Post-Soviet Submarine Fleet: Rising after the Fall
K-535 Yuri Dolgoruky strategic nuclear
submarine. Borey class series
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The restoration of the combat capabilities of the submarine fleet is a priority of Russia’s military-technical policy. A key distinction of the Russian submarine fleet is its fundamental emphasis on maintaining a strong anti-ship component, since formations of potential enemy large surface ships are still regarded as the most likely targets for Russian submarines. In addition, the requirement to maintain the naval potential of strategic nuclear forces remains in force as well.
The restoration of the combat capabilities of the submarine fleet is a priority of Russia’s military-technical policy. However, the requirements laid out for the structure of the Russian submarine fleet are very different from those made by the U.S. Navy; in part, they are determined by the geopolitical position of Russia. A key distinction of the Russian submarine fleet is its fundamental emphasis on maintaining a strong anti-ship component, since formations of potential enemy large surface ships are still regarded as the most likely targets for Russian submarines. In addition, the requirement to maintain the naval potential of strategic nuclear forces remains in force as well.
Submarine Fleet as a Means of Counteraction
The submarine fleet has historically occupied a special place in the naval forces of Russia. After World War II and during the beginning of the Cold War, submarine formations allowed the Soviet Union to challenge the naval power of the West, led by the U.S., which inherited the Mistress of the Seas burden from the British Empire. The reason for the reliance on the submarine fleet was simple enough, since creating a balanced surface fleet capable of openly challenge the dominant navies of the U.S. and its allies would have taken decades and would have threatened to become an unbearable burden for the war-ravaged country. At the same time, the construction of a powerful submarine fleet allowed for the quick creation of a real threat to global seaborne trade and naval forces of the West and at an acceptable cost. This was confirmed, in particular, by the two world wars.
Russian Navy
Later, despite the strengthening of the Soviet economy and the growth of its industrial potential, the priorities for fleet creation did not undergo major changes. By the end of the 1970s, the Soviet surface fleet surpassed the U.S. Navy in terms of the number of ships, but it was still mainly focused on performing missions in the waters surrounding the borders of the Soviet Union rather than in the oceanic zone. The large submarine fleet made up the basis of the Navy's striking force. The significance of the former was particularly increased by the emergence of nuclear-powered submarines (NPS), and, especially, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN).
At the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Navy had over 300 submarines [1], including 64 nuclear-powered and 15 diesel-powered submarines with ballistic missiles of various ranges; 79 cruise-missile carriers (including 63 nuclear-powered vessels); and about 80 nuclear-powered and roughly the same number of diesel-powered attack submarines.
However, the inadequate development of deployment and maintenance infrastructure prevented the use of submarines with a high level of efficiency. The operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the Soviet submarine fleet did not exceed 0.2-0.25; i.e. at any given point of time, no more than 20-25 percent of combat-ready submarines were at sea. The number of these submarines varied greatly and depended on the subclass and the specific project; there were more vessels of the already mastered projects than those of the latest or outgoing class. On average, approximately two thirds of the submarines were constantly on alert. The remaining third were under repair, being modernized, being worked on by crews after commissioning or, on the contrary, being prepared for disposal.
The current State Armament Program for the period 2011-2020 provides for the allocation of more than 4 trillion rubles for the fleet, a large part of which will go to submarines. Major expenditures on the Navy are also scheduled for the period after 2025.
Analyzing the structure of the Soviet submarine fleet, it should be noted that up to a quarter of the vessels carried cruise missiles, focusing mainly on conducting anti-surface ship warfare missions. Such a composition was determined by the Navy’s two main purposes: ensuring delivery of a nuclear strike on the enemy's territory upon receiving an appropriate order, and complicating as much as possible the functioning of its surface fleet and ocean-freight shipments before the war turned into a "nuclear Armageddon”.
The Collapse of the Soviet Union – the Collapse of the Fleet
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a rapid reduction in the navy, including its submarine fleet: by the mid-1990s, the latter had decreased by about half. Currently, the fleet comprises about 60 vessels (excluding special purpose underwater vehicles and their carriers) or five times less than it had during the late 1980s. The share of combat-ready submarines also decreased: according to some unofficial estimates, no more than 25-30 submarines, which is about half of the total, can perform combat missions. Despite the decrease in the total number of vessels, the operational tempo is low because of deteriorated coastal infrastructure. Thus, no more than 6-8 submarines of the Russian Navy can presently be at sea at any given moment. In the 2000s, Russia was not always able to maintain the active service of strategic attack submarines, which had to keep the watch mainly “at the pier”.
K-329 Severodvinsk – 4th generation
Project 885 Yasen class nuclear sub
The current State Armament Program for the period 2011-2020 provides for the allocation of more than 4 trillion rubles for the fleet, a large part of which will go to submarines. Major expenditures on the Navy are also scheduled for the period after 2025. During the years from 2010 to 2020, the fleet will grow by a total of 35-36 A-subs and up to 20 conventional submarines. The total expenditures on the submarine fleet will be no less than 1.7 trillion rubles at current prices, even excluding money spent on updating Soviet-built submarines. While waiting for the commission of new vessels, the fleet will modernize the old submarines, which remain in service. In general, the renovation process is comparable in terms of quantity with that conducted by the U.S. Navy. By 2030, the U.S. plans to build up to 30 multimission nuclear-powered fast attack submarines of Virginia-class and begin the construction of new generation, nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines. In this regard, it is interesting to identify the differences in the structures of Russian and U.S. submarine fleets resulting from different combat missions.
Under these conditions, it appears reasonable to develop a new, less ambitious, and less expensive project that would replace the decommissioned multipurpose submarines in a one-to-one proportion.
The format of the submarine forces of the Russian Navy, which was originally defined by the State Armament Program for the period 2011-2020, involves the construction of 8 Borei-class SSBNs (Project 955), 7-8 Yasen-class multipurpose submarines (Project 885) and 10-12 conventional submarines. This plan can hardly be regarded as balanced. With an adequate SSBN and conventional submarine replacement rate, the original program threatened to seriously reduce the number of multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines. Today, the Russian Navy has 27 multipurpose submarines of Projects 949A (Oscar II class), 971 (Akula class), 671RTMK (Victor III class) and 945/945A (Sierra I/II class), many of which will be written off because of physical obsolescence in the next 10-12 years.
In all, 7-8 Yasen-class multipurpose submarines are unlikely to serve as adequate replacements for the decommissioned vessels. Notwithstanding the admirable features of the Project, Yasen-class submarines cannot be in several places at the same time and fill the gaps formed by the dramatic reduction of the fleet. However, it appears unrealistic to increase construction of Yasen-class submarines to at least 15 units by 2025 because of the great cost (more than 100 billion rubles per unit) [2] and complexity of the vessel.
Under these conditions, it appears reasonable to develop a new, less ambitious, and less expensive project that would replace the decommissioned multipurpose submarines in a one-to-one proportion.
K-535 Yuri Dolgoruky is the first in the Borey
class series
This decision was finally taken. In early July 2013, some media outlets, quoting a competent source in the United Shipbuilding Corporation, reported that the Russian Navy was developing a new nuclear-powered submarine to replace the Soviet submarine of Projects 671, 971 and 945. The main objectives of the new vessel will be to protect SSBNs from attacks from enemy multipurpose submarines and hunt for enemy missile carriers within their patrol areas.
This specialization allows us to qualify the new vessel as a “submarine destroyer”, aimed to combat with its own kind. In addition, due to the development of modern missile systems, these submarines will have a certain strike potential, although more modest than the Yasen-class vessels, carrying up to 32 cruise missiles of various types in 8 universal launchers.
The specifications of the promising project have not yet been disclosed, but according to unofficial reports, the prospective submarine destroyer will have a displacement of 6-7 thousand tons (vs. 13-14 thousand tons of Yasen-class), a speed of around 30 knots and an armament of 4-6 torpedo tubes and 8-12 cruise missiles in universal launchers. The cost of such a submarine should not exceed 50-60 billion rubles at current prices.
The less powerful propulsion system and a simplified sеt of weapons should allow for the construction these submarines at a faster pace. It is assumed that the construction of the new project lead ship could begin within the next 2-3 years. With adequate financing, this submarine can be put into operation by 2020 or 2021. Serial building at several dockyards (apart from the Sevmash Shipyard, construction can take place at the Admiralty Shipyards, the Amur Shipyard and, possibly, at the Red Sormovo Shipyard) will put into operation by 2030 up to 20 “destroyers” from the new project. However, even 10-12 new vessels in combination with the Yasen-class submarines and modernized submarines of the latest Soviet projects will make a considerable addition to the fleet.
The American Approach: Similarities and Differences
The problem which the Russian Navy is trying to solve today is one that the U.S. Navy faced after the end of the Cold War, when its budget was dramatically constrained and the cost of new project submarines grew.
It has been repeatedly argued that we should follow the “American way” and restrict the Yasen-class submarines to 2-4 units with a subsequent transfer over to some cheaper shipbuilding projects.
In the 1990s, the U.S. Navy cancelled the serial construction of Seawolf-class submarines which were large, heavily-armed and fast submarine cruisers. A choice was made in favor of a less ambitious project, namely Virginia-class submarines. The intended fleet of 30 Seawolf-class submarines was limited to just three vessels, built in the 1990s (the last one – the USS Jimmy Carter – was designed as a special purpose vessel). At the same time there were built 10 Virginia-class submarines (the first Virginia-class submarine was laid down in 1999). As already mentioned, the U.S. Navy’s total requirement is for 30 vessels of the class to replace Los Angeles-class submarines that become obsolete.
The structure of the U.S. submarine fleet is quite simple. Its combat potential lies in two subclasses of nuclear-powered submarines: some with ballistic missiles (SSBN – Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear) and other general-purpose attack submarines, conducting primarily hunter-killer missions against enemy submarines and hitting coastal targets with cruise missiles (SSN) as a supplementary feature. The possibilities of cruise missiles, utilized and appreciated in conflicts during the 1990s, led to the creation of a new subclass of U.S. Navy submarines – specialized cruise missile carriers (SSGN – conventionally armed nuclear powered). The four converted Ohio-class SSBNs rejoined the U.S. Navy in the 2000s.
Virginia-class submarine
The modernized Ohio-class submarines will be replaced later by cruise missile carriers built on the basis of Virginia-class submarines. In contrast to the Russian/Soviet SSGNs intended to combat the enemy fleet, the American ones are designed primarily to attack coastal targets.
Anti-Ship Potential as Sine Qua Non
When discussing development of the Russian submarine fleet, it has been repeatedly argued that we should follow the “American way” and restrict the Yasen-class submarines to 2-4 units with a subsequent transfer over to some cheaper shipbuilding projects.
Currently, this solution is unacceptable for political reasons. The multi-purpose Yasen-class submarines of Project 885 are intended to replace the Russian Navy nuclear-powered submarines of Project 949A, the main purpose of which was to combat large units of surface ships, primarily aircraft carriers. This purpose remains of concern in light of the complex format of Russian-American relations and the situation in the Far East. Japan and China, the key regional actors, are building up their surface fleets. When analyzing hypothetical threats to Russia, Japan appears to pose the greatest among the industrialized countries.
Russia could follow the American way only if it joined the American geopolitical orbit and entered into a military alliance with the United States, which is practically impossible in the foreseeable future.
For the U.S. Navy, the Seawolf-class submarines have retained their great potential as, above all, “underwater destroyers”, while the mission of combating the enemy surface fleet is now mainly being carried out by deck-based aircraft. Thus, Russia could follow the American way only if it joined the American geopolitical orbit and entered into a military alliance with the United States, which is practically impossible in the foreseeable future.
In view of the current geopolitical situation, Russia's submarine fleet has to retain its “anti-ship” component, which automatically necessitates having at least 8-10 multi-purpose submarines with a powerful missile armament. For the period up to 2030, this task can be solved by building 7-8 Yasen-class submarines and keeping 3-4 modernized cruisers of Oscar II class in the fleet (Project 949A).
Non-Nuclear Future
Project 877 Paltus
Russia, unlike the United States, has to maintain an impressive fleet of conventional submarines [3] due to its theaters of naval operations on the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Sea of Japan as well as the lack of allies to share this burden.
The U.S. does have such allies, namely Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Japan and some other countries. The existing tasks necessitate maintaining a fleet of at least 20 such submarines capable of solving problems on closed theaters of naval operations without involving nuclear-powered submarines.
As of today, the Russian fleet has only 18 Paltus-class diesel-electric submarines (better known as Varshavyanka-class), which were built in the 1980-1990s and most of which are unfit for comba. The recovery of conventional submarine potential goes in two directions: the repair of Varshavyanka-class vessels and the construction of new units. While the situation with repairs is more or less clear, the implementation of the new Project 677 Lada-class submarines faced difficulties.
In the 2000s, there three Lada-class vessels for the Russian Navy were laid, but their construction was delayed because the power plant, a new sonar system and other equipment showed major deficiencies and fell short of contract requirements. As a result, only the lead ship was transferred to the Russian Navy and it has yet to show its “contract” capabilities.
Russia, unlike the United States, has to maintain an impressive fleet of conventional submarines.
The best submarine and power-unit design bureaus were assigned to make changes to improve the Lada and its propulsion system. However, the process took longer than planned, partly because engineering and design specialists from the energy industry were involved in restoring the Sayano-Shushenskaya power station after the accident.
In the end, as a temporary measure, it was decided to build submarines of the Project 636 Varshavyanka (advanced export version of Project 877 Paltus) at a delay of almost 10 years, since the Project was offered to the Russian Navy in the early 2000s. Had the decision been made on time, today the fleet would have had at least 6-8 new diesel-powered submarines. However, 6 Varshavyanka-class vessels have been ordered in order to strengthen the submarine forces of the Black Sea Fleet and 3 of them are already under construction. The Project 636.3 lead ship Novorossiysk is to be launched this year.
The Required Minimum
Today, the Navy has, as already noted, at least 60 submarines (excluding various special purpose vehicles and their submarine carriers). However, according to various estimates, no more than 4-5 missile-carrying submarines, 12-15 multipurpose nuclear submarines and 8-10 conventional submarines can perform combat missions, which is less than half of the available forces. This is not enough to just maintain the Navy’s presence in critical areas, not to mention help buildup forces in case of a need.
With adequate repairs and modernization, no more than 2-3 strategic attack, 8-10 multipurpose nuclear-powered and 6-8 diesel submarines will remain in service till 2025-2030.
Therefore, the restoration of the submarine fleet potential requires the construction of 8-10 SSBNs, 18-22 multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines and 12-15 conventional ones. Currently, 4 SSBNs, 2 multipurpose nuclear-powered and 3 conventional submarines are being built (or are under construction). Before the end of 2013, one SSBN, one multipurpose nuclear-powered submarine and two conventional ones will be laid down. This “stage of construction” is still in line with the stated priorities – the restoration of sea-based strategic nuclear forces potential and the maintenance of anti-ship capabilities. However, this imbalance is fraught with diminishing possibilities of countering the submarine forces of potential enemy and to protect their own missile-carriers from possible submarine attacks.
In view of the above, it makes sense to review the priorities of the submarine fleet construction and reschedule some of the programs. In our view, it is quite reasonable to put off the program of building eight Borei-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines for five years (Project 955) by 2020. This will release funds for the accelerated construction of multipurpose submarines, and may be backed by extending the service life of Project 667BDRM SSBNs, which make up the basis of naval strategic nuclear forces of Russia.
1. A.S. Pavlov. Sovetskij VMF. 1990–1991. Reference book. Jakutsk, 1991.
2. It was announced later that the Defense Ministry and contractors “agreed” on about 50 billion rubles as the price of a serial Yasen-class submarine. However, many experts now call this underpricing unjustified and politically motivated. A more realistic estimate of the price is 75-80 billion rubles.
3. The term “conventional submarine” replaced the traditional “diesel-powered submarine” after the appearance of various air-independent propulsion systems, including those without traditional diesel engines.
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