“Money in the Morning — Chairs In The Evening” or “Eastern Partnership” before the Riga Summit
5th anniversary of the Eastern Partnership at
the Prague Castle in Prague April 24, 2014
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Doctor of Economics, Professor of Foreign Relations Department at St. Petersburg State University, RIAC Expert
The purpose of the EU Eastern Partnership project has never been and could not be to raise the living standards in the participant countries, just as the task was never set of preparing for joining the EU. The important task that was set was to draw as many as possible of the countries facing an integration vector choice into an endless race for criteria of compliance with various European standards.
Let us recall Ilf and Petrov’s immortal novel “The Twelve Chairs”, in which the Marxist formula “goods-money-goods” was set out by the authors from Odessa in the local version: “money in the morning – chairs in the evening”. In relation to the history of the “Eastern partnership”, we understand the term “chairs” as meaning political and economic reforms, while the interpretation of “money” remains unchanged.
Since its inception, the Eastern Partnership has undergone a serious struggle between Kiev, Kishinev and Tbilisi, claiming money, and the EU, wishing first for structural and political reforms, i.e., “chairs”. And only then, from the historical perspective to give the money.
Understanding of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership initiative is impossible without recalling when and in what capacity this project arose. The EP initiative appeared and materialised at the peak of the global and European economic crisis as a political project called on to demonstrate the universal nature of European values and the effectiveness of the EU political organisation. In states of the post-Soviet period, in principle prepared to accept the initiative with all its political and ideological conditions, there was greater interest in the amount of economic aid, which was, not without reason, considered as the main condition. That is how the key reason for the ineffectiveness of the Eastern Partnership took shape.
Since its inception, the Eastern Partnership has undergone a serious struggle between Kiev, Kishinev and Tbilisi, claiming money, and the EU, wishing first for structural and political reforms, i.e., “chairs”.
Against the background of the all-embracing crisis of the European economy, financial and structural problems, degradation of multiculturalism, alarming demographic and migrations trends, a new, breakthrough project was needed with a relatively small budget and a powerful propaganda effect. It was precisely as a mechanism for implementing the EU political and ideological values that the Eastern Partnership arose. Economic aspects were of limited importance or even of no importance at all. The text of the Declaration of Prague states that the participants in the Prague Summit agreed that the Eastern Partnership programme would be based on obligations with respect to fundamental values, including democracy, supremacy of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the principles of international law, the market economy and stable development. Even so, adherence to market economy principles is not tantamount to financing market reforms at Europe’s expense.
Since 2014, the European instrument of neighbourhood and partnership has been replaced by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the main source of financing for the countries of the Eastern Partnership, it having been stressed once more that the ENI would meet political needs, ensure more differentiation and more flexibility, combined with stricter selection criteria, but also a set of advantages for the best performers. The difficulty of choosing the best performer is obvious.
In this context, the question arises as to whether the problem might not lie in the current difficulties suffered by the post-Soviet economies but in the Eastern Partnership project itself. To what extent did the programme’s ideologists understand the problems that already existed? Were there any experts and scholars who pointed out the objective difficulties arising from eastern direction of European integration? Of course there were. Let us give just one example. Ms K. Pelchinska-Nalec, back before the start of her diplomatic career that raised her to the high position of Polish Ambassador to Russia, noted: “One of the key problems …. Is the discrepancy between the declared principle of partnership and the existing practice of asymmetry in the relations between the EU and its neighbours… In its striving to disseminate its own values, standards and rules, the EU has not yet managed to avoid recognition of the fact that its relations with the countries under this policy are asymmetrical..” [1]. This was written in 2005, straight after Poland joined the EU and long before the idea of the Eastern Partnership materialised.
Of the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004, only Poland demonstrates successful economic transformations and virtually painless transition through the 2008-2009 economic crisis.
Nowadays, one should speak about the consensual Russian evaluation of the project and practice of the Eastern Partnership: “<…> the programme (EP) was based on the European view of the quite successful experience of expanding European integration to the Mediterranean, as well as to the East European countries of the former socialist camp”. It is also indicative that the head of the non-governmental organisation Project on Transitional Democracies and former member of the US military intelligence Bruce Jackson give an equally harsh assessment, to the effect that they were too accustomed to such countries as Poland and Latvia, integration with which was successful virtually overnight, and exerted a tremendous pressure on such countries as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to transform themselves just as fast.
Perhaps it is worth determining whether the experience of Poland and the Baltic states was really successful in economic terms. Politicians and economists in the Baltic countries, while not actually deliberately distorting the facts, do make very selective use of them. Juris Poikans, ambassador at large for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Latvia, wrote in an article supporting the Eastern Partnership that, from the time these three countries jointed the EU in 2004, they had experienced unprecedented economic growth, which amounted to 12% per annum up to 2008 [3]. Yes, the growth rates in the Baltic states were higher than in the EU on average. Yes, the GDP growth indicator of 12% was achieved by one Baltic state during one budget year. But the fall in Latvia’s GDP in 2009 was 18%. What kind of growth of 10-11% would end by 18% fall? Of the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004, only Poland demonstrates successful economic transformations and virtually painless transition through the 2008-2009 economic crisis. This is too little for the thirteen countries of the last three EU expansions. It should be noted that, for all the questions regarding the professional competence of the governments of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, they can find a corresponding line on the Eurostats site. However, some of them apparently cannot: “We have always believed that Moldova, with its history and potential, could become the next success story in Europe, following in the footsteps of the Baltic countries; we must be confident and decisive. The successes of these countries after shrugging off Communism and joining the EU are an example for us”.
Subsidies for road building, say, in Portugal, or measures to support agriculture in southern Italy continue to be financed at the same level, no-one will remember the Eastern Partnership in Europe.
It is interesting that, in the Baltic states, to whose successes the Moldovan minister refers, skepticism regarding the partnership is growing. “The next Summit of the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme countries will take place in Riga ... Europe has learned bitter geopolitical lessons and its ambitions there will be less”. In the opinion of eminent Latvian politician Janis Urbanovic: “If nothing is done and things go on as they are in Vilnius, in May 2015 in Riga the current EU Eastern Partnership program will simply cease to exist”. This last assertion is still too categorical. For the inhabitants of most EU countries and the key middle link of Eurocrats, the Eastern Partnership is no more than one expenditure line of the European budget. As long as subsidies for road building, say, in Portugal, or measures to support agriculture in southern Italy continue to be financed at the same level, no-one will remember the Eastern Partnership in Europe.
Let us return to the key question in today’s heading. The purpose of the EU Eastern Partnership project has never been and could not be to raise the living standards in the participant countries, just as the task was never set of preparing for joining the EU. The important task that was set was to draw as many as possible of the countries facing an integration vector choice into an endless race for criteria of compliance with various European standards.
For Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, the main priority in the Eastern Partnership has been and will continue to be the economy, a desire to resolve their own systemic economic problems with the help of the EU. It cannot be said that the political elite of Ukraine or Moldova failed to understand the essence of the given fundamental disagreement over the priorities and benchmarks of the Eastern Partnership. First Yanukovich and then his successor entered into positional bargaining in an attempt to gain maximum assistance for minimum obligations. Lacking sufficient economic capabilities for really supporting Ukraine, the European Union put P. Poroshenko in essentially the same position as V. Yanukovich, plus the war and impending default, minus territorial integrity and political predictability.
1. Pelczynska-Nalecz K. The ENP in practice – the European Union’s policy towards Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova one year after the publication of the Strategy Paper. – Warszawa, czerwiec 2005. – P.45-46.
2. Ponomoreva E., Shishelina L. Latvia’s EU-2015 presidency: the Eastern Partnership instead of or together with Russia / Analytical report (ed. Gaman-Golutvina O.). Russian association of political science, Moscow, 2014. p. 4
3. Poikans Juris The European Union Eastern Partnership from Vilnius to Riga // per Concordiam. Journal of European Security and Defence Problems Vol. 4, No. 4 p.18
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