Navigating Multiple Hotspots: Russia and the Middle East

The Middle East has historically been of great importance to Russia due to its geographic location. Moscow seeks to build constructive and pragmatic relations with the countries of the region.

Russia’s approach emphasises pragmatic cooperation with those who hold power rather than focusing on historical conflicts or affiliations. At the same time, prioritising state authority does not prevent Russia from maintaining contact with non-state and semi-state armed actors. The country has played a mediating role in the Middle East in several instances. For example, Russia has acted as a mediator in the inter-Palestinian dialogue. In 2023, relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria were restored with Russia’s involvement. Moscow also facilitated Syrian-Turkish contact between 2022–2024. Russia’s diplomatic toolkit keeps adapting to the changes in regional configurations.

One factor strengthening Russia’s position in the Middle East is the desire of regional players to diversify their external relations. Russia is a popular ally as it is an independent actor and a significant political variable. Its veto power in the UN Security Council is also a key consideration for regional actors.

In 2026, following the escalation of the conflict, Russia’s ability to maintain a balance between Iran and Arab states faced growing constraints. Moscow sought to prevent further escalation and avoid a deeper regional power imbalance. These constraints were particularly visible in the UN Security Council, where Russia combined diplomatic support for Iran with efforts to preserve working relations with Arab states, leading to differentiated positions on various draft resolutions. At the same time, Russia used its veto power in one case it considered potentially destabilising, blocking a resolution on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which it viewed as potentially enabling further escalation under ambiguous legal terms.

Overall, Russia is pursuing a complex strategy in the Middle East. It seeks to navigate multiple hotspots by balancing its relations with different actors, while limiting the level of its engagement and prioritising the efficient use of resources. Moscow does not aim to replace the United States politically, but it remains an attractive partner for countries in the region seeking to diversify their foreign policy ties.

The Middle East has historically been of great importance to Russia due to its geographic location. Moscow seeks to build constructive and pragmatic relations with the countries of the region.

Political Dimension

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia aimed to pursue a balanced policy in the Middle East. Moscow developed relations with Arab states and key regional actors such as Türkiye, Iran, and Israel, maintaining this balance for a relatively long period. In recent years, however, amidst the growing escalation across the Middle East, it is becoming increasingly difficult for all external actors, including Russia, to sustain this balance. In addition, Russia’s Middle East policy is often reactive rather than proactive, partly due to the concentration of resources on other priorities.

Extra-Regional Actors in the Middle East. RIAC Report

Russia’s approach emphasises pragmatic cooperation with those who hold power rather than focusing on historical conflicts or affiliations. At the same time, prioritising state authority does not prevent Russia from maintaining contact with non-state and semi-state armed actors. The country has played a mediating role in the Middle East in several instances. For example, Russia has acted as a mediator in the inter-Palestinian dialogue. In 2023, relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria were restored with Russia’s involvement. Moscow also facilitated Syrian-Turkish contact between 2022–2024. Russia’s diplomatic toolkit keeps adapting to the changes in regional configurations.

Yet, the multilateral formats promoted by Russia, such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), are perceived in the Middle East only as additional engagement platforms (with Iran being an exception). Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and the UAE participate in the SCO as partners, while Iran is a full member of the organisation. Iran, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates are BRICS members, while Saudi Arabia remains in a suspended or undecided status. Among multilateral mechanisms, however, of note is the ministerial-level Russia-GCC Strategic Dialogue.

One factor strengthening Russia’s position in the Middle East is the desire of regional players to diversify their external relations. [1] Russia is a popular ally as it is an independent actor and a significant political variable. Its veto power in the UN Security Council is also a key consideration for regional actors.

Military and Security Dimension

Russia seeks to maintain its military presence in the Middle East, primarily in Syria. These military facilities are Russia’s only outside former Soviet space, and that gives them particular strategic significance, despite ongoing debates about their economic costs. [2] Combating terrorism, which remains one of Russia’s core priorities in the region, is closely connected with Russia’s military presence, including the maintenance of bases, the potential patrolling of southern Syria, [a] and the conduct of joint military exercises with individual Middle Eastern states. Russia has also conducted naval exercises in the Mediterranean with Egypt, as well as joint drills with China and Iran, with exercises extending into the Gulf area. Broadly, then, Russia’s military presence is considered a contributing military-political factor in the Middle East, as well as an element of securing maritime supply routes in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Military-technical cooperation has traditionally played an important role in Russia’s relations with the Middle East, although this area faces substantial constraints due to sanctions. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russian arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) declined by 83 percent in 2020–2024 compared to 2015–2019, against the backdrop of an overall decline in arms imports to the MENA region during the same period. [3]

Amid increasing regional turbulence, Russia’s involvement in regional politics can be characterised as a strategy of navigating key hotspots across the Middle East. A trigger for the instability in the region was Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, and subsequent developments, including the effective suspension of the Arab-Israeli normalisation process, especially within the framework of the Abraham Accords. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Moscow attempted to maintain a balanced position, criticising certain acts of violence by both Israel and Hamas, and calling for dialogue and peaceful settlement. At the same time, not all regional actors consider that Russia fully preserved neutrality, primarily due to Moscow’s meetings with Hamas representatives. [4]

Ivan Timofeev:
Russia Completes the Diplomatic Puzzle

The escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war in the Gaza Strip have led to a transformation of the security balance in the Red Sea. Importantly, Russia is less dependent on maritime shipping through the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and is therefore less directly exposed to the instability caused by the activity of Yemen’s Houthi movement Ansar Allah. This may explain Moscow’s relatively limited involvement in the Yemeni issue.

Among the specific regional crises that Russia has been involved in to varying degrees, two cases stand out: Syria and the Iran-Israel confrontation. Russia supported the government of Bashar al-Assad for several years, primarily providing political and military assistance. Russian military bases in Syria were used, among other things, to launch attacks against opposition forces. At the same time, a complex configuration of interests emerged around Syria, including some sort of competition for influence between Russia and Iran, as well as substantial divergences in Russia’s and Türkiye’s approaches.

The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 has fundamentally altered the situation. Iran had previously played a key role in Syria but its presence has significantly diminished after the change of power. At the same time, the influence of Türkiye and Qatar has increased. Russia’s position in Syria is not entirely lost, and the Russian military bases in Syria remain preserved. States in the region, including Arab countries and Israel, have an interest in maintaining Russia’s military presence in Syria to balance Turkish influence. Politically, Russia has moved towards legitimising the new Syrian leadership. Moscow has entered into dialogue with Syria’s new president Ahmed al-Sharaa and has demonstrated its willingness to establish working relations with him. [5]

In terms of the confrontation between the United States and Israel on the one hand and Iran on the other, Moscow and Tehran signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in January 2025. " [6] This was just some months before the confrontation escalated into direct military conflict. Unlike the treaty with the DPRK that contained a clause obliging the parties to provide military assistance to each other in the event of an attack, however, Russia’s agreement with Iran did not include such a provision. It only stipulated that the parties would refrain from assisting each other’s adversaries. Consequently, Russia did not provide military assistance to Iran during the 12-day, nor did it do so in 2026 after the outbreak of renewed hostilities involving the United States and Israel against Iran, as well as Iranian strikes against several Arab states.

In 2026, following the escalation of the conflict, Russia’s ability to maintain a balance between Iran and Arab states faced growing constraints. Moscow sought to prevent further escalation and avoid a deeper regional power imbalance. These constraints were particularly visible in the UN Security Council, where Russia combined diplomatic support for Iran with efforts to preserve working relations with Arab states, leading to differentiated positions on various draft resolutions. At the same time, Russia used its veto power in one case it considered potentially destabilising, blocking a resolution on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which it viewed as potentially enabling further escalation under ambiguous legal terms.

Economic Dimension

Russia has generally prioritised large, long-term contracts in the Middle East, over a diversified approach involving extensive private-sector participation and a wide range of goods. Its largest trade volumes are with Türkiye (US$49.1 billion [7]), the UAE (US$12 billion [8]), and Egypt (US$10.5 billion [9]). Tourism is also highly significant as Middle Eastern countries have traditionally been among the most popular destinations for Russian travellers. Investment cooperation is particularly dynamic with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

Ivan Timofeev:
Doctrines of Progress: Trump, Xi, Putin, Modi

Economic cooperation with the Middle East is of particular importance for Russia, especially in the context of sanctions and the reduction of economic ties with the European Union and the United States following 24 February 2022. The sanctions imposed on Russia have had other fallouts: many countries limit their cooperation with Moscow in various areas due to the fear of secondary sanctions, a phenomenon known as overcompliance. Cooperation with certain states in the Middle East is sometimes used to circumvent these restrictions.

Agricultural cooperation, primarily in grain supplies, forms a core aspect of this cooperation. Russia is one of the largest grain suppliers, particularly of wheat, for several Middle Eastern countries. Egypt, Türkiye, and Iran are among the largest importers of Russian grain, [10] while wheat importers include Türkiye, Egypt, Syria, and Oman. [11] Thus, Russia plays a key role in ensuring food security in the region.

Russia also continues to cooperate with several Middle Eastern countries in the energy sector, including oil and gas. Russian companies operate in several Middle Eastern countries, participating in the development of oil fields. Coordination with Saudi Arabia and other Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members within the OPEC+ framework is significant for Russia and the region. In nuclear energy, Russia is implementing large-scale projects to build power plants in Türkiye (Akkuyu), Egypt (El-Dabaa), and Iran (Bushehr).

Conclusion

Overall, Russia is pursuing a complex strategy in the Middle East. It seeks to navigate multiple hotspots by balancing its relations with different actors, while limiting the level of its engagement and prioritising the efficient use of resources. Moscow does not aim to replace the United States politically, but it remains an attractive partner for countries in the region seeking to diversify their foreign policy ties.

First published in the Observer Research Foundation Special Report “Russia’s Engagement with the Global South: From Concept to Practice”.

Endnotes

aThis would entail a return to the format of patrols conducted by the Russian military police, as practiced under the Bashar al-Assad regime. As an auxiliary force, their functions included guarding military facilities and ensuring the safe and rapid movement of military convoys.

1. Alexander Aksenenok, “Russia’s Main Middle East Policy Priorities,” in Extra-Regional Actors in the Middle East, ed. Svetlana Gavrilova et al. (Moscow: NPMP RIAC, 2025), 16.

2. Russian International Affairs Council, “Extra-Regional Actors in the Middle East” [video], YouTube, https://youtu.be/F-ogxf9F8rw.

3. Zain Hussain and Alaa Tartir, “Recent trends in international arms transfers in the Middle East and North Africa,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 10, 2025, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2025/recent-trends-international-arms-transfer....

4. “«Я очень верю в открытый и прямой диалог» [‘I strongly believe in an open and direct dialogue’],” Kommersant, February 4, 2025, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6492853.

5. “Russia-Syria talks,” The Kremlin, Moscow, October 15, 2025, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78213.

6. President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, https://president.ir/en/156874.

7. “Foreign Trade Statistics, December 2025,” Turkish Statistical Institute, January 30, 2026, https://veriportali.tuik.gov.tr/en/press/53911.

8. “Товарооборот России и ОАЭ превысил 12 млрд долларов [Trade turnover between Russia and the United Arab Emirates exceeded $12 billion.],” Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, January 29, 2026, https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/news/tovarooborot_rossii_i_oae_prevysil_12_mlrd_dollarov.html.

9. “Российский посол рассказал о рекордном товарообороте с Египтом [The Russian ambassador spoke about record trade turnover with Egypt],” RIA Novosti, February 9, 2026, https://ria.ru/20260209/egipet-2073132857.html.

10. “Russian Union of Grain Exporters and Producers Chairman Dmitry Sergeyev: Market conditions for grain exporters extremely tense now,” Interfax, June 6, 2025, https://interfax.com/newsroom/exclusive-interviews/111916/.

11. Vivian Iroanya, “Platts Milling Wheat Marker rises on steady demand and negative margins,” S&P Global, November 4, 2025, https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/agriculture/110425-platts-milling-wheat....