The U.S. and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East: An Alliance of Competing Powers, Too Risky to Break?
U.S. President Barack Obama concludes
a meeting with Saudi Arabia's King Salman at
the G20 summit at the Regnum Carya Resort
in Antalya, Turkey, November 15, 2015
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PhD in Political Science, Director of the Center for Advanced American Studies at MGIMO University; Non-resident Scholar, Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program, Middle East Institute, RIAC expert
"Daesh has a mother: the invasion of Iraq. But it also has a father: Saudi Arabia and its religious-industrial complex. Until that point is understood, battles may be won, but the war will be lost. Jihadists will be killed, only to be reborn again in future generations and raised on the same books." This is an excerpt from the op-ed in French daily Le quotidien d’Oran by renowned Algerian journalist Kamel Daoud and recently reprinted by the New York Times, which has not just become the most cited piece this past weekend but also stressed a point rarely mentioned in the U.S. public discourse.
"Daesh has a mother: the invasion of Iraq. But it also has a father: Saudi Arabia and its religious-industrial complex. Until that point is understood, battles may be won, but the war will be lost. Jihadists will be killed, only to be reborn again in future generations and raised on the same books." This is an excerpt from the op-ed in French daily Le quotidien d’Oran by renowned Algerian journalist Kamel Daoud and recently reprinted by the New York Times, which has not just become the most cited piece this past weekend but also stressed a point rarely mentioned in the U.S. public discourse.
American politicians and analysts, like ordinary citizens, understand the nature of the Saudi regime and its mismatch with the democratic standards the United States applies to other countries both in the region and beyond. Similarly, they understand the nature of Riyadh's relations with certain groups, which have been included on lists of radical and extremist groups by numerous countries. However, during its 70-year-long partnership with the Saudis, Washington preferred to focus on pragmatic aspects, proceeding from the tenet that there are two sides to every coin. Over many decades this approach suited both parties in that convoluted Middle Eastern system that operates to a brutal but still clear-cut pattern. But the Arab Spring markedly diversified the regional palette of political actors and trends, in the process throwing up many more nuances in relations between the allies Washington and Riyadh.
Well aware of the Washington's foreign policy rules, Riyadh decided to increase its U.S. lobbying USD 3.66 billion.
The U.S. allies largely share the same needs, i.e. security guarantees plus more aggressive political and military support for their regional interests and initiatives. However, the U.S. seems to have lost some of its leverage in the Middle East. The Obama administration has also partially reconsidered the U.S. role in the region, and shown willingness to oblige on security guarantees. From 2010 to now, the United States has sold KSA F-15 fighters worth USD 29.4 billion, AWACS planes worth USD 2 billion, tanker aircraft worth USD 6.7 billion, attack helicopters worth USD 31.1 billion, missiles and bombs worth USD 10.2 billion, armored vehicles worth USD 1.5 billion, patrol boats worth USD 1.2 billion, in addition to other hardware worth USD 8.4 billion. In 2015, this amount is expected to grow 52 percent to reach USD 9.8 billion.
Nevertheless, the Saudis were concerned that the White House was not acting with sufficient agility or on a scale significant enough to meet their expectations. Well aware of the Washington's foreign policy rules, Riyadh decided to increase its U.S. lobbying activity, targeting decision-makers including the government and think tanks, allocating at least USD 3.66 billion in 2014 and more than USD 2 billion to these activities so far this year. That is why the Saudi embassy in Washington has employed four major consultancies including its favorite Qorvis/MSLGroup, in addition to Hogan Lovells, Squire Patton Boggs and Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman. Experts say that the Saudis employ highly advanced lobbying techniques, with social media operations carried out by Targeted Victory and Zignal Labs, leaders in the field.
This strategy has delivered some results, i.e. the U.S. promise of a military shield against Iranian missiles, Congress adopting sanctions against Iranian proxies, and American support for Saudi armed action against the Houthi in Yemen. In this context, the Senate’s recent decision to cut off funding for Hezbollah by putting sanctions on all financial institutions that deliberately do business with them indicates that these promises are being transformed into concrete obligations.
Besides, in mid-November this year, the U.S. State Department approved the sale of over 19,000 smart bombs worth USD 1.29 billion Saudi Arabia to replenish its arsenal, which had been depleted by numerous counterterrorist operations, as the Pentagon noted, in a statement that seems to hint at current and future campaigns against rebels in Yemen and air strikes against ISIS.
However, Riyadh does not feel that Washington is sufficiently committed to their partnership, and suspects that the Obama administration wants to balance its Iranian initiatives, which Saudi views as at best shortsighted and at worst treacherous. And the Saudis have good reason to think so. Despite Riyadh’s rhetorical protests and behind-the-scenes opposition, the White House has reached a deal with Tehran and refrains from overly strenuous efforts to oust Bashar Assad. The U.S. is also insisting on a truce in Yemen and a political settlement, while Riyadh expects support for their military operation against the Houthi in order to achieve their complete suppression and political marginalization, and to diminish Iranian influence in the Peninsula.
The Saudis’ eagerness can hardly be called an attempt to find balance between Russia and the United States, since Riyadh’s steps are too situational and opportunistic.
In public, Washington invariably presents its every move as brotherly concern for its key Gulf ally. In fact, the most recent contract was interpreted as a boost for bilateral relations in military affairs and support for the further expansion of Saudi’s defense capabilities in joint operations with the United States in order to achieve a more effective response to regional threats and better security around the world’s largest oil fields. However, in times when most external fronts and the domestic climate seem less than encouraging for Riyadh and the country is losing regional clout, the Saudis view this U.S. rhetoric as an “imitation of partnership,” rather than the real thing.
The monarchy is of course concerned, and this periodically generates anti-U.S. demarches ranging from tough public statements to the rejection of nonpermanent membership in the UN Security Council on the grounds that the organization fails to properly assist in the resolution of military conflicts. But the Americans are holding their ground, with the State Department laconically responding “the Saudi refusal is their own business.” However, analysts believe that Riyadh gave up its UNSC position over fears of failure in its traditional backstage diplomacy.
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Many in Washington see Riyadh’s demands as excessive and likely to narrow U.S. room for maneuver. That is why U.S. hardliners on Iran and the Middle East pin their hopes on Crown Prince Muhammad ibn Naif who is Minister of Interior. They are wary about the possible rise of Minister of Defense Muhammad ibn Salman, the King’s son, unsure about his ability to govern.
Although complicated by Russia’s campaign in Syria, closer contacts with Moscow in 2015 also fit into their demarche rationale. The Saudis’ eagerness can hardly be called an attempt to find balance between Russia and the United States, since Riyadh’s steps are too situational and opportunistic. And Russia is in no position to replace the U.S. as the key extra-regional partner for Saudi Arabia, or anything close.
Occasional suggestions on the subject in the Russian media do not mean that the Kremlin is entertaining any such illusions, despite clear interest in the dream becoming reality. Despite its numerous problems, Riyadh will have a significant impact on the Syria settlement. One should not expect full-fledged Saudi support in the struggle against ISIS until the monarchy senses a threat to themselves, which is greater than that to their rivals. However, joint drafting of lists of extremist organizations to be excluded from any transitional government is hardly a matter of cordiality or common vision, which would be completely unrealistic. In fact, it is instead a matter of setting out pragmatic requirements for longer-term arrangements in the Middle East.
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