The Expert Dialogue on NATO-Russia Risk Reduction. Seven Recommendations
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In December 2020, this group of senior Russian, American and European experts offered governments a set of recommendations on Russia-NATO risk reduction. The recommendations addressed most of the areas of common ground so far sketched in Russian, US and NATO exchanges during the present crisis. Had those recommendations been acted upon, we might now be on a better path away from crisis.
We renew to all sides seven of our recommendations, updated to meet the present situation. They are simply good sense. They are modest, but they can be implemented tomorrow and would be a start on making Europe safer:
1. Regular meetings should be held between the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, reinforced by military experts, to address issues of current concern.
These meetings would not be to negotiate the present crisis but to ensure military deconfliction and day-to-day risk reduction at this time of heightened tension and military deployments. They would take place entirely separately from the series of prepared thematic meetings of the NATO-Russian Council that the NRC’s Chairman has proposed.
2. In addition, NATO member states and Russia should resume contacts at the level of military representatives in the NATO Military Committee and restore the Russian military liaison mission at SACEUR Headquarters.
These steps would parallel the establishment of civilian hotline communications that Russia has proposed and the re-opening of the Russian mission to NATO and of NATO liaison offices in Moscow proposed by NATO. They would rebuild the communication that for safety and good deterrence must take place in foul weather and not just fair.
3. Russia and NATO member states could agree that both sides will conduct large- scale military exercises, as a rule, at a militarily meaningful distance from their borders, but where geography prevents this then additional measures of notification, transparency and predictability must be taken. They should consider reducing the scale and frequency of military activities with respect to numbers and geography, in particular exercises near borders. Generally, military exercises should be executed responsibly, not provocatively.
Both sides should now be seeking to communicate militarily responsible, unprovocative behaviour. The definitions of meaningful distance, scale and frequency could be the subject of discussion through the military channels proposed above. Military professionals are able quickly to judge and report good faith or the absence of it.
4. Both sides could take initial steps in the form of parallel unilateral measures that do not necessarily require conclusion of a formal agreement between NATO, or NATO member states, and Russia, which could prove politically difficult to achieve in the present environment.
The crisis means that finding joint agreement on measures both large and small between Russia and NATO will generally require protracted, painstaking negotiation. A device for getting round this obstacle, especially for military risk reduction, is for commanders to order parallel, unilateral measures based either on informal mutual understandings or as a small, clearly communicated challenge to see whether the other side will reciprocate.
5. Russia and the United States could confirm that, irrespective of the course of the present crisis, they will systematically develop their dialogue on the future of strategic stability and cyber security as agreed at their Geneva summit in June 2021.
Progress on the fundamental issue of strategic stability is crucial, has its own value, and should not be subordinated to other levels and tracks of negotiations. We wholeheartedly support the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, published on 3 January 2022, including the P5 commitment to the fundamental principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
6. Russia and NATO could immediately agree to launch negotiations on a new zero option for the deployment in Europe of US and Russian intermediate-range land- based missiles and their launchers.
In their recent exchanges Russia, the United States and NATO have all indicated that they want to see progress on ground-based intermediate-range missiles.
7. Russia and NATO member states could immediately agree to launch negotiations on a package of measures on the basis of the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements on prevention of incidents at sea and above the sea, and on prevention of dangerous military activities.
In their recent exchanges Russia, the United States and NATO have all indicated that they would like to see progress in these very practical areas of risk reduction, which are particularly relevant to periods of heightened tension.
Taken together these seven measures would materially contribute not just to a reduction of Russia-NATO tension but a reduction of Russia-NATO risk.
Russia-NATO Dialogue Group February 2022.
In December 2020, this group of senior Russian, American and European experts offered governments a set of recommendations on Russia-NATO risk reduction. The recommendations addressed most of the areas of common ground so far sketched in Russian, US and NATO exchanges during the present crisis. Had those recommendations been acted upon, we might now be on a better path away from crisis.
We renew to all sides seven of our recommendations, updated to meet the present situation. They are simply good sense. They are modest, but they can be implemented tomorrow and would be a start on making Europe safer:
1. Regular meetings should be held between the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, reinforced by military experts, to address issues of current concern.
These meetings would not be to negotiate the present crisis but to ensure military deconfliction and day-to-day risk reduction at this time of heightened tension and military deployments. They would take place entirely separately from the series of prepared thematic meetings of the NATO-Russian Council that the NRC’s Chairman has proposed.
2. In addition, NATO member states and Russia should resume contacts at the level of military representatives in the NATO Military Committee and restore the Russian military liaison mission at SACEUR Headquarters.
These steps would parallel the establishment of civilian hotline communications that Russia has proposed and the re-opening of the Russian mission to NATO and of NATO liaison offices in Moscow proposed by NATO. They would rebuild the communication that for safety and good deterrence must take place in foul weather and not just fair.
3. Russia and NATO member states could agree that both sides will conduct large- scale military exercises, as a rule, at a militarily meaningful distance from their borders, but where geography prevents this then additional measures of notification, transparency and predictability must be taken. They should consider reducing the scale and frequency of military activities with respect to numbers and geography, in particular exercises near borders. Generally, military exercises should be executed responsibly, not provocatively.
Both sides should now be seeking to communicate militarily responsible, unprovocative behaviour. The definitions of meaningful distance, scale and frequency could be the subject of discussion through the military channels proposed above. Military professionals are able quickly to judge and report good faith or the absence of it.
4. Both sides could take initial steps in the form of parallel unilateral measures that do not necessarily require conclusion of a formal agreement between NATO, or NATO member states, and Russia, which could prove politically difficult to achieve in the present environment.
The crisis means that finding joint agreement on measures both large and small between Russia and NATO will generally require protracted, painstaking negotiation. A device for getting round this obstacle, especially for military risk reduction, is for commanders to order parallel, unilateral measures based either on informal mutual understandings or as a small, clearly communicated challenge to see whether the other side will reciprocate.
5. Russia and the United States could confirm that, irrespective of the course of the present crisis, they will systematically develop their dialogue on the future of strategic stability and cyber security as agreed at their Geneva summit in June 2021.
Progress on the fundamental issue of strategic stability is crucial, has its own value, and should not be subordinated to other levels and tracks of negotiations. We wholeheartedly support the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, published on 3 January 2022, including the P5 commitment to the fundamental principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
6. Russia and NATO could immediately agree to launch negotiations on a new zero option for the deployment in Europe of US and Russian intermediate-range land- based missiles and their launchers.
In their recent exchanges Russia, the United States and NATO have all indicated that they want to see progress on ground-based intermediate-range missiles.
7. Russia and NATO member states could immediately agree to launch negotiations on a package of measures on the basis of the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements on prevention of incidents at sea and above the sea, and on prevention of dangerous military activities.
In their recent exchanges Russia, the United States and NATO have all indicated that they would like to see progress in these very practical areas of risk reduction, which are particularly relevant to periods of heightened tension.
Taken together these seven measures would materially contribute not just to a reduction of Russia-NATO tension but a reduction of Russia-NATO risk.
Russia-NATO Dialogue Group February 2022.
List of Signatories to the Expert Dialogue on NATO – Russia Risk Reduction Seven Recommendations
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Russian signatories |
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Name |
Position |
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1. |
Dmitry Danilov |
Head, Department of European security, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS) |
|
2. |
Victor Esin |
Colonel General (ret.), Former Head of the Main Staff of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, Research Professor, Centre for Advanced Studies of Russian National Security, HSE University |
|
3. |
Alexandra Filippenko |
Senior Research Fellow, Department of Internal Policy Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN) |
|
4. |
Valery Garbuzov |
Director, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN) |
|
5. |
Alexey Gromyko |
Director, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences |
|
6. |
Evgenia Issraelian |
Leading Research Fellow, Department of Canadian Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN) |
|
7. |
Igor Ivanov |
Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998-2004), former Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (2004-2007), President of Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) |
|
8. |
Andrey Kortunov |
Director General, Russian International Affairs Council |
|
9. |
Oleg Krivolapov |
Senior Research Fellow, Department for Military- Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN) |
|
10. |
Valentin Kuznetsov |
Vice Admiral (ret.), former Chief Military Representative of the RF at NATO, Senior Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN); |
|
11. |
Vladimir Lukin |
Russian Ambassador to the United States (1992- 1994), director on the board of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Deputy Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of the RF |
|
12. |
Alexander Nikitin |
Director, Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MGIMO), Honorary President of the Russian Association of Political Science |
|
13. |
Mikhail Nosov |
Member of Directorate, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS) |
|
14. |
Sergey Oznobishev |
Head, Department of Military and Political Analysis and Research Projects, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) |
|
15. |
Pavel Palazhchenko |
Head of Press Office, Gorbachev Foundation |
|
16. |
Alexander Panov |
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Honored Member of the Russian Diplomatic Service, Head, Department of Diplomacy MGIMO University |
|
17. |
Sergey Rogov |
Academic Director, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN), Chairman of the International Security Advisory Board of the Scientific Council at the Security Council of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences |
|
18. |
Pavel Sharikov |
Leading Research Fellow, Department of the European Integration, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS) |
|
19. |
Igor Sherbak |
Former First Deputy of the Permanent Representative of the RF at the United Nations, Leading Research Fellow, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS) |
|
20. |
Alexey Stepanov |
Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN) |
|
21. |
Nataliya Stepanova |
Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN) |
|
22. |
Alexander Usoltsev |
Head, International Relations Department, Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR) |
|
23. |
Fedor Voytolovsky |
Director, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences |
|
24. |
Igor Yurgens |
President of the All-Russian Insurance Association, Member of the Board of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs |
|
25. |
Andrey Zagorskiy |
Head, Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Studies, Primakov National Research Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO) |
|
26. |
Pavel Zolotarev |
Major General (ret.), Leading Research Fellow, Department of Military-Political Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN) |
|
Western signatories |
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|
Name |
Position |
|
|
27. |
James Acton |
Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |
|
28. |
Roy Allison |
Professor of Russian and Eurasian International Relations, Director, Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford |
|
29. |
James Bindenagel |
Ambassador (ret.), Henry Kissinger Professor, Center for Advanced Security, Strategy and Integration Studies Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn |
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30. |
Sharan Burrow |
General Secretary, International Trade Union Confederation |
|
31. |
Richard Burt |
Chairman of Global Zero US, US Chief Negotiator in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with the former Soviet Union, former US Ambassador to Germany |
|
32. |
Pierce Corden |
Former division chief, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and research fellow at the Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy, Amer. Assoc. for the Advancement of Science |
|
33. |
Christopher Davis |
Professorial Research Fellow, University of Oxford |
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34. |
Marc Finaud |
Head of Arms Proliferation and Diplomatic Tradecraft, Geneva Centre for Security Policy |
|
35. |
Nancy Gallagher |
Director, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) |
|
36. |
Helmut W. Ganser |
Brigadier General (ret.), Defence Advisor to the German NATO Delegation 2004-2008, Brussels |
|
37. |
Joseph Gerson |
President, Campaign for Peace, Disarmament & Common Security |
|
38. |
Alexander Graef |
Research Fellow, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) |
|
39. |
Thomas Graham |
Managing director, Kissinger Associates, Inc. |
|
40. |
Thomas Greminger |
Director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), former Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) |
|
41. |
Sven Hirdman |
Ambassador to Russia 1994-2004, State Secretary Ministry of Defence of Sweden (1979-1982); |
|
42. |
Jon Huntsman |
Former Ambassador to Russia, former Governor of Utah |
|
43. |
Daryl Kimball |
Executive Director, Arms Control Association |
|
44. |
Lawrence Korb |
US Navy Captain (ret.), former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reagan Administration, Senior Research Fellow, Center for American Progress, and Senior Advisor, Defense Information Center; |
|
45. |
Reinhard Krumm |
Director, FES Office for Peace and Security, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung |
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46. |
Ruediger Luedeking |
Ambassador (ret), former Deputy Commissioner of the German Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control |
|
47. |
Douglas Lute |
Lieutenant General (rt.), US Ambassador to NATO, 2013-2017, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center, Harvard University |
|
48. |
Jack Matlock |
US Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1987-1991) |
|
49. |
Hanna Notte |
Senior Research Associate, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) |
|
50. |
Sam Nunn |
Former U.S. Senator, Co-chair, NTI |
|
51. |
Olga Oliker |
PhD, Adjunct Professor, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies |
|
52. |
Janusz Onyszkiewicz |
Former Minister of National Defense of Poland |
|
53. |
Zachary Paikin |
Researcher, EU Foreign Policy at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) |
|
54. |
William Perry |
Former US Secretary of Defense, Director of the Preventive Defense Project at CISAC, FSI Senior Fellow |
|
55. |
Andreas Persbo |
Research Director, ELN |
|
56. |
Nicolai Petro |
Professor of Political Science, University of Rhode Island |
|
57. |
Thomas Pickering |
Former US Under Secretary of State, former Ambassador to Jordan, Nigeria, El Salvador, Israel, the United Nations, India and Russia |
|
58. |
Steven Pifer |
Former US Ambassador to Ukraine, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and research fellow at Stanford University; |
|
59. |
William Potter |
Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey |
|
60. |
Wolfgang Richter |
Colonel (ret.), Senior Military Advisor of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the OSCE, Vienna (2005–2009); Senior Associate, International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin (SWP) |
|
61. |
Cynthia Roberts, |
Professor of Political Science, Hunter College, City University of New York, Senior Research Scholar, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies Columbia University |
|
62. |
Lynn Rusten |
Vice President for Global Nuclear Policy, Nuclear Threat Initiative |
|
63. |
Kevin Ryan |
Brigadier-General (ret), Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center |
|
64. |
Vladimir Senko |
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus |
|
65. |
Reiner Schwalb |
Brigadier-General (ret), National German Representative at NATO Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk/VA, 2007-2010; German Senior Defense Official and Attache to the Russian Federation, Moscow, 2011–2018 |
|
66. |
Stefano Silvestri |
Senior Scientifi c Advisor at Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), former Under Secretary of State for Defence, former President of IAI (2001-2013); |
|
67. |
Graham Stacey |
Senior Consulting Fellow, ELN, former Chief of Staff of NATO Transformation |
|
68. |
Strobe Talbott |
Distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, Deputy Secretary of State (1994-2001), President of the Brookings Institution (2002-2017) |
|
69. |
Bruno Tertrais |
Deputy Director, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (Foundation for Strategic Research, FRS) |
|
70. |
Greg Thielmann |
Board member of the Arms Control Association, Commissioner of the U.S.-Russian-German “Deep Cuts” Project; |
|
71. |
Adam Thomson |
Director of the European leadership network, Permanent UK representative to NATO (2014-2016) |
|
72. |
José M Treviño Ruiz |
Admiral SP Navy (retired) |
|
73. |
Harlan Ullman |
Senior Advisor, Atlantic Council |
|
74. |
Alexander Vershbow |
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, former NATO Deputy Secretary General; former US Ambassador to South Korea, NATO, Russia; Distinguished Visiting Fellow at University of Pennsylvania's Perry World House; Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council. |
|
75. |
Dov Zakheim |
Vice Chair, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Former Under Secretary of Defense |
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