Peace in Times of War

The “war or peace” dilemma is false under current circumstances. If war is understood solely as armed conflict, then it will likely come to an end within the foreseeable future. An endless war of attrition is not in our interest. What is needed is victory—and that remains entirely achievable, provided that important decisions are taken both at home and on the battlefield. Even then, however, there will be no genuine lasting peace. The confrontation with the West will continue across multiple spheres and in many different forms.

This confrontation will be a prolonged one and it will require something we have long lacked: long-term goal-setting and a carefully planned strategy for achieving those goals. Our principal objective should be to build the Russian "civilizational state" that we have proclaimed but have yet to define. What we need, it seems, is a project aimed at shaping a society grounded in civic solidarity and on foundational core values shared by all: faith, freedom, family, and justice. In this context, the country’s economic and political system would also have to undergo profound renewal.

This new internal character of Russian society and the state will also shape the country’s position on the world stage. It could enable the country, among other things, to become a stronger “pole”— in the literal (magnetic) sense of the word. However, the most important thing for Russia itself is to avoid the prospect of being forced to align with major geoeconomic and geopolitical powers: the Euro-Atlantic bloc and China.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, three generations of Russians were raised in an atmosphere of external security: first, under conditions of strategic stability based on mutual nuclear deterrence with the United States, and then in an environment of partnership and cooperation in a world where a “major war” came to be regarded as an anachronism. Now we find ourselves at a stage where the very paradigm of security has become obsolete. War in peacetime or peace in wartime—this is the new, unsettling reality. To accept this reality, endure a long and difficult struggle, and ultimately emerge transformed and victorious—that is the path before us. There is no going back for Russia, for going back only means to fall.

The “war or peace” dilemma is false under current circumstances. If war is understood solely as armed conflict, then it will likely come to an end within the foreseeable future. An endless war of attrition is not in our interest. What is needed is victory—and that remains entirely achievable, provided that important decisions are taken both at home and on the battlefield. Even then, however, there will be no genuine lasting peace. The confrontation with the West will continue across multiple spheres and in many different forms.

This confrontation will be a prolonged one and it will require something we have long lacked: long-term goal-setting and a carefully planned strategy for achieving those goals. Our principal objective should be to build the Russian "civilizational state" that we have proclaimed but have yet to define. What we need, it seems, is a project aimed at shaping a society grounded in civic solidarity and on foundational core values shared by all: faith, freedom, family, and justice. In this context, the country’s economic and political system would also have to undergo profound renewal.

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Such a project cannot be left to the elites alone. In fact, the elites themselves are in need of renewal—not only in generational terms, but also for new mechanisms of reproduction and new relations with the majority of society. Meritocracy is unquestionably essential, but it is clearly not enough. The ideological and value-based nature of the elite’s activities, and their commitment to service, are just as important as competence and professionalism. Only under such conditions can a “project” cease to be merely an intellectual construct and become an idea capable, to borrow a well-known expression, of “gripping the masses.”

Only an idea that truly becomes national in character will be capable of transforming Russia. Then it may be said that the Special Military Operation—with its immense trials, extraordinary strain, and irreparable losses and sacrifices—became not merely a turning point in the country’s history, but a prologue to a profound transformation of both the state and the people.

This new internal character of Russian society and the state will also shape the country’s position on the world stage. It could enable the country, among other things, to become a stronger “pole”— in the literal (magnetic) sense of the word. However, the most important thing for Russia itself is to avoid the prospect of being forced to align with major geoeconomic and geopolitical powers: the Euro-Atlantic bloc and China.

The stakes for Russia in this confrontation with the West could hardly be higher. Despite all the talk if restoring dialogue between the European Union and Russia, no one in Europe is genuinely seeking a real agreement with Moscow. Our adversary—the West’s “globalist elites,” as President Vladimir Putin has described them—is not pursing compromise, but the total defeat of Russia as its ultimate objective. Let me stress: not “regime change,” but the destruction of our country as a major independent power in the world.

In this struggle, we can and must rely first and foremost on ourselves. Belarus is part of our common homeland, as President Lukashenko has stated. Our brotherhood in arms with the DPRK is sealed in blood. We highly value our strategic partnership with China, which continues to deepen and expand, but we must clearly understand that Beijing always pursues its own national interests above all else. The same applies to our other partners in the CSTO, the EAEU, the SCO, and BRICS, as well as other countries of the Global Majority.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, three generations of Russians were raised in an atmosphere of external security: first, under conditions of strategic stability based on mutual nuclear deterrence with the United States, and then in an environment of partnership and cooperation in a world where a “major war” came to be regarded as an anachronism. Now we find ourselves at a stage where the very paradigm of security has become obsolete. War in peacetime or peace in wartime—this is the new, unsettling reality. To accept this reality, endure a long and difficult struggle, and ultimately emerge transformed and victorious—that is the path before us. There is no going back for Russia, for going back only means to fall.