Proposals for Refining Russia’s Foreign Policy in the Arab Mashriq

With its strategically important location, the Arab Mashriq—comprising Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria—has been living through a period of heightened instability in recent decades. The subregion is marked by a crisis of statehood, armed conflicts, the increasing role of non-state actors and geopolitical rivalry among regional and global powers. The 2023 Russian Foreign Policy Concept describes Islamic civilization a friendly; at the same time, it should be acknowledged that the countries of the Arab Mashriq are not a top priority in Moscow’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, emerging threats and challenges are raising the subregion’s profile not only in terms of security but also in energy and cultural and humanitarian ties. With current realities in mind, it can be argued that articulating a distinct policy toward the Arab Mashriq—even if it is embedded within a broader approach to the Islamic world—would allow Russia to advance its interests more effectively in the long run.

The realization of Russia’s interests in the Arab Mashriq depends on a complex interplay between external and regional actors, each with its own motives and tools of influence. Russia’s success in the region will be determined by its ability to balance these interests and find common ground with key players. At present, the main threat to Russian interests in the region is posed by the actions of the United Kingdom, the U.S. and Israel, aimed at undermining statehood in the Arab Mashriq and, more broadly, in West Asia. The U.S. maintains significant military influence in the region and exerts sanctions pressure, not merely complicating the implementation of projects but blocking them outright. The current U.S.-Israeli aggression against Iran is both reshaping the balance of power in the Mashriq and fitting strategically into a broader logic of subordinating parts of Eurasia.

Russia’s consistent stance on respecting the sovereignty of the Mashriq states will boost its reputation as a reliable partner amid external interference. Supporting national security forces and training the military elite could help cement Russia’s influence in this sensitive sphere. Moreover, fostering interfaith dialogue and peacemaking missions of the Russian Orthodox Church and Muslim spiritual boards and assemblies may contribute to a positive perception of the country.

It seems advisable for Moscow to consider, subject to appropriate expert assessment, initiating a “Russia-Arab Mashriq” diplomatic platform (modeled on the Russia-GCC strategic dialogue). Its promotion should be matched by extensive engagement and funding of foreign policy nonprofit organizations and research centers. There is a demand in the region for a stronger Russian humanitarian footprint, including additional financing for Russian Houses and starting research activities at these cultural centers, which would involve specialists in Oriental studies, anthropologists, sociologists and analysts under the coordinating role of the Russian Academy of Sciences. These efforts would aim to compile databases of representatives of the elites and societies of these countries, as well as to promote the agenda of sovereign development and cooperation with Moscow. The idea of founding a large media holding focused on covering developments in the Arab Mashriq also appears promising. It could compete with existing pan-Arab media outlets but should reflect the positions and perspectives of the Mashriq states themselves. It may also be useful to consolidate the efforts of media outlets in the subregion, building on teams that already compete with pan-Arab broadcasters Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya but lack their vast resources.

Economic cooperation should be grounded in a fundamental understanding of the need to mitigate risks and pursued with a focus on long-term collaboration. This involves bringing in competent personnel (Arabists or Arabs specializing in Russian studies) to communicate with partners and engage the business community in social and political projects. It is reasonable to develop cooperation with government bodies and with party and clan leaders.

The advancement of economic cooperation between Russia and the Arab Mashriq should be based on the development of profitable business projects and conditions for the elites in these nations and have state backing. The greatest potential for cooperation lies in energy, agriculture and military-technical cooperation, as well as water and food security.

The most significant challenge to the development of the Arab Mashriq could be the deeper fragmentation of states in the subregion. Under external pressure and internal processes, existing state institutions may weaken and completely give way to quasi-state entities and the radicalization of traditional social institutions (which in turn would strengthen terrorist and extremist groups). Should the fragmentation continue, this process would be extremely painful, and newly formed states or quasi-states would not be able to formulate and defend their own agenda. In the long run, such a scenario could undermine Russia’s presence in the region and allow these quasi-state entities and their territories to be used against Moscow.

With its strategically important location, the Arab Mashriq—comprising Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria—has been living through a period of heightened instability in recent decades. The subregion is marked by a crisis of statehood, armed conflicts, the increasing role of non-state actors and geopolitical rivalry among regional and global powers. Competition among major powers for influence in the region is on the rise. This study seeks to outline proposals for fine-tuning Moscow’s foreign policy in the Arab Mashriq to improve its effectiveness amid contemporary challenges.

The 2023 Russian Foreign Policy Concept lists the Islamic world after the Near Abroad, the Arctic, China, India, and the Asia-Pacific. This prioritization is grounded in Russia’s ongoing efforts to safeguard its vital interests in the near abroad, the region most critical to the country’s security and development. Debate over Russia’s role in the Arab Mashriq often comes down to two conflicting paradigms: a concept that denies the region’s strategic importance to national interests and advocates situational engagement amid a crisis of statehood in the subregion; and a strategy that aims to expand Russia’s political and economic reach as far as possible. The selection between these approaches is informed by value-based and identity considerations, while foreign policy formulation is anchored in interests, goals and available resources. Russia’s declared commitment to a polycentric world order calls for a long-term strategy, an active international presence and openness to cooperation. At the same time, Russian engagement in the region should be guided by strategic economic benefits and avoidance of involvement in protracted conflicts.

Extra-Regional Actors in the Middle East. RIAC Report

Russia and the Arab Mashriq between risks and interests

The Russian expert community, just like the global one, stands on the geopolitical realities of distinguishing the Middle East or the Arab world (less commonly, West Asia). Projections of the region’s development occasionally go along with a subregional division into the Arab Mashriq, the Gulf and the Arab Maghreb. As V. Naumkin and V. Kuznetsov observe, “if Maghreb connects with Europe and Mashriq connects with Eurasia in a more or less smooth manner, the issue of revising the foundations of inter-civilisational interaction already within the two new centres of international politics will arise. This, however, is a matter of a relatively distant and very hypothetical future. So far, the players are busy addressing completely different concerns.” [i]

It should be acknowledged that, in the medium term, the countries of the Arab Mashriq are not a top priority in Moscow’s foreign policy, and given regime instability and external influence, there is only room for situational engagement, not long-term strategies. Nonetheless, emerging threats and challenges are raising the subregion’s profile not only in terms of security but also in energy and cultural and humanitarian ties. Moreover, proposals and ideas that are now deemed off the table could be reconsidered over time as Moscow develops its future relations with the states in the region.

With current realities in mind, it can be argued that articulating a distinct policy toward the Arab Mashriq—even if it is embedded within a broader approach to the Islamic world—would allow Russia to advance its interests more effectively in the long run. Moreover, the existence of regimes aligned with Moscow in the Arab Mashriq, particularly in Iraq, is of critical importance. In the context of U.S.-Israeli aggression against Iran and in the event of a regime change leading to a pro-American government, there is a risk that NATO military infrastructure could be established there, which could potentially lead to a confrontation between the United States and Russia on the southern flank.

Perspectives from within the region should also be given consideration. The idea of integration within the Arab Mashriq gained notable traction in academic work in the 1990s and 2000s, dubbed the “New Arab Mashriq”. Yet this vision inevitably ran up against a geopolitical rival in another more prominent project, “New Middle East,” which relied on U.S.-Israeli dominance and Israel’s leading role in the region, underpinned by its technological, military and political superiority, as long as the fragmentation of other states along ethno-confessional lines persisted. This explains the renewed interest in this concept among Arab intellectuals, including distinguished figures from the Centre for Arab Unity Studies and Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi (“The Arab Future”) journal.

It is precisely the consolidation among the Arab countries of the Mashriq that can be viewed as a stabilizing factor in relations between the states—both between Arab countries and Israel, and across West Asia as a whole. In 2018, at a press conference with Sergey Lavrov, Lebanese Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil invited Russia to take part in a project to revive the Arab Mashriq (alongside plans for a conference on the protection of religious and ethnic groups in the Middle East).

Russia’s core interests in the Arab Mashriq lie in mitigating security threats and protecting its citizens, companies and their investments. In this respect, Moscow supports the stabilization of the military and political situation, the restoration of domestic political order by national governments, efforts to counter external influence that damages Russian interests, and the dismantling of military infrastructure hostile to Russia. These processes should go hand in hand with deeper cooperation in energy, humanitarian and military-technical spheres in the medium term.

It seems advisable for Moscow to consider, subject to appropriate expert assessment, initiating a “Russia-Arab Mashriq” diplomatic platform (modeled on the Russia-GCC strategic dialogue). Interactions with Arab experts lead to believe that the agenda and approaches of the Arab Mashriq states differ vastly from those of the Gulf monarchies or the Maghreb and therefore warrant a separate track. The idea of the Russia-Arab forum is also valuable; however, the Arab League has proved ineffective, and in practice, the Arab Mashriq states have to defer to their influential and wealthy Gulf counterparts. That said, building such a platform is a lengthy process and will take time. So it is necessary to be prepared for a gradual expansion of cooperation rather than expecting quick results.

Russia’s engagement in the Arab Mashriq requires a clearer approach to the region’s principal conflict—the Israeli-Palestinian one. To bolster its mediating role, Russia should arrange a series of informal consultations with Palestinian factions, including Fatah and Hamas, with a view to forging a unified negotiating position. Such efforts are already underway at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences with support from the Russian Foreign Ministry, and separately by China (the 2025 Beijing Declaration). Nonetheless, it seems that Moscow and Beijing could advance this diplomatic track jointly with the countries of the Arab Mashriq. If all of them were to put forward this initiative, with backing from Russia and China, it could inject new momentum toward direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and overcome the negative inertia of the Abraham Accords, which helped advance the interests of Israeli leadership but did not deliver a Palestinian state. At a later stage, the parties could pursue a “package” approach to peace settlement, which means discussing key issues simultaneously—borders, security, refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and water resources. In doing so, it is well worth learning from the mistakes of the 1990 Madrid peace process and developing not only institutional but also informal approaches to advancing the initiative [ii]. Moreover, this strategy would help prepare for the inevitable generational transition within the Palestinian Authority (engagement with potential successors to President Mahmoud Abbas should already be underway, including among organizations that stand in opposition to the groups aligned with Abbas).

According to World Bank data, Iraq has a population of over 46 million, Syria over 24.6 million, Lebanon 5.8 million, Jordan over 11.5 million, and Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) around 5.3 million [iii]. So, in aggregate, the Arab Mashriq has more than 93 million people. Iraq and Syria are the largest countries in the Arab Mashriq by both size and population, and Iraq has the largest economy in the subregion, with a GDP of $279 billion.

Russia’s foreign policy toolkit in the Arab Mashriq encompasses a range of political, economic, military and humanitarian measures aimed at strengthening its influence, ensuring security and advancing Russian interests in the region. Key instruments include:

1. Diplomatic and humanitarian tools. Russia acts as a source of legitimacy for the regimes and an important actor in conflict resolution. It also has a sizable diaspora in the region (including mixed families), and nationals of these countries reside in Russia and have their own interests here (the number of only Syrians is estimated at over 100,000). At the same time, modern experts point to a shortage of Arabists and Arabs specializing in Russian studies, who are needed to build what V. Kuznetsov described in an interview with the author as a “coherent communication framework.” Russia also urgently needs to expand its humanitarian projects and improve the quantity and quality of work carried out by nonprofit organizations. This requires additional funding, which could be provided by Russian state corporations with coordination from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Economic and business instruments. At various times, cooperation has spanned energy, agriculture, the food industry, metallurgy, construction (including railways), healthcare, digitalization and tourism, suggesting the presence of specific stakeholders. Oil and gas cooperation remains an important tool for Moscow in building ties with the leadership of Syria and Iraq (Russian oil companies also operated in Lebanon for some time). So, as Russian experts and diplomats agree, the potential for economic cooperation remains untapped.
3. Military-technical cooperation. Russia has the capacity to both train personnel and supply the weapons systems that the countries of the Arab Mashriq need. One key vulnerability across the region is air defense. A pragmatic initial step for Moscow would be to strengthen Iraq’s air defense (particularly at sites where Russia has commercial interests, something that could be arranged with partners on a commercial basis).

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Iraq: vast prospects and multiple risks

Iraq is a country with a young and growing population of over 46 million. Given its oil and gas infrastructure, expanding real estate and technology, the Iraqi market can be profitable but needs special attitude for its complexities. The 2026 U.S.-Israeli aggression against Iran briefly undermines Iraq’s investment appeal, but it does not deprive Baghdad of it in a strategic sense.

Russia-Iraq relations are marked by steady, positive cooperation and growing mutual interest across multiple areas. That said, risks of destabilization persist in Iraq due to U.S.-Iran confrontation, the spillover effects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and regional rivalries. Moreover, Russian business interests are exposed not so much to conventional security threats—which Russian firms can generally adapt to—as to risks of pressure from external actors, particularly the U.S. This was especially evident in the sanctions imposed on Lukoil and the oil giant’s loss of the largest project in the Arab Mashriq, the West Qurna-2 field.

Iraq’s place and role in the regional system of international relations and security in West Asia have been steadily evolving, shaped both by transformations in the global and regional order and by the specific dynamics of its domestic political processes. After two decades of armed conflict, foreign intervention and counterterrorism efforts, Iraq is taking on a more active role in regional peacebuilding processes.

Russia supports the efforts of the Iraqi authorities aimed at restoring the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Prompt and decisive actions to provide comprehensive assistance to Iraq in countering the ISIS* threat in 2014–2017 bolstered the trust of Iraq’s military and political leadership in Russia as a reliable, effective and promising security partner. Yet this did not help Moscow protect Russian interests in the wake of U.S. sanctions of 2025.

Amid current tensions in the near abroad and in the Middle East, it seems well worth it for Russian policy toward Iraq to focus on:

1. Strengthening Russian influence within Iraq’s elite clans, security apparatus and armed forces, which is a priority for Russia. This will help prevent the consolidation of U.S. military infrastructure in Iraq that threatens Moscow’s interests;
2. Recovering lost opportunities in Iraq’s oil sector through additional negotiations with the U.S. or through leverage with Iraqi elites. Total Russian investments in Iraq were estimated at around $19 billion as of 2023. The three flagship projects were Lukoil’s investment in West Qurna-2, Gazprom’s in Badra, and Rosneft’s in Iraqi Kurdistan. U.S. sanctions against Lukoil led to the transfer of the West Qurna-2 field first under Iraqi control, and then Baghdad handed it over to the American company Chevron. Amid the current U.S.-Israeli aggression against Iran, American installations in the region have come under repeated attack. The Iraqi government may come to view the handover of this strategic field to the U.S. as a threat, which could raise the issue of revisiting that decision;
3. Advancing military-technical cooperation and maintaining contact with key political movements and leaders of the Shia community (including figures from the Popular Mobilization Forces [iv]);
4. Achieving alignment between two infrastructure projects: the North-South transport corridor and the Development Road (the transport and logistics system unveiled by Baghdad in 2023). Efforts to this end should be intensified within the framework of the intergovernmental Russia-Iraq-Iran working group;
5. Pushing for additional funding for civil society, universities and institutes, and nonprofit organizations. Any major economic project should come together with the building of a “humanitarian pillar”, for example, a local branch of a Russian think tank, so as to organize research and events and engage the local foreign policy elite in the context of positive bilateral relations.

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Syria: retaining presence but hedging risks

A risk-oriented approach appears most appropriate for Syria, as economic gains in this war-devastated country are now, as they were in the past, uncertain, despite the lifting of U.S. sanctions (which, however, is not without conditions). The temporary nature of such measures may give way to a more proactive policy toward Syria in the “post-Ukraine” period. As N. Surkov noted in an interview with the author, “the current situation [removing sanctions from Syria and abandoning major joint projects] makes the emergence of a full-fledged alliance with Russia more unlikely. Nevertheless, it is strategically sound to invest resources now in maintaining a presence and cultivating cooperation, with a focus on mutual interests and engagement with key local actors such as tribal elites. Delaying these steps would carry high costs in the future.” [v] It is worth noting, however, that Russian assistance can be transactional: with Turkey and the Gulf states constrained financially (the latter will need to replenish their arms stocks and offset the economic costs of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran), Moscow can be more demanding about protecting its interests and supporting political projects (for example, the “Russia-Arab Mashriq” platform).

It is worth noting that the new authorities in Damascus did not demand the immediate withdrawal of Russia’s Khmeimim air base or the logistics facility in the port city of Tartus. On December 19, 2024, President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia was planning to use its military bases in Syria for humanitarian aid deliveries, but this will depend on whether Moscow’s interests align with those of the new Syrian leadership.

At the same time, experts stress that advancing Russia’s positions and strengthening ties with the new Syria require competent goal-setting. Decision-makers often view humanitarian and business contacts with certain Middle Eastern countries as unreliable, which undermines efforts to promote these ties. As N. Sukhov argues, alongside goal-setting, policy should be grounded in concrete resources, including personnel capable of ensuring necessary communication [vi]. Addressing these challenges would help build ties with Syrians, thereby spurring further engagement between the two countries. At present, Moscow’s priority is to preserve people-to-people relations and retain its airbase and logistics facility, which are described as important for supporting Russian projects in Libya and the Sahel.

Given the constraints that arise from diverting resources toward higher-priority tasks in the near abroad, Syria policy is likely to center on temporary solutions and a risk-hedging strategy. Moscow should focus on:

1. Ensuring the safety of Russian citizens and retaining the airbase and naval logistics facility in order to promote Russian interests, including in the Sahel. There is also the traditional geopolitical rationale for maintaining a Russian military footprint in the Eastern Mediterranean (namely, containing any possible aggressive act against Russia from this area) [vii];
2. Monitoring and preemptively countering the activities of terrorist organizations. Particular attention should be paid to groups capable of recruiting supporters in the post-Soviet space (such as al-Qaeda* and Islamic State — Khorasan Province*). This requires additional contacts not only with the intelligence services of the CIS countries, but also with the current authorities in Damascus (alongside cooperation with Kabul);
3. Developing dialogue with Damascus, Israel and the Druze community to identify mutually acceptable solutions in southern Syria. For Israel, “a Syria united under the Islamist rule and supported by Qatar and Turkey poses a direct threat. Hence Israel’s policy to support any separatist and self-governance movements in Syria. By the same token, Israel seeks to expand its buffer zone along the border by gradually taking over new territory, especially considering that this expansionist policy fulfills the religious and ideological aspirations of the Israeli far right.” [viii] Engaging in active dialogue with Israel and Damascus on security issues in southern Syria will allow Moscow, at the very least, to keep an ear to the ground and, at best, to capitalize on the role of an “honest broker” between the parties in the future. In pursuing its policy in Syria and, more broadly, in the Mashriq, Moscow could explore opportunities for non-confrontational engagement with Turkey (the diplomats could work out additional safeguards to protect interests in the event that one party is tempted to move to a “hidden agenda”);
4. Establishing engagement not only with the Syrian leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa, but also—informally—with influential leaders of former anti-Assad groups (including current provincial governors and senior officials in the Syrian Defense Ministry). As L. Issak said in an interview with the author, “by training or arming the Syrian army, Russia can identify its members, their views, convictions and methods. This helps sustain Russian influence within the security apparatus and armed forces, which is of paramount importance and a priority for Russia now.” Separately, it seems advisable to develop contacts with representatives of Syria’s traditional social institutions (not just Kurdish actors, but also Arab tribal sheikhs). This approach would help improve awareness and enable Moscow to adapt to a new situation if the balance of power in Damascus shifts or the country spirals into a new phase of civil war (a possibility that experts do not rule out);
5. Revitalizing communication channels with Syrian think tanks and leaders of the Syrian diaspora (including those in Russia). Such contacts may prove useful over time, as these actors may come to take a more active part in the Syrian political process in the medium term.

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A roadmap for promoting the “Russia-Arab Mashriq” diplomatic platform

The promotion of the “Russia-Arab Mashriq” diplomatic platform should be matched by extensive engagement and funding of foreign policy nonprofit organizations and research centers. There is a demand in the region for a stronger Russian humanitarian footprint, including additional financing for Russian Houses and starting research activities at these cultural centers, which would involve specialists in Oriental studies, anthropologists, sociologists and analysts under the coordinating role of the Russian Academy of Sciences. These efforts would aim to compile databases, as well as to promote the agenda of sovereign development and cooperation with Moscow. This work will help cement informal ties as well. The idea of founding a large media holding focused on covering developments in the Arab Mashriq also appears promising. It could compete with existing pan-Arab media outlets but should reflect the positions and perspectives of the Mashriq states themselves. It may also be useful to consolidate the efforts of media outlets in the subregion, building on teams that already compete with pan-Arab broadcasters Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya but lack their vast resources.

The implementation of the “Russia-Arab Mashriq” diplomatic platform should be preceded by the launch of expert working groups involving specialists from Russia and the Arab Mashriq states, with the support of their respective foreign ministries. In addition to political and economic issues, it seems beneficial to facilitate a conference on religious freedom and interfaith reconciliation. The first conference could be co-organized in Moscow by Russia and one of the Arab Mashriq countries (for example, Iraq), while the second could take place in the capital of an Arab state by consensus. It is important to promote these efforts in the media sphere (through news outlets, online platforms and social media).

Going forward, the key task for the expert groups would be to take stock of political and economic projects and formulate an agenda for collective engagement. Russia could support the idea of holding a conference on security in the Arab Mashriq. The main emphasis in developing such initiatives would be on promoting sovereign development, the complementarity of regional economies and the economic dimension of Russian interests. For the Mashriq states, it may be worth considering the establishment of an investment fund—the Arab Mashriq Bank for Reconstruction and Development—in cooperation with economic institutions such as the New Development Bank (BRICS), the Eurasian Development Bank, and others [ix].

The realization of Russia’s interests in the Arab Mashriq depends on a complex interplay between external and regional actors, each with its own motives and tools of influence. Russia’s success in the region will be determined by its ability to balance these interests and find common ground with key players. At present, the main threat to Russian interests in the region is posed by the actions of the United Kingdom and the U.S., aimed at undermining statehood in the Arab Mashriq and, more broadly, in West Asia. The U.S. maintains significant military influence in the region and exerts sanctions pressure, not merely complicating the implementation of projects but blocking them outright.

Russia’s consistent stance on respecting the sovereignty of the Mashriq states will boost its reputation as a reliable partner amid external interference. At the first stage, it should be expected that the agents of influence of our opponents who hold senior roles at certain ministries and agencies in the Mashriq countries may seek to derail efforts to “nationalize” the elites of these states (unfortunately, this may have a distinct ethno-confessional dimension). However, the situation is fluid: over time, it will even out as the forces oriented toward sovereignty in these countries come into play. Supporting national security forces and training the military elite could help cement Russia’s influence in this sensitive sphere. Moreover, fostering interfaith dialogue and peacemaking missions of the Russian Orthodox Church and Muslim spiritual boards and assemblies may contribute to a positive perception of the country.

In promoting this format of dialogue, Russia should remember to maintain communication channels with Israel. Russia may emphasize that the initiative is not directed against any party but is aimed at regional stabilization. Moscow is already demonstrating this approach by maintaining dialogue with Israel while simultaneously engaging with Arab nations.

Economic cooperation should be grounded in a fundamental understanding of the need to mitigate risks and pursued with a focus on long-term collaboration. This involves bringing in competent personnel (Arabists or Arabs specializing in Russian studies) to communicate with partners and engage the business community in social and political projects. It is reasonable to develop cooperation with government bodies and with party and clan leaders.

The advancement of economic cooperation between Russia and the Arab Mashriq should be based on the development of profitable business projects and conditions for the elites in these nations. Given the specific characteristics of the countries, the business sector should receive state backing (and, conversely, it should finance projects led by Russian humanitarian, scientific and nonprofit organizations in these countries). The greatest potential for cooperation lies in energy, agriculture and military-technical cooperation, as well as water and food security. Moscow could also consider building small modular reactors in the Arab Mashriq (Iraqi and Jordanian officials have flagged interest in such projects, though this would require additional security risk assessments).

The most significant challenge to the development of the Arab Mashriq could be the deeper fragmentation of states in the subregion. Under external pressure and internal processes, existing state institutions may weaken and completely give way to quasi-state entities and the radicalization of traditional social institutions (which in turn would strengthen terrorist and extremist groups). Should the fragmentation continue, this process would be extremely painful, and newly formed states or quasi-states would not be able to formulate and defend their own agenda. In the long run, such a scenario could undermine Russia’s presence in the region and allow these quasi-state entities and their territories to be used against Moscow.

* The organization is designated terrorist and banned in Russia.

This study has received funding from the Russian Science Foundation (grant No. 24-78-00056)

The author would like to thank Alexander Bobrov, Irina Zvyagelskaya, Lisa Issak, Vasily Kuznetsov, Grigory Lukyanov, Nikolay Sukhov and Nikolay Surkov for insightful discussions and comments in the course of working on these proposals. The views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author.

i. Naumkin V., Kuznetsov V. The Middle East and the Future of Polycentric World // Valdai Discussion Club. 20.02.2023. P. 24.

ii. Tarasov G., Smirnov V. The Road to Madrid. The USSR and the Preparations for the Madrid Peace Conference on the Middle East (1985–1991). M.: IOS RAS, 2025. 436 pp.

iii. The data reflects estimated figures for 2024, not the results of a comprehensive census (except for Iraq).

iv. Mamedov R. Transformation of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces. Integration into the political and economic elite? // Vostok (Oriens). 2024. No. 5. Pp. 83–94.

v. Surkov N. — PhD in Political Science, Senior Researcher at the Center for the Middle East Studies, IMEMO RAS.

vi. Sukhov N. — PhD in History, Leading Researcher at the Center for the Middle East Studies, IMEMO RAS. He previously served as a Senior Political Officer in the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Syria in Damascus and headed the Russian House cultural center in Damascus until 2024.

vii. Mardasov A. Russia-U.S. competition against the backdrop of regime change in Syria // Bulletin of Moscow State University. Series 13. Oriental Studies. 2025. Vol. 69, No. 1. Pp. 142–150.

viii. Naumkin V., Kuznetsov V. Stuck in Mid-Sentence: The Middle East at the Start of the 21st Century’s Second Quarter. M.: Valdai Discussion Club, 2026. P. 12.

ix. For more on the economic opportunities in the Arab Mashriq subregion, see: Mamedov R., Makhmutov T. Proposals on Building a Regional Security System in West Asia and North Africa. Working Paper 38 / 2017 / RIAC. Pp. 19–25.