The Hormuz Paradox: How the Crisis Is Reshaping the Energy Geography of the Middle East

For decades, the Strait of Hormuz was regarded in energy security studies as one of the most vulnerable points in the global energy transportation system. The possibility of its closure was regularly discussed during periods of heightened tensions surrounding Iran, but until 2026 such assessments remained largely hypothetical. Governments, oil and gas companies, and major factored this risk into their military and economic planning and developed reserve capacities, while assuming that a prolonged disruption of shipping through the Strait was relatively unlikely. The 2026 crisis changed this assessment.

The Strait of Hormuz paradox lies in the discrepancy between two consequences of the same crisis. In 2026, Hormuz confirmed its exceptional importance for the Persian Gulf energy sector and global energy trade. At the same time, the use of this dependence as a means of pressure created additional incentives to reduce it. This does not mean that the Strait of Hormuz will lose its status as the region’s primary energy corridor. Existing and future alternative routes will not be able to accommodate all the oil and gas transported through the Strait in the foreseeable future, and for a significant portion of LNG shipments, there is simply no viable physical alternative. Even several years from now, the Strait of Hormuz will likely remain the main route for oil and gas exports from the Persian Gulf. At the same time, Iran’s ability to use dependence on the Strait as a means of pressure may gradually diminish. If Gulf states are able to redirect a significant share of their exports through other routes, and consumers can replace disrupted supplies more quickly from other sources, any new restrictions on shipping through the strait will cause less damage.

The extent of this shift will become clearer from its practical results: how many new routes are actually built, what share of exports they can accommodate during a crisis, and how reliably they operate amid regional tensions. It is also important to understand whether reducing dependence on Hormuz will create new vulnerabilities involving transit states, other maritime chokepoints, and individual segments of transport infrastructure.

For decades, the Strait of Hormuz was regarded in energy security studies as one of the most vulnerable points in the global energy transportation system. The possibility of its closure was regularly discussed during periods of heightened tensions surrounding Iran, but until 2026 such assessments remained largely hypothetical. Governments, oil and gas companies, and major factored this risk into their military and economic planning and developed reserve capacities, while assuming that a prolonged disruption of shipping through the Strait was relatively unlikely.

The 2026 crisis changed this assessment. In 2025, approximately 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the Strait of Hormuz each day, with around 80% of this flow destined for Asian markets. More than 110 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas (LNG) were also transported through the strait, including the overwhelming majority of Qatar’s LNG exports. Following the military confrontation between the U.S. and Israel and Iran on February 28, 2026, normal shipping operations were disrupted. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates, the average flow of oil and petroleum products through Hormuz between March and May fell to approximately 2.7 million barrels per day. The subsequent partial resumption of shipping did not restore the market’s previous confidence in the consistent availability of this transport route.

The duration of the crisis is particularly important. The consequences of a short-term disruption to shipping can be mitigated through commercial and strategic reserves, adjustments to tanker schedules, and greater utilization of alternative routes. If disruptions continue for months, however, these measures become insufficient. Governments are compelled to consider expanding reserve infrastructure and developing new routes for oil and gas exports. Investment calculations begin to factor in the possibility of a similar crisis recurring, and the cost of reserve capacity is increasingly weighed against the potential losses resulting from an interruption of exports.

This is the paradox of the Strait of Hormuz. By using the region’s dependence on this route for exports as a means of exerting pressure, Iran demonstrates the leverage afforded by its geographic position while simultaneously raising the cost for other states of maintaining such dependence. The experience of a prolonged disruption to shipping increases their interest in bypass pipelines, new export terminals, additional reserves, and other means of sustaining supplies during a crisis. Restructuring the transport system will take time. Existing bypass oil pipelines can handle only a portion of the flows that previously passed through Hormuz (see Figure 1). Qatar’s LNG currently has no fully viable alternative route. The construction of new pipelines will take several years and require substantial investment and interstate agreements. However, as viable alternatives emerge, the portion of Iranian influence derived from regional exporters’ lack of other routes to global markets may diminish.

Figure 1. Existing and Prospective Oil and Gas Export Routes Bypassing the Strait of Hormuz

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Gulf Research Center.

Such a process does not mean that the importance of Hormuz will decline rapidly. The strait will retain its central place in the Persian Gulf energy system, while existing and prospective alternatives will continue to lag behind it in terms of total throughput capacity for a long time. What will change is the balance between dependence on the main route and the ability to redirect some flows in the event of another crisis. The more oil and gas that states can export to global markets through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Oman, the Eastern Mediterranean, and other routes, the less damage a disruption to shipping at a single geographic chokepoint will cause.

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How Should Changes in Energy Geography Be Analyzed?

Analyzing the consequences of the crisis requires more than comparing the capacity of existing and prospective routes. Disruptions to shipping through Hormuz simultaneously affect state military capabilities, transportation costs, investment decisions, relations between producers and transit countries, the international legal regime governing the Strait of Hormuz, insurance, and future risk assessments.

To address this issue, the following article uses multilayered realism, a method developed by the author. It proceeds from the premise that an international crisis unfolds simultaneously across several interconnected spheres, the significance of which varies depending on the specific situation.[1] In the case of the Strait of Hormuz, the analysis covers six aspects: military, infrastructural, economic, institutional, regional, and informational (relating to risk perception).

The military aspect allows for an assessment of the potential impact on shipping and infrastructure; infrastructure—existing methods for rerouting traffic; economic—the cost of disruptions and the cost of reserve capacity; institutional—shipping regulations, insurance, and intergovernmental agreements; regional—changes in relations between producers and transit countries; and informational—changes in the perceptions of policymakers, companies, and consumers regarding the likelihood of a recurrence of the crisis.

It is particularly important to track differences in the pace of change across these dimensions. Market flows and transportation schedules can change within a matter of days or weeks; utilizing the spare capacity of existing pipelines requires relatively little time; concluding interstate agreements takes months; and constructing new trunk pipelines takes years. For this reason, the initial effects of the crisis are felt in the market and in the use of existing infrastructure, while changes in the region’s energy geography itself occur much more slowly.

The Risk Was Known in Advance: What Changed Was Its Cost

The Gulf states began developing infrastructure to export oil bypassing the Strait of Hormuz long before the 2026 crisis. The reason was the vulnerability of Persian Gulf maritime routes amid regional conflicts. By the outbreak of the war, Saudi Arabia and the UAE already had operational oil pipelines that allowed part of their exports to be routed to coastlines beyond the Strait.

Under normal conditions, large reserve capacities are difficult to justify from an economic standpoint. Maritime transportation through the Persian Gulf provides an established route to the main export markets, whereas a bypass oil pipeline requires substantial expenditures on construction, maintenance, pumping stations, terminals, and security. Under normal shipping conditions, part of its capacity may remain unused for years. Such infrastructure effectively serves as costly insurance against a major disruption of exports.

The 2026 war changed this calculation. According to estimates, during the first month of restrictions on shipping through Hormuz, Gulf exporters lost an average of approximately $2 billion per day. Therefore, the cost of a reserve oil pipeline must now be weighed against the potential losses from a prolonged shutdown of the main export route. Spare capacity acquires economic value if it allows a significant share of supplies to be maintained during a crisis. Consequently, the need to create and maintain reserve capacity is being reassessed. Its value is increasingly determined not by normal utilization in peacetime, but by its ability to minimize losses during a major disruption of transport links. This shift in risk assessment is likely to influence investment decisions even after normal shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has resumed.

Why Was Saudi Arabia Better Prepared?

The Saudi case demonstrates the practical importance of reserve export infrastructure during a prolonged disruption to shipping. Following the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Riyadh increased its use of the East–West Pipeline and the Yanbu terminal. According to estimates by the Gulf Research Center, during the first weeks of the crisis, up to 77% of Saudi crude oil exports were routed through the Red Sea. The pipeline made it possible to redirect a significant share of supplies from the Eastern Province to the Red Sea, bypassing the area of hostilities. From Yanbu, the oil moves through a different system of maritime routes. Shipments can be routed through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, use Egypt’s SUMED system to reach the Mediterranean, or proceed south through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait into the Indian Ocean. Bypassing Hormuz thus shifts part of the transportation risks to the Red Sea and other trade routes.

By July 2026, this constraint had become more significant: the IEA noted growing threats in the Bab el-Mandeb area. Saudi Arabia nevertheless retained an important advantage—the ability to choose among several shipping routes and redirect flows depending on the situation. Infrastructure developed in advance allowed Saudi Arabia to significantly reduce the dependence of its exports on a single maritime route.

UAE: Access to Fujairah

Long before the 2026 crisis, Fujairah’s development was part of the UAE’s long-term strategy to expand port and transportation infrastructure along the country’s eastern coast. Particularly important is the Habshan–Fujairah oil pipeline, which allows part of Abu Dhabi’s oil production to be transported to terminals on the Gulf of Oman coast, beyond the Strait of Hormuz. During the crisis, this infrastructure made it possible to maintain part of the UAE’s exports without tankers having to pass through the Strait. Fujairah thus became one of the main alternative routes for UAE oil exports. Its example demonstrates the practical value of having pre-developed maritime access beyond the Strait, although the capacity of this route allows only a portion of the country’s total export flows to be redirected.

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Alternatives to Hormuz and Their Limitations

The experience of Saudi Arabia and the UAE confirmed the practical value of pre-developed alternative routes. At the same time, it demonstrated the limits of this approach: the sustainability of exports depends on the capacity of reserve infrastructure, the security of the entire transportation chain, and the ability to use an alternative route during a regional crisis. For other Gulf states, the challenge is more complex, as they either lack comparable infrastructure or must accept new transportation and political dependencies in order to reduce their reliance on Hormuz.

A new export route requires either the construction of costly infrastructure or transit through neighboring countries. In this case, the technical challenge becomes directly linked to a political one. The operation of an export route begins to depend on relations with the transit state, its domestic situation, the security of pipelines and terminals, as well as the willingness of the parties to maintain traffic during a regional conflict. Under such conditions, reducing dependence on Hormuz may be accompanied by the emergence of dependence on another route, state, or segment of the transportation system.

For this reason, true resilience should be assessed not only in terms of the capacity of an alternative route. Its geography, the political reliability of transit, the security of infrastructure, and the ability to redirect flows if one route is disrupted are also important. Qatar, Iraq, and Oman illustrate three different approaches to adapting to this challenge: through the global market and consumers, the development of multiple cross-border routes, and through a combination of their own geographic position and participation in the regulation of shipping.

Qatar: Restrictions on Alternative Routes

Qatar is more dependent than other Gulf states on freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz for its gas exports. In 2025, more than 112 billion cubic meters of LNG passed through the Strait—around one-fifth of global LNG trade. Qatari supplies accounted for the bulk of this volume: approximately 93% of the country’s LNG exports passed through Hormuz. The Dolphin pipeline, which carries Qatari gas to the UAE and Oman, does not resolve this problem. In 2025, approximately 20.5 billion cubic meters of gas were transported through the pipeline, and its available capacity remains limited. Further gas exports through the UAE or Omani coast would require additional liquefaction capacity, while Oman’s facilities were already operating close to full capacity even before the crisis.

Developing an alternative route for natural gas is considerably more complex than for oil. Oil can be transported to another terminal and loaded onto a tanker. LNG exports require an integrated system for gas transportation, processing and liquefaction, storage, and maritime loading. For Qatar, a land-based alternative to Hormuz would effectively require the creation of an entirely new export complex.

Gas pipeline projects through Saudi Arabia and onward to coastlines beyond the Persian Gulf are under discussion. The Gulf Research Center examines, in particular, options for transporting Qatari gas to new liquefaction facilities in Fujairah or Oman. Such projects require substantial investment, several years of construction, and interstate agreements. The more national borders such a route crosses, the more its operation depends on relations with transit states.

The crisis revealed another dimension of Qatar’s vulnerability. On March 2, 2026, Ras Laffan—the world’s largest gas liquefaction complex—was damaged. The disruption to shipping thus coincided with a reduction in production capacity. According to a July IEA estimate, the cumulative loss of global LNG supply in 2026–2030 resulting from the current disruptions and damage to the region’s gas infrastructure could amount to approximately 140 billion cubic meters.

Since Qatar was unable to quickly establish an alternative route for LNG exports, the consequences of reduced Qatari supplies had to be offset outside Qatar’s export system. From March through June, LNG loadings in Qatar and the UAE fell by approximately 35 billion cubic meters compared with the same period in 2025. Over the same period, LNG production outside the Gulf increased by almost 27 billion cubic meters, offsetting roughly three-quarters of the shortfall. A significant share of this increase came from new capacity that had already been commissioned or was being prepared for launch independently of the Hormuz crisis. This substitution was accompanied by higher prices, the redirection of some LNG shipments to higher-priced markets, and reduced gas consumption in several Asian and European markets as high prices prompted some consumers to switch to alternative fuels.

The Qatari case highlights the difference between the capabilities of an exporter and those of consumers. The geography and structure of the gas industry significantly constrain Qatar’s ability to quickly establish an alternative export route. Consumers, by contrast, can diversify their supplier base, increase inventories, and reduce consumption more rapidly. As a result, Qatar’s dependence on Hormuz persists, while the global market can partially mitigate the impact of disruptions by drawing on supplies from other regions.

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Iraq: Multiple Routes and Dependence on Neighboring States

Iraq has greater potential to expand its export routes than Qatar. Iraqi oil can be transported to the Mediterranean and Red Seas, and access to the Arabian Sea could also be considered in the future. For decades, however, the bulk of the country’s exports has been concentrated in the south, around the Basra oil fields and terminals, from where tankers proceed through the Strait of Hormuz.

The crisis revealed the cost of such dependence. By the end of April 2026, Iraqi oil exports had fallen from the pre-war level of 4.3 million barrels per day to approximately 1.4 million barrels per day. For a country where oil revenues account for around 90% of the state budget, disruptions to transportation routes quickly create problems for public finances.

The first available alternative was the route through Turkey. The pipeline to Ceyhan allows Iraqi oil to be transported directly to the Mediterranean Sea. Its history illustrates how dependent this route is on political conditions. In 2023, exports were suspended following an arbitration dispute between Iraq and Turkey and resumed only in September 2025. The pipeline’s operation has also been affected by disagreements between Baghdad and Erbil over exports and revenue sharing.

The crisis accelerated the development of new routes. In 2026, Iraq moved forward with the Basra–Haditha oil pipeline project, designed to carry up to 2.5 million barrels per day. From Haditha, the oil is expected to be transported onward through several corridors—to Ceyhan in Turkey, Baniyas in Syria, and Aqaba in Jordan. In July, the government approved the preparation of technical and financial feasibility studies for the routes through Turkey and Syria. The Syrian route could provide Iraq with an additional outlet to the Mediterranean and increase Syria’s importance as a transit country. The viability of such a route would depend on security conditions along its path, the state of the infrastructure, and relations between Baghdad and Damascus. In this case, reducing dependence on Hormuz would be accompanied by greater reliance on another state along the export route. In July 2026, Iraq and Syria had already signed a memorandum on restoring the Haditha–Baniyas oil pipeline.

A similar dependence on political and transportation conditions arises with the Basra–Aqaba project. The crisis brought it back onto the agenda of Iraqi-Jordanian negotiations. The proposed oil pipeline is intended to carry Iraqi oil to the Red Sea, but its construction would require substantial investment, while onward transportation would depend on the security of Red Sea shipping routes.

The option of exporting Iraqi oil through Oman to the Arabian Sea remains the least likely to be implemented, although it is also being considered as a possible way to reduce dependence on Hormuz. The Iraqi case demonstrates that export resilience is determined by the number of routes that are actually operational, their throughput capacity, and the ability to redistribute flows among them during a crisis. Routes through Turkey, Syria, and Jordan expand Baghdad’s options, but each creates dependence on a transit state and on political relations with it. The more such routes operate simultaneously, the less damage is caused by the disruption of any one of them and the greater Iraq’s ability to choose where to route its oil exports. Expanding the number of export routes therefore requires Baghdad both to develop infrastructure and to maintain stable relations with several neighboring states.

Oman: Access Beyond Hormuz and a Role in Managing the Strait

Oman is less dependent on Hormuz than other Gulf exporters. Its main oil terminals are located outside the Strait, which allowed the country to maintain access to foreign markets during the crisis and suffer significantly fewer losses than Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain.

Dukm—a port and industrial zone on the coast of the Arabian Sea—is of particular importance, as its development began long before the crisis. For neighboring exporters, Dukm could potentially serve as the endpoint of routes allowing oil and gas to be exported beyond the Persian Gulf. However, there is currently no existing infrastructure connecting their production areas to the Omani coast. Creating such corridors would require substantial investment, pipeline construction, and interstate agreements, while their reliability would depend on relations among the countries through whose territories they would pass.

The 2026 crisis increased the importance of another Omani function—its role in shaping the rules governing navigation through Hormuz. On April 4, Muscat and Tehran, as the two coastal states bordering the Strait, began consultations on possible ways to ensure the movement of vessels during the crisis. On June 23, the two sides agreed to establish a joint working group to discuss the future organization of navigation, related services, and costs. Their joint statement also reaffirmed the need to keep the Strait open to international shipping. The following day, Oman announced coordination with the International Maritime Organization on establishing a temporary corridor for vessels and advocated freedom of navigation without transit fees. In July, negotiations continued at the political and technical levels, while Oman’s foreign minister linked Muscat’s participation in seeking a long-term solution to the country’s particular responsibility as one of the two states whose territorial waters lie within the Strait.

The Omani case illustrates another way of mitigating the consequences of the Hormuz crisis. The country has its own export infrastructure outside the Strait while simultaneously participating in efforts to establish more predictable conditions for navigation through Hormuz. For states that will be unable to develop a fully viable alternative route in the foreseeable future, a stable navigation regime through the Strait itself becomes an integral part of energy security.

The cases examined above show that the ability of regional states to reduce their dependence on the Strait of Hormuz varies considerably. Nevertheless, the general direction of change is already apparent: some export flows have gained, or may eventually gain, additional routes to external markets. While the Strait will retain its central role, the growing number of operational routes will gradually reduce exporter dependence on a single transportation chokepoint. For Iran, this means a change in the conditions under which Hormuz can be used as a means of pressure.

Iran: How to Preserve Hormuz’s Importance

For Iran, the development of alternative routes and the growing ability of the global market to replace disrupted supplies mean a gradual change in the conditions under which control over the Strait can be used as a means of pressure. At the same time, a prolonged crisis imposes growing costs on Tehran itself.

Initially, restrictions on shipping allowed Iran to extend the consequences of the war far beyond the immediate confrontation. They affected the oil and gas revenues of Gulf states, energy supplies to Asian economies, maritime transportation and insurance costs, as well as energy prices. The ability to affect the interests of states not directly involved in the hostilities through a single transportation chokepoint became an important element of Iran’s approach to deterring its adversaries.

By the end of April 2026, the limitations of this strategy had become apparent. The U.S. was unable to compel Iran by military means to accept its demands, but the blockade of the Strait likewise failed to secure Tehran’s own objectives. The ability to inflict substantial economic damage on an adversary and third countries does not, in itself, ensure the achievement of political goals.

Iran also depends on maritime trade and oil exports through the Persian Gulf. Additional pressure came from the U.S. naval blockade targeting Iranian oil exports and commercial shipping. As a result, prolonged disruption to maritime traffic created an increasingly complex balance of benefits and costs for Tehran: it retained the ability to affect international shipping, but at the same time faced growing constraints on its own exports and access to maritime trade routes.

This increases Iran’s interest in a form of control over the Strait that would allow it to retain political leverage over shipping without bringing the entire flow to a prolonged halt—hence the attention to transit rules, prior authorization, fees, and restrictions on specific categories of vessels. In the summer of 2026, Iran established a body to manage traffic through the Strait, while also discussing prior authorization requirements, transit fees, and restrictions on vessels belonging to states deemed hostile by Tehran.

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Hormuz as a Source of Uncertainty

In addition, the is another potential source of leverage: economic costs arise as soon as new restrictions are anticipated, even before they are actually imposed. Shipowners, insurers, and energy companies must factor in the possibility of attacks, changes in insurance terms, new transit requirements, and the risk of renewed disruptions to shipping. Such uncertainty raises transportation costs, prompts companies to build additional inventories, and forces them to account for potential disruptions when concluding contracts and planning deliveries. In this sense, the political significance of Hormuz lies in Iran’s ability to influence the conditions under which the Strait is used even during periods when shipping continues.

However, Iran’s ability to institutionalize such an arrangement is limited. The use of military means to influence shipping does not in itself create an internationally recognized right to determine the rules of passage unilaterally. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides for unimpeded transit passage through international straits, limits the ability of coastal states to obstruct such passage, and supports their cooperation in regulating navigational safety. In practice, Tehran must consider the positions of Oman, other Gulf states, major energy importers, and international maritime organizations.

The debate over possible transit fees is particularly revealing. A permanently imposed toll would increase costs for importers and exporters and would have an especially significant impact on the largest Asian economies. This also highlights the China-related constraint on Iran’s strategy. China remains the largest market for Iranian oil and an important economic partner for Tehran, but its interests in the Gulf extend far beyond bilateral relations with Iran and include stable supplies from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and other states. Beijing requires secure access to energy resources from across the region. A prolonged disruption to shipping or a permanent increase in the cost of passage through Hormuz would therefore affect China’s own economic interests. The more Iranian pressure affects the region’s overall energy flows, the more difficult it becomes for Tehran to count on support from states interested in maintaining close relations with it.

As a result, Iran’s strategy is gradually shifting from the ability to block traffic toward an attempt to influence the conditions of access to the Strait. Such an approach allows Tehran to retain a degree of leverage at a lower cost, although its effectiveness depends on the positions of other coastal states, major energy buyers, and international shipping stakeholders. Over the longer term, the significance of this approach will also depend on the pace at which alternative routes and sources of supply are developed, enabling exporters and consumers to reduce the damage caused by another disruption to traffic through the Strait.

When Using an Advantage Changes Its Value

The 2026 crisis demonstrated the leverage that Iran derives from its geographic position. Disruption at a single transportation chokepoint produced consequences for energy markets far beyond the region. At the same time, the scale of these consequences increased the incentive for states and companies to develop reserve routes and additional sources of supply. This process can be described as an adaptive erosion of chokepoint leverage. It refers to the gradual decline in the political value of control over a critical transportation chokepoint as actors dependent on it develop viable means of maintaining exports, imports, and supplies when its operation is disrupted.

Here, it is vital to distinguish between the physical importance of Hormuz and the political value of dependence on it. The Strait will remain a key route for oil and gas exports from the Persian Gulf, even if some flows gain access to alternative routes. For Iran’s political leverage, what matters is how severe the consequences of a new disruption to shipping would be and how quickly exporters and consumers could mitigate them. If a growing share of supplies can be redirected, substituted, or otherwise compensated for, Iran’s ability to use the Strait as a means of pressure will diminish, even though Hormuz itself will retain its central place in the region’s energy system.

Reducing dependence on the strait does not necessarily make the export system less vulnerable, as some risks are transferred to other routes, transportation chokepoints, and transit states. This process takes different forms for each country. Saudi Arabia, for example, can redirect part of its exports to the Red Sea, but this increases its dependence on the security of shipping in the Red Sea and through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Iraq, by developing routes that bypass Hormuz, becomes more dependent on political stability and relations with the states through whose territories these routes pass. Qatar cannot rapidly establish a new route for LNG exports, meaning that reduced Qatari supplies must be offset by other producers, the redirection of LNG cargoes, and changes in global demand. Oman is located outside the Strait of Hormuz while simultaneously seeking to make navigation through it more predictable through agreements governing vessel passage. Thus, the concentration of vulnerability in a single chokepoint declines, but vulnerability itself may become distributed across a larger number of routes, states, and institutions.

Iran is also changing the way it uses the Strait of Hormuz. As alternative routes develop, a prolonged disruption of shipping may become a less effective means of pressure. Under these conditions, Tehran may increasingly resort to selective restrictions, attempts to influence the terms of vessel passage, and the maintenance of uncertainty surrounding the navigation regime, using Hormuz as an instrument of political bargaining and to manage the level of regional tensions. The result is a “competition” between models of adaptation: states and companies seek ways to reduce the damage from possible restrictions in the Strait, while Iran seeks to preserve its ability to derive political advantages from its control over this critical transportation chokepoint.

The experience of the crisis is also changing investment calculations. The actual losses caused by a prolonged disruption to shipping make it possible to reassess the value of reserve pipelines, terminals, and other infrastructure. However, there is a time lag between changes in these calculations and changes in energy geography itself: investment decisions may be taken today, while new major routes will only become operational several years from now.

The Hormuz Paradox

The Strait of Hormuz paradox lies in the discrepancy between two consequences of the same crisis. In 2026, Hormuz confirmed its exceptional importance for the Persian Gulf energy sector and global energy trade. At the same time, the use of this dependence as a means of pressure created additional incentives to reduce it. This does not mean that the Strait of Hormuz will lose its status as the region’s primary energy corridor. Existing and future alternative routes will not be able to accommodate all the oil and gas transported through the Strait in the foreseeable future, and for a significant portion of LNG shipments, there is simply no viable physical alternative. Even several years from now, the Strait of Hormuz will likely remain the main route for oil and gas exports from the Persian Gulf. At the same time, Iran’s ability to use dependence on the Strait as a means of pressure may gradually diminish. If Gulf states are able to redirect a significant share of their exports through other routes, and consumers can replace disrupted supplies more quickly from other sources, any new restrictions on shipping through the strait will cause less damage.

The extent of this shift will become clearer from its practical results: how many new routes are actually built, what share of exports they can accommodate during a crisis, and how reliably they operate amid regional tensions. It is also important to understand whether reducing dependence on Hormuz will create new vulnerabilities involving transit states, other maritime chokepoints, and individual segments of transport infrastructure.

[1] Multilayered realism is a method for studying the Middle East that combines the analysis of the balance of power with the study of economic dependencies, social structures, identities, ideologies, and information narratives. Its starting premise is that these layers have their own internal logic but operate in interaction, jointly shaping actors’ resources, perceptions of threats, alliance choices, and the stability of the political order. The method seeks to identify causal relationships among these layers rather than reduce regional processes to a single predominant factor.