Print
Rate this article
(votes: 1, rating: 5)
 (1 vote)
Share this article
Yury Dubinin

Professor of the Department of Diplomacy of MGIMO-University of the RF MFA, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation

This is the first paper in a series devoted to the art of diplomacy, a lecture read by Yuri V. Dubinin, Professor of the Diplomacy Department at MGIMO-University, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation, to the students of Moscow Linguistic University. In our age of public and social diplomacy, it appears critical to gain a clear understanding about the purpose of these activity and ways to accomplish the emerging objectives.

This is the first paper in a series devoted to the art of diplomacy, a lecture read by Yuri V. Dubinin, Professor of the Diplomacy Department at MGIMO-University, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation, to the students of Moscow Linguistic University. In our age of public and social diplomacy, it appears critical to gain a clear understanding about the purpose of these activity and ways to accomplish the emerging objectives.

Dear friends!

Let us talk about the art of diplomacy, a new subject for this audience.

As a matter of fact, some time ago I was struck by the paradox of why the art of war is now the focus of attention, while the art of diplomacy has been largely neglected. If you open an encyclopedia, you are sure to find substantial information on warfare, and even more within specialized literature. At school we learned about victory in the Battle of Cannes, and later about Clausewitz, The Science of Victory by Alexander Suvorov, the genius of Mikhail Kutuzov and many other concepts, including the victory in the Great Patriotic War.

All these points are quite sensible. But where does the art of diplomacy stand? No answer has been given.

Once I asked a foreign affairs luminary: "Have you read any research or books on the art of diplomacy?"

He thought for a while and said: "Never in my life, I have never seen one either in Russia or abroad."

"Why do you think they keep writing on the art of war, but have absolutely no terminology for the art of diplomacy?" I asked. He thought for while, shook his head and said: "I believe the art of diplomacy is something more complicated."

Offering no comment, I asked the final question: "Do you think there that the art of diplomacy has the right to exist as a concept, deserving profound research and teaching?"

"Undoubtedly!" was the answer.

So, what is the art of diplomacy? To begin with, here is an example.

Photo: www.economicportal.ru
Negotiations on the Treaty of Portsmouth
(Sergei Witte is sitting in the middle of the
left row). Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
the US, 1905

Let us take a look back to the year 1905, at the century-before-last events that in fact are related to the present day. At the end of an attritional and bloodletting war between Russia and Japan, the final treaty was negotiated by Russian Prime Minister Sergey Witte and Japanese Foreign Minister Jutaro Komura. At a certain point, the Japanese counterpart lost his nerve and snapped: “You are behaving as if Russia and not Japan has won the war.” And Komura seemed to have grounds for indignation. In fact, Russia had been crushed, both on land and at sea, having lost both with its army and the navy, and leaving Siberia defenseless. However, Witte was not just rejecting Japan’s demands, but putting forward his own. The approach was provocative, even considering Japanese patience. Leaping slightly ahead, we should remember that in the end Japan had to give up most of its claims and even to withdraw from the north of Sakhalin Island it once had occupied. What kind of weapon did Mr. Witte employ? It was the art of diplomacy.

Mr. Witte’s success was properly appreciated, for he was awarded the title of count. As far as Japan was concerned, the agreements were codified by the Portsmouth Peace Treaty and perceived in Japan as humiliation, sufficient to cause riots in Tokyo and force Komura’s resignation.

What kind of levers did Mr. Witte use to overcome his opponent? Apart from Japan’s military success, his position was complicated by mediation of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt who was all the time playing on the Japanese side. And the talks were held in the U.S.A. too. What kind of tactics did Mr. Witte employ in this hostile environment? Here are his notes on the tactics developed prior to negotiations.

First, by no means show that Russia wanted peace. Behave as to produce an impression that the Emperor had agreed to talk (it was a U.S. initiative) only because all parties desired to have the war discontinued, while Russia did not really care about peace. Second, behave as befits a representative of the Grand Empire that has run into minor trouble (and Russia really was a globally important empire). Third, bearing in mind the huge role of media in America, be courteous and accessible to its all representatives in order to obtain their favor. Next, attract the highly democratic American population with frankness and a democratic attitude, with an absence of any kind of arrogance. Due to the considerable influence of Jews in New York City and the American press, never display hostility to them, which in fact corresponded to his overall views.

Here are the guidelines, the guidelines that turned effective. But their implementation required the art of diplomacy. This is how the situation developed, as Mr. Witte writes in his memoirs.

“As we approached New York City, our steamer was surrounded by several boats with correspondents of various American newspapers. As soon as they embarked on our ship, I expressed my delight about coming to the country that had always been friendly to Russia, as well as my overwhelming appreciation for the press that is exceptionally important in America. Since that moment and up to the departure, I was closely watched by the media people who, if I may say so, were following my every step.

In Portsmouth, where the talks were held, I was given two small rooms, one of which had windows – I am not sure whether it was made on purpose – oriented to make me constantly viewed. All the time, from arrival to departure, onlookers photographed me with their Kodaks. People, mostly ladies, were coming up to ask me to stop by and take my picture. Every day people from all over America asked me to send my autograph; they also came up, especially ladies, to make me sign a piece of paper. I amiably fulfilled all their requests, allowed correspondents to freely communicate with me, and displayed full attention to all Americans in general. Thus I was gradually winning the favors both of the American press and the public.

Traveling by fast trains, upon arrival I always visited the engineer to thank him and shake hands. When I did so for the first time to surprise the public, the next day it was thankfully covered by all papers. Judging by all our ambassadors and top officials, both Russian and foreign, Americans expected to see a standoffish European. But all of a sudden they met the extraordinary envoy of Russian Emperor, a prime minister, a long-time finance minister and a secretary of state who was more natural and more accessible than President Roosevelt who himself was keen on democratic simplicity. Although such behavior was extremely burdensome because of continuous acting, especially in the beginning, I am sure that the American public and then the press were increasingly supportive of the Russian Czar’s representative and his staff. The process was clearly seen in the press reporting.

The phenomenon was reflected by President Roosevelt’s cable in the talks’ final stretch. He sent it to Japan after as soon as he made sure that I would never meet many of the Japanese demands, including the contribution. The cable said that during the talks American public opinion had significantly shifted toward Russia, and that he as the President must state that if the Portsmouth negotiations bring no result, Japan would never find in America sympathy and support on the previous level.”

As for the Japanese, Mr. Witte wrote that they were his best allies in driving the American public opinion toward Russia. “They were not as prim as European top diplomats, among other things because of their appearance, but Americans were to the same extent rebuffed by their secretiveness and seclusion.”

And what was the result? “Afraid that broken negotiations would shift public opinion against himself and the Japanese,” President Roosevelt cabled to the Japanese Emperor to advise him accepting the proposal of the Russian envoy, which he did. As you may see from the abstracts, Mr. Witte demonstrated a revolutionary diplomatic style based on the recognition of the public role. Alongside the pinpointed tactics, it brought success. The statesman proved that the art of diplomacy is by no means less important than the art of war. Frequently, a skilful diplomat is of greater significance than a skilful commander.

Then, what is the art of diplomacy?

The notion is quite capacious, in a broad sense suggesting the successful management of foreign policy. In everyday life, it means high culture in interpersonal communication.

The better the foreign policy calculus, the wider is the room for effective diplomatic maneuver. At the same time, advanced diplomacy expands the foreign policy resources of the state.

The art of diplomacy means the ability to perfectly use the entire arsenal of tools accumulated by diplomatic activities. At the same time, which is most important, it means the ability to blaze trails, find innovative solutions, and open new vistas in diplomacy and foreign policy.

While the mission of foreign policy is in defining targets in international affairs, the art of diplomacy provides answers to the question “how to?” or, to be exact, “how to in the optimal way?” The art of diplomacy means professionalism elevated to creativity, i.e. an activity producing something qualitatively novel, something that has never existed before.

May one receive the command of the art of diplomacy? The answer is as follows: any person preparing for a diplomatic, foreign policy or foreign trade career not only should but absolutely must at least launch the process which will continue during his entire professional stretch. This wisdom seems to fit any art. Art is infinite, inspiration being its major driver. First of all, one should study accumulated and current diplomatic practices, and use them as the basis of moving forward. Perfection of diplomatic skills requires attention not only to the outcomes of diplomatic efforts or events but also an insight into the essence and motives of the participants, as well as into the methods used for problem solving. In a nutshell, it is something you may call living history, something unimaginable without inspiration. Success in the art of diplomacy implies the amalgamation of knowledge, experience, talent and high-level aspirations.

What are the components of the art of diplomacy? Primarily, it is the ability to assess a situation through diplomatic effort. This is the key starting point, the basis both for the art of diplomacy and politics in general.

The famous Chinese military leader Sun Tzu said 2,500 years ago: “There is nothing more valuable than appropriate picturing of the situation.” In fact, he who commands information commands the environment. Hence, data gathering, conclusions and picture-making for subsequent action make up an intrinsic part of the art of diplomacy. If the work has been done properly, it may offer relevant guidelines for action and even predetermine its success.

Let us consider specific examples, passing from the simple to the complex. In what way should work be organized? We may call it information-and-analytical activity. Stage one is fact finding. One should be able to plunge into the permanently growing information flow and single out reliable data, discern biased and false information, uncover the essence of propaganda campaigns, and finally pull together the most valid pieces usable for all subsequent data gathering and analytical operations.

Of course, primary information and fact finding is not enough. Of utmost importance is the ability to analyze relevant commentaries. This is secondary information that helps making final conclusions. Special attention should be given to the so-called live information, which implies contacts with data carriers, i.e. individuals related to policy-making.

Let us consider an example from the World War II. In the first half of the war, one of the key problems was the opening of the second front. It was extremely important for the Soviet Union to know when the U.S.A. and Great Britain were going to do so. This knowledge became an absolute must on the eve of the USSR-U.S.A.-UK conference in Tehran on November 28-December, 1942. Of course, all Soviet agencies, including the secret services, were involved in the data gathering process.

Shortly before the conference, Kyrill Novikov, Soviet acting ambassador in London, was instructed to urgently inform the Foreign Office that he was included in the delegation to the Tehran event. He was prescribed to seek permission to fly to Tehran on the same airplane with the British mission. Of course, he explained that there was no other way to get from London to Tehran. The Brits agreed, and he was placed on the same plane with Winston Churchill who was heading the British delegation. At the intermediate landing in Cairo, Mr. Churchill was given a party. While the guests were leaving the reception, Mr. Churchill invited the Soviet diplomat to have one for the road. The conversation was quite down-to-earth and friendly. All of a sudden, Mr. Churchill asked: "Mr. Novikov, you must be eager to know when we open the second front?" And immediately answered: "On May 2, 1944 at the earliest."

The Soviet ambassador was stunned, since the entire Soviet intelligence was hunting for the information. But he obtained it personally from Winston Churchill. On arrival to Tehran, Mr. Novikov wrote a short memo, and Joseph Stalin was immediately informed. When the second front was under discussion, he was aware of the Western approach and had more room for maneuver. On December 1, 1943, the Tehran Conference participants signed the historical document that stated that Operation Overlord was to be launched early in May 1944.

Photo: Meeting of the leaders of the Soviet
Union, the UK and the US at the Tehran
conference, 1943

One more detail to highlight Mr. Novikov's achievement by the shades of the epoch. Soon after the Tehran Conference, Stalin stated at a Politburo meeting: "Everyone must work as hard as Comrade Novikov." Later these words made Mr. Novikov undergo quite a stressful test. He was summoned by Soviet security chief Lavrenty Beria and offered a lieutenant-general job at his Ministry of Internal Affairs. One could easily imagine the consequences if the offer was rejected. But the ambassador decided that Stalin's praise would protect him from Beria's revenge. And he was absolutely right.

Where is the art of diplomacy, you might ask? What about trying to establish a relationship with a national leader so that he would invite you for a tête-à-tête drink and talk to him in a way to hear something you really need.

However, the history of diplomacy shows that information rarely comes straight into the niche to do the trick, and rarely comes to its seeker as a windfall. In most cases, the process is thorny, and there is another good World War II example to demonstrate the difference. Here is the story Sergey Vinogradov, which my first ambassador told me when I took up my diplomatic career.

In 1940, Mr. Vinogradov was appointed counselor to the Soviet embassy in Turkey, the second senior position after the ambassador. Soon he became the charge d'affaires in Ankara at the age of 33. Both then and now, the post has been seen as quite significant. Its importance grew immeasurably after the fascist Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Turkey did not participate in the war, but played host to embassies of the USSR and its allies and German embassy too. A lot depended on the side taken by Turkey, a country of paramount military and strategic importance. Ankara's intentions were a mystery, which made the Soviet Union keep a major contingent at its border.

The episode took place in the fall of 1942, when fighting on the Soviet-German front peaked. The attention of the entire world was riveted to Stalingrad, where the battle broke out to determine the war both for the Soviet Union and the whole world. In the south, the armada of German tanks was moving to Baku aiming to proceed to Iran and the Middle East. The Germans captured passes over the main Caucasus Ridge, so that only a narrow strip of Transcaucasia separated the frontline from the Soviet-Turkish border.

At that time Mr. Vinogradov was urgently summoned to Moscow with no reasons explained. After a tiresome journey he immediately reported to the Foreign Ministry that also failed to clarify the situation. His colleagues only shrugged and pointed fingers to the sky to indicate that the order had come from the top echelon. Mr. Vinogradov was placed at a hotel and told to wait for subsequent instructions. The signal came in the middle of the night worded as "the car has been sent to pick you up". I will complete the story trying to preserve the flavor of Mr. Vinogradov's narration.

The car brought him to Stalin's so-called near dacha. Inside he immediately faced the leader who was sitting at the dinner table with several Politburo members. Mr. Vinogradov greeted the gathering and heard Stalin's words: "Give the ambassador some vodka." Somebody poured a glass. "Drink up, ambassador." So he did, naturally "to Comrade Stalin's health."

 — Tell me, ambassador, will Turkey attack us?

 — It will not, Comrade Stalin.

 — Give him more vodka.

More vodka came.

 — Drink it up, ambassador.

He downed the second one.

 — So, will Turkey launch war against us? – He heard the same question.

 — It will not, Comrade Stalin.

 — All right, ambassador. Get back to Ankara. But remember about your commitment.

Mr. Vinogradov flew away, while Stalin ordered a relocation of the troops kept at the Turkish border in case Turkey sided with Germany. The contingents were brought to Stalingrad to reinforce the Soviet army at the breaking point of the historic battle.

Impressed by the story, I asked: "What made you speak to Stalin like that? Maybe you had some hints from your Turkish counterparts or had some other data?" "Oh, no," he said. "Nothing like that. The Turks were quite sociable, and sometimes I even played chess with the foreign minister. But they never shared their secrets. And I had no confidential information either. But when answering Stalin, I was absolutely sure." And he explained: "The conclusion was based on my observations of local situation, the sentiments in the country and the elite. Sometimes it is more important than possession of secret materials."

Just let me add that after the war, most successful Soviet diplomats were to be decorated. Many of them justly deserved the honor, and the Ministry intended to award Mr. Vinogradov with the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. Definitely, the lists were to be signed by Stalin who crossed out the proposal to replace it with "To be awarded the Lenin Order", the decoration of a significantly higher status.

Case one implies accurate information, straight to the point and clearly worded.

Case two is about making conclusions to bring us to the next stage of the art of diplomacy, i.e. to analysis.

Shall we try an experiment? Suppose you all are officers of the Foreign Ministry. In the morning, you are summoned by the boss who says: "Something has happened somewhere (say, in Syria). We have lots of information incoming from all over the world. Your task is to take up the entire massive in the neighbor room and report your assessments and recommendations by the end of the day."

What will be doing in the neighbor room? What sort of modus operandi will take up?

A reply from the audience (Julia):

Julia: I am not really sure but I would first try to analyze the data coming from the states allied to Russia, then from our opponents, and then from Syrian allies. Further, I would use the results for conclusions.

Mr. Dubinin: What would you do next?

Julia: I would pull my conclusions together for a final conclusion.

Mr. Dubinin: Do others agree with the approach? Any other opinions? Remember, I am expecting an algorithm for any situation, so that the principles could be applicable for various cases.

Julia: I just believe that each country has allies and opponents. Hence, as I see it, my approach fits any situation.

Mr. Dubinin: I would not argue about friends and foes. Does everyone agree with the approach? Who thinks differently?

A remark from the audience: I am not willing to offer assessments, just my point of view. I would divide states into capitalist and socialist. To begin with, we should define the ideology of country covered by the information. Then, analyze what its opponents say, their propaganda too. An information war is underway, you know. We must discern between propaganda and provocation and reliable data. Speaking about Syria, we should primarily analyze the domestic environment, and understand the principles used by its establishment, as well as their aims and opponents, so that all these could be used for a conclusion. We should also define our own position, and develop further suppositions and strategies proceeding from these points.

Mr. Dubinin: The criteria are quite substantial and require extensive efforts. And you can hardly apply them to all cases, as it is not easy to find purely socialist and capitalist countries, among other things.

To launch the process, one should somehow streamline the data. Information is plentiful, and you can hardly read everything, while your superiors are expecting proposals. It means that systematization requires a simpler and more convincing criterion. Why not proceed from the initial report? Where is the root of the problem? If you find the primary source, set out the info chronologically up to today. And of course skip the data you find less important, preserving the pieces that reflect stages of its dynamics. As a result, you obtain a clear-cut picture. The approach is called historical analysis used to find a foolproof case for your boss.

At the same time, historical analysis offers a simplistic vision, since the core storyline may have collateral events. You should set them chronologically alongside the main plot. Hence, you will obtain major collateral events influencing the main event. This is systemic analysis. When you combine the two approaches, you get a distinct picture based on your information, although additional data is also applicable. This is logical analysis. Each of your words is grounded, proceeding from a logical analysis of events and facts.

As a matter of fact, textbooks contain theory, while the art of diplomacy implies action that must be more dynamic and more professional than that of your partners. This is actually the point.

Pavel: Definitely, we should grasp the entire analysis, which must make the basis. And we also take into account the attitude of our state. The Russian Foreign Ministry believes that domestic conflicts make an internal problem to be resolved without foreign interference. Accordingly, we should advise our U.S. colleagues that we do not share their support of the Syrian opposition and insist that the settlement should come directly from the conflict parties, i.e. the Syrian people. In this case, we should not assist any warring party but urge the sides to negotiate and settle the dispute peacefully.

Mr. Dubinin: Pavel was really good at defining Russia’s approach that one can find in any speech by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin. And he has also shown knowledge of the principles of international law. But to tell the truth, all these have failed to clarify the situation, and we have no data on further developments. What to do under the circumstances? The situation may change any time. But Pavel has drawn us to a proper conclusion. Such problems arise not only in foreign ministries but in everyday life as well. What to do if there are neither facts nor data on the events to come? Science is in search of ways to answer the question.

They say extrapolation is good. You analyze previous events and move forward from past dynamics. Regrettably, unexpected things may occur.

There is also calculation with help of matrixes. But where do they come from? From the brain of the analysts, don’t they?

In a situation like that we turn to intuition. What is it? Andrey Gromyko, the foreign minister of a superpower for 28 years, wrote about that in his memoirs. Everything he did was thought out and deeply analyzed, actually with no errors found.

Photo: encyclopedia.mil.ru
President of the US, J.F. Kennedy and Foreign
Minister of the Soviet Union A.A. Gromyko

He writes that any sort of diplomatic move must involve intuition. Of course, it is very important to have a command of the picture. But it is much more important to be able to forecast events and make proper decisions. John Kennedy, an outstanding U.S. president, used to say that he had thousands of advisors who know how to build a pyramid but none of them could say whether there is a need for one. This is where intuition comes in.

And life offered him a chance to use it in practice. After the Soviet Union had launched Yuri Gagarin into space, America and the entire world just gasped talking their heads off about Soviet super fuel, excellent education, etc. As for President Kennedy, he set up an expert commission to ask them what to do to regain U.S. prestige. And more specifically, whether there was a need to fly to the Moon. The commission advised against the lunar mission but he did just the opposite, which exemplified his intellectual feat and his innovative mindset. Do you remember the first words of the American astronaut on the Moon surface: “One small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind.”

People have been fascinated by intuition from ancient days. This is an unexplainable feeling you acquire spontaneously on the basis of previous experience that prompts you towards a proper solution.

So, let us break down the first stage of the art of diplomacy – picture, forecast and course of action. Those able to analyze, predict and make conclusions through learning or self-perfection form the golden fund both of their state and mankind. One should advance proceeding not just from the past experiences that have been profoundly analyzed, but also from the flight of the human thought and inspiration. I have presented some of these ideas in my book The Negotiating Craft, Russia’s first textbook on the subject. Actually, I have never seen anything like that abroad as well.

A lot of creativity is hidden in linguistics.

Just have a look at the 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242 on the Middle East settlement that provides for the return of the “occupied territories” by Israel. Arab and many other states believe that the wording suggests the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied territories. However, Israel refers to the English text where the words “occupied territories” are not preceded by the definite article, insisting that the Resolution dose not cover all territories. Anyway, the Resolution forms the basis for the Middle East settlement talks until now.

A question from the audience: “Could you name your most impressive and most enriching negotiations?

Mr. Dubinin: Among other things, it was the preparation of the Helsinki Final Act, in fact the peace treaty finalizing the outcomes of World War II and the post-war developments in Europe. Its significance is momentous, as the accords have liberated Europe from the millennium-long plight of the border wars.

As it chanced, I chaired the final preparation session for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to approve the document draft. The decision was wanted by leaders of 35 states, most badly by those of the Soviet Union. But 500 diplomats in Geneva kept arguing about the wordings with no consensus in the offing. There also was a months-long dispute between Turkey and Cyprus. Some time before, Turkey deployed its troops in Cyprus to have the second Turkish state proclaimed. The new entity was not recognized by anyone else but Ankara insisted that Cyprus be divided into Greek and Turkish territories and the Cypriot president could represent the entire Cyprus. The situation escalated to the point for the Turks to state that they would not approve the Final Act if the president of Cyprus would be allowed to come to Helsinki. Cyprus and other countries objected.

There seemed to be no way out. Bickering went on for weeks and months. Different solutions were suggested but all of them were biased. Diplomatic battles continued round the clock. One night I was chairing a session on the issue. Where is the solution? The chairman’s maneuver is limited. Should he take a side, he would be removed. At the same time, the chairman is everyone’s hope – what if he suggests something suitable everyone? After two o’clock at night, all participants were breathless and watching the chairman. And I know that in Moscow Leonid Brezhnev is waiting for the signal to go to Helsinki for his starlit hour. But I have no insights for a solution.

So I blurt out: “You all have heard what has been said”, a seemingly simple phrase that at the same time constitutes the stating part of a resolution or a decision. I surveyed the audience – nobody was protesting. And what could they actually say? They were not deaf, weren’t they? So I say in French “Passer à l’ordre du jour”, i.e. “Shall we proceed to the agenda.” The phrase also carries a legal meaning, which means that the previous matter has been exhaustively discussed and closed. The meeting is taking up the next issue on the agenda, while previous one is just removed. While translation into five languages was going on, I was watching for either the Turk or the Cypriot raise their hand and voice disagreement. But nothing happened to indicate an overall agreement.

The question was settled to open the way to Helsinki!

I asked for draft Final Act that was brought with all amendments. I asked: “Are there any objections against the draft Final Act text and its transfer to Helsinki to be signed by heads of states and governments?” Everyone agreed, all thanks to intuition.

The next morning we were discussing breaking the news within our delegation. An influential official said loudly that I could have found a better solution for Cyprus, a Soviet ally. It was an open challenge. Such things do occur in the diplomatic circles – diplomats are also human. So I replied: “OK, the Cyprus delegation head is your best friend. Call him to the Embassy. I am chairing until midnight. Please ask the Cypriot what could be improved in the solution I have drawn. And I will call the Turk to resume the session.”

Boyishness, you may say. About that, but a test for intuition at the same time.

My offender called in the Cypriot and they had a lengthy tête-à-tête. Then the entire Soviet delegation gathered and he conveyed to me that Cyprus wanted no improved solution, which means the sixth sense had not failed me.

Have a good day, and I do wish you every success!

Rate this article
(votes: 1, rating: 5)
 (1 vote)
Share this article

Poll conducted

  1. In your opinion, what are the US long-term goals for Russia?
    U.S. wants to establish partnership relations with Russia on condition that it meets the U.S. requirements  
     33 (31%)
    U.S. wants to deter Russia’s military and political activity  
     30 (28%)
    U.S. wants to dissolve Russia  
     24 (22%)
    U.S. wants to establish alliance relations with Russia under the US conditions to rival China  
     21 (19%)
For business
For researchers
For students