Print Читать на русском
Rate this article
(no votes)
 (0 votes)
Share this article
Artem Dankov

PhD in History, Director of the TSU Confucius Institute, Associate Professor, Department of World Politics, Faculty of Historical and Political Studies, Tomsk State University

We live in a rapidly urbanizing world, where city populations are growing in across the globe at an impressive rate. In 1950, 28.8 percent of the world’s population lived in cities, in 1975 – this figure was 37.2 percent and in 2000 – 45.0 percent, while more recently, in 2009, it exceeded 50 percent. This trend is also apparent in the post-Soviet space, chiefly in Central Asia. In 1959, city-dwellers accounted for 38.5 percent of the population, whereas in 2014 this figure had risen to 47.6 percent, with the population increasing from 8.9 to 32.1 million. According to UN forecasts, by 2050 the region is to become home to 82 million people, with 45 million or 55 percent residing in cities. The fastest increase takes place in major cities, which are gradually becoming into megalopolises, and this gives rise to a range of political challenges for Central Asian states.

We live in a rapidly urbanizing world, where city populations are growing in across the globe at an impressive rate. In 1950, 28.8 percent of the world’s population lived in cities, in 1975 – this figure was 37.2 percent and in 2000 – 45.0 percent, while more recently, in 2009, it exceeded 50 percent. This trend is also apparent in the post-Soviet space, chiefly in Central Asia. In 1959, city-dwellers accounted for 38.5 percent of the population, whereas in 2014 this figure had risen to 47.6 percent, with the population increasing from 8.9 to 32.1 million. According to UN forecasts, by 2050 the region is to become home to 82 million people, with 45 million or 55 percent residing in cities (See Fig. 1). The fastest increase takes place in major cities, which are gradually becoming into megalopolises, and this gives rise to a range of political challenges for Central Asian states.

Figure 1.Urban and rural population dynamics in Central Asia (1959–2050), million

Sources: Calculated by 1959 and 1989 USSR censuses, current data and UN forecasting (UN World Population Prospects 2012)

Urbanization processes in Central Asia are extremely unbalanced, with some areas boasting lots of city residents and others still dominated by rural communities. As has been noted, the population is growing fastest in major cities, which attract a high number of Central Asians. According to official data, in 2014 the region’s seven largest cities (See Table 1) boasted over eight million residents, or 12 percent of the total [1]. Over the past 25 years, these cities’ populations have increased by 1.5-2-fold, with Astana being the absolute leader as the number of its inhabitants has tripled. The two largest Central Asian cities are Tashkent and Almaty, ranking fourth and seventh, respectively, in the former USSR. Tashkent is more populated than Paris, and Almaty has more residents than Brussels and Milan.

Table 1. Population of largest cities in Central Asia (1989-2030), million

City 1989 1999 2009 2014 2030 (forecast)
Tashkent 2,07 2,14* 2,21* 2,35* 3,00
Almaty 1,07 1,13 1,36 1,54* 2,20
Astana 0,28 0,32 0,61 0,81* 1,40
Shymkent 0,39 0,44 0,62 0,85* 1,50
Bishkek 0,62 0,76 0,84 0,92* 1,20
Dushanbe 0,59 0,58** 0,73** 0,78* 1,00
Ashgabat 0,40 0,60*** 0,85* 0,95* 1,30

* current statistics

** 2000 and 2010 data respectively

*** 1995 data

Source: USSR-wide census of 1989, national censuses of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, as well as current statistics. The forecast is based on average growth rates of populations in Central Asian cities 2009-2014.

Central Asia’s major cities will continue to expand in the medium term. By 2030, cities that today have populations of over seven million are expected to have populations officially totaling 12 million, i.e. over 15 percent of the regional population, and almost 25 million combined with settlements around these new megalopolises. In fact, in 15 years’ time every third Central Asian resident will live in large agglomerations around the million-plus cities. (See Fig.2).

Figure 2. Population of largest Central Asian cities in 1989-2030, million.

In fact, the urbanization and formation of megalopolises is a new phenomenon for Central Asia. According to the 1989 USSR census, by 1991 the share or urban residents in Central Asia fluctuated from 33 percent in Tajikistan to 57 percent in Kazakhstan, well below the USSR average of 66 percent. The region had only two million-plus cities, i.e. Tashkent, the largest regional city, and Almaty, where the population only passed the one million mark in 1981. Most people living in towns, were largely of European origin by the late 1980s and resided in small and medium-size towns.

Megalopolises Pose Tough Political Challenges: Changing Ethnic Balance in Central Asia

By the end of the Soviet period, all cities in Central Asia that have a population of over 350,000 were multiethnic, none were dominated by a titular ethnicity [2]. During the two decades of independence, their ethnic composition has drastically changed. On the one hand, de-Europeanization followed the massive outflow of non-Asians, while on the other, the titular ethnic groups gained ground through migration from the countryside. For example, over the period 1989-2014, the share of Uzbeks in Tashkent rose from 44 to 65 percent, while that of Russians dropped from 34 to 18 percent. Over the same period, the proportion of Kazakhs in Almaty grew from 24 to 56 percent, and that of Russians contracted from 57 to 30 percent [3]. Some large cities became almost mono-ethnic, with Tajiks accounting for 89 percent of Dushanbe’s population in 2014, although in 1989 they accounted for just 39 percent of the total. This process engenders several problems.

In Central Asia, where politics is highly dependent on ethnic, religious and clan solidarity, the numbers of people from a certain nationality or region to a great extent determines the configuration of the political system.

The Fate of Ethnic Minorities. Despite a larger presence of titular ethnic groups, problems involving ethnic minorities remain.

For a long time, national minorities including non-Asians, Koreans and others played a key role in the Central Asian republics, not only did they help shape the urban middle classes, they played key roles in industry, transport, municipal infrastructure and the social sector. In the post-Soviet period, many have set up small and medium-size businesses and have thus come to form the backbone of the business community. Minorities boast fairly high education levels and living standards, but an issue arises due to broader changes in ethnic balance within the population.

On the one hand, the continuing contraction of ethnic groups in large cities hampers their sustainable development, as they have historically boasted varying competencies that have proved vital for the industrial, transportation, energy and municipal sectors. Many are employed in the education system, replenishing the professional workforce, or own businesses and create jobs.

On the other hand, these megalopolises face a massive influx of rural migrants who mostly represent titular ethnicities. Regrettably, many are poorly educated and lack the qualifications they would need to get a decent job and settle into city life. Hence, they tend to gather in suburban favelas, are underpaid and have a low quality of life, resulting in the accumulation of social and interethnic tensions fraught with the risk of social unrest. Under this scenario, well-off minorities may fall victim to the wrath of those rebelling under slogans of national, ethnic, and social justice.

They may be tempted to try to exploit regional identity and mobilize political supporters for rallies and marches or even unrest and military clashes, as was the case in 1992 in Dushanbe, which escalated into civil war.

Relations Between Regional Indigenous Peoples. All Central Asian countries, except for Kazakhstan with its three expanding big cities, suffer from the lack of alternative centers of growth. Hence, they are seeing only one megalopolis develop, in the capital, which attracts migrants from other parts of the country. In Central Asia, where politics is highly dependent on ethnic, religious and clan solidarity, the numbers of people from a certain nationality or region to a great extent determines the configuration of the political system.

As a result, an issue is emerging. Although Central Asian countries are each largely ruled by a single dominant regional political clan e.g. Turkmenistan is dominated by the Akhal velayat, and Tajikistan – by the Khatlon Region. The capital-megalopolises give a home to people from various territories, including those whose clans are not happy about the distribution of powers. Therefore, they may well be tempted to try to exploit regional identity and mobilize political supporters for rallies and marches or even unrest and military clashes, as was the case in 1992 in Dushanbe, which escalated into civil war.

Big Cities’ Oversized Economic and Political Significance

Mean that capitals have an excessive importance for their countries.

Managing a major city is a complicated and risky process, and the emergence of Central Asian megalopolises poses a tough challenge to regional stability, chiefly due to their excessive political and economic clout.

First, big cities are centers of economic activity, their share in national GDPs reaches 20-30 percent. This relates in particular to Bishkek, which generates 39 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP, with the figure expected to rise in the period 2014-2016. Second, specific features characteristic of those political environments (rigidly centralized decision-making systems, etc.) mean that capitals have an excessive importance for their countries. In the post-Soviet era, no Central Asian country has seen regime change through peripheral conflicts. The partly-Islamist revolt in Andijon, Uzbekistan in May 2005 was crushed swiftly and ruthlessly, although the uprising was definitely the most powerful in the former USSR and the rebels enjoyed massive support among the local population. The December 2011 riot in Mangystaut Region, Kazakhstan’s largest oil producing territory, was quashed with similar alacrity. And on the contrary, imposed control over the capital served as a major factor in the political victory and establishment of a new regime, during the civil war in Tajikistan and Kyrgyz revolutions of 2005 and 2010.

These big cities’ problem is defined by their role in Central Asia’s socio-economic and political life. Its leaders allocate sizeable resources to maintain urban stability because complications invariably threaten the state’s broader steady political and economic development. As a result, other regions receive less attention, with their problems going unsolved for decades. This prompts more people to rush to megalopolises, further aggravating their environment and ultimately forming a vicious circle.

Favelization of Suburbs

The favelization of the suburbs has recently become the predominant threat to the sustainable development of major cities.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the region for a long time lacked balanced urban development policies. The various administrations plunged headlong into the illegitimate sale or distribution of huge plots of land for private house-building. As a result, in the 1980s, Central Asia became home to the spontaneous construction of settlements and country-house complexes, as well as uncontrolled development of farming lands adjacent to large cities. This unplanned construction spree failed to provide for social infrastructure, and often buildings even remained unconnected to basic utilities. New residential communities were inhabited by people hailing from rural areas, who for some reason could not stay in the cities. For two decades most major cities were surrounded by massive newly built housing developments, which continue to expand. There is the notorious Adobe Belt of residential communities around Bishkek, where almost one third of the city’s population lives. In fact, these people were especially active in both Kyrgyz revolutions and accompanying looting, further proof that favelization begets a host of social and political problems.

The Stigma of Life in the Favelas. These suburban settlements are known for having a very poor quality of life, high levels of poverty, a skyrocketing crime rate, the absence of elementary utilities (potable water, electricity and gas), and highly limited access to social services like education and healthcare. This is a beehive for rural migrants, poorly educated and unskilled, who cannot find a decent job and settle in the megalopolis. Many become stuck there for years with the dubious status of neither rural nor urban, they marry and transmit this intermediate culture to the younger generation that is growing up poor, uneducated and often without values. The emerging adolescent community shows higher incidences of unmotivated aggression, as was the case at the concert of singer Kairat Nurtas in Almaty in August 2013.

Social Protest. The rising urban population requires megalopolises to expand, and that in turn requires proper city planning. But the construction of new residential neighborhoods, civic centers and transportation infrastructure, i.e. roads, bridges, etc., is hampered by the suburbs. Most are illegitimate, with land and property undocumented. But then comes the problem of moving the residents, as was seen in their clashes with the police in Almaty suburbs of Bakai and Shanyrak-1 in 2006 and Duman-2 in 2011.

Crime and Terrorism. The impoverished suburbs serve as ideal recruiting sites used for organized crime and terrorist groups. This is an environment where shelter is easily found, where persecution is unlikely because the territories are highly criminalized and dog does not eat dog. Criminal groups are merging with international terrorist cells that resort to extortion, robbery and drug trafficking to obtain funds for their attacks. Numerous villages, settlements and country-house complexes around large cities are in fact the marginalized and criminalized favelas of the 21st century, which often serve as a refuge for extremists and terrorists, and they seem to be set to grow into a potent tool for political struggle in Central Asian countries. Recently the region has seen considerable uptick in Islamic State activity, and special operations took place both in the city center and the suburbs.

In the 10-15 years to come, Central Asia’s large cities are expected to keep growing, chiefly because the population is expanding. Besides, rural territories are overpopulated, with per capita fertile lands at their virtual minimum and farmers forced to resettle. The third reason lies in the attractiveness of large cities by economic activity and jobs. As a result, hundreds of thousands of rural residents head to large regional centers, primarily to the already-stretched capitals. In the near future, infrastructure development will remain a burning issue because two thirds of the city infrastructure, except for Astana, was built in the Soviet period.

On the whole, it is governments’ ability to effectively manage their cities’ sustainable development that holds the key to political stability across Central Asia, and unrest is sure to damage Russian interests in the region, in part by sparking an increased inflow of refugees.

1. Current statistics. Actual population with unregistered citizens and temporary labor migrants amounts to 12 million.

2. According to the 1989 census, the largest titular population was in Ashgabat where Turkmens accounted for 50 percent.

3. Results of the 1989 USSR-Wide Census for Tashkent. Part 1. Tashkent. 1990. P. 5. National Composition of Kazakhstan Republic and its Regions. Volume 1. Astana. 2011. P. 15.

Rate this article
(no votes)
 (0 votes)
Share this article

Poll conducted

  1. In your opinion, what are the US long-term goals for Russia?
    U.S. wants to establish partnership relations with Russia on condition that it meets the U.S. requirements  
     33 (31%)
    U.S. wants to deter Russia’s military and political activity  
     30 (28%)
    U.S. wants to dissolve Russia  
     24 (22%)
    U.S. wants to establish alliance relations with Russia under the US conditions to rival China  
     21 (19%)
For business
For researchers
For students