense center in Taiwan as “its understanding of Chinese language, culture, business networks, and political landscape make it invaluable in the fight against cyber-attacks.” [75]

The annual U.S. intelligence report published on March 12, 2013 points out that China has “limited, albeit growing, capacity for power projection” not only in the Pacific, but also in the Indian Ocean [76]. The United States is becoming increasingly concerned about China’s efforts to create asymmetric means of war to counter the superior U.S. forces. This is true of its anti-satellite weapon, growing Navy, use of cyber-weapons, and deployment of long-range anti-ship missiles. A Chinese DF-21D MaRVed missile that can hit a U.S. aircraft carrier at 1,500 km costs 1,000 times less than the aircraft carrier [77].

The territorial disputes between China and its neighbors over islands in the East China and South China Seas have, in particular, caused Washington lots of anxiety, and it is now showing its allies that Washington will not abandon them to face Beijing alone.

The United States is drawing a red line in military matters that China should not cross: Taiwan, the disputed islands near Japan and in the South China Sea, something that Beijing counts is its “legitimate” zone. China maintains it is still the Middle Kingdom. Beijing has the first line of islands – Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines, and the second one: Guam and the Marshall Islands, Indonesia and even Hawaii. China has been busy developing missiles against U.S. aircraft carriers and seeks to deny the U.S. Navy Fleet the Western Pacific and approaches to Taiwan.

In the scenario of a war over Taiwan, the Rand Corporation believes that “Precluding the Chinese from dominating the air or sea, and limiting the damage from land attack missiles, perhaps by mainland strikes, would be core missions.” [78] However prominent U.S. reporter Jim Hoagland argues: “It is now accepted at the Pentagon that an attack by Beijing on Taiwan could not be successfully turned back by U.S. planes and ships. The dense deployment of missile batteries along the mainland Chinese coast has shifted the immediate balance of power, meaning that the United States will now depend on its ability to inflict massive retaliatory damage to deter China from crossing the Taiwan Strait.” [79]

The Obama Doctrine lists China as among the United States’ potential military adversaries: “States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities.” [80] So, the Pentagon will invest in capabilities that enable it to overcome resistance to access by the U.S. armed forces [81].

US Army Commands

The largest of the six regional armed forces commands is in the Pacific. Its total strength, including civilian personnel, is about 330,000. The U.S. Pacific Command has 180 ships including five carrier battle groups, two hundred aircraft, five army brigades and two amphibious infantry divisions.

Donilon insists that a confrontation between the two powers is not inevitable. However, the Obama Administration has already announced the re-focusing of its defense strategy in the Asia Pacific. The bases in the region will accommodate not 55 but 60 per cent of the U.S. Navy. Additionally, the U.S. Navy will ensure it controls oil transportation routes to China from the Persian Gulf and Africa.

However, Washington is not seeking to be drawn into a direct bipolar confrontation with Beijing. As Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates put it, anyone “… who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia … should 'have his head examined’....” [82] U.S. defense experts have come up with a concept for an aerospace-maritime operation with a focus on the U.S. air force and navy, whereas land troops will play a supportive role. It has been described as a “light footprint.” [83]

At the same time, the Pentagon has been closely following China’s investments in its nuclear forces. China has deployed several short- and medium-range missiles. China is estimated to have between 7 and 75 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Some U.S. observers think “mutually guaranteed destruction” will inevitably emerge in relations between the United States and China [84]. In any case, Washington is not prepared to accept parity with Beijing.

By all accounts, the United States intends to ensure it remains capable of delivering a destructive nuclear missile attack on China. Revealingly, today 8 out of 14 strategic missile submarines are permanently stationed in the Pacific, from where it will be rather difficult to hit Moscow. Before that, the core group in the U.S. maritime strategic forces was based in the Atlantic.

The Asia Pacific is also to have the core U.S. missile defenses. The Pacific already has 16 out of 26 U.S. Navy ships with Aegis defense systems and SM-3 Block 1A interceptor missiles. Japan has four Aegis destroyers. South Korea is planning to build six destroyers [85]. South Korea and Japan have deployed several batteries of US Patriot 3 anti-tactical missiles. There is a THAAD system in Hawaii, and there are plans to deploy more to the Guam Islands. However, all this is too much to counter the North Korean threat. These capabilities are quite sufficient to protect against China’s short- and medium-range missiles in addition to the protection offered against North Korea.

U.S. missile defense strategic interceptors were deployed ten years ago in Alaska and California. On March 15, 2013 Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced an increase in the number of GBI systems stationed in Alaska from 30 to 44, due to the long-range missile tests that North Korea conducted [86]. Another AN/TPY-2 radar will also be placed in Japan to guide American antimissiles. But at the same time, the Obama Administration decided against deploying SM-3 Block 2В strategic interceptors in Europe, and that program was scrapped [87].

According to The New York Times, “such decisions send a signal to China,” [88] whereas Chinese observers believe that “the U.S. has set up three-tier missile defenses in the Asia Pacific region – low, medium and high level.” [89] The build-up of U.S. missile defenses in the Pacific, under the pretext of protection against the North Korean threat, points to U.S. intentions to neutralize China’s missile and nuclear capability. The strategic missile defenses that Americans are building in the Asia Pacific region will be capable of intercepting a retaliatory attack by Chinese ICBMs.

According to The Wall Street Journal, forcing China to behave responsibly in the Asia-Pacific region, the world’s most dynamic region, both economically and strategically, requires the U.S. to support powerful armed forces, alliances and partnerships to deter China from using force or the threat of force to change the regional status quo [90].

Washington still maintains a colossal defense expenditure gap with Beijing. The U.S. accounts for over 40 percent of global defense expenditure, against China’s 8 percent (see Table 1). However, due to Washington’s budget issues, the Pentagon’s expenditure will continue to be slashed, while China, with its GDP growing, will catch up with the United States in its defense expenditure. According to the RAND Corporation, “Over the next 20 years, China's gross domestic product and defense budget could exceed those of the United States, making it a true peer competitor.” [91]

However, the defense budget of TPP countries (i.e. the United States and NATO’s European countries) will then account for about 58 percent of total defense expenditures (see Table 3). Together with the U.S. Pacific allies, the share will approximate 64 percent [92]. Moreover, in terms of their arms expenditure, the two U.S.-led regional coalitions will account for at least 80 percent, and over 90 percent in terms of defense R&D. Neither China, nor even the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) can equal the TAP and TPP in that.

World by Mid-Century

As The Foreign Policy writes, “The No. 1 power is the United States, the standard-bearer of the West. The No. 2 power rapidly catching up is China, an Asian power. If China passes America in the next decade or two, it will be the first time in two centuries that a non-Western power has emerged as No. 1. … The logic of history tells us that such power transitions do not happen peacefully. Indeed, we should expect to see a rising level of tension as America worries more and more about losing its primacy.” [93]

The Obama Doctrine aims to create a new political, economic and defense architecture in international relations, one that would allow Washington to maintain its leadership in world affairs for the foreseeable future. According to David Sanger, President Obama’s strategy is “to convince American allies and adversaries that his strategic shift will bolster American power.” [94]

If implemented, such a strategy will prevent China, even after it overtakes the United States in GDP, to oust it as the world’s leading power.

Even if the ASEAN+3 happens, from the perspective of a number of indicators, it will be on a par with a weaker TPP. But then Tokyo, Seoul and Jakarta will no longer be able to count on the U.S. defense umbrella to protect them against China. The ASEAN will “blow up” too, as some of its members (e.g., Vietnam, the Philippines and Singapore) have already agreed to the TPP.

These two regional Washington-led “rings” will look less impressive if Japan, South Korea or Indonesia ignore the TPP. So far these neighbors of China have been hesitant or even loath to choose between Beijing and Washington. The U.S. economic claims are more painful for them than China’s terms. Nevertheless, following his visit to Washington, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe agreed to enter TPP negotiations.

ruvr.ru
It is also vital for the United States to prevent
any further consolidation of BRICS. The Obama
Administration has successfully promoted
a “special relationship” with two of the five BRICS
nations, the emerging democracies of India and
Brazil, and South Africa also enjoys the support
of the first black U.S. President

However, U.S. long-term strategy may fail if the Obama Administration does not succeed in overcoming its differences with its allies and partners. Nor are negotiations with the EU bureaucracy, infamously inflexible, likely to be easy. Differences between Washington’s economic interests and those of its partners are not insurmountable, but negotiating them would require mutual compromises that neither the United States, nor other TPP and TAP countries, seem prepared to make.

It is also vital for the United States to prevent any further consolidation of BRICS. The Obama Administration has successfully promoted a “special relationship” with two of the five BRICS nations, the emerging democracies of India and Brazil, and South Africa also enjoys the support of the first black U.S.

President.

BRICS will enable its members to address some short-term tactical issues, as they try to push their way up the world hierarchy. However, the BRICS nations are so different that they would hardly be able to integrate economically or create a military-political union. Relations between countries such as China and India are still potentially conflict-prone.

The United States will undoubtedly continue to promote relations with India, recognizing its regional ambitions, in order for it to counterbalance China in Asia, although Delhi will not join either the TPP or the TAP.

As for Brazil, it has no interest in TAFTA or any other Trans-American partnership. Brazil may be trying to pursue regional cooperation within Mercosur while maintaining its bilateral relations with the United States.

While Russia, similar to the United States, borders both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Moscow is not contributing to integration processes either in the West or in the East.

In 2011, the EU accounted for 48.4 percent of Russian exports and 43.4 percent of its imports; China had, respectively, 7.3 and 16.9 percent; the United States, 3.4 and 4.5 percent; and ASEAN, 1.6 and 2.7 percent (see Tables 6 and 9).

In 2011, Russian-U.S. trade increased; although trade statistics seem to differ considerably, probably due to re-export from third countries. According to global statistics (see Tables 5 and 6), U.S. exports to Russia stood at a meager USD 8.3 bn. (0.56 percent of total U.S. exports) and that of the Russian Federation, USD 16 bn. (1.57 percent of U.S. imports). However, progress on trade is difficult to predict. The prospects for any further growth of Russia’s export of oil and gas to the United States look less than encouraging due to the “shale oil revolution.”

The land, air and maritime communications that connect the two major economic regions of the world may provide the Russian Federation with a key role in the global economy. While today less than one percent of trade between Europe and East Asia goes through Russia, this proportion could expand significantly.

This would help restore the economic integrity of Russia’s domestic market, from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok. People and commodities could start moving faster and more cheaply across the country.

But Russia’s transport infrastructure requires a radical upgrade and major capital investment. Russia needs a dedicated state program mobilizing domestic and foreign private investors to make this potential real.

So far, Washington has not invited Moscow to participate in the TPP or TAP. Neither has China suggested that Russia join the Comprehensive regional economic partnership (ASEAN+6), which prompts one to consider Russia’s place in the new configuration of international relations. Russia’s “critical mass” is not that high: 2 percent of the world’s population, and 3 percent of global GDP. With the Eurasian integration, these proportions will grow but will remain significantly smaller than that of the world’s giants.

This geopolitical and geo-economic seclusion in the new system of international relations is replete with risks. We need to identify ways out of this situation. Given its geographic position, the Russian Federation could emerge as a connecting continental link in Pacific and Euro Atlantic integration.

Table 1.Key indicators of the world’s leading economies, 2011
(%, world)

  Population GDP Share of global defense expenditure IMF share
USA 4,5 21,6 40,6 16,8
EU 7,2 25,1 16,8 31,9
China 19,3 10,5 8,2 3,8
Japan 1,8 8,4 3,4 6,2
India 17,8 2,6 2,7 2,3
Brazil 2,8 3,5 2,0 1,7
Russia 2,0 2,7 4,1 2,4

Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator and http://www.trademap.org

Table 2.Key indicators of the world’s leading economies, 2011
(%, world)

  Share in world trade Share in global market capitalization Share in global R&D expenditure Share in global high-tech export
USA 10,4 33,4 29,7 8,73
EU 33,12 16,8 24,1 34,44
China 10,1 7,5 14,1 24,35
Japan 4,7 7,9 11,4 7,32
India 2,1 2,3 2,9 0,60
Brazil 1,3 2,6 2,1 0,49
Russia 2,1 1,7 2,6 0,31

Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator and http://www.trademap.org

Table 3.Key indicators of trade and economic alliances, 2011
(%, world)

  Population GDP Share of global defense expenditure IMF share
NAFTA 6,6 25,7 42,1 20,8
TPP (with NAFTA) 11,2 37,5 48,5 31,0
TPP (without NAFTA) 4,6 11,8 6,4 10,2
TAP (with NAFTA) 13,8 50,8 58,9 48,7
TAP+TPP 18,5 62,7 63,6 58,9
ASEAN+3 30,4 23,4 15,1 15,1
ASEAN+6 48,6 28,0 19,2 19,1

Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator and http://www.trademap.org

Table 4.Key indicators of trade and economic alliances, 2011
(%,world)

  Share in world trade Share in global market capitalization Share in global R&D expenditure Share in global high-tech export
NAFTA 14,84 39,8 33,9 12,42
TPP (with NAFTA) 22,7 52,8 47,8 31,22
TPP (without NAFTA) 10,8 13,0 13,9 18,80
TAP (with NAFTA) 48,0 56,6 58,0 46,86
TAP+TPP 58,8 69,6 71,9 65,66
ASEAN+3 24,5 21,0 31,9 47,08
ASEAN+6 28,1 26,1 36,3 47,95

Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator and http://www.trademap.org

Table 5.Bilateral trade. 2011 export
(USD bn.)

  ASEAN Mercosur CIS EU NAFTA USA China Russia World Total
ASEAN 306,9 10,0 7,2 136,0 122,0 107,4 143,3 5,1 1244,1
Mercosur 14,0 61,2 6,7 69,4 41,9 31,1 63,1 5,6 445,0
CIS 11,6 6,7 96,0 326,8 25,4 20,9 59,5 45,2 722,7
EU 94,5 69,8 213,1 3730,9 439,6 366,0 189,6 151,1 5801,3
NAFTA 82,7 81,4 15,3 328,6 1101,2 606,7 126,8 10,3 2372,1
USA 76,4 68,4 12,8 269,1 478,3 0,0 103,9 8,3 1476,7
China 170,1 50,1 67,2 356,2 374,3 325,0 0,0 38,9 1898,4
Russia 7,9 4,6 26,4 231,1 17,1 16,0 34,7 0,0 478,0
World Total 1165,4 362,7 500,5 6028,8 3168,5 2665,6 1817,6 312,6 17855,7

Source: www.trademap.org

Table 6.Export share for the relevant bloc or country, 2011
(%, exports of the relevant bloc or country)

  ASEAN Mercosur CIS EU NAFTA USA China Russia
ASEAN 24,67 0,80 0,58 10,93 9,81 8,63 11,52 0,41
Mercosur 3,15 13,76 1,50 15,60 9,42 6,99 14,19 1,26
CIS 1,60 0,93 13,28 45,22 3,51 2,89 8,23 6,26
EU 1,60 1,18 3,62 63,29 7,46 6,21 3,22 2,56
NAFTA 3,63 3,57 0,67 14,41 48,30 26,61 5,56 0,45
USA 5,16 4,62 0,87 18,19 32,32   7,02 0,56
China 8,96 2,64 3,54 18,76 19,71 17,12   2,05
Russia 1,64 0,97 5,52 48,36 3,59 3,35 7,26  

Source: www.trademap.org

Table 7.Share of world exports, 2011
(%, world export)

  ASEAN Mercosur CIS EU NAFTA USA China Russia World Total
ASEAN 1,7 0,1 0,0 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,8 0,0 7,0
Mercosur 0,1 0,3 0,0 0,4 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,0 2,5
CIS 0,1 0,0 0,5 1,8 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,3 4,0
EU 0,5 0,4 1,2 20,9 2,5 2,0 1,1 0,8 32,5
NAFTA 0,5 0,5 0,1 1,8 6,2 3,4 0,7 0,1 13,3
USA 0,4 0,4 0,1 1,5 2,7 0,0 0,6 0,0 8,3
China 1,0 0,3 0,4 2,0 2,1 1,8 0,0 0,2 10,6
Russia 0,0 0,0 0,1 1,3 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,0 2,7
World Total 6,5 2,0 2,8 33,8 17,7 14,9 10,2 1,8 100,0

Source: www.trademap.org

Table 8.Bilateral trade. 2011 import
(USD bn.)

  ASEAN Mercosur CIS EU NAFTA USA China Russia  
ASEAN 272,5 17,3 14,2 109,4 102,8 93,6 162,9 12,7 1165,4
Mercosur 11,4 59,6 6,6 66,1 68,3 54,0 53,5 4,1 362,7
CIS 10,0 9,4 125,2 177,2 22,5 19,3 68,1 79,1 500,5
ЕС 141,8 79,1 337,0 3534,4 345,0 288,4 438,5 253,3 6028,8
NAFTA 146,9 95,0 48,6 465,8 1020,9 398,1 518,2 38,0 3064,0
USA 122,4 81,5 42,0 375,5 584,4 0,0 417,3 35,5 2262,6
China 193,0 71,8 65,5 211,2 154,7 123,1 0,0 40,4 1743,4
Russia 7,6 6,3 23,6 123,4 15,4 12,9 48,2 0,0 284,7
  1244,1 445,0 722,7 5895,0 2279,7 1479,7 1898,4 478,0 18137,4

Source: www.trademap.org

Table 9.Import share for the relevant bloc or country, 2011
(%, imports of the relevant bloc or country)

  ASEAN Mercosur CIS EU NAFTA USA China Russia
ASEAN 23,38 1,48 1,22 9,39 8,82 8,03 13,98 1,09
Mercosur 3,13 16,44 1,82 18,21 18,84 14,88 14,76 1,14
CIS 2,01 1,89 25,02 35,40 4,50 3,85 13,60 15,81
EU 2,35 1,31 5,59 58,63 5,72 4,78 7,27 4,20
NAFTA 4,79 3,10 1,59 15,20 33,32 12,99 16,91 1,24
USA 5,41 3,60 1,86 16,60 25,83   18,44 1,57
China 11,07 4,12 3,76 12,11 8,87 7,06   2,32
Russia 2,68 2,21 8,28 43,35 5,41 4,53 16,94  

Source: www.trademap.org

Table 10.Share of world export, 2011
(%, world import)

  ASEAN Mercosur CIS EU NAFTA USA China Russia World Total
ASEAN 1,5 0,1 0,1 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,9 0,1 6,4
Mercosur 0,1 0,3 0,0 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,0 2,0
CIS 0,1 0,1 0,7 1,0 0,1 0,1 0,4 0,4 2,8
EU 0,8 0,4 1,9 19,5 1,9 1,6 2,4 1,4 33,2
NAFTA 0,8 0,5 0,3 2,6 5,6 2,2 2,9 0,2 16,9
USA 0,7 0,4 0,2 2,1 3,2 0,0 2,3 0,2 12,5
China 1,1 0,4 0,4 1,2 0,9 0,7 0,0 0,2 9,6
Russia 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,7 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,0 1,6
World Total 6,9 2,5 4,0 32,5 12,6 8,2 10,5 2,6 100,0

Source: www.trademap.org

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17. ITAR-TASS, 17 March, 2013

18. Vzglyad, 11 March, 2013

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27. The Atlantic. February 20, 2012.

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39. Ibidem.

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51. The American. March 8, 2013.

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63. Ibidem.

64. Stars and Stripes. March 20, 2013.

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66. Simon Lester. The Challenges of Negotiating a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Free Trade Bulletin, February 26, 2013.

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73. H.R. 933-76.

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76. James R. Clapper. Director of National Intelligence. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the United States Intelligence Community. March 12, 2013, p. 22.

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81. Ibidem, p. 5.

82. The Christian Science Monitor. February 26, 2011.

83. Major Fernando Lujan. Light Footprints: The Future of American Military Intervention. Center for a New American Security. March 2013.

84. Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relationship. Center for Strategic and International Studies. March 2013, p.6.

85. Joint Forces Quarterly. 4th Quarter 2012, p. 89.

86. DOD News Briefing on Missile Defense from the Pentagon. March 15, 2013.

87. Ibidem.

88. The New York Times. March 16, 2013.

89. People’s Daily, August 27, 2012

90. The Wall Street Journal. March 5, 2013.

91. What’s the Potential for Conflict with China and How Can It Be Avoided. RAND Corporation. 2012.

92. SIPRI 2012.

93. The Foreign Policy. February 27, 2013.

94. The New York Times, July 13, 2012.

 

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