Electoral Battles in Moldova
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Chief of Moldova Department, Institute of CIS Countries
On October 30, Moldova will for the first time since 1996 elect its president in a nationwide vote. Although officially 12 candidates take part in the electoral campaign (A. Nastase and I. Popenko have for various reasons dropped out of the presidential race), realistically there are only three credible candidates: Igor Dodon, leader of the Socialist Party; Marian Lupu, the head of the Democratic Party; and Maia Sandu, who leads the Action and Solidarity Party.
On October 30, Moldova will for the first time since 1996 elect its president in a nationwide vote. Previously, until 2000, the president was elected by a qualified parliamentary majority, three-fifths of the total number of deputies. However, on 4 of March, 2016 the Republic’s Constitutional Court annulled the amendment to the country’s main law. In June the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (the Venice Commission) approved the bill on changing the Electoral Code thus reverting to the former mechanism of electing the head of state through direct nationwide vote. Although they formally espouse European values, Moldovan deputies did not agree with all the Venice Commission recommendations. For example, they rejected the Commission’s proposal to cut the age qualification (to 35 years) for presidential candidates. Under the current Electoral Code the head of state has to be a person not younger than 40 years of age who has lived in the country for at least ten last years and has command of the official language. The parliament deputies also rejected the Venice Commission recommendation on increasing the number of polling stations abroad. This, according to expert Valery Ostalep, a priori puts Moldavan citizens living abroad at a disadvantage. An estimated million Moldovan citizens work outside the country, with about 60—70% of them working in Russia.
The duration of the presidential campaign has been reduced from two months to one which objectively plays into the hands of the oligarchs who have a lot more resources, including the media, to organize large-scale campaigning for their candidates. Those who do not have such resources are unlikely to be able to do anything within a month. Moldova has four TV channels and three radio stations owned by the Vice Chairman of the ruling Democratic Party who is the “shadow” boss of Moldova, V. Plakhotnyuk.
It has to be noted that the course of the election campaign in Moldova is being closely watched not only in the EU, but also in Washington, which, as usual, is trying to orchestrate it.
Although officially 12 candidates take part in the electoral campaign (A. Nastase and I. Popenko have for various reasons dropped out of the presidential race), realistically there are only three credible candidates: Igor Dodon, leader of the Socialist Party; Marian Lupu, the head of the Democratic Party; and Maia Sandu, who leads the Action and Solidarity Party. Andrei Nastase, leader of the Dignity and Truth Platform, one of the realistic contenders for the presidential post on the right side of the political spectrum backed the candidacy of Maia Sandu at the eleventh hour.
The European People’s Party led by I. Leanca, should have been an alternative pro-European political project. However, by August of 2016 there was no trace left of the imagined opposition leanings of the European People’s Party. On 29 of July Iurie Leanca signed an agreement on “National Partnership” with the ruling coalition and was given the symbolic post of chairman of the Parliamentary Council for European Integration. Iurie Leanca faces two tasks in the electoral race, according to Bogdan Tirdea. First, he has to pull all the plugs out to criticize the leader of the left political segment, Igor Dodon. Secondly, he has to “snatch votes from the leader of DA Platform Andrei Nastase so that he could campaign for the establishment candidate Marian Lupu in the second round”. This will also be the job of the majority of candidates of the political right.
Igor Dodon
For example, this role will be played by the leader of the Liberal Party M. Ghimpu, he is to deliver information attacks on Igor Dodon and Maia Sandu. Because an information attack against opponents will be launched not by the representatives of the Democratic Party the latter would not be open to charges of abusing media resources. I. Leanca and M. Ghimpu for their part will labour in favour of V. Plakhotnyuk’s regime because this is the only guarantee that after the opposition comes to power they would not be charged with abuses and damaging the state during the rule of Euro-integrators.
Although M. Sandu belongs to “right-wing opposition” and demands the removal of the oligarchy regime, she supports the Euro-integration course of the Republic’s development. It has to be noted that the course of the election campaign in Moldova is being closely watched not only in the EU, but also in Washington, which, as usual, is trying to orchestrate it. One notes the statement by American Ambassador J. Pettit in which he effectively ruled out the possibility of Moldova uniting with Romania. The statement had great resonance, but it is controversial. It is true that Washington is not anxious to confront the far-reaching consequences for the geopolitical situation in the region that this process may trigger. On the other hand, the American Ambassador’s statement can be seen as a tactical move aimed at not scaring away voters with the unionist views of pro-European candidates (notably M. Sandu).
Along with other leaders of the pro-European coalition he is responsible for the systemic crisis in the country, which objectively weakens his electoral chances.
It has to be said that the Constitutional Court decision to reintroduce direct elections of the President was passed on 4th March in the wake of the March 2 visit to Chisinau by assistant US Secretary of State B. Brink; just like the government of Pavel Filip was hastily approved on 20 January 2016 after the visit to Romania by assistant US Secretary of State V. Nuland. The fact that Maia Sandu has strong support from the USA and the European Union shows that she is the second (stand-by) candidate after Marian Lupu if the latter fails to make it to the second round because Euro-integrators are extremely unpopular in Moldova.
M. Lupu embodies the current corrupt political regime being the protégé of the odious oligarch V. Plakhotnyuk. Along with other leaders of the pro-European coalition he is responsible for the systemic crisis in the country, which objectively weakens his electoral chances. One important miscalculation of the ruling class on the eve of elections was that after the high-profile scandal with the disappearance of a billion euros from three state-owned banks, the government of Moldova recently passed a package of laws one of which would make the ordinary people bear the brunt of repaying the state debt resulting from the “robbery of the century”. This unpopular measure will certainly be held against M. Lupu as the formal representative of the ruling regime. So, M. Lupu has little chance of winning in an honest duel. However, it has to be remembered that today the Democratic Party has the most powerful administrative and media resource among all the participants in the electoral rate. The party has over 50,000 members and 43 territorial organizations. Democrats or their appointees head up 20 regions and 384 cities across the country which provides them with a powerful administrative resource.
Marian Lupu
That puts into question the chances of an outright victory for I. Dodon although the latest polls confirm that I. Dodon whose personal approval rating exceeds the combined ratings of all the other main candidates, is a clear favourite in the electoral race. The reason for the popularity of I. Dodon in the Republic is not his alleged “pro-Russian” attitude, but the steadfastness with which he upholds the priorities of his programme: Moldova’s statehood; its neutrality; diversified foreign policy which implies restored relations with Russia; the strengthening of Moldovan identity; a robust economy, etc. At the same time the West, viewing I. Dodon as a “pro-Russian” politician will go out of its way to prevent his victory in the elections which lends a distinct geopolitical character to the election campaign.
Another feature of the campaign is that it is even less democratic than the November 2014 elections for parliament, which means that there will be large-scale vote-rigging. The problem of “dead souls” has become a time bomb. The results of the 2014 census have still not been published. From the results of the first Academy of Sciences’ demographic barometer unveiled in the summer of 2015 the country’s population stands at 2.9 million. However, the number of registered eligible voters on the CEC lists is 3.2 million.
Although the latest polls confirm that I. Dodon whose personal approval rating exceeds the combined ratings of all the other main candidates, is a clear favourite in the electoral race.
The second problem is the distribution of polling stations. The authorities, knowing that more than half of the total number of Moldavan émigrés (700,000) work in Russia, have decided to open there just 8 polling stations. Meanwhile about a hundred stations will be opened in the Western countries where Moldovans are in favour of rapprochement with the EU. The decision was passed in spite of numerous protests over the results of the parliamentary elections in November 2014 when only 15,000 Moldovans were able to vote in Russia. By way of comparison, in Romania where the number of Moldovans at the time was twelve times less than in Russia, eleven polling stations were opened.
This situation, which challenges universally accepted democratic norms persists although the PACE mission (a sympathizer of the current authorities) which recently visited the Republic flagged many problems in the course of the election campaign. They include the opaque system of financing parties and election campaigns, including from abroad; monopolization of the media market and lack of transparency in financing the media; the role of oligarchic structures in the country’s political life, especially in the electoral process. The mission was told about abuses and the use of administrative resources in collecting signatures in support of Democratic Party candidate, M. Lupu. The staff of a number of government enterprises were forced to sign in support of his candidacy.
Maia Sandu
Another feature of the election campaign was that it was boycotted by some political parties and movements, notably the Communist Party. The reason for this is that according to forecasts, V. Voronin, former President and permanent head of the Communist Party, can hope to garner 5—6% of the votes. For V. Voronin, such a result, after his poor performance in the parliamentary elections in November 2016 would be not just a humiliation, but a political catastrophe. It has to be noted that after the 2014 parliamentary elections the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova has practically withdrawn from the protest movement against the pro-European oligarchic regime. Indeed the Communist Party has lately drawn closer to the Democratic Party and launched a vigorous propaganda campaign against the largest and most influential left-wing opposition party, the Socialist Party and against Igor Dodon personally.
Yet another feature of the election campaign was that the left-wing opposition has failed to unite and rally behind a single candidate, Igor Dodon. If the Our Party candidate D. Chubashenko whose latest approval rating is about 7%, withdrew his candidacy, I. Dodon would almost certainly win in the first round.
The outcome of the second round will largely depend on the mood in the outskirts of large cities and in rural areas where the majority of the population lives.
If this does not happen in the remaining time, then in the opinion of the majority of experts a second round would be inevitable. The candidates most likely to make it to the second round are: I. Dodon on one side and M. Lupu or M. Sandu on the other side. To prevent I. Dodon from winning the ruling regime has pressed into service a powerful media and administrative resource. The outcome of the second round will largely depend on the mood in the outskirts of large cities and in rural areas where the majority of the population lives. One should also bear in mind that in the local elections of 2015 most of the winners in the Republic’s regions represent the parties of the ruling coalition.
Should I. Dodon win in the second round, events may follow the scenario of 2009 when the losing pro-European side resorted to mass protests and demanded a revote. In this way it effectively stole victory from V. Voronin bringing off another “colour” revolution scenario.
The situation of the shadow “boss” of Moldova, V. Plakhotnyuk is determined by the fact that on 28 September a resolution was introduced at the US Congress condemning corruption in Moldova and proposing sanctions against the country’s leadership including V. Plakhotnyuk. In this situation V. Plakhotnyuk would settle for nothing less than the victory of his own man, M. Lupu. It may happen that V. Plakhotnyuk, under external pressure would have to agree to the candidacy of M. Sandu for whom he has little liking. All these circumstances make the electoral battles in Moldova quite a tense period.
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