Refugees in Russia: Myths and Reality
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member calms her down at a temporary tent
camp set up for Ukrainian refugees in the town
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Professor at Middle Tennessee State University
Practically unknown during the Soviet period, the problem of refugees became the order of the day, both for media outlets and academics, in the 1990s. Interest subsided in the early 2000s, but the issue is definitely gaining ground with the flow of refugees on the rise. The situation is aggravated by the current status of Russian NGOs, which play a major role in assisting migrants and refugees all over the world.
Practically unknown during the Soviet period, the problem of refugees became the order of the day, both for media outlets and academics, in the 1990s. Interest subsided in the early 2000s, but the issue is definitely gaining ground with the flow of refugees on the rise.
For many centuries, Russia was a country with tight borders that exercised strict state control over migration, first of all that coming from the outside of the country. At the same time, people, mostly ethnic Russians, were constantly migrating from centrally located regions to the periphery. This process intensified during the Soviet period to the point where from 1959 to 1974, Russia lost 2.1 million people to other Soviet republics; this lasted almost up to the period of perestroika [1].
However, in the mid-1970s, the situation drastically changed, for between 1976 and 1990, the population of Russia increased by more than 2.5 million through inter-republic migration [2]. Following the breakdown of the USSR, Russia became the second largest immigration destination after the United States – 12.3 million Russian residents were born outside its borders, while the U.S. figure is 40.5 million [3] . In the 1980s, the process was augmented by a new and quite painful reality because of the torrents of refugees that emerged during the last years of the Soviet Union.
This event required the prompt development of a relevant legal basis and the establishment of new migration service structures, since during the Soviet period, immigration was limited and severely controlled by the state. Refugees were quite rare at this time [4]. . Applications for asylum had been possible only on political and ideological grounds.
Following the breakdown of the USSR, Russia became the second largest immigration destination after the United States.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, legal emigration also significantly increased for the first time since after the Russian Civil War; since 1991, about 1.3 million Russian citizens have received official permission for permanent residence outside the ex-USSR [5]. In addition, the demolition of the Iron Curtain also generated a flow of those willing to cross the Russian territory in order to settle in the West. Hence, the Russia Federation has acquired a triple role in the global migration chain, i.e. the immigrant recipient, the emigrant generator (mostly to the far abroad), and the transit hub for the Western-bound migrants. The two latter roles turned out to be of critical importance for the configuration of refugee flows on Russian territory.
Migrants and Refugees in Europe
Anatoly Vishnevsky:
The New Role of Migration in Russia’s
Demographic Development
Brussels has been definitely aiming at the parallel construction of two clear-cut European migration regimes, i.e. guaranteed free movement and the establishment of a single labor market within the EU.
Of great significance appears the swift change in the Western approach to migrants and refugees. Free exit from communist countries was a key Western slogan during the Cold War, so refugee status was easily obtainable. After the communist bloc collapsed, the political foundations evaporated and the West lost interest both in the issue and the fate of most migrants, who were increasingly seen as a burden. As a result, doors shut, parallel with the rise of economic hardships and ethnic tensions, which have driven many European states to strictly limit immigration and take in only skilled labor to the detriment of other migrant categories, including refugees. For example, during his presidency, Nicolas Sarcozy insisted on the switchover from "hardship" to "select" immigration [6].
Currently, 40-60 percent of legal immigrants to Europe utilize the family reunification scheme; in France the figure is as high as 70 percent [7]. Hence, the abrupt growth of preferred migrants may be causing drastic structural changes in migration flows and affecting the positions of refugees in society.
In launching the Schengen Area in 1990, signing the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and declaring the formation of the "area of freedom, security and justice" in Tampere in 1999, Brussels has been definitely aiming at the parallel construction of two clear-cut European migration regimes, i.e. guaranteed free movement and the establishment of a single labor market within the EU, along with erecting massive barriers around the union to cut off unwanted migrants and complicate entry for many categories of previously welcome refugees. These schemes are known as those oriented at guaranteeing rights (inter-European) and security (externally restrictive), i.e. "Europe without borders" and "European fortress." New restrictions for refugees include the requirement that migrants must apply for refugee status in the entry country, as well as a delay in joining the Schengen Area for the new EU members and a reform of the migration law, including the introduction of a stringent border regime with neighbor non-EU countries, agreements with them on the obligatory return of migrants who failed to receive legal refugee status in the Schengen states, tougher refugee status criteria, a curtailing of preferences, etc.
These changes appear to be quite obnoxious for Moscow, since the chances are increasing that migrants who cross Russia in order to move to the West, may instead be forced to settle in the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, Russia possesses extended frontiers that are sometimes improperly guarded as well as has agreements on visa-free exchanges with many post-Soviet and other countries [8]. At that, certain states lucky to have such agreements, for example Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, are also suffering from problems guarding their borders and have similar agreements with third countries, only increasing the potential burden on Russia's migration system.
Migrant Integration: The European Experience
and Prospects for Russia
Refugees Today
Refugees are quite new for Russia, the first of which are known to have emerged during the Soviet period – victims of conflicts in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan. Soon, the group was augmented by fugitives from conflict areas in Russia proper, first the Ossetia-Ingushetia conflict, and then the two Chechen wars [9].
Despite the severe economic crisis, confused migration legislation and state disorder, Russia did not hesitate in joining key international agreements on the rights of migrants and refugees, although sometimes with poor attention being paid to financial and organizational aspects. Back in November 1992, after the establishment of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) and prior to the adoption of a relevant law, Russia acceded to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Moreover, in the early 1990s, Russia launched a process of dynamic cooperation with the Bureau for Europe of the UN High Commissioner on Refugees that was extremely significant in the absence of a national legislative and organizational base. In February 1993, the State Duma adopted the Russian Federation Law on Refugees with interpretations close to the 1951 UN Convention [10].
However, the specific post-Soviet environment left its imprint on Russia's legal and practical approach to the problem of refugees. On the one hand, the country was plagued by ethnic conflicts which generated inter-regional flows of Russian citizens regarded as displaced persons. In addition, a great number of citizens of the USSR – over 54 million representatives of the titular nations of the Soviet republics alone (out of the total population of 289 million in the USSR of 1989) – lived outside their titular republics. In fact, over 25 million Russians and nine million members of titular ethnic groups of Russian regions lived outside of Russia [11]. In the early post-Soviet period, bloody ethnic conflicts, discrimination in some new states, a desire to return to one’s historical homeland, and the fear of losing citizenship of their countries caused massive flows of return migration [12] , including Russian citizens going back to Russia, who are qualified as forced migrants.
Despite the severe economic crisis, confused migration legislation and state disorder, Russia did not hesitate in joining key international agreements on the rights of migrants and refugees, although sometimes with poor attention being paid to financial and organizational aspects.
Under Russia's international obligations, the recognition of a migrant belonging to one of the three groups provides him/her with a number of meaningful socio-economic and political rights. Russian law specifies two additional migrant categories. There are recipients of temporary asylum who may legally stay on Russian territory, but are practically deprived of assistance from the state. There is also political asylum. Ironically, the latter is the only category recognized during the Soviet period, while currently Russia has only a few political refugees on its territory.
Apart from specific classification of forced migrants, the Russian situation, primarily in the 1990s, was different in several other ways. Due to the hasty acceptance of international obligations under an immature migration law, economic collapse and explosive immigration flows, Russia was virtually unable to provide forced migrants with appropriate preferences [13]. At the same time, the preferential status and distribution of resources were oriented primarily toward Russia citizens and ethnic Russians, whereas citizens of countries other than former members of the USSR were placed on the backburner [14].
Forced migration in Russia peaked in 1993-1995, when the total number of refugees and forced migrants reached 230,000 a year, while their share of the overall figure of new migrants skyrocketed to 28.2 percent in 1995. The total of the two categories hit its peak of over 997,000 in 1996-1997, after which both absolute and relative figures switched to a downward curve. In 2002, refugees and forced migrants among registered settlers dropped to 10.9 percent, in 2005 to 2.5 percent, and to 0.1 percent 2009. The total number in 2009 was only 46,030, i.e. more than 20 times less than that counted in the mid-1990s [15].
The drastic decrease came from political stabilization, the gradual resolution of armed conflicts in the post-Soviet space and the realization of the fact that Russia was neither too willing nor able to provide migrants with effective assistance. Moreover, the Russian Federation government set a course for cutting the number of forced migrants, changing their status and curtailing opportunities for new arrivals. The above-mentioned problems were mostly socio-economic in nature (a lack of housing [16] , jobs, proper healthcare and social services) and were augmented by new hardships related mostly to integration into Russian society and the social exclusion of many migrants and refugees.
Due to the improved political situation and harsh administrative measures, the number of registered refugees in Russia swiftly dropped [17]. Today, obtaining refugee status is extremely rare, as only 951 persons received it from April 2007 to April 2012. By late 2012, temporary asylum was given to 2,993 individuals, while political asylum seems to be an even more arduous affair – just 15 recipients from 2007 to April 2012 [18].
The harsh control policy was expected to continue, for in 2014-2015, the FMS has planned to offer temporary asylum in Russia to only 800-900 individuals, political asylum to 180-200 persons, and political asylum to only one lucky man a year [19]. But the flow of refugees from Ukraine may considerably increase these numbers and require emergency budgeting. According to the FMS report of July 29, 2014, "since the outbreak of the conflict, over 730,000 Ukrainian citizens have forcibly left Ukraine and are now residing in Russia" [20] .
The Russian Federation government set a course for cutting the number of forced migrants, changing their status and curtailing opportunities for new arrivals.
Thus, the FMS assesses the number of potential Ukrainian applicants for temporary asylum and refugee status at almost 50,000. In turn, last June 24, UNHCR reported about 110,000 Ukrainian arriving in Russia, 9,600 of them applying for asylum. UNHCR spokesperson Melissa Fleming said that "most of them are using other ways to legalize their presence in Russia, often explaining it by fears of future problems or repressions if they decide to return to Ukraine" [21] .
Because of this, changes of the situation and policies toward Ukrainian refugees are unlikely to help settlers from other countries.
Refugees in Russia: Political Aspects
Refugees from Ukraine
The situation is aggravated by the current status of Russian NGOs, which play a major role in assisting migrants and refugees all over the world. Although Russian NGOs, for example the Forum of Migrant Organizations, do markedly provide assistance to settlers, many foreign and international NGOs have faced limitations. Russian groups financed from abroad are obliged to register as foreign agents. Contributions from Russian religious organizations are also insignificant, whereas U.S. churches play a key role in supporting migrants and refugees.
This state of affairs is not only diminishing the range of services rendered to these categories of citizens but is also creating an extra burden on the government. Hence, an analysis and application of foreign practices appears extremely helpful. With refugee flows abruptly dropping, it also appears critical to replace ethnic criteria with humanitarian ones.
As is, Russian government bodies at all levels and the populations of recipient areas appear quite skeptical about the hardships of migrants and refugees. With civil society in Russia still fragile and widespread xenophobia among the population, the government and media outlets are not helping increase public understanding about the significance of migration issues and are overshadowing the human dimension of the refugee conundrum.
Therefore, civil society organizations and media should increase their efforts to return the problem to the limelight and make both the government and population understand its paramount significance. Of no small importance appears to be the engagement of new Russian and international actors, both governmental and nongovernmental, including religious groups, in providing assistance to refugees. As global experience has shown, in the absence of a broad coalition and the painstaking education of elites and wider public masses about the spirit of tolerance and compassion towards forced migrants, refugee problems will not be resolved, but rather trigger outbursts of xenophobia and more socio-political tensions.
1. A.G. Vishnevsky. Ed. Population of Russia in 1996: the 4th Annual Demographic Report (Moscow, Center for Demography and Human Ecology, RAS Institute for Economic Forecasting, 1997), 6, 13.
2. A.G. Vishnevsky. Population of Russia in 1996: the 4th Annual Demographic Report (Moscow, Center for Demography and Human Ecology, RAS Institute for Economic Forecasting, 1997), 6, 13, A.G. Vishnevsky, ed. Population of Russia in 2009: the 17th Annual Demographic Report (Moscow: Higher School of Economics, 2011), 11-12.
3. Pew Hispanic Center. A Nation of Immigrants: A Portrait of the 40 Million, Including 11 Million Illegals.
4. Article 38 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution specified that "the USSR renders asylum to foreigners persecuted for defending the interests of workers and the cause of peace, for participation in revolutionary and national liberation movement, and for progressive socio-political, scientific and other creative activities." CONSTITUTION (Main Law) of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. Adopted by the Special 7th Session of the 9th USSR Supreme Soviet on October 7, 1977.
5. A.G. Vishnevsky. Ed. Population of Russia in 2003-2004: 11th-12th Annual Demographic Report (Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 2006), 325.
6. Joppke, Christian. Trends in European Immigration Policies. In: J. Peter Burgess and Serge Gutwirth, eds. A Threat Against Europe? Security, Migration and Integration. Brussels: VUBPress, 2011, 17.
European experts distinguish between "wanted" (skilled labor) and "unwanted" (unskilled labor related to family reunification and refugees) migration. The "unwanted" group includes "inevitable" (in fact, illegal) migrants, both arriving within family reunification schemes and for asylum. (Carling, Jorgen. The European Paradox of Unwanted Immigration. In: J. Peter Burgess and Serge Gutwirth, eds. A Threat Against European Security, Migration and Integration. Brussels: VUBPress, 2011, 134-35).
7. Joppke, Christian. Trends in European Immigration Policies. In: J. Peter Burgess and Serge Gutwirth, eds. A Threat Against Europe? Security, Migration and Integration. Brussels: VUBPress, 2011, 18.
8. See Consular Information Website of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Information by Country.
9. In 2001, 422,000 people were forced to leave their homes in the Chechen Republic (Irina Ivakhnyuk and Vladimir Iontsev. The Integration of Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and IDPs in the Russian Federation. Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration. CARIM-East Explanatory Note13/119, 4.
10. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Adopted on July 28, 1951 by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened following Resolution 429 (V) of the General Assembly on December 14, 1950. according to the Convention, "A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."
11. National Composition of the USSR Population. Moscow: Finances and Statistics, 1991.
12. In 1992-2009, the net population increase in Russia due to migration amounted to 6.3 million against 1.5 million in 1981-1990. Ed. Population of Russia in 2000: the 8th Annual Demographic Report. (Moscow: Center for Demography and Human Ecology. RAS Institute for Economic Forecasting, 2001), 125; A.G. Vishnevsky. Ed. Population of Russia in 2001: 2002: The 10th Annual Demographic Report (Moscow: Center for Demography and Human Ecology. RAS Institute for Economic Forecasting, 20040, 132-3b, 148, A.G. Vishnevsky. Ed. Population of Russia in 2009: the 17th Annual Demographic Report (Moscow: Higher School of Economics, 2011), 13).
13. Among other things, refugees should have the right for obtain information on their rights and obligations, access to a translator, assistance in preparing documentation, travel to their place of residence, one-time allowance, housing, job seeking, access to training, healthcare and social protection on par with the country’s citizens, participation in social activities, and the voluntary return to the country of their citizenship (Irina Ivakhnyuk and Vladimir Iontsev. The Integration of Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and IDPs in the Russian Federation. Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration. CARIM-East Explanatory Note 13/119, 14).
14. See discussion of the problem in: Oxana Shevel. Migration, Refugee Policy, and State Building in Postcommunist Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
15. Oxana Shevel. Migration, Refugee Policy, and State Building in Postcommunist Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 102.
16. The FMS possesses only three temporary accommodation centers to house 145 persons. Situated far from potential jobs, they are only aggravating refugees' problems, provoking conflicts with the local population.
17. Irina Ivakhnyuk and Vladimir Iontsev. The Integration of Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and IDPs in the Russian Federation. Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration. CARIM-East Explanatory Note 13/119, 1.
18. Vladimir Mukomel. Asylum, Refugees, and IDPs in Russia: Challenges to Social Cohesion. Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration. CARIM-East Explanatory Note 13/117. September 2013, 2.
19. About 36-40 percent of temporary asylum and seven percent of refugee status applications are expected to be granted. The number of displaced persons on Russian territory is expected to decrease from 35,000 to 34,000, with at least 500 persons in this category able to receive housing and only nine persons receiving compensation for homes lost in the territory of the Chechen Republic. (Vladimir Mukomel. Asylum, Refugees, and IDPs in Russia: Challenges to Social Cohesion. Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration. CARIM-East Explanatory Note 13/117.September 2013, 2).
20. Information on Ukrainian Citizens Forced out of Ukraine Territory
21. As of today, Russia's migration authorities received applications from: about 160,000 Ukrainian citizens for consultations on lengthy stay in Russia unrelated to labor activities; over 57,000 Ukrainian citizens for temporary residence permits; over 48,000 Ukrainian citizens for temporary asylum and refugee status; over 27,000 Ukrainian citizens for Russian Federation citizenship; over 19,000 Ukrainian citizens for residence permit; and over 12,000 Ukrainian citizens for participation in the State Program for Resettlement of Compatriots. According to the UNHCR, another 750 individuals have applied for asylum in Poland, Belarus, Czech Republic and Romania, while over 54,000 have been displaced inside Ukraine (Abrupt Growth of Displacement in Ukraine: more than 50,000 Displaced Persons inside the Country).
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